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‘So are the people of Bosnia some kind of anthropological experiment to 
you?’  
   -  Question asked to ICTY Spokesperson by unidentified Bosnian woman 
‘Once more, completeness of the law is proved to be an idle dream’ 
    -   Maarten Bos A Methodology of International Law (1984) 300. 
 
 
Henry Abraham describes the nature and attendant problems relating to 
judicial legislating as an ‘endemic can of worms’.1 These problems include 
questions relating to the relationship between law and morality, law and 
politics, where law derives its authority and legitimacy from and the role of 
judges. The traditional positivist view is that judges should declare the law 
and not make the law. This view is embodied in the principle iudicis est ius 
dicere sed non dare. Judges should be passive agents through which the law 
speaks. According to Blackstone the role of the judiciary is that of  ‘living 
oracles’ of the law.2  That this view, represented by philosophers such as 
Blackstone and Montesquieu,3 is pervasive enough to be taken seriously is 
proved by the fact that judges and academics are quick to criticise it in 
strong terms. Legal literature yields a wealth of examples of judges 
reminding us that they are only human and that applying the law is not a 
mechanical, mathematical exercise. There are those who describe the notion 
that a judge should not make law as a model of straw or as fantastic as a 
fairy tale.4  But many who reject this notion insist that the lawmaking 
function of judges is at most ‘interstitial’5 and not ‘dynamic’.6 
                                                   
1 H J Abraham The Judicial Process (1998) 430.  
2 Blackstone also describes judges as the ‘depositaries of the law’.  See W Blackstone The 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 1 (1876) 47. 
3 See Montesquieu The Spirit of the Law Vol 1 (1949) 152, quoted by M Shahabuddeen 
Precedent in the World Court (2001) 234.  
4 In the words of Lord Reid: ‘Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in 
some Alladin’s cave there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour and that on a 
judge’s appointment there descends on him knowledge of the magic words ‘Open Sesame’. 
Bad decisions are given when the judge has muddled the password and the wrong door 
opens. But we do not believe in fairy tales anymore.’ Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker 
(1972) 12 JSPTL 22. See also the statement by Van der Heever JA in Sachs v Donges NO 1950 
(2) SA 265 (A) 312.  
5 Holmes wrote: ‘I recognise without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they 
can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.’ See 
Holmes J in Southern Pacific Co v Jensen 244 US 205, 221 (1916). 
6 P Devlin The Judge (1979) 9 ff. 
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Lawmaking in the context of international criminal law and at the ad hoc 
Tribunals, the subject of this thesis, comes with its own special set of 
problems. It could be argued that because of the severity of the sanctions 
imposed by traditional criminal law, which includes the possibility of 
depriving people of their most fundamental freedoms, judges have to be 
especially careful when making international criminal law. Lawmaking in this 
field could lead to infringement upon the fundamental principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege. International criminal lawyers also have the difficult task of 
harmonising the approaches of international lawyers and criminal lawyers, 
and of civil lawyers and common law lawyers. There are the special 
concerns pertaining to ad hoc Tribunals such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the ‘Tribunal’ or ICTY)7 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)8 regarding the 
impartiality and independence of an international judicial body established 
for the purpose of trying the alleged perpetrators of particularly serious 
crimes.9 It is because of the potential risks of injustice and abuse that 
judges, taking into accout their greater responsibility in this regard, be 
especially careful when making international criminal law.   
 
Much has been made of the establishment of the ICTY as the first war 
crimes tribunal to be established since Nuremberg. The symbolic and 
historical value of the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals cannot be 
overestimated. Alvarez has described the Tadic judgment as ‘political’, ‘epic’ 
and ‘foundational’.10 In early academic and journalistic commentary the 
Tribunals were often described as sui generis and Tribunal judges have often 
appealed to the new, rudimentary nature of the Tribunals to justify unusual 
or controversial decisions or features of the ICTY and ICTR.11 The birth or 
                                                   
7The full denomination of the ICTY is the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, established by the Security Council 
through Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and functioning under a Statute originally 
published as an Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) S/25704, 3 May 1993. 
8 The full name of the ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide 
and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 
January and 31 December 1995. 
9 V Morris & M P Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia Vol 1   (1995) 38, 39. 
10 J Alvarez ‘Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic case’ (1996) 17 EJIL 1. 
11 See for example, Address of Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, 4 November 1997. 
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establishment of the Tribunal was accompanied by much fanfare and (at 
least initially) it could do no wrong. With time academic commentators have 
become more critical of the work of the judges. In light of the importance 
of the work done by the judges at the Tribunals and the influence of 
Tribunal jurisprudence on the jurisprudence of both national courts and 
new international courts and Tribunals, criticism is vital. The fact that the 
Tribunals can be described as self-contained systems with no supervisory 
body with the competence to review their decisions also calls for strict 
scrutiny and might militate against judicial lawmaking.12 
 
The lack of academic criticism of the work of the Tribunals could also be 
ascribed to the laudable purpose of the Tribunals: the prosecution of those 
who committed the most serious international crimes. How can one 
question or challenge the actions or decisions of judges tasked with the 
noble pursuit of prosecuting those accused of the most serious international 
crimes? The question of to what extent Tribunal judges have relied on the 
grave nature of the crimes in question as a justification for adventurous 
lawmaking will be addressed. The preamble of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Statute states that it is the task of the ICC to ‘prosecute 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of mankind’. The 
serious nature of international crimes was vividly described in the Eichmann 
case: 
Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international 
character, but their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and 
widespread as to shake the international community to its very foundations.13 
 
Some claim that international criminal courts have inherent bias against 
defendants. They express the concern that there is political pressure at the 
Tribunals to deliver guilty verdicts and that many cases are ‘prejudged’ for 
political reasons and because of the gravity of the offences concerned.14 It 
has even been argued that the Tribunals might have an institutional bias 
against defendants because their continued existence depends on ‘producing 
convictions’.15  Although pressure to convict might have existed in the early 
                                                   
12 In the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision the ICTY Appeals Chamber referred to the centralised 
structure of international law and stated that: ‘every tribunal is a self-contained system’. See 
Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-771-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 11. 
13Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, Israel Supreme Court (1968) 36 ILR 304. 
14 See the views of Martin Bell as discussed in J K Cogan ‘International Criminal Courts and 
Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 133. 
15 Ibid. Hammond makes the interesting point that the official name of the ICTY, ‘The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
11
 
years of the Tribunals’ existence both Tribunals have acquitted accused on 
the basis of lack of evidence.16 Pressure to convict tends to increase the 
lawmaking activities of the judges since the existence of such pressure 
makes it highly unlikely that judges will find a non liquet.17  
 
It is not the object of this thesis to establish whether judicial lawmaking 
should or should not be permitted. The object is rather to consider the 
peculiarities of international criminal law as well as the particular context of 
the ad hoc Tribunals and ask: What are the arguments in favour of and 
against judicial lawmaking at the Tribunals?  
 
When discussing the concept of lawmaking it is important to consider what 
is understood by ‘law’.18 The definition of ‘law’ is a much debated 
jurisprudential question. Because of its abstract and multifaceted nature the 
concept is difficult to define. Legal philosophers such as Hart, Raz and 
Dworkin have all grappled with the question ‘what is law?’19 The definition 
of law will depend to great extent, on one’s jurisprudential allegiance.20 
Although the definition of law remains problematic and to some extent 
                                                                                                                       
Yugoslavia since 1991’ (my emphasis) does not show sensitivity to the presumption of 
innocence or of the possibility that those appearing before the Tribunal might not be 
‘responsible for serious violations’. Testimony of Larry A. Hammond before the House 
International Relations Committee, 28 February 2002, 7. See 
www.house.gov/international_relations/107/hamm0228.htm  
16 A vivid example of pressure to convict at the Rwanda Tribunal is the Rwandan 
government’s reaction to Barayagwiza v The Prosecutor ICTR-97-AR72, 3 November 1999. See 
the discussion in Chapter 7. 
17 However, Sayers points out that in the ten year history of the ICTY, only two accused 
have been acquitted on all charges at the trial chamber level. Delalic was acquitted on all 
twelve charges of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as well as charges of violations 
against the laws or customs of war. Prosecutor v Delalic IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998. In the 
Kupreskic case the ICTY Appeals Chamber acquitted the three Kupreskic brothers as a result 
of a defective indictment and erroneous finding of fact by the Trial Chamber. Prosecutor v 
Kupreskic IT-95-16-A, 23 October 2001 See the article by S M Sayers ‘Defence Perspectives 
on Sentencing Practice in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ 
(2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 751. The ICTR acquitted Ignace Bagilishema on 7 
June 2001. The accused Bernard Ntuyahaga has also been acquitted by the ICTR.  
18Lord Simon of Glaisdale has stated: ‘It is idle to debate whether… the courts are making 
law… it depends on what you mean by ‘make’ and ‘law’ in this context.’ Stock v Franck Jones 
(Tipton) Ltd [1978] ICR 347, 353 Quoted by A T H Smith ‘Judicial Lawmaking in the 
Criminal Law’ (1984) 100 Law Quarterly Review 46. 
19 See HLA Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983) 1-3; R Dworkin Law’s Empire 
(1998) 1-49. 
20 Realists for example believe that law is only a matter of what legal institutions, like 
legislatures and courts, have decided in the past. Dworkin ibid 7. There is an important 
disagreement between natural lawyers and positivists about the role of morality in the law. 
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elusive, the abstract term ‘the law’ represents the idea that certain rules of 
conduct are obligatory.21 Other important features of law are that law is 
institutionalized and has a normative character.22 Law is a system of binding 
norms. Cassese defines international criminal law as the body of 
international rules designed to both proscribe international crimes and to 
impose upon States the obligation to prosecute and punish those crimes.23 
In this thesis the term ‘law’ will be broadly interpreted to include both 
substantive law and procedural law. The concept of lawmaking will be 
analysed in chapter 2. 
 
The idea that international law should have a humanitarian function might 
serve as an acceptable justification for adventurous lawmaking. Theodor 
Meron has argued that principles of humanity as reflected in the Martens 
Clause provide authority for interpreting international humanitarian law 
consistently with the principles of humanity and the ‘dictates of public 
conscience’.24 Some, such as Sassoli and Olson have argued that lawmaking 
could be an extension of the protection of humanitarian law to those not 
previously protected.25 The Appeals Chamber in Tadic relied on Article 4 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, directed at protecting civilians to the 
maximum extent possible, to extend the protection of humanitarian law.26  
 
The way in which progressive development of international humanitarian 
law occurs is important. International lawyers recognise that the growth and 
interpretation of international criminal norms must be reconciled with the 
fair treatment of defendants, including the prohibition of ex post facto 
responsibility.27 According to Alvarez, the tension between the goals of 
progressive development and adherence to the principle of legality is 
exacerbated to the extent one relies on the politically expedient measure of 
creating the ad hoc Tribunals by way of Security Council Resolutions.28 The 
tension is also heightened to the extent that one relies on judicial legislation 
                                                   
21WJ Hosten, AB Edwards (et al) Introducton to South African Law and Legal Theory (1983) 10. 
22 Ibid 2. 
23 Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 15. 
24 T Meron ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and Dictates of Public Conscience’ 
(2000) 94 AJIL 87, 88. 
25 M Sassoli & L M Olson ‘The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber on the merits in 
the Tadic case’ (2000) 82 International Review of the Red Cross 733. 
26 Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter Tadic Appeals Judgment) Tadic 94-1-A 
para 168. 
27 J E Alvarez ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’ (1999) 24 Yale 




in the course of criminal trials to nudge the law in new directions or to fill 
gaps. The tension is recognised explicitly in Article 22 of the Rome Statute 
which instructs ICC states that ‘the definition of a crime shall be strictly 
construed and shall not be extended by analogy: in case of ambiguity, the 
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, 
prosecuted or convicted’. 
 
Since the subject of this thesis is Judges and Lawmaking at the ICTY and 
ICTR, attention will be paid to the institutional culture of the Chambers of 
the Tribunals. The question of judicial independence forms an important 
part of this institutional culture and will therefore receive significant 
attention. This thesis will be strongly concerned with the legitimacy and 
accountability of the ICTY and ICTR. Judicial independence plays an 
important role in maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of international 
tribunals.29 Thomas Franck defines legitimacy as ‘a property of a rule or 
rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on 
those addressed normatively’.30 Because of the severity of the sanctions 
imposed by criminal law, including life imprisonment in the case of the 
Tribunals, it is important that the institutions imposing the sanctions have 
legitimacy.  
 
The ICTY, in exercising its judicial functions, has to contribute to the 
settlement of wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and establishing 
the truth of the events in the former Yugoslavia.31 The aims of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, those of serving peace32, deterring future crimes and advancing 
reconciliation can only be achieved if the Tribunals are perceived as 
legitimate institutions. A public perception of bias and partiality on the part 
of the judges can only increase existing tensions in the volatile Great Lakes 
and Balkan regions and be detrimental to efforts to build peace. This is 
illustrated in the description of the bench of Milosevic judges as ‘NATO 
judges’.33 It will be argued that because of the questions surrounding the 
legitimacy of the establishment of the Tribunals, the judges should exercise 
particular caution when making new law. The expense of erecting 
                                                   
29 R Mackenzie & P Sands ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the 
International Judge’ (2003) 44  Harvard International Law Journal  271. 
30 T Franck The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) 16. 
31 Prosecutor v Erdemovic IT-96-22, 29 November 1996, Sentencing Judgment, para. 58. 
32Gabrielle Kirk McDonald said that it is the principal responsibility of the Tribunals to 
bring to justice ‘those individuals whose presence impedes the establishment of civil society 
in the former Yugoslavia.’ See the address by President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald to the 
General Assembly, 8 November 1999. ICTY Yearbook (1999) 199. 
33 See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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international tribunals also increases the need for judicial accountability. 
Alvarez writes that acquittals might result if international judges, cognizant of 
their forum’s tenuous legitimacy, err on the side of caution.34 The decision by the 
Kupreskic Appeals Chamber to acquit the accused because of insufficient 
evidence has been praised by commentators.35 According to Judge Wald 
(presiding in the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber case) one needs ‘credible 
evidence to establish incredible events’.36 The real possibility of acquittal can 
only increase the public perception of the fairness of the Tribunals. 
Nollkaemper has gone as far as to suggest that, instead of artificially relying 
on customary international law to fill gaps, the Tribunal could simply 
recognise that the international community has not yet been able to adopt 
all the necessary rules criminalising such acts.37 
 
If one accepts that it is inevitable that Tribunal judges will make new law it 
is important that this lawmaking should be subject to constraints, the most 
important of which is the principle of legality. In the Report of the Secretary 
General on the establishment of the ICTY the importance of the Tribunal’s 
adherence to the requirements of the principle of legality is emphasised. The 
Report states: ‘the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary law so that the 
problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions 
does not arise.’38 The Secretary General explained that ‘in assigning to the 
International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Security Council 
would [thus] not be creating or purporting to ‘legislate’ that law. The 
Tribunals would rather have the task of applying existing international 
humanitarian law.’39 The law applied by the Tribunals must come from 
existing international criminal law or the national law of the situs of the 
                                                   
34 Alvarez (note 27) 429.  
35 Prosecutor v Kupreskic IT-95-16, 23 October 2001. 
36 P Wald  ‘To ‘establish incredible events by credible evidence’: the use of affidavit evidence 
in Yugoslavia war Crimes Tribunal proceedings’ (2001) 42 Harvard Journal of International Law 
552. 
37 A Nollkaemper  ‘The Legitimacy of International law in the case law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugolslavia’ in  T A J A Vandamme. & J-H Reestman 
(eds) Ambiguity in the Rule of Law, The Interface between National and International Legal Systems 
(2001) 13-23. 
38 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) 
(presented 3 May 1993) (S/25704) para 34. 
39 Ibid  para 29.  
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conduct alleged to be criminal.40 The judges in Delalic stated that ‘[t]he 
Statute does not create substantive law, but provides a forum and 
framework for the enforcement of existing international humanitarian 
law’.41 But the cases produced by the Tribunals are beginning to form and 
shape a new body of Tribunal law, within the branch of law called 
international criminal law.  It can be said that this law, including the 
definitions of many of the crimes contained in the respective Statutes, has 
developed and evolved.  
 
This thesis will be concerned with both substantive and procedural 
lawmaking by the judges. Substantive lawmaking is more problematic and 
more difficult to define than procedural lawmaking. Substantive law defines 
legal rights, duties and remedies.42 Procedural law is concerned with the 
proof and enforcement of rights, duties and remedies and involves 
questions such as in which court the case should proceed, what forms the 
proceedings should take, and how the proceedings should be conducted in 
court.43  
 
Substantive lawmaking involves the development of the law relating to 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunals (crimes contained in the Statutes 
of the Tribunals). Substantive lawmaking also includes defining the elements 
of crimes and criminal responsibility. Procedural lawmaking involves the 
drafting and amending of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The 
distinction between substance and procedure is not always clear. Procedural 
changes can affect the substantive rights of the accused. Because the 
Tribunals are international criminal tribunals judges should be careful not to 
create substantive rights. This is one more reason why the judges’ power to 
make rules needs to be carefully scrutinised.  
 
The Tribunals have also engaged in indirect lawmaking. Judge Cassese’s 
Dissenting Opinion in the Erdemovic case on the place of national case law in 
                                                   
40 M C Bassiouni & P Manikas The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (1996) 266. 
41Prosecutor v Delalic et al, IT-96-21, 6 December 1996. Final Judgment, 16 November 1998, 
para 417 and discussion at paras 414-417. See also the statement of the Appeals Chamber in 
Prosecutor v Delalic, Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal by Hazim Delic (Defects in the Form of 
the Indictment) IT-96-21: ‘the Tribunal’s Statute does not create new offences but rather 
serves to give the Tribunal jurisdiction over offences which are already part of customary 
law’ para 26. 




international criminal law is a good example.44 Indirect lawmaking takes 
place when the judges pronounce on matters not central to the legal 
question before them. Such lawmaking occurs incidentally as part of an 
obiter statement.  
 
One of the most interesting features of the ad hoc Tribunals lies in the 
composition and combination of the body of judges. When the ICC judges 
were inaugurated at the Dutch Parliament on 12 March 2003, the Secretary 
General of the UN referred to them as ‘…the embodiment of our collective 
conscience…’ and asked them to be wise, honest and efficient and to ‘shine 
with moral and legal clarity’ in order to bring clarity to the provisions of the 
Rome Statute.45 The same is expected of ICTY and ICTR judges. 
 
Tribunal judges hail from both common and civil law backgrounds and, 
although the law and procedures of the ICTY and ICTR are predominantly 
adversarial, many civil law influences have found their way into Tribunal 
jurisprudence. The civil versus common law distinction is almost decisive 
when it comes to judges’ attitudes and public acceptance of lawmaking. In 
common law systems it is accepted that superior courts, within certain 
limits, do not merely apply the law but also make law. The implications of 
this for the sphere of criminal law specifically will be examined. The 
distinction between civil law and common law has also been described as 
the distinction between statutory law and judge-made law or between 
codified written law and unwritten law based on custom and tradition.The 
question of how the civil or common law backgrounds of the judges 
influence attitudes towards lawmaking will be addressed.  
 
Some believe that the domain for creativity in international law may be 
smaller for international tribunals than for domestic courts. In contrast to 
the environment in which domestic law is made and practised, international 
law lacks the common culture and traditions that help instill confidence in 
international judges. As a result the legitimacy of international tribunals 
depends on the extent to which their decisions give effect to existing norms 
accepted by states. 
 
Judges who are not afraid of or apologetic about making law could be 
described as activist. In the context of the Tribunals one finds support for 
                                                   
44 Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, IT-96-22-A, 7 
October 1997. 
45 See ‘Judges Inaugurated to the International Criminal Court’, United Nations Chronicle, 
at http://www0.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/webArticles/031703_icc.html  
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judicial caution as well as for judicial activism. It could be argued that the 
fragile nature of the Tribunals, its new and sui generis character as well as the 
rudimentary nature of international criminal law in general calls for judicial 
caution.46  But those in favour of judicial activism have also relied on the 
newness and fragility of the Tribunals to support their arguments for 
activism. Adventurous lawmaking by the judges has often been justified by 
the claim that the Tribunals, being new and sui generis, need a certain 
flexibility, a certain scope for correcting errors, for trial and error.47 In this 
regard the practice and views of judges of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) will be discussed. In spite of the strong tradition of judicial restraint at 
the ICJ there have been important examples of judicial activism. The 
pronouncements of ICJ judges on the question of judicial restraint will be 
examined. 
 
In addition to the above reason for judicial caution the institutional 
competence of international tribunals to create law has also been 
questioned. An important reason why international judges should be 
hesitant to create new rules is that, in contrast to the domestic sphere, there 
is no possibility to correct a judicially created rule through legislative action 
if the rule proves unsatisfactory.48 Those who argue that international law is 
not law have traditionally relied upon the absence of an international 
legislature and enforcement organ in international law.49 This means that 
the doctrine of separation of powers does not apply, at least not as originally 
formulated. The absence of a central legislature or similar ‘supervisory’ body 
in the emerging system of international criminal law places the judges in the 
position of ultimate lawmakers – a position calling for restraint. Another 
argument for restraint is the ‘democratic deficit’ inherent in the international 
criminal justice system. It is argued that the international criminal justice 
system suffers from a lack of legitimacy because of a lack of democratic 
                                                   
46In this regard, see the views of M Koskenniemi From Apology to Utopia (1989) 227 and T 
Franck Judging the World Court (1986) 10. 
47 See the views of Cassese on the amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Address of Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, 4 November 1997. 
48D Bodansky ‘Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law’ in L Boisson de 
Chazournes & P Sands (eds)  International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear 
Weapons (1999)169. See the views of J Stone ‘Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the 
International Community’ (1959) 35 BYIL 152. 
49 Austin categorized international law as ‘law improperly so called’. See J Austin Lectures in 
Jurisprudence 5 ed (1977) 86 et seq. 
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accountability.50 For this reason, the Triunals have been described as 
controversial and ambitious.51 
 
International criminal law is a rudimentary system of law. Lauterpacht, a 
strong proponent of the completeness of international law and the 
inadmissibility of non liquet, has argued that the ‘defective’ nature of 
international law calls for judicial restraint or even the declaration of a non 
liquet. He observed that, in certain circumstances, the apparent indecision 
[of the International Court of Justice], which leaves room for discretion on 
the part of the organ which requested the Opinion, may both as a matter of 
development of the law and as a guide to action be preferable to a deceptive clarity 
which fails to give an indication of the inherent complexities of the issue. In 
so far as the decisions of the Court are an expression of existing 
international law (whether customary or conventional) they cannot but 
reflect the occasional obscurity or inconclusiveness of a defective legal 
system.52 
 
Throughout this study, references and comparisons will be made to the 
jurisprudence and judicial and institutional character of the International 
Court of Justice. There are many reasons why the ICJ is an appropriate 
forum with which to compare the work of the Tribunals. Similar to the 
Tribunals, the ICJ is a judicial body and organ of the United Nations. 
Another similarity is that the Tribunals are courts of both first and last 
resort. A court of first resort must weigh evidence, hear witnesses and 
establish a probable factual scenario whereas a court of last resort weighs 
and refines legal principles that may develop the law and seeks consistency 
by connecting the past, present and future.53 Importantly, both the ICJ and 
the ad hoc Tribunals have the responsibility of developing international law. 
Some judges, such as Judge Shahabuddeen, Judge Abi Saab and Judge van 
den Wyngaert, have served as both ICJ judges and Tribunal judges. The 
important difference between the work of the ICJ and that of the ad hoc 
Tribunals is that the ICJ decides disputes between states whereas the 
Tribunals prosecute individuals. It is also important that Tribunal judgments 
                                                   
50 AM Danner, & JS Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’ (2005) 93 California Law 
Review 75 96. The authors point out that, unlike most domestic criminal systems, 
international criminal law is not ‘embedded in a mature political or legal system’ lending 
legitimacy to its criminal process. 
51 Ibid 97. 
52 H Lauterpacht The Development of International Law by the International Court (1982) 152 
(emphasis added). 
53 T Franck Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) 335. 
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are enforced whereas the decisions of the ICJ are not easily enforced. 
Neither the ICJ nor the ad hoc Tribunals are bound by precedent nor are 
they bound by each other’s decisions.54 A prominent example of an ICTY 
Appeals Chamber referring to (and rejecting) ICJ jurisprudence is the Tadic 
Appeals Chamber’s decision not to follow the jurisprudence of the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua case.55 The decision in Tadic regarding the criminality under 
international law of the violations of international laws of war in the context 
of internal armed conflict will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
In the Celibici case the relationship between the ICJ and ICTY was  
considered: 
 
However this Tribunal is an autonomous international judicial body, and although 
the ICJ is the ‘principal judicial organ’ within the United Nations system to which 
the Tribunal belongs, there is no hierarchical relationship between the two courts. 
Although the Appeals Chamber will necessarily take into consideration other 
decisions of international courts, it may, after careful consideration, come to a 
different conclusion.56 
 
Some believe that the fact that the ICJ hears disputes between states means 
that the ICJ is more political than the ad hoc Tribunals.57 At the Tribunals it 
likewise appears as if considerations such as the nature of the appointment 
process and international politics influence appointments. It has been said 
that politics influences the nomination and election process of the ICTY 
and that judges are not selected simply on the basis of their suitability for 
the job.58  
 
In discussing the phenomenon of lawmaking at the Tribunals, this study will 
look both to the future and to the past. Comparisons will be made with the 
lawmaking and procedures of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.59 The 
legal framework and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals are generally 
regarded as improvements upon the Nuremberg Tribunal. The fact that, 
unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY and ICTR provide for the right 
to appeal, is one of the most significant improvements. The fact that the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR are more detailed 
                                                   
54 See Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-A, 24 March 2000, para 89 et seq. 
55 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
Merits Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 114. 
56 Prosecutor v Delalic IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001 (‘Celibici’) Appeals Judgment para 24. 
57 Franck (note 46) 6. 
58 For more on the political nature of the electoral process see Chapter 3. 
59 The Tokyo Tribunal will also be referred to as the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE). 
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than the Nuremberg Rules can also be regarded as a procedural 
improvement.  
 
The ICTR and ICTY have been described as ‘models’ or as providing a 
blueprint for the ICC.60 Since the drafting of the Statute and Rules of the 
Rome Statute has not been a judicial enterprise one cannot make a direct 
comparison between judicial lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals and at the 
ICC. To compare lawmaking at the Tribunals with lawmaking at the ICC 
one will have to wait for a body of case law to develop at the ICC. 
Comparisons between the institutional culture at the ICC and at the ad hoc 
Tribunals can however be made.61 
  
Structure of the Study 
In Chapter 1 the establishment and organisation of the ad hoc Tribunals will 
be discussed. The history of the efforts to establish an international criminal 
Tribunal will be traced from its early tentative roots to the establishment of 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. It is important that the Tribunals are perceived 
to have been established legitimately. It will be argued that as the legality of 
the establishment of the Tribunals has been challenged the Tribunal’s 
legitimacy rests on a tenuous foundation and judges should therefore be 
particularly careful when making new law. The challenges to the legality of 
the establishment of the Tribunals will therefore be discussed.  
In Chapter 2 the concept and theory of lawmaking will be described, the 
influence of the rudimentary nature of international criminal law on the 
lawmaking of Tribunal judges will be discussed and the difference between 
judicial legislation and development of international law will be highlighted. 
The meaning of a ‘gap’ or lacuna in the law will be examined. The question 
of whether a finding of non liquet could be seen as an alternative to 
lawmaking will be canvassed. Because judges are reluctant to admit to 
lawmaking, it is difficult to analyse what they do. Judge Cassese seems to be 
the only judge who has been unapologetic and open about his lawmaking at 
the ICTY.62 Since the ICTY and ICTR Statutes contain no ‘choice of law’ 
or sources provisions similar to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the sources the 
judges can draw from in making international criminal law will be examined.  
Special attention will be paid to the use of custom and general principles as 
lawmaking tools. Tribunal judges have looked to customary law to 
                                                   
60 S R Ratner & J S Abrahams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (2001) 220, 221. 
61 See for example the discussion of the appointment on ICC judges in Chapter 3. 
62 Interview Judge Cassese, 6 June 2003, Florence. 
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determine the elements of the offences set forth in the Statutes. Cassese 
argues that usus and opinio juris, as elements of customary law, play a 
different role in humanitarian law than in international law generally because 
of the influence of the Martens clause.63 The judges at the Tribunals have 
also often resorted to general principles as a lawmaking tool. It has been 
argued that relying on general principles, in so far as it is used to fill gaps in 
the application of existing law, may beg the question of legality since 
‘general principles’ are more likely to result in generality rather than 
specificity.64    
Chapter 3 concerns the lawmakers: the judges as a body of individuals. 
Franck writes that every bench creates its own ‘cultural environment’.65 
Different aspects of the cultural environment at the ICTY and ICTR will 
receive attention. Questions such as the drafting process and the importance 
of dissenting opinions will be discussed. The argument made by legal realists 
has been that because judges are not automatons, it is inevitable that they 
will be influenced by their personal and professional backgrounds. Much is 
expected of judges. Kennedy writes that judges are supposed to ‘rise above’ 
and ‘transcend’ their personal interest, their instinctive and intuitive 
sympathies, their partisan affiliations, and their ideological commitments 
and are supposed to submit to something ‘higher’ than themselves.66 
The question of judicial independence at the Tribunals forms part of the 
discussion of institutional culture. Judicial independence is the topic of 
Chapter 4. This chapter discusses questions which affect the independence 
of ICTY and ICTR judges such as their election. The question of whether 
Judges Odio Benito, Florence Mumba and Richard May should have 
recused themselves in particular cases because of alleged bias will receive 
attention.     
Chapter 5 focuses on the importance of the principle of legality in the 
context of international criminal law generally, and specifically in the 
context of the Tribunals. It will be argued that in the context of 
international criminal law the principle of legality constitutes the most 
important constraint on judicial lawmaking by the judges. Because German 
law has the oldest tradition of recognising and applying the principle of 
                                                   
63 For more on the Martens  Clause see A Cassese ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or 
Simply Pie in the Sky?’ (2000) 11   EJIL  187. See also Chapter 6. 
64 M C Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1999) 121-122. 
65 Franck (note 46) 320. 
66 D Kennedy  A Critique  of Adjudication (fin-de-siecle) (1997) 3. 
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legality, the way the principle has been interpreted in German law will 
receive extensive attention. The status of the principle of legality in 
common law jurisdictions such as the United States will also be discussed. 
There seems to be general consensus that the context of international 
criminal law calls for a more lenient and flexible approach to the application 
of this principle than would be the case in municipal systems.   
In Chapter 6 instances of lawmaking in the case law of the ICTY and ICTR 
will be discussed. Lawmaking should be understood as development of the 
law and extending the law to new areas. Different methods of lawmaking 
will be considered. The cases selected show inter alia how the tribunals 
formulated and expanded definitions, applied purposive interpretation and 
filled gaps in the Statutes. The chapter will consider how the Tribunals 
developed the concept of an internal as opposed to an international conflict 
and how they expanded and developed the concepts of common purpose, 
reprisals and protected persons. Attention will also be paid to the indirect or 
obiter lawmaking by Judge Cassese in Erdemovic.67 The judges have also 
defined and redefined crimes such as torture and rape. These instances of 
lawmaking have triggered a considerable amount of academic debate. The 
chapter explores the question of whether a particular instance of lawmaking 
constitutes legitimate or illegitimate lawmaking.      
Tribunal judges have amended and made new rules on several occasions. 
The rulemaking activity of the judges will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Procedural lawmaking by the Tribunals has taken the form of making and 
amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Judges are not authorised 
to create new substantive law or to impose new obligations on states under 
the guise of procedural rules.68  Knoops writes that adherence to procedure 
assists in promoting the fundamental goals of certainty of the law and 
fairness in criminal proceedings.69 It can be argued that the frequent 
amendments made to the rules violate the principle of legality and threaten 
legal certainty. Alternative solutions to the making of amendments will be 
suggested. 
                                                   
67 Erdemovic (note 44). 
68 V Morris & M Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (1995) 179. 




A Short Note on Method and Terminology 
Information about the personal philosophies and theoretical affiliations of 
individual judges is not easy to obtain. It is always difficult to pierce the 
judicial veil. Many judges see it as incompatible with their role as judges to 
speak of their personal philosophies. Few judges speak freely. The principle 
of confidentiality of deliberations in chambers is taken seriously. This 
principle entails that the ideas underlying the judgment and the 
controversies that may have been debated are kept secret.70 It is therefore 
difficult to capture the ‘full flavour’ of a judgment.71 The information 
obtained about the individual Tribunal judges has been obtained in a few 
personal interviews, in their curricula vitae, in articles written by the judges 
themselves and in interviews with Legal Officers at the ICTY.   
         
In this thesis the ICTY and ICTR will sometimes be referred to as the ad hoc 
Tribunals or ‘the Tribunals’. The term ‘Tribunals’ will therefore refer 
exclusively to the ICTY and ICTR. The term ‘Tribunal judges’ will refer to 
ICTY and ICTR judges. The ICTY will sometimes be referred to as the 
‘Yugoslav or Yugoslavia Tribunal’ and the ICTR will sometimes be called 
the ‘Rwanda Tribunal’.  
 
Frequent reference will be made to the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993).72 This Report will be 
abbreviated as the ‘Secretary General’s Report’.   
 
For technical reasons the accents on Slavic surnames have not been 
included. The state of the law at the Tribunals and developments at the 





                                                   
70 T ten Kate ‘Dissenting Opinion, A background sketch’ in S K Martens,  M I Veldt, G J M 
Corstens, W E Haak Martens Dissenting: The Separate Opinions of a European Human Rights Judge 
(2000) 12.  
71 Ibid. 
72 The foundational document of the ICTY was a 35 page report submitted to the Security 
Council by the Secretary General. The report was prepared at the request of the Security 
Council and unanimously adopted by it. See D McGoldrick ‘Criminal Trials before 
International Tribunals: Legality and Legitimacy’ in D McGoldrick, P Rowe & E Donnelly 







            CHAPTER ONE 
 
SETTING THE STAGE: THE ESTABLISHMENT AND 




It has become customary to begin studies on the ad hoc Tribunals with the history 
of the establishment of the Tribunals and the work of the International Law 
Commission to create a permanent international criminal court. This chapter will 
not do so merely as a matter of convention.  To understand the lawmaking activity 
of the judges one has to understand the context within which that law is made. It 
has been stressed and overstressed that the ad hoc Tribunals are sui generis in terms 
of their method of establishment, character and function. This chapter will not 
address the question of whether the specific nature of the Tribunals calls for more 
flexibility or elasticity in applying or making the law. This question will be 
addressed in Chapter 2. The present chapter will be of a more descriptive nature. 
The method of establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, the structure and different 
organs of the Tribunals will be described. The important question of why the 
Rwandan and Yugoslav conflicts were singled out for special and expensive 
attention by the Security Council will be addressed briefly. 
 
The judges in the first case before the ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, acknowledged that 
criminal law is only effictive if the body that determines the criminality is viewed 
as legitimate.1 According to Max Weber ‘a sovereign’s command…acquires the 
additional legitimacy necessary to promote habitual obedience without 
encountering serious resistance only when the rule’s subject is aware that the rule, 
and the ruler, both have a democratic legitimacy’.2 In the context of international 
criminal law and the Tribunals this means that the rules and institutions of 
international criminal law will only be respected if they are seen as legitimate. The 
challenges to the legality of the establishment of the Tribunals will therefore be 
discussed.  
 
This chapter will start by tracing the history of the Tribunals - from the early 
abortive efforts of the international community to create an international criminal 
court to the creation of the Nuremberg, Tokyo and eventually the ad hoc Tribunals 
and the International Criminal Court. 
 
                                                   
1 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995, para 6. 
2 M Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (1968) 17. 
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 2. Historical Precedents 
(i) The Interbellum 
The idea of creating an international criminal court to bring those responsible for 
war crimes to justice was seriously considered for the first time in the aftermath of 
the First World War. The ‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of 
the War and Enforcement of Penalties’ proposed the establishment of a ‘high’ 
tribunal composed of judges drawn from many nations.3 The Treaty of Versailles 
eventually included a provision, Article 227, which provided for the establishment 
of a tribunal, composed of five judges (appointed by the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Italy and Japan) to try the former Kaiser of Germany, Wilhelm II. 
Since the Netherlands refused to hand over the accused this tribunal was never 
established.4  
 
Another failed attempt was made in 1920 when the ‘Advisory Committee of 
Jurists’ was summoned to prepare the project for the establishment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Committee proposed that the ‘High 
Court of International Justice’ should also be competent to try crimes constituting 
a breach of international public order or against the universal law of nations, 
referred to it by the Assembly or the Council of the League of Nations.5 This 
proposal was however rejected by the Assembly of League of Nations as being 
‘premature’.6 This was followed by the Convention for the Creation of an ICC of 
16 November 1937 7 but the Convention was only ratified by India and never 
came into effect.8  
 
Subsequently, draft statutes of an international criminal court were adopted by 
non-governmental organisations and by scholarly bodies.9 Since the efforts 
                                                   
3 See however the dissenting opinion of the two United States delegates (R Lansing and J Brown 
Scott) in the ‘Report of the Commission’ (1920) 14 AJIL 121-3, 129, 139 ff.  
4As a political formality, the Allies merely requested that the Netherlands ‘make the Kaiser available 
for trial’. The Netherlands inferred that the Allies would not attempt to seize the Kaiser and denied 
the request arguing that the charges against him appeared to be of a political and not a criminal 
nature. T Taylor The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992) 16. On the non-implementation of 
Article 227, see amongst others, A Merignhac and E Lemonon Le Droit des grens et la guerre de 1914-
1918 (1921) 80 ff. 
5 See the text of the Second Resolution adopted by the Advisory Committee in  Lord Phillimore 
‘An International Criminal Court and the Resolutions of the Committee of Jurists’ (1922-23) 3 
BYIL  80. 
6 Ibid  84. 
7 See Part I (2) of the Final Act of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, 
League of Nations Official No C 548 M 385 1937 V. 
8 M C Bassiouni  International Criminal Law Vol 1 2ed  (1999) 7. 
9 An example of a non-governmental organisation would be the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1925. 
The International Law Association discussed the creation of a permanent international court at 
meetings in Buenos Aires (1922), in Stockholm (1924) and in Vienna (1926). See the Chapter by G 
Tanja ‘International Adjudication of War Crimes’ in E Denters & N Schrijver  (eds) Reflections on 
International Law from the Low Countries: in Honour of Paul de Waart (1998) 218, 219. 
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undertaken in academic circles were not followed by appropriate diplomatic 
action, none of these drafts led to anything concrete.  
 
(ii) Nuremberg and Tokyo 
During World War II, the Allies again took up the idea of establishing an 
‘international tribunal’. The four major Allies collectively provided for the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) in the 
London Agreement to which nineteen other states acceded.10 In Tokyo the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, 
unilaterally established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) through a general military order.11 In this instance there was no treaty 
and no participation in the institution-creating process by the defeated party.12  
 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly invited the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to study the desirability and possibility of establishing a 
criminal judicial body, in particular as a ‘Criminal Chamber of the International 
Court of Justice’.13 Neither the early discussions of the Commission, nor the 
provisions of Article VI of the Genocide Convention on ‘an international penal 
tribunal’ were translated into reality. 
 
Since World War II, the international community, represented by the United 
Nations, has made several efforts to establish a permanent international criminal 
court. For many years these efforts proved unsuccessful. The debates of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), the body entrusted with the task of drafting 
a statute for an international criminal court, became mired and seemed fated never 
to succeed.14 One reason for this was that during the Cold War countries were 
fearful of any interference into their sovereignty.  Bennouna emphasised this 
obstacle of state sovereignty and came to the following pessimistic conclusion: 
‘The establishment of an international criminal court remains an academic 
exercise, which can even become dangerous if it is perverted by sovereignties to 
justify fait accompli or to salve the conscience of those in power.’15 At the end of 
the Cold War, in 1989, the General Assembly requested the ILC ‘to address the 
                                                   
10 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
August 1945, 59 Stat 154482, UNTS 279 (hereinafter London Agreement). The charter of the IMT 
was annexed to this agreement. See Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), 8 August 1945, 59 Stat 1544, 
1546, 82, UNTS 279, 284 (hereinafter IMT Charter). 
11 Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, 19 January 
1946, TIAS No1589, 4 Bevans 20: Charter Dated 19 January 1946. 
12 V Morris & M P Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Vol 1 (1995) 8  fn 42. 
13 The Path to The Hague, Selected documents on the origins of the ICTY  (2001) 7. 
14 P Tavernier ‘The experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda’ (1997) 321 International Review of the Red Cross 605. 
15 M Bennouna ‘La creation d'une jurisdiction penale internationale et la souverainete des etats’ 
(1990) Annuaire francais de droit international  299-306. 
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question of establishing an international criminal court’.16 By 1993 the ILC had 
prepared a draft statute under the direction of James Crawford. In 1994 the 
Commission submitted the final version of its work to the General Assembly.17  
 
3. Establishment of the ICTY 
The tragic events and gross violations of human rights that followed the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia led the Security Council to agree to 
establish the ICTY.18 The establishment of a Tribunal for Yugoslavia was a 
political decision. Many believe that the decision to create the ICTY and later the 
ICTR was an attempt by the international community to salve its conscience. The 
omissions of the UN and international community during the genocide in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda are well publicised.19 This may help to explain the 
question why a tribunal was established in these and not in many other 
conflict-ridden areas of the world. 
 
The scope of this chapter does not allow for a full description of the history of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. It is however instructive to look at the 
preliminary steps taken by the UN leading up to the formal establishment of the 
Tribunal.  
 
The first steps taken by the United Nations included the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping force, known as the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in the areas of conflict inside Croatia and Bosnia. The task of 
UNPROFOR was to oversee the cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia.20 
 
What made the establishment of the ICTY different from the establishment of the 
IMT and IMTFE was that this Tribunal was created by a Security Council 
Resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Unlike the cases of the 
IMT and IMTFE, the ICTY was not established to judge the defeated party's or 
parties' nationals. The Security Council, acting on behalf of the world community, 
established the Tribunal to judge all parties to the conflict who committed 
violations of well-established international criminal law.21 The legality of the 
establishment of the Tribunals will be discussed under the heading ‘Challenges to 
the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal’. 
 
                                                   
16 Res 44/339 of 4 December 1989. 
17 J Crawford ‘The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal’ (1994) 88 AJIL 140. 
18 For historical background on the conflict in the Balkans, see Morris & Scharf (note 12) 18 - 22.  
19 It is tragic but true that ‘the world had stood around with its hands in its pockets’ during the 
extermination of approximately 800 000 Tutsis in 1994. Comment of the Rwandan General 
Kagame cited by P Gourevitch We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families (1998) 
163. See also S Power A Problem from Hell, America and the Age of Genocide (2002) 364 – 5. 
20 See SC Res 743 (1992) 21 February 1992. 
21 See C Tomuschat ‘International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed’ 
(1994) 5 Criminal Law Forum  237. 
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On 6 October 1992 the Security Council adopted Resolution 780 which 
established a Commission of Experts to investigate breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed during the conflict in Yugoslavia.22 The Commission heard reports of 
ethnic cleansing, forced expulsion, and widespread and systematic detention and 
rape of women.23 The Commission of Experts interpreted its mandate as requiring 
the collection of all relevant information and evidence concerning violations of 
international humanitarian law it could secure. The Commission's efforts resulted 
in 65 000 pages of documents, a database cataloguing the information in these 
documents, over 300 hours of videotape, and 3 300 pages of analysis.24 All this 
information was handed over to the Prosecutor of the ICTY between April and 
December 1994. 
 
The Commission of Experts proposed the idea of establishing an international 
tribunal25 on 26 January 1993.26 Various draft proposals for an ad hoc Tribunal 
were submitted by a number of states and international bodies to the United 
Nations Secretary General. This assisted him in the drafting of the Statute of the 
ICTY after the Security Council, at the proposal of France, adopted Resolution 
808 on 22 February 1993. Resolution 808 was the resolution by which it was 
decided to establish a Tribunal.27 The use of the term ‘tribunal’ rather than ‘court’ 
was chosen partly because of the Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents and partly to 
distinguish the ICTY, an ad hoc Tribunal, from the efforts to establish a permanent 
international court.28 
 
On 25 May 1993 the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 827 
which established the ICTY and approved the Secretary General's draft of the 
Statute without change. The ICTY came into legal existence on the same day. The 
                                                   
22 SC Res 780 SCOR,47th Sess, 2, UN Doc S/RES/780 (6 October 1992) (hereinafter Resolution 
780). 
23 See SC Res 798 (1992) 18 December 1992. See also the Report of the European Community 
investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia, S/25240, 
Annex 1 (1993). 
24 These documents and analysis comprise the Annexures to the Final Report of the Commission of 
Experts. The analytical reports were prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the 
Commission of Experts, M C Bassiouni. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN SCOR Annex UN Doc S/1994/674 (27 May 
1994) (hereinafter Final Report). 
25 ‘The Commission was led to consider idea of the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal. 
In its opinion, it would be for the Security Council or another organ of the United Nations to 
establish such a tribunal in relation to events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The 
Commission observes that such a decision would be consistent with the direction of its work.’ UN 
Doc S/25274 Annex I para 74. 
26 The International Conference on the former Yugoslavia also proposed the establishment of a 
tribunal on 30 January 1993, See UN Doc S/25221 Annex I para 9. 
27 M C Bassiouni The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  (1996) 205. 
28 V Morris & M P Scharf The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998) 138. 
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Judges were elected on 15 September 199329 and the Prosecutor took office on 15 
August 1994. The Commission of Experts submitted its Final Report on 24 May 
1994.30  
 
4. Principal Organs of the ICTY 
The ICTY consists of three principal organs. The first organ is the Chambers, 
which is entrusted with the performance of judicial functions. The second organ is 
the Office of the Prosecutor, responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
alleged criminals. These two independent organs are served by a third 
administrative organ, the Registry.31 
 
The Security Council initially decided that the Prosecutor of the ICTY should also 
serve as the Prosecutor for the ICTR. In spite of this institutional link, the Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and that of the ICTR remained two separate, 
independent organs. On 28 August 2003 the UN Security Council amended the 
statute of the ICTR to provide the ICTR with its own prosecutor as of 15 
September 2003. On 6 April Jassan Jallow was appointed to this position.  
 
This thesis is strongly concerned with the role of the judges. The Chambers will 
not be discussed here but in two chapters devoted exclusively to Tribunal judges. 
The election and independence of the judges forms the subject matter of Chapter 
3. The institutional culture of Chambers is discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
It is however important to note that the two Tribunals share a common Appeals 
Chamber. The Security Council believed that a common Appeals Chamber would 
allow the two tribunals ‘to function more economically and harmoniously’.32 In 
addition the use of a common Appeals Chamber was meant to ensure the 
consistent interpretation of humanitarian law.33  
 
An important reason for the sharing of organs was that neither Tribunal should 
hand down decisions inconsistent with those of the other.34 It is generally 
considered desirable for international courts (although not bound by precedent) to 
                                                   
29 The Security Council unanimously accepted the Secretary General's list of twenty-three 
nominations for the position of Judge. In terms of Article 13 of the Statute the General Assembly 
was to elect eleven of the nominees to a four year term. SC Res 857 UN SCOR 48th Sess 3265th 
mtg, UN Doc S/Res/857 (20 August 1993). 
30 The Annexes to the Report were submitted on 28 December 1994. These annexes were 
published by the UN for public dissemination in August 1995 as UN Doc S/1994/674/Add 2 (Vol 
1) (31 May 1995) (Vols II -V) (28 December 1994) (hereinafter Annexes).  
31 Morris & Scharf (note 12) 137. 
32See Article 12 (2) of the ICTR Statute. 
33 L D Johnson ‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1996) 211 International Review of Penal Law  
18. 
34 C Aptel ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1997) 321 International Review of the Red 
Cross  2. The decision reportedly reflects a compromise reached during the negotiations that 
preceded the adoption of Resolution 955. 
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follow their own precedent as ‘internal consistency’ could be said to be more 
important than international courts following the precedent of other international 
courts.35 The composition of the Appeals Chamber is discussed further in Chapter 
4. 
 
5. Jurisdiction of the ICTY 
 (i) Concurrent Jurisdiction  
Article 9 of the ICTY Statute provides that the ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction 
with and primacy over national courts. The concurrent jurisdiction of the 
Tribunals is based on the principle of universality. Whereas as a general rule states 
apply their criminal laws only in their own territories, certain crimes, universally 
dangerous to states and their subjects, require the jurisdiction of all community 
members wherever they may occur, even in the absence of a link between the state 
and the parties in question.36 From a practical point of view it was considered 
almost impossible for the ICTY to prosecute all the perpetrators of atrocities in 
the former Yugoslavia. The idea was that states should be encouraged to search 
for, to prosecute and to punish any persons responsible for war crimes in the 
territory as demanded by the Geneva Conventions.37 Shortly after its 
establishment the ICTY urged countries that had arrested suspected war criminals 
from Yugoslavia to initiate domestic prosecutions. The ICTY reserved the option 
to assert its primacy of jurisdiction in these cases when it became fully 
operational.38 
(ii) Subject-matter Jurisdiction 
The Statute of the ICTY grants the Tribunal subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
following crimes: 1) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; 2) violations of 
                                                   
35 On the question of precedent at the ICTY, see Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-A, 24 
March 2000, para 89. In the case of the ad hoc Tribunals one can distinguish between consistency 
between different decisions of the same tribunal, consistency between the decisions of the two ad 
hoc Tribunals and consistency between the ad hoc Tribunals and the decisions of other international 
courts such as the ICJ. As will be illustrated in the chapters on the principle of legality (Chapter 5) 
and lawmaking through the case law (Chapter 6) the Tribunals do not always decide consistently. 
The crime of rape, for example, has been defined differently by the ICTY and the ICTR.  Different 
ICTY Trial Chambers have even defined rape differently. See the discussion in Chapter  6. 
36  Universal jurisdiction has traditionally been asserted over the crime of piracy on the high seas 
because any nation that apprehended and punished a pirate acted in community interest. After 
World War II, strong arguments were advanced, based largely on the principles of the Nuremberg 
Trials and various United Nations Resolutions, that perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 
humanity were also subject to universal jurisdiction. T Buergenthal & HG Maier Public International 
Law in a Nutshell 2 ed (1990) 172-3, K Randall ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International 
Law’(1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785 (1988), Morris & Scharf (note 12) 122. 
37 Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV respectively. 
38 Morris & Scharf  (note 12) 312.  
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the laws or customs of war; 3) genocide; and 4) crimes against humanity.39 The 
scope of this chapter does not allow for a full analysis of each of these crimes.40  
 
How does the ICTY Statute define crimes against humanity? Article 5 defines 
crimes against humanity as being the following crimes: (a) murder; (b) 
extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) 
rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane 
acts. Article 5 requires the above crimes to be committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian 
population.   
(iii) Personal Jurisdiction 
Article 6 of the ICTY Statute limits the personal jurisdiction of the ICTY to 
natural persons. This is consistent with the personal jurisdiction of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, which was given the ‘power to try and punish persons’.41 
 
The personal jurisdiction of the ICTY may be exercised over natural persons 
charged with individual criminal responsibility for having planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in a crime, or persons with 
superior criminal responsibility, or persons who had authority and control over 
subordinates and who knew or had reason to know subordinates were committing 
or persons about to commit a crime who failed to take necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent, halt or punish the crimes.42 In contrast to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal that was only empowered to try ‘persons acting in the interest of the Axis 
countries’,43 the personal jurisdiction of the ICTY extends to any person alleged to 
have committed crimes referred to in the Statute in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia after 1991 regardless of nationality. 
 
(iv) Territorial Jurisdiction 
Security Council Resolution 808 provides that the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal is limited to the territory of the former Yugoslavia,44 including its land 
                                                   
39 M-C Roberge ‘Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda over 
crimes against humanity and genocide’ (1997) 321 International Review of the Red Cross 651. 
40 See M Boot Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(2001); G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005); G Mettraux International Crimes and the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals (2005) for a thorough analysis of these crimes. 
41 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. The IMT did however certain organizations as criminal (in 
accordance with article 9 of the IMT Statute), such as the SS, the Gestapo, the Leadership Corps of 
the Nazi Party  and the SD. A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 138. 
42 Article 7(1) ICTY Statute. 
43 Article 6 Nuremberg Charter. 
44 This limitation on the competence of the ICTY is the result of the Security Council mandate 
rather than international law. International law recognises jurisdiction on the part of all States to try 
persons suspected of crimes under international law without regard to where the crime is 
committed. Morris & Scharf (note 12) 117. 
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surface, airspace and territorial waters.45 Every element of a crime need not have 
occurred in the former Yugoslavia but the fact that a significant element of the 
crime occurred therein may be sufficient.46 
(v) Temporal Jurisdiction 
The temporal jurisdiction extends to any crime committed after 1 January 1991.47 
The temporal jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia Tribunal was defined in its Statute 
only in terms of the starting point since atrocities were still being committed in the 
former Yugoslavia when the statute was adopted and there was no indication of 
when violations of humanitarian law would cease.48 The possibility of extending 
the jurisdiction was recognised by the Security Council in Resolution 827 
establishing the Yugoslavia Tribunal which refers to the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 
during the period ‘between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the 
Security Council upon the restoration of peace’.49 
 
6. The Establishment of the ICTR 
Within a year of the establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Security 
Council was confronted with the genocide in Rwanda. The Security Council was 
accused of Eurocentrism which was an important reason why the Council was 
compelled to establish the Rwanda Tribunal.50 
 
The Arusha Peace Agreement was concluded in August 1993. The most serious 
acts of genocide however, occurred after this date. Talks for the initiation of a 
cease-fire in Rwanda started in 1994.51 As in the case of the former Yugoslavia, 
the Security Council requested the establishment of a Commission of Experts to 
investigate specific violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda.52 The 
Commission found serious breaches of international humanitarian law on both 
sides of the conflict.53 The members of the Security Council believed that the 
prosecution of those responsible for the violations by a neutral international body 
would deter further atrocities, break the cycle of violence and retribution, and 
                                                   
45 See Report of the Secretary General pursuant to para 2 of SC Resolution 808 (1993) S/25704, 3 May 1993 
(hereinafter ‘Secretary General’s Report’) para 16. 
46 A significant link between the crime and the territory of Yugoslavia is required but this would not 
necessarily exclude crimes involving a transnational element. Morris & Scharf (note 12) 118. 
47 This means that the recent Kosovo conflict also falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
48 Morris & Scharf (note 12) 119.  
49 SC Res 827, UN SCOR 48th Sess at 29 UN Doc S/INF/49 (1994), reprinted in Morris & Scharf 
(note 11) 177. 
50 M Scharf ‘The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court’ (1995-1996) 6 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 168. 
51 This took place after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 918 (1994). 
52 Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) established the Commission of Experts. 
53 G Erasmus & N Fourie ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Are all issues 
addressed?’ (1997) 321 International Review of the Red Cross 706. 
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encourage the return of refugees.54 A decision was made to set up an international 
criminal tribunal and the ICTR was established on 8 November 1994. 
 
The Preamble of the ICTR Statute states that the ICTR was established by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In a similar way to 
the Preamble of the ICTY Statute55, the Preamble further establishes the general 
principle that the Rwanda Tribunal must function in accordance with the 
provisions of the Statute. 
 
Unlike the ICTY which the Security Council established on its own initiative to 
help restore and maintain peace in that territory, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda was created in response to an official request by the 
Rwandan government.56 In spite of having initially called for the setting up of the 
Tribunal, the Rwandan government subsequently voted against the adoption of 
Resolution 955 in the Security Council.57 Ambassador Bakuramutsa, the Rwandan 
Representative to the United Nations, expressed his government's dissatisfaction 
with the Rwandan Tribunal as constituted. He argued that the temporal 
jurisdiction which enables the Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for 
violations between 1 January and 31 December 1994, was too limited and would 
not cover the lengthy period during which preparations were made for the 
genocide.58 Secondly, he argued that the composition of the Tribunal, consisting 
of only two Trial Chambers,59 would prevent it from functioning properly in view 
of the large number of prosecutions to be brought.60  
 
The Secretary General was not requested to prepare a report to assist the Security 
Council in the establishment of an International Tribunal for Rwanda since the 
                                                   
54 New Zealand, the principle sponsor of Resolution  955 (1994), the resolution establishing the 
ICTR, stated: ‘ We believe the guarantee of a fair and impartial trial would go some way to 
encouraging the millions of Rwandese now in refugee camps in neighbouring countries to return to 
their homeland.’ UN SCOR 49th Sess, mtg at 2, UN Doc S/PV 3453 (1994) 5. 
55 The Preamble of the ICTY Statute states that the Tribunal ‘shall function in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Statute’. 
 56 Letter of 28 September 1994 addressed by Rwanda's Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations to the President of the Security Council, Doc S/1994/115. 
57 Summary Record of the 3453rd meeting of the Security Council (8 November 1994), Doc S/PV 
3453. 
58 C Aptel (note 34) 2. 
59 Initially the ICTR had only two Trial Chambers. On 30 April 1998 the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1165 (1998) which established a third Trial Chamber of three additional judges in order 
to try without delay the large number of accused awaiting trial before the ICTR. 
60 Ambassador Bakuramutsa made five more arguments: (i) the scope of the subject-matter 
jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal could result in a scattering of its resources, whereas its 
priority should be to try persons presumed to be responsible for genocide; (ii) countries said to have 
been involved in the events of 1994 should refrain from putting forward their own nationals as 
candidates for judges; (iii) the problem of terms of imprisonment served outside Rwanda; (iv) the 
fact that those tried and found guilty by the Tribunal would escape capital punishment; and  (v) the 
need for the Tribunal to be based on Rwandan territory to enable it to take part in the struggle 
against impunity. Aptel (note 34) fn 9. 
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Secretary General's Report on the former Yugoslavia was thought to provide a 
sufficient analysis of the relevant legal issues relating to the establishment of the 
Tribunal. In addition the ICTY Statute was believed to provide an acceptable 
blueprint for the ICTR Statute.61  
 
7. Principal Organs of the ICTR 
The Security Council decided to provide the ICTR with structures similar to that 
of the ICTY.Similar to the ICTY, the ICTR consists of three organs: the 
Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and a Registry. In addition to the three 
Trial Chambers there is an Appeals Chamber common to the two Tribunals. The 
Chambers are composed of eleven independent judges, with three serving in each 
of the Trial Chambers and five judges serving in the Appeals Chamber. 
 
8. Jurisdiction of the ICTR 
The Rwanda Tribunal is a court established for the sole purpose of prosecuting 
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law commtted in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994. Article 1 of the Statute confers this limited jurisdiction on 
the Rwanda Tribunal. Similarly to the ICTY, the ICTR has subject-matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction and temporal jurisdiction 
in accordance with the limited mandate conferred by the Security Council.62 
(i) Concurrent Jurisdiction 
According to Article 8 of the ICTR Statute, the ICTR shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. The Article also states that the ICTR shall have primacy over 
the national courts of all States. The question of whether a Tribunal should be 
vested with exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction depends on factors such as the 
purpose for which the Tribunal is established, the role envisaged by the Tribunal 
in relation to national courts and the nature and extent of the crimes which the 
tribunal is intended to address.63 In the context of Rwanda, these three factors 
weighed in favour of establishing a Tribunal with concurrent jurisdiction. Rwanda 
requested the establishment of an international tribunal to supplement rather than 
supersede the jurisdiction of its national courts.64 In establishing the Rwanda 
Tribunal the Security Council recognised that the national courts of Rwanda 
would need to hear a large number of cases in addition to the cases heard by the 
ICTR. It would be virtually impossible for the ICTR to prosecute all the 
individuals responsible for crimes during the Rwandan genocide. Because of the 
fact that simultaneous or consecutive trials could violate the principle of ne bis in 
idem the ICTR was awarded primacy of jurisdiction. This means that the ICTR is 
                                                   
61 Morris & Scharf (note 28) 101. 
62 ICTR Statute Articles 2 to 5 and 7. 




authorised to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of national court of any 
state.65 
(ii) Subject-matter Jurisdiction 
First and foremost, the Rwanda Tribunal has jurisdiction over the crime of 
genocide. It has been said that the focus of the jurisdiction of the ICTR is not on 
war crimes, but on genocide as Rwanda had requested.66 Perhaps the most 
important reason for Rwanda's objection to the Rwanda Tribunal was the failure 
to restrict its jurisdiction to genocide.67 Rwanda was afraid that genocide, the 
crime that brought about the Tribunal's existence, could be relegated to a 
secondary level.68 The Security Council agreed to place genocide first on the list of 
crimes in Article 2 of the ICTR Statute but decided against limiting the list only to 
that crime. The Security Council thought that prosecuting the Hutu-dominated 
former government for genocide and excluding ‘crimes against humanity’ and 
other crimes committed by the Tutsi group would have conveyed the wrong legal 
and political message.69 According to Morris and Scharf prosecuting only one of 
the parties to the conflict would not have achieved the aims of the Security 
Council which included promoting national reconciliation by ensuring 
independent and impartial justice and alleviating the threat to international 
peace.70 Article 3 of the ICTR Statute therefore states that the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction over Crimes against Humanity. In addition Article 4 states that the 
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute Violations of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. 
 
                                                   
65 In the Rwanda Tribunal Statute the phrase ‘national courts’ was replaced with ‘courts of any 
State’ to avoid a restrictive interpretation of the primacy of the Tribunal. Uganda has however 
challenged the primacy of the ICTR over its national courts with respect to crimes committed in 
neighbouring states such as Uganda. See Letter Dated 31 October 1994 From the Charge d'Affaires a.i of 
the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council UN 
Doc S/1994/1230 (1994), reprinted in Morris & Scharf (note 28) Vol II, 362. 
66 The reason for this can be found in the statement of New Zealand, UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 345 
remtg at 5, UN Doc S/PV 3453 (1994).  
67 Morris & Scharf (note 28) 164. 
68Mr Bakuramutsa stated on behalf of Rwanda: ‘…my delegation was surprised to see in the draft 
Statute that the International Tribunal, instead of devoting its meagre resources, and probably 
equally meagre financial ones, to trying the crime of crimes, genocide, intends to disperse its energy 
by prosecuting crimes that come under the jurisdiction of internal tribunals. Furthermore nothing in 
the draft resolution and statute indicates the order of priority for crimes considered by the Tribunal. 
In these conditions, nothing could prevent the Tribunal from devoting its resources on a priority 
basis to prosecuting crimes of plunder, corporal punishment or the intention to commit such 
crimes, while relegating to a secondary level the genocide that brought about its establishment’. 
Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, Fourty Ninth Year, 3453rd Meeting, UN SCOR, 49th 
Sess, UN Doc S/PV 3453, 8 November 1994, reprinted in Morris & Scharf (note 28) Vol II, 308. 
69 D Shraga & R Zacklin ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1996) 7 EJIL 501, 508.  
70 Morris & Scharf (note 28) 164, 165. See also LJ van de Herik The Contribution of the Rwanda 
Tribunal to the Development of International Law (2005).  
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(iii) Personal Jurisdiction 
Article 5 of the ICTR Statute limits the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
natural persons. Article 5 reproduces mutatis mutandis Article 6 of the ICTY 
Statute. It is important to note that the personal jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited 
with respect to the nationality of the persons responsible for crimes committed in 
the neighbouring states of Rwanda. The territorial jurisdiction of the ICTR 
extends beyond the territory of Rwanda so as to encompass serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in neighbouring states. However the 
extended territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal only applies to Rwandan nationals. 
The reason for this was to ensure that the crimes committed outside of Rwanda 
were nonetheless related to the situation in Rwanda.71 
(iv) Territorial jurisdiction 
The territorial jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in the territory of 
Rwanda or in neighbouring states by Rwandan citizens under Article 7 of the 
Statute. The Nuremberg Tribunal was not subject to any limitation on its 
territorial jurisdiction. According to the Charter the Nuremberg Tribunal was 
established for the purpose of trying the major Nazi war criminals whose offences 
had no particular geographic location.72  
 
The territorial jurisdiction of the ICTR first extends to crimes committed within 
the borders of Rwanda. Rwandan territory also includes a portion of Lake Kivu 
which is located between Zaire and Rwanda.73 
(v) Temporal Jurisdiction 
Article 7 of the ICTR Statute provides that the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Rwanda Tribunal encompasses the crimes covered by the Statute if committed 
during the period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994. 
The reason why the first day of January 1994 was selected as the starting point for 
the temporal jurisdiction was to include the planning and preparation of the 
                                                   
71 This limited personal jurisdiction avoids unnecessarily encroaching on the territorial jurisdiction 
of states by conferring jurisdiction on the ICTR for unrelated crimes committed in neighbouring 
states that should be dealt with by the competent national authorities of those states. Morris & 
Scharf (note 28) 291. 
72 Nuremberg Charter, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279, Article 1. 
73 There are two situations in which crimes described in the Statute may have been committed by 
Rwandan citizens outside the territory of Rwanda but that will nevertheless  be considered 
sufficiently connected to the situation in Rwanda to fall within the teritorial jurisdiction of the 
ICTR. First, crimes may have been committed by Rwandan citizens who stepped across the border. 
It was believed that these people should not from the jurisdiction of an international tribunal 
established  simply because they stepped across the border. The second situation covers crimes 
which were committed in Rwandan refugee camps located in neighbouring states. As in the case of 
the ICTY the territorial jurisdiction does not require that every element of a crime should have 
occurred in Rwanda or a neighbouring state. The fact that a significant element of the crime 
occurred in one of those states may be sufficient. Morris & Scharf (note 28)  296, 297. 
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massive and systematic criminal acts that started in early April.74 The last day of 
December 1994 was selected as the end point even though this date came several 
months after the cease-fire unilaterally declared by the Rwandese Patriotic Front 
on 18 July 1994, the date when the internal armed conflict effectively ended. On 
19 July 1994 a Government of National Unity was formed.75 Morris and Scharf 
believe that the finite nature of the temporal jurisdiction, in contrast with the 
open-ended temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY, limits the deterrent value of the 
ICTR with respect to crimes committed after 1994. Dissatisfaction with the the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal was one of the seven reasons given by 
Rwanda for voting against its establishment 76. 
 
9. The Cost of Justice: Funding and its Implications for Independence 
(i) The Funding of the ICTY and ICTR 
Tribunals are expensive. The cost of Tribunals has led many to object to this form 
of implementation of international criminal law.77 The tremendous costs involved 
make it difficult for the UN to establish Tribunals in parts of the world where it 
may be equally necessary.78 The gap in resources between the ICTR and the 
national courts in Rwanda has led some to ask whether there has been a similar 
disparity between the quality of justice dispensed by the national courts and the 
Tribunal. 
 
According to Megret the question of money is ‘no less the lifeblood of justice as it 
is of war’.79 He writes that the dilemma concerning whether the Tribunal should 
be funded by the regular UN budget or through voluntary contributions illustrates 
what could be described as an ‘insoluble quandary’: on the one hand the risk of a 
                                                   
74 ‘Although the crash of the aircraft carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 
1994 is considered to be the event that triggered the civil war and the acts of genocide that 
followed, the Council decided that the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal would commence on 1 
January 1994 in order to capture the planning stage of the crimes.’ Report of the Secretary General 
Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution  955 (1994) at para 14 UN Doc S/1995/134 (1995).  
75 Morris & Scharf (note 28) 299.  
76 Rwanda explained its dissatisfaction with Article 7 as follows: ‘First my delegation regards the 
dates set for the ratione temporis competence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda from 1 
January 1994 to 31 December 1994 as inadequate. In fact, the genocide the world witnessed in April 
1994 was the result of a long period of planning during which pilot projects for extermination was 
successfully tested. For example, there were the extermination of a sub-group of Tutsis, the 
Bahimas, in Mutara in October 1990, the extermination of another Batutsi sub-group, the 
Bagogwes, in the region of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, in January and February of 1991; the massacre 
of over 300 Bahutsi in Bugesera in March 1992; and the massacre of more than 400 other Bahutsi 
in Gisenyi, in January 1993.’ UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453 mtg. at 14-15, UN Doc S/PV 3453 (1994). 
77 See also R Zacklin ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2004) 2  JCIJ 543. 
78 See SC doc S/2004/616, 23 August 2004 (‘Zacklin Report’) which states that ‘the tribunals have 
been expensive and have contributed little to sustainable national capacities for justice 
administration.’ 
79 F Megret ‘The Politics of International Criminal Justice’ (2002) EJIL 13, 5.  
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tribunal that cannot function because of lack of money, on the other hand a 
Tribunal that risks being controlled by it.80 
 
Arsanjani writes that the question of financing for the International Military 
Tribunals for Nuremberg and the Far East did not appear to have been a 
significant or problematic issue.81  Article 30 of the Charter of the IMT stated: 
‘The expenses of the Tribunal and of the Trials shall be charged by the Signatories 
against the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council for Germany.’82 
However, despite Article 30 it appears that each of the four participating Allied 
governments covered at least some, if not all, of the costs of their own staff at the 
Tribunal. In the case of the IMTFE the issue of financing was not addressed in 
the Proclamation for its establishment or in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
It seems as if in the case of the IMTFE the United States ended up paying for 
most of the Tribunal's expenses. In most cases, the costs of commissions or 
military tribunals established after World War II have been born by the 
prosecuting states.83 
 
The word ‘independence’ in the context of the ICTY and ICTR can refer to at 
least three forms of independence: The independence of the Prosecutor, the 
independence of the Judges and the independence of the Tribunals from the 
Security Council. It can refer to formal or ‘structural’ independence or real, 
substantive independence. Questions of judicial and institutional independence 
will be addressed in Chapter 3. It seems clear that the question of funding has some 
impact on the independence of the Tribunals.84 
 
Although the Chambers of the ICTY appear, at least formally, to be completely 
independent, the Tribunal, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, is 
administratively serviced by the UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). The internal 
workings of the Tribunal are subject to UN administrative rules and regulations. 
Ultimately administrative and financial control over all aspects of the Tribunal's 
                                                   
80 Ibid. 
81 M H Arsanjani ‘Financing’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta, J R W D  Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 315, 316. 
82 Ibid 316. 
83 As a result of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on 8 
September 1951, most of the expenses of the Tribunal and the occupation was paid by the 
American dominated occupation authority, America ended up paying ‘for most if not all of the 
expenses of the IMTFE.’ Some IMTFE-related costs were however paid by Japan. Ibid 317, fn 7. 
84Some believe that the financing of the ICTY could be an obstacle to achieving  impartiality and 
independence According to Trifunovska, the manner of the financing of the Tribunal through 
private donors and ‘intermeshing of NATO governments’ indicates the influence which some 
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Trifunovska, Snezana, ‘Fair Trial and International Justice: The ICTY as an example with special 
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workings is exercised by UN headquarters in New York.85 In addition, the budget 
of the Tribunal is subject to approval by the UN Controller's Office in the first 
instance, in the second instance by a Review Committee, the Advisory Committee 
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and ultimately by the Fifth 
Committee of the GA.86 It has been argued that the General Assembly, as the 
most representative organ of the UN, should have played a more substantial role 
in the establishment of the Tribunal.87 The General Assembly has however been 
granted the power to appoint the judges and to determine the budget. According 
to Article 32 of the ICTY Statute the expenses of the Tribunal will be borne by 
the regular budget of the United Nations on the basis of Article 17 of the UN 
Charter.88  
 
Whereas initially both the ICTY and ICTR were understaffed and underfunded 
the Tribunals now receive generous funding. The Tribunals receive money from 
two main sources: the UN and trust fund money from various governments. In its 
Resolution 47/235 of 14 September the General Assembly invited Member States 
and other parties to make voluntary contributions to the Tribunal both in cash 
and in the form of services and supplies. As at May 2001, the Voluntary Fund of 
the Tribunal has received approximately $32.9 million in contributions from 30 
countries.89 The UN pays the biggest share. When the ICTY was established it had 
a starting budget of $500 000. For the period from 1 January to 31 December 
2000 the General Assembly decided to appropriate an amount of $95, 942, 600 to 
the Special Account of the Tribunal.90 The 2004-2005 ICTY budget estimate was 
$327.3 million.91 
 
The ICTR started of with a budget of $13, 467, 300 in 1994.92 The ICTR received 
$86, 154, 900 for 2000. Interestingly, the amount appropriated to the ICTR for 
                                                   
85 Bassiouni (note 27) 216. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See ‘Challenges to the Establishment of the ICTY’ below. 
88According to the regular procedure, the budget is initially submitted by the Secretary General and 
reviewed by both the 16-member Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary questions 
(ACABQ) and by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. The budget is finally approved by 
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90 At the 98th plenary meeting of the fifty-fifth session on 23 December 2000 the General Assembly 
having considered the report of the Fifth Committee (A/55/691/Add.1) adopted resolution 
55/225 B, in which it appropriated $4, 899, 400 for the Tribunal for six ad litem judges for the 
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91 Press Release GA/AB/3594. The increase in the appropriation for the ICTY was attributed to 
the weakening of the dollar vis-à-vis the euro. Ibid.  
92 For the 1994 budget, see UN Document A/49/945, Report of the Fifth Committee on 
‘Financing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
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2002-2003 is significantly higher- an amount of $ 177, 739, 400. According to the 
ICTR the increase in the budget is related to heightened activities in 
investigations.93 For the period 2004-2005 the amount of $239.2 million was 
appropriated to the ICTR. The increase in the cost of the ICTR was attributed to 
the increase in the number of ad litem judges and the appointment of a separate 
Prosecutor. 94 
 
The above amounts do not include the trust funds that both Tribunals have for 
special expenses. It can be argued that the expense of the Tribunal places an 
additional responsibility on the judges and the Tribunal as a whole to be 
accountable and responsible in its judgments and general operation. 
 
Apart from the UN contribution, the United States has made the biggest financial 
contribution to the ICTY. The United States has also made significant voluntary 
contributions towards different projects.95 Pursuant to GA Resolution 47/235 a 
voluntary trust fund for contributions to the Tribunal has been established. In the 
Thirteenth Report of the ABACQ it is stated that as of February 1995, a number 
of states had contributed a total of US$ 6.08 million to the fund.96 Because of the 
significant role played by voluntary contributions and gratis personnel in setting 
up the Tribunals the role of voluntary contributions was important in the debates 
surrounding the funding of the ICC.97 Many developing countries opposed the 
idea of the ICC accepting voluntary contributions on the grounds that in the case 
of the ad hoc Tribunals most of the gratis personnel came from North America and 
Western European States which led to an imbalance in the geographical 
competence among the personnel. This was especially problematic because the 
functions of the gratis personnel included supervisory and policy competences 
which led developing countries to believe that the Tribunal was losing its 
international character in favour of becoming an Anglo-European court.98 
 
Interestingly, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, being a Tribunal established by 
treaty and not under Chapter VII of the United Nations, is not funded by the 
United Nations but relies on voluntary contributions. Over fifty countries have 
made voluntary contributions. The court has an annual budget of $15 million - 
one tenth of that of the ICTY. The Special Court initially experienced serious 
                                                   
93 See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTR, 2 October 2000, A55/435-S/2000-927. 
94 Press Release (note 91). 
95 The United States has also provided significant intelligence information to the ICTY to support 
its investigations. In addition they have provided ‘political support’. 
96 Thirteenth Report of ABACQ, Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, A/49/7/add. 12 March 1995, 11.  
97 Arsanjani (note 81) 326. 
98 As a result of this the General Assembly passed a series of resolutions strictly limiting gratis 
personnel even though it was clear that they were crucial to the work of the two Tribunals. Ibid. 
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financial pitfalls.  It will be interesting and instructive to see whether the budget 
proves sufficient.99  
 
In the context of the ICC it was feared that ‘he who pays the piper, calls the tune’. 
The parties at Rome feared that an imbalance between states' contributions and 
those by non-states entities could lead to possible influences by non-states entities 
in the operation of the court. 100 With regard to the ICTY it has been argued that 
the Tribunal is independent and autonomous because it is not under the direction 
and control of the Security Council when it comes to exercising its judicial function. 
According to some the UN has been very conscious of the fact that the Tribunal 
is a judicial organ and has been careful not to interfere.101 It can however be 
argued that the UN, by withholding funds can exercise control over the Tribunal 
in an indirect way.  
 
Bassiouni maintains that control over bureaucratic procedures and finances are the 
means by which the UN exerts political control over the activities over its organs. 
In 1995 he wrote that although bureaucratic and financial factors have at times 
slowed the progress of the Tribunal, these factors have not yet placed the 
independence or the integrity of the Tribunal in danger.102 
(ii) The Funding of the ICC 
According to Schabas, it is one of the ‘unpleasant consequences’ of the fact that 
the ICC is not a UN body that it is responsible for its own funding.103 Article 117 
of the Rome Statute allows the Court to take money based on assessed 
contributions upon State Parties following the basic scale already in use at the 
United Nations. In addition, the court may take any funds provided by the United 
Nations. In the case of Security Council referrals for example, it would seem 
fitting that the UN must be responsible.104 Proposals that the court should be 
financed solely by the UN were resisted - principally by the three biggest 
contributors to the United Nations budget, the United States, Germany and 
Japan.105 In addition Article 116 states that the court is entitled to receive and use 
any voluntary contributions from governments, international organisations, 
individual corporations and other entities. The practice of receiving voluntary 
contributions is already well entrenched in the United Nations and other 
international organisations.  
 
                                                   
99 The court has a three year budget of $ 57 million. Lecture by D Crane, Chief Prosecutor of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Hague, 4 April 2003. 
100 Arsanjani (note 81) 326. 
101 Interview with Judge Cassese, 6 June 2003.  
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Some stated that the funding of the ICC should be independent and not drawn 
from the UN.106 Some argued that requiring only State Parties or states referring 
cases to it to bear the expenses of the court could be a disincentive for states to 
join the court or initiate proceedings. Advocates of the State Parties approach 
however thought it was important to maintain the independence of the court in all 
respect. However a later view emerged that envisaged the payment of voluntary 
contributions as an additional means of financing.107  
 
10.  A Question of Pedigree: The Legality of the Establishment of the  
       Tribunals 
       Challenges to the Establishment of the ICTY 
  
(i) Arguments Against and in Favour of the Treaty Approach 
     Was the decision by the Security Council to establish the Tribunals ultra  
      vires its powers?  
 
The question of the legality of the establishment of the ICTY has attracted much 
debate and is important because it affects the authority and credibility of the 
judges of the Tribunals and of the Tribunal as an institution. Some states preferred 
the establishment of the ICTY by way of the consensual act of nations or by 
treaty. Still others believed that the General Assembly, being the most 
representative organ of the United Nations, would have been the most 
appropriate organ to establish the ICTY since it would have guaranteed full 
representation of the international community.108  
 
According to Morris and Scharf, the advantages of the treaty approach were that it 
provided States with an opportunity to ‘carefully examine and elaborate provisions 
on all aspects of the tribunal’109 and to exercise their sovereign will in the 
negotiation and conclusion of such treaty. The main argument raised against the 
treaty approach in the context of the former Yugoslavia was that too much time 
was required for the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty and for obtaining the 
necessary ratifications for its entry into force. In light of the sensitive political 
situation there was no guarantee that the states concerned whose participation 
would be essential for the effectiveness of the tribunal would have become party 
to the treaty.110 
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Interestingly, Morris and Scharf point out that the ICTY was created pursuant to a 
treaty - the United Nations Charter - and that the Security Council, in creating the 
Tribunal, acted not on behalf of individual states but on behalf of the whole 
international community of states 111 
 
States such as Mexico, France and Brazil believed that the General Assembly, as 
the most representative organ of the United Nations, should play a role in respect 
to the establishment of the Tribunal such as participating in drafting or reviewing 
its statute.112 It was considered important that the General Assembly be provided 
with a means by which it could lend its authority and prestige to the Tribunal. The 
ICTY Statute provided it with such a role in that the General Assembly was given 
the role of electing the judges, approving the budget and reviewing the Annual 
Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.113 
 
The objections to the involvement of the General Assembly were similar to the 
objections to the treaty approach. Commentators again focused on the idea that 
such a time-consuming approach could not be reconciled with the urgent need to 
address the continuing violations of international humanitarian law in the former 
Yugoslavia, as emphasised in Resolutions 780 and 808.114 
 
According to Bassiouni the involvement of the General Assembly in the 
preparation of a statute would have added a potentially time-consuming phase. He 
repeats the two advantages of establishment of the Tribunal by the Security 
Council. First, it provided an expeditious method for establishing the Tribunal 
because the Security Council could act relatively quickly on the basis of the 
Secretary General's Report and, secondly, the Security Council's decision to 
establish the Tribunal under Chapter VII would be effective immediately and 
would create binding obligations for all states.115 
 
The Report of the Secretary General concluded that a decision of the Security 
Council would be the most consistent with the Security Council's emphasis on the 
need to effectively and expeditiously implement its decision to establish the 
Tribunal. The Report of the Secretary General determined that the recommended 
action by the Security Council ‘would be legally justified, both in terms of the 
object and purpose of the decision and of past Security Council practice’.116 
 
                                                   
111 Ibid 87. 
112 See the submissions of these three countries contained in UN Doc A/47/922-S/25540 (1993), 
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Doubts about the method of establishment were, however, already raised during 
the debate on Security Council Resolution 827. Some delegates referred to ‘the 
exceptional nature or character’ of establishing the Tribunal and indicated that for 
political reasons they were willing to accept the method of establishment. 
Interestingly, China stated that the ‘exceptional’ political circumstances ‘should 
not be construed as our endorsement of the legal approach involved’.117  
 
In spite of the objections of some states, Sluiter points out that the overwhelming 
majority of states have recognized and expressed their support for the ICTY and 
ICTR in a variety of ways.118 He argues that the practice of states in this regard 
should form an important interpretative tool concerning the provisions of the UN 
Charter which attribute powers to the Security Council and which have been relied 
on by the Security Council for the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR.119 
 
The first challenge to the legality of the proposed ICTY came shortly after the 
Secretary General issued his Report and just before the Security Council adopted 
the draft statute contained therein. The challenge came in the form of a letter 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Secretary General questioning 
whether the Security Council could establish the ICTY as a subsidiary organ under 
Article 29 of the United Nations Charter.120  
(ii)  The Tadic Challenge 
The most important case in this regard has been the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision.121 
In this decision the Appeals Chamber dealt with the various ‘constitutional issues’ 
put forward by the Appellant. The diverse responses of the Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber in Tadic show the contested propositions regarding the 
reviewability of Security Council decisions posed by the creation of the tribunals. 
 
The Trial Chamber in Tadic concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review 
the action taken by the Security Council.122 It held that the competence of the 
Tribunal is narrowly defined and does not extend beyond the prosecution of 
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persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.123 
The Trial Chamber resorted to the political question doctrine derived from US 
constitutional law124 and considered the Article 39 determination of ‘threat to the 
peace’ and its choice of means to meet that threat as a non-justiciable policy 
determination. 125  
 
It is widely believed that the Trial Chamber judgment was a weak one. Alvarez 
writes that the Trial Chamber, by describing the matter as a non-reviewable 
political question, came close to suggesting that the judges should follow the 
Security Council's dictates ‘even if this were to violate defendants’ (or victims’) 
human rights or even if the Council were to mandate selective enforcement of 
international humanitarian law’.126 In essence the Trial Chamber views the Security 
Council as all-powerful and non-reviewable. 
 
The Appeals Chamber took a very different approach. The majority of the 
Appeals Chamber 127 disagreed with the view of the Trial Chamber and held that 
the principle of competence de la competence gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction.128 The Appeals Chamber’s use of the doctrine of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is treated as an example of Tribunal lawmaking in Chapter 6. 
(iii) Criticising Tadic 
The reasoning of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic has been widely criticised, 
particularly by Judge Li, and Judge Shahabuddeen. In a dissenting opinion to the 
Appeals Chamber decision Judge Li disagreed with the view that the Tribunal had 
the competence to determine its own jurisdiction. He argued that the Tribunal 
cannot review the legality of the resolutions by the Security Council. According to 
him such review is ultra vires and unlawful. In his comment in a collection of essays 
in memory of Judge Li Judge Shahabuddeen asks: If jurisdiction entitles the ICTY 
to say that it has not been validly established, in what capacity is it acting when it 
makes that determination?129 According to Shahabuddeen there are problems with 
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the view that persons who accept appointments as judges of a court and who 
swear to serve such court can, in their capacity as judges, question the validity of 
the law establishing the court. In what capacity are such persons acting when they 
make that decision? Are they acting as judges or individuals?130 Shahabuddeen 
points out that if judges say that their court was never lawfully established they are 
speaking as individuals. He writes:  
 
 If they are speaking as a court, they are exercising judicial power and 
therefore recognising the authority from which that judicial power flows; for the only way 
they can decide as a court is by affirming the validity of the law by whichthe court is 
established.  The contradiction will be that they are accepting that they are a court at the 
same time when they are denying that they are a court.131 
 
Shahabuddeen continues that the Security Council, acting under Article 96 of the 
Charter, could have referred the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. In the 
Effect of Awards 132 case the ICJ decided that the General Assembly was competent 
to establish the United Nations Administrative Tribunal as a judicial body.133 By a 
similar procedure the court could have been asked for its advice as to whether the 
Security Council was competent to establish the ICTY.  
 
Alvarez attacks the Trial Chamber position. He finds it inconsistent that the Trial 
Chamber judges aver that an issue is non-justiciable and then purport to dismiss 
this issue, ‘perfunctorily on the merits.’134 If the judges believe there is ‘no law’ to 
apply with regard to certain questions, they should also not pronounce on these 
questions. Judge Li takes the same absolutist yet logical position. In his Separate 
Opinion he argues that judicial statements about either the Security Council's 
Article 39 determination or its chosen means of dealing with a threat to the peace 
are ‘imprudent and worthless in both fact and law’.135 Alvarez states that a reason 
why the majority of the judges in the Trial and Appeals Chambers reject this 
position might be because they regard it as unacceptable for an international 
criminal court to admit that a defendant will be subject to the ‘capricious whim’ of 
the Security Council instead of the rule of law.136 
 
Bassiouni writes that similar challenges to Security Council actions have been 
unsuccessful in the past. He points out that organs of the UN enjoy a 
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presumption of legality. Security Council actions only become ultra vires once the 
presumption is rebutted.137 To rebut such presumption there would have to be a 
showing that the establishment of the tribunal is not rationally related to the 
establishment, maintenance and restoration of peace. Considering the 
international character and the ius cogens nature of the crimes committed in the 
Balkans it is hard to conceive the possibility that the presumption of validity 
would be rebutted. The ICJ, despite being described by some as the ‘ultimate 
guardian of UN legality’138 has not yet resolved the question of whether it can 
legitimately review the legality of Security Council action. 
 
Alvarez states that the legal arguments used by the Trial Chamber and the Appeals 
Chamber to affirm the legality of Tadic's prosecution by the Tribunal are in 
themselves not sufficient to legitimize a Tribunal with ‘political, foundational and 
epic goals’.139 According to Alvarez the reviewability of Chapter VII acts remain 
highly debatable. He writes it would be naïve to believe that the Tribunal, whose 
‘questionable pedigree is at stake’ has conclusively settled a question which even 
the ICJ has avoided.140 According to Alvarez the Appeals Chamber should have 
adopted some model of judicial review and of UN constitutional interpretation.141 
 
In the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision the Prosecutor stated that the ICTY ‘is not a 
constitutional court set up to scrutinize the actions of the Security Council’.142 The 
Prosecutor emphasised that the ICTY was a criminal tribunal with very limited 
defined powers and that if it were to confine its adjudication to those limits ‘it will 
not have authority to investigate the legality of its creation by the Security 
Council’.143  
 
The matter of the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal was raised by 
Milosevic after he was brought to stand trial before the ICTY.144 After Milosevic 
was arrested on 3 August 2001 defense lawyers for Milosevic summoned the 
Netherlands to release him. This request was ignored by the Netherlands and 
defense lawyers subsequently instituted interlocutory injunction proceedings 
against the Netherlands in the District Court of The Hague. The Hague District 
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Court considered itself incompetent to consider the question.145 The essence of 
Milosevic's challenge to the legality of the Tribunal was that the Tribunal should 
have been established by international convention or at least by a motion adopted 
by the General Assembly.146 The President of the District Court addressed the 
matter and said that the issue of Security Council competence has already been 
dealt with at length by Trial Chamber II and by the Appeals Chamber of the 
Tribunal in the Tadic decision. On 31 August 2001 the President of the District 
Court of The Hague pronounced his judgment, finding he had no jurisdiction to 
decide on Milosevic's application for release.147 
 
11. Challenges to the Legality of the Establishment of the ICTR 
The ICTR’s establishment by Security Council Resolution instead of by treaty was 
equally controversial.148 The treaty approach in the context of Rwanda, would 
have had similar disadvantages to those mentioned in the context of Yugoslavia. 
Ratification of a treaty was believed to be a potentially too time-consuming 
process, not reconcilable with the need to urgently address the continuing 
violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda. A treaty would have had 
to be speedily ratified not only by Rwanda but also by the neighbouring states of 
Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire and by other states harbouring Rwandan 
refugees.149 In light of Rwanda's opposition to Security Council Resolution 955, it 
is unlikely that a generally acceptable treaty could have been negotiated and 
concluded with the participation of Rwanda with the necessary speed.150 
In Ntakirutimana151 the legitimacy of the ICTR was challenged in a district court in 
the United States in which the United States, on behalf of the ICTR, requested the 
extradition of Eliziphan Ntakirutimana. The first request for extradition was 
denied by a magistrate of the US district court. Ntakirutimana's counsel argued 
that the UN Security Council exceeded its powers under Chapter VII of the 
                                                   
145 See the summary of the case ‘Judgment in the Interlocutory Injunction Proceedings Slobodan 
Milosevic v The Netherlands ‘ (2001) XLVIII  3 Netherlands International Law Review 357- 362, 394. 
146 Ibid 359. 
147Milosevic, the plaintiff, contended that the ‘so-called Tribunal’ has no basis in law and possesses 
no democratic legitimacy. He claimed that the Security Council is not competent to establish an 
international tribunal since it is not sufficiently representative of the world community.  He claimed 
that not a single rule of law exists which would entitle the Security Council to limit the sovereign 
rights of states. He contended that the establishment of the so-called Tribunal is a flagrant violation 
of the principle of the sovereign equality of all UN member states, as enshrined in Article 2 
paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. The Security Council has no jurisdiction over the individual citizens 
of states. That the so-called Tribunal can sit in judgment over its own lawfulness is neither credible 
nor acceptable. Ibid  359.  
148 The legality of the establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal was challenged by Joseph Kanyabashi, 
one of the first defendants who came before the ICTR.  Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-T, 
Decision on the Defence Motion on  Jurisdiction, 18 June 1997. 
149 Morris & Scharf (note 28)  99.  
150 Ibid 99, 100. 
151 In Re The Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Misc No L-96-005 (SD Texas, 1997). 
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United Nations Charter in establishing the Rwanda Tribunal.152 He explained why 
the Tadic judgment did not settle the question of the legitimacy of establishment 
by way of Security Council Resolution in the following terms:  
 
The Tadic opinion adds nothing to the issue. The Yugoslavia Tribunal is a    
creature of the very statute that was under challenge. The several views of   
the judges show they cannot agree on anything except their own  
legitimacy. But they fail to find a source for their creation in the  
Charter.153  
 
Ntakirutimana unsuccessfully sought to be released on the ground of habeas corpus 
and appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit 
found that it was outside the scope of the court’s habeas review to address 
Ntakirutimana’s arguments that the UN Security Council is not authorized to 
create the ICTR and that the ICTR is incapable of protecting Ntakirutimana’s 
rights under US and international law.154 The majority of the Fifth Circuit decided 
that Ntakirutimana could be extradited.155 It was decided that Ntakirutimana 
would be surrendered to the ICTR.156 
 
The first challenge brought before the ICTR was by Joseph Kanyabashi. Like the 
Tadic Trial Chamber, the Kanyabashi Trial Chamber (consisting of Presiding Judge 
Sekule, Judge Khan and Judge Pillay) rejected the defence challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal.157 Kanyabashi is however more than merely a 
copy of Tadic. The Trial Chamber continued to consider the defence motion. It 
stated that even though some of the issues raised by the defence had already been 
dealt with in the Tadic case, ‘in view of the issues raised regarding the 
establishment of this Tribunal, its jurisdiction and its independence and in the 
interest of justice…the Defence Counsel's motion deserves a hearing and full 
consideration’.158 
 
In considering the merits of the motion, the Trial Chamber rejected the principal 
objections raised by the defence. First, the defence argued that the establishment 
of the Rwanda Tribunal violated the sovereignty of States, particularly Rwanda, 
because it was it was not established by means of a treaty recommended by the 
General Assembly. The Trial Chamber stated that the accused could raise the plea 
of state sovereignty but concluded that the establishment of the ICTR did not 
                                                   
152 Memorandum in Opposition To Surrender of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, In Re The 
Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Misc No L-96-005 (SD Texas), 6 March 1997, para 20-24. 
153 Second Memorandum In Opposition To Surrender of Pastor Elzabephan Ntakirutimana, In Re 
The Surrender of Elizabephan Ntakirutimana, Misc No. L-96-005 (SD Texas), 5 May 1997, para 5. 
154 Ntakirutimana v Reno, 184  F 3d 419, 430 (5th Cir 1999), cert denied, 68 USLW 3479 (US 25 
January 2000) (No 99-479). 
155See the commentary on the case by M Coombs ‘In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana’ (2000) 94 
AJIL 171. 
156 In Re The Surrender of Elizabephan Ntakirutimana (note 153). 
157 Kanyabashi (note 148). 
158 Ibid para 6. 
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violate the sovereignty of Rwanda or the other Members of the United Nations 
which had accepted certain limitations on their sovereignty by virtue of the United 
Nations Charter and had agreed to follow and carry out Security Council decisions 
under Article 25 thereof.159 The Trial Chamber further stated that (i) there was no 
merit to the argument raised by the defence that the Rwandan conflict did not 
pose a threat to international peace and security which is a matter to be 
determined by the Security Council160 and (ii) that there was no basis for the 
‘submission that the Security Council's competence to act rested on a preexisting 
international conflict’.161 Internal conflicts too have international implications 
which can justify Security Council action.162 The court stated that the 
establishment of an ad hoc tribunal clearly falls within the ambit of measures 
adopted to satisfy the goal of restoring peace notwithstanding the absence of any 
direct mention of the establishment of judicial bodies in the nonexhaustive list of 
measures contained in Article 41 of the UN Charter. According to the Trial 
Chamber the existence of specialised bodies or institutions for the protection of 
human rights does not preclude the Security Council from taking action against 
human rights violations.163 
 
The defence challenged the supremacy of the Tribunal by arguing that the 
supremacy violated the principle of jus de non evocando.164 The Trial Chamber 
concluded that this principle was not violated. In this regard the judges quoted the 
Appeals Chamber in Tadic which stated that this principle is aimed at avoiding the 
creation of special or extraordinary courts designed to try political offences in 
times of social unrest without guarantees of a fair trial.  In the opinion of the Trial 
Chamber the Tribunal is ‘far from an institution designed for the purposes of 
removing, for political reasons, certain offenders from fair and impartial justice 
and have them prosecuted for political crimes before prejudiced arbitrators’.165  
      
 
The fourth objection of the defence was that it was contrary to the United 
Nations Charter to confer on the Tribunal jurisdiction over individuals since the 
Security Council's authority was limited to states and did not extend to 
individuals.166 In its response to this objection the Trial Chamber stated that in 
establishing the two Tribunals ‘the Security Council explicitly extended 
international legal obligations and criminal responsibilities directly to individuals 
for violations of international humanitarian law. In doing so the Security Council 
                                                   
159 Ibid para 13. 
160 Ibid para 22. 
161 Ibid  para 24. 
162 Ibid  para 7. 
163 Ibid para 8.  
164 Ibid  para 7. 
165 Ibid para 8. 
166 Ibid  para 33. 
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provided an important innovation of international law…’.167 Interestingly, the 
Trial Chamber also rejected the argument that the Security Council's failure to 
establish an international tribunal in response to other comparable situations in 
the past (such as Congo, Somalia and Liberia) precluded it from doing so in 
respect of Rwanda.168 
 
The Trial Chamber stated that it respected the ‘persuasive authority’ of the 
decision of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case.169 Kress writes 
that the ICTR’s acceptance of Tadic as quasi-precedent for Kanyabashi is desirable 
as a matter of judicial policy.170 Kress provides interesting criticism on the 
reasoning in Kanyabashi pertaining to the criminal responsibility of individuals 
under international law. In his opinion one would have expected the Trial 
Chamber to elaborate on the general statement in Tadic relating to the criminal 
liability imposed for serious violations of common Article 3 as supplemented by 
other general principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed 
conflict. The Trial Chamber seemed to miss an opportunity to further clarify 
international criminal law in the context of internal armed conflict. What it does 
instead is to describe the approach of the Security Council as embodied in the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes ‘an important innovation of international law’. 
According to Kress this reasoning is surprising. He writes that this implies that the 
Security Council, by enacting the ICTR Statute, made use of legislative power. He 
writes that it is difficult to see how the Security Council, by enacting the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes, could have ‘innovated the law’ without violating the principle of 
legality.171 The ‘seriousness’ of the crimes referred to by the Trial Chamber, does 
not, in the view of Kress, provide a sufficient justification for the extension of the 
law. In his view the Trial Chamber should have examined customary international 
law more carefully as was done in Tadic.172  
 
Fifth, the defense argued that the ICTR was not impartial and independent 
because of its establishment by the Security Council which is a political body. The 
defense characterised the ICTR as ‘just another appendage of an international 
organ of policing and coercion, devoid of independence’.173 The Trial Chamber 
responded by arguing that criminal courts worldwide are political bodies because 
                                                   
167 Ibid  para 35. 
168 The Trial Chamber stated: ‘The fact that the Security Council, for previously prevailing geo-
strategic and political reasons, was unable in the past to take adequate measures to bring to justice 
the perpetrators of crimes against international humanitarian law is not an acceptable argument 
against introducing measures to punish serious violations of international humanitarian law when 
this becomes an option under international law.’ Ibid  para 36. 
169 Ibid para 4. 
170 See the Commentary by Claus Kress in A Klip & G Sluiter (eds) Annotated Leading Cases on 
International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. II The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2001) 23. 
171 Ibid para 25. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid para 37. 
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they are created by legislatures which are eminently political bodies.174 The Trial 
Chamber noted that the ICTY in Tadic held a similar view. 
 
The Trial Chamber concluded that the independence of the ICTR was 
demonstrated by: (1) its not being bound by national rules of evidence; 175 (2) the 
requirement that the judges ‘exercise their judicial duties independently and freely’, 
‘are under oath to act honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously’ and 
‘do not account to the Security Council for their judicial function’;176 and (3) the 
requirement of the personal independence of the judges underscored by Article 12 
(1) of the Statute.177 The subject of judicial independence at the Tribunals will 
receive more attention in Chapter 3. 
 
12. Conclusion 
Many have remarked that the existence of the Tribunals as a functional reality is in 
itself a great accomplishment.178 It is of course necessary to look beyond the mere 
fact of establishment. It can be argued that only the legitimate establishment of the 
Tribunals would lend legitimacy both to the ‘ordinary’ work of the judges and to 
their more innovative lawmaking activities. It has been suggested that the legal 
arguments presented by the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber in the Tadic 
Jurisdictional Decision were not sufficient to legitimise a Tribunal with political, 
epic and foundational goals.179 The position of the Trial Chamber is especially 
problematic.  In light of the controversial nature of the Tribunals and the 
adventurous lawmaking by the judges the Trial Chamber should not have glibly 
dismissed the matter as non-justiciable. 
 
Stronger reasoning in Tadic could have legitimised not only the work of the ICTY 
but also of successor Tribunals established by Security Council Resolution such as 
the ICTR. For similar reasons it is important that the Tribunals be independent. 
Questions such as whether the sources of a Tribunal’s funding affect its 
institutional independence should be taken seriously. Questions of independence, 
legitimacy and accountability will again be addressed in Chapter 3 when judicial 
independence is considered. Before discussing the judges and their work it is 
prudent to analyse the concept and theoretical underpinnings of the term 
‘lawmaking’. 
 
                                                   
174 Ibid para 39. 
175 Ibid para 40.  
176 Ibid para 41. 
177 Ibid para 42. 
178 Bassiouni (note 27) 236. See also Sir N Stephen ‘A Viable International Mechanism’ (2004) 2 
JICJ  385; G Kirk McDonald ‘Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY’ (2004) 2  JICJ 
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  CHAPTER TWO 
 
WHEN THE RULES RUN OUT 
The Lawmaking Function of International Judges 
 
1. Introduction 
Great jurisprudential division exists about whether the judicial role is ever 
legitimately creative (or ‘legislative’) rather than exclusively declaratory (or 
‘adjudicative’).1 Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, was an 
enthusiastic proponent of the view that judges do not make the law but simply 
find the law. According to Blackstone the role of the judiciary is that of the 
‘living oracle of the law’.2  Montesquieu similarly believed that judges were 
only those through whose mouth the law spoke. In L’Esprit des lois he wrote: 
‘Judges are but the mouthpiece which recites the law – inanimate beings who 
cannot moderate either its force or its vigour.’3 The principle that only the 
legislature may make law is a view closely connected to the principle of 
separation of powers - a principle considered  fundamental to the American 
constitutional structure. Although this view has been fairly pervasive and 
tenacious it has also been described as removed from the reality of legal 
decisionmaking - a jurisprudential ‘model of straw’. It is part of the English 
positivist tradition, which will be discussed below, that judicial legislation is 
inevitable ‘when the law runs out’.4  
 
Are the judges at the ad hoc Tribunals empowered to make law? The Report of 
the Secretary General states that the Tribunals will apply only lex lata, existing 
law.5 How will the judges then fill the gaps which many acknowledge exist in 
the ‘rudimentary’ body of law called international criminal law? Could it be 
argued that the ‘law’ by which the gaps are filled exists albeit not in written 
form and that it is the task of the judges to find and discover the unwritten 
law? Judge Cassese has spoken of the judges revealing the ‘hidden rules’ of 
customary international law.6 In his view development of the law would mean 
to ‘help push’ the law in a new direction and that development of the law is 
often more a matter of interpretation than lawmaking.7 In his view judges 
must help the law to see the light.8 
                                                   
1  M D A Freeman (ed) Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 7 ed (2001) 83.  
2  W Blackstone The Commentaries on the Laws of England (1876) 47.  
3 Montesquieu wrote: ‘Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of 
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.’ The 
Spirit of the Law Vol 1 (1949) 152. 
4 D Kennedy A Critique of Adjudication (2001) 81.  
5 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 S/25704 para 
34. 






This chapter will focus on the nature of adjudication, lawmaking, interpretation 
and gap-filling in the context of international law. The peculiar nature of 
international criminal law will first be explored. The question of what 
constitutes a gap in international law and the way international judges have 
interpreted the concept of ‘lawmaking’ will be examined. The sources from 
which judges can legitimately draw to make law will also be explored. 
 
2. The (Rudimentary) Nature of International Criminal Law 
As late as 1973, academics were of the opinion that international criminal law 
‘does not really exist’.9 Lack of conformity in the ‘regulations’ governing the 
applicability of this field of law and the absence of binding rules were 
presented as reasons for this state of affairs.10  Van Bemmelen described 
writing about international criminal law as a ‘rather dismal task’.11 In 1950 
Schwarzenberger wrote that ‘international law has not yet evolved a branch of 
criminal law of its own.’12 
 
Much more recently, Cassese has written that international criminal law is a 
relatively new branch of law – a product of the late nineteenth century.13 It is 
also a rudimentary branch of law.  He suggests at least three reasons for this: 
First, treaties, and to some extent customary rules, originally confined 
themselves to prohibiting acts without laying down the criminal consequences 
of these acts. Secondly, when international law did start criminalising certain 
conduct it initially relied on national courts to prosecute and punish such 
crimes. Thirdly, when the international Tribunals were created the classes of 
crimes contained in their Statutes constituted a specification of jurisdictional 
authority rather than a general criminal code. The crimes specified were 
germane to the court’s jurisdiction and were not intended to have general 
applicability.14 
 
It has often been said that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were the major 
precedents and predecessors of the ad hoc Tribunals and presented the first 
opportunity for international judges to apply international criminal law in the 
context of the prosecution of war crimes. Schwarzenberger however calls the 
law applied by the international military tribunals international law and not 
international criminal law. He writes: ‘In form, the law applied by the 
                                                   
9 J M van Bemmelen ‘Reflections and Observations on International Criminal Law’ in M C 
Bassiouni and V P Nanda (eds) A Treatise on International Criminal Law Vol I (1973)  93.  
10  Ibid. 
11 Ibid  77. 
12 Schwarzenberger emphasised not only the underdeveloped state of international criminal law but 
also of international law. G Schwarzenberger ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law’ 
(1950) 3 Current Legal Problems 278, 293. 
13 A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 16. 
14 Ibid 17.   
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[Nuremberg] tribunal was international law: international customary law in so 
far as jurisdiction regarding war crimes in the technical sense was concerned, 
and newly established treaty law regarding crimes against peace and 
humanity.’15 It was pointed out in the Nuremberg judgment that the signatories 
of the Nuremberg Charter only did jointly what each of the countries, if in sole 
control of Germany, could have done alone.16 He writes that in their capacity 
as co-sovereigns of Germany the Powers were not limited to the application of 
the customary laws of warfare in the exercise of their condominium over 
Germany but were free to agree on applying any additional legal principles.17      
 
The ICTY and ICTR have often been described as sui generis, unique in their 
method of establishment, legal character and mandate. If one accepts the 
above view the ad hoc Tribunals would be the first true fora for the application 
of international criminal law in the context of the prosecution of war crimes. In 
light of the uncertain status of international criminal law it can be argued that 
the ICTY and ICTR have to help build a coherent new legal system. In the 
absence of clear codes and written rules the Tribunals might have to place 
strong reliance upon customary rules and unwritten general principles. Perhaps 
the judges should be understood as builders of a system rather than as fulfilling 
the traditional role of arbiters and interpreters of pre-existing laws and rules.  
 
What makes this task of system building more difficult and interesting is the 
hybrid nature of international criminal law. It is a field of law which draws 
upon international human rights law, humanitarian law and national criminal 
law in a significant way. International criminal law has the unique characteristic 
that, more than any other branch of international law, it simultaneously derives 
its origin from, and continuously draws upon, human rights law and national 
criminal law.18  
 
Within the corpus of international criminal lawyers one finds supporters of the 
view that humanitarian law should dominate and those who believe that the 
criminal law nature of the discipline should be emphasised. As a general rule, the 
humanitarian lawyers are in favour of maximising the protection afforded by 
                                                   
15 Schwarzenberger (note 12) 290. 
16 ‘The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made 
regulations for the proper conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any of 
them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up 
special courts to administer law.’ Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German 
Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, London: HMSO 1946, (Miscellaneous no 12) 38. 
17 In a similar way the unconditional surrender of Japan provided a sufficient legal basis for trying 
the Japanese war criminals in accordance with legal principles which went beyond the scope of 
international customary law. Schwarzenberger (note 12) 291. 
18 Cassese (note 13) 18. See also Allison Marston Danner &  Jenny S. Martinez ‘Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 80 who write that international criminal law sits at the 
‘confluence’ of various bodies of law. 
56
 
humanitarian law whereas the criminal lawyers tend to be more cautious in 
their approach to development. Humanitarian lawyers are more liberal in 
extending the law, criminal lawyers more conservative. Criminal lawyers 
emphasise due process, fair trial and the importance of the principle of legality. 
At the Tribunals a further subdivision can be made. Most Tribunal judges can 
be divided into international law judges and criminal law oriented judges. 
Judges Wald, May and MacDonald are examples of criminal law oriented 
judges whereas Judges Cassese, Abi Saab, Meron and Shahabuddeen19 are more 
typical international law judges – judges with a strong background and academic 
interest in international law and its development. An important difference 
between these two fields of law is that international law, being more concerned 
with regulating the behaviour and peaceful relations between states, can be 
described as a more normative system of law (a system concerned with how 
states should behave) than criminal law which can be described as a coercive 
system, (a system concerned with the prevention of crime) with more severe 
consequences for individuals.  
 
What are the consequences of the unwritten, rudimentary nature of 
international criminal law and how does this affect the lawmaking of the 
judges? International criminal law rules, because of their essentially unwritten 
nature, are relatively indeterminate, adaptable to new circumstances and 
possess a certain ‘malleability’ and flexibility. This malleability can also make 
this field of law easy to manipulate. Because there is less law and less precedent 
in international criminal law it seems more appropriate, even necessary, to 
make law. At the same time the need for lawmaking should be reconciled with 
fair trial guarantees, respect for individual freedom and respect for the 
principle of legality.   
 
3. The Concept of Lawmaking 
The imperceptible process in which the judicial decision ceases to be an application of existing 
law and becomes a source of law for the future is almost a religious mystery into which it would 
be unseemly to pry. 
Hersch Lauterpacht20 
What does it mean to say that judges make law? Some believe that a judge 
makes law every time she interprets and applies a legal provision.21 Others 
reserve the term ‘lawmaking’ for instances where the law is extended to new 
areas of law or to the filling of legal gaps. For the purpose of this study 
lawmaking refers not simply to every application and interpretation of law. The 
term lawmaking is understood as applying to instances in which the Tribunals 
                                                   
19 For the professional background of ICTY judges, see Chapter 4. 
20 H Lauterpacht The Development of International Law by the International Court  (1958) 21. 
21 M Boot Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Nullum Crimes Sine Lege and the Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2002)18. 
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filled gaps or extended the law. Not every instance of interpretation will 
constitute lawmaking. Interpretation will only constitute lawmaking if 
interpretation serves to fill a gap in the law or to extend the law to new areas. 
The question of legal gaps will be addressed below. 
 
Judicial lawmaking is often (negatively) described as judicial legislation. It is 
generally accepted that the process of lawmaking through legislating requires 
value judgments, which, by nature of their subjectivity, is also political. Because 
legislating is political it should be done by elected officials operating under a 
norm of accountability to their constituents. Adjudication, on the other hand, 
determines the rights of parties to a dispute. It is generally agreed that the rule 
of law requires that parties have a right to the determination of their rights by a 
process that is not tainted by subjective political preferences of judges.22 The 
exercise of force against citizens must be justified in two ways: First, by appeal 
to a norm produced by the democratic decisionmaking process embodied in 
legislation and, secondly, by the application of a norm to the facts in a process 
that is independent of the decisionmaking process that generated it.23 Judicial 
legislation is problematic because it violates these requirements. 
 
Many have interpreted the idea of ‘making law’ as ‘developing the law’. 
Lauterpacht writes that the indirect purpose of the ICJ is to develop 
international law.24  To him the law applied by judges is not the ‘mechanical 
product of an effortless interpretation of the clear manifestations of the will of 
States’.25  He describes the controversy of whether judges make law or merely 
reveal the law as ‘highly unreal’ 26 and of insignificant practical importance.27  
 
Judges avoid the use of terms suggesting that they make law and prefer to use 
terms which indicate that all they are doing is to work out the true meaning of 
existing legal principles – they are just interpreting or developing the law.28 In 
commenting on the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision29 Cassese said that an effort was 
made not to create criminal law. He also admits that judges are reluctant to admit 
that they make law even if that is what they are doing.30  
 
                                                   
22 Kennedy  (note 4) 27. 
23 Ibid 27, 28. 
24 Lauterpacht (note 20)  66. 
25 Ibid 21, 22. 
26 Ibid  21. 
27 Ibid. 
28 According to Lauterpacht the denial of the ICJ judges of any intention to legislate is legitimate 
and proper.  See Lauterpacht (note 21)156, 157. According to Kennedy any individual judge making 
any particular rule has an interest in presenting the rule choice as not being judicial legislation. See 
Kennedy (note 4) 29. 
29 Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-AR72A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction,  2 October 1995 (‘Tadic Jurisdictional Decision’). 
30 Interview Judge Casesse, 6 June 2003, Florence. 
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What does ‘developing the law’ mean in the context of international criminal 
law? It is argued here that developing international criminal law will involve 
extending the application of concepts to areas where they were previously not 
applied to and updating international humanitarian law. 
 
Judges themselves often announce that they are not automatons and that the 
judicial role is influenced by factors extraneous to the law. American judges 
provide one with particularly colourful pronouncements in this regard. For 
example, the American Judge McReynolds insists that a judge should not be ‘an 
amorphous dummy unspotted with human emotions’.31 What is the 
relationship between the claim that the judicial function can be influenced by 
factors outside the law and the question of whether judges should make law?  If 
judges are influenced by extrajudicial considerations they will not merely be 
applying or stating existing law. Those opposed to judicial lawmaking state that 
judges should merely state or apply the law.   
 
As will become evident in the discussion of the views of international judges 
such as Judges Lauterpacht and Cassese, it is especially international law judges 
with backgrounds as international law professors who insist on the desirability 
of developing the law.32 To some making law and developing law is almost 
indistinguishable. Judge Alvarez remarked that ‘in many cases it is quite 
impossible to say where the development of law ends and where its creation 
begins’.33  
 
Judge Shahabuddeen has given the question of lawmaking by international 
judges the most extensive academic attention. In addressing the ‘old quarrel’ of 
whether decisions of the ICJ create law he makes a number of observations 
relevant to lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals.34 He presents the views of 
several ICJ Judges (such as Judges Krylov 35 and Tanaka 36) on the question 
whether the court is a lawmaking body. He concludes that the passages in 
question do not necessarily exclude the view that the court has a limited power 
                                                   
31 H Abraham The Judicial Process (1998) 352, 353. 
32 See Antonio Cassese ‘Black Letter Lawyering v Constructive Interpretation: The Vasiljević Case’ 
(2004) 2  Journal of International Criminal Justice, 265 and Lauterpacht (note 20). 
33 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 
1949, Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez, ICJ Reports 1949, 190. 
34 Shahabuddeen Precedent in the World Court  (1996) 90.  
35 In Judge Krylov’s view ‘the Court can only interpret and develop the international law in force; it 
can only adjudicate in conformity with international law.’ Reparation for Injuries Suffered (note 34) 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Krylov, 219, quoted in Shahabuddeen ibid 84. 
36 ‘Undoubtedly, a court of law declares what is the law, but does not legislate. In reality, however, 
where the borderline can be drawn is a very delicate and difficult matter. Of course judges declare 
the law, but they do not function automatically. We cannot deny the possibility of some degree of 
creative element in their judicial activities.’ South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka ICJ Reports 1966, 277, quoted in Shahabuddeen ibid. 
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of creativity.37 Shahabuddeen points out that whereas a legislature can enact 
legislation where no relevant law existed, the court cannot do this and 
  
…must proceed on the basis that the law which it lays down is somehow implicit in the 
existing legal system. However when it has done so, it may well appear that, contrary to 
the asserted mode of operation, new law has in fact been made.38 
 
He summarises the dilemma of judicial lawmaking in international law as a 
question of whether and at what point a process of development of the law 
eventuates in the creation of law.39 Shahabuddeen concludes that even though the 
ICJ, if it ever had to answer the question of whether it makes law would give a 
negative answer,40 it nevertheless has ‘a power of limited creativity’.41 Just as it 
would be an exaggeration to suggest that the court is a legislator, so it would be an 
exaggeration to assert that it cannot create any law at all.42  
 
Shahabuddeen believes that the Tribunals can play an important role in the 
progressive development of international law.43 He believes that nullum crimen sine 
lege, although important, does not have to impede the development of the law. He 
addresses the influence of the severity of the crimes the accused at the Tribunals 
are charged with on the interpretation of international criminal law at the 
Tribunals.44 He maintains that the fact that the conduct of the accused ‘would 
shock or even appal decent people is not enough to make it unlawful in the 
absence of a prohibition’.45 
 
According to Shahabuddeen it does not accord with reality to suggest that the ICJ 
may develop the law only in the limited sense of bringing out the true meaning of 
existing law in relation to particular facts.  The development of the law is not 
limited (as it is in domestic law) to determining, for example, whether a statutory 
reference to ‘domestic animal’ includes a particular animal.46 Shahabuddeen 
believes that another way of asking whether development of law results in the 
creation of law is to ask whether decisions of a court can serve as sources of law.47 
                                                   
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid  91. 
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But it does not follow from the fact that judicial decisions are not primary sources 
of international law that judges do not create new law.  In spite of the absence of a 
system of precedent at the Tribunals48 ICTY decisions are increasingly cited by 
domestic and international courts and are expected to form an important source 
of authority for future ICC decisions.49 The Bouterse decision of the Court of 
Appeals of Amsterdam50 is an example of a case that was directly inspired by 
ICTY jurisprudence.51 In the Jorgic case the German Federal High Court of 
Germany relied on the Akayesu case in its interpretation of destructive intent as an 
element of genocide.52 
 
In the context of the ICJ one encounters conflicting pronouncements by judges 
on the issue of judicial lawmaking. Judge Read declared that the court ‘is not a 
law-making organ’.53 In the Barcelona Traction case, however, Judge Armand-Ugon 
said: ‘The Permanent Court and the International Court, which were created by 
states, have the capacity to lay down mandatory rules of law in the same way as 
any national legislature.’54 On the other hand, Judge Krylov has stated: ‘The court 
can only interpret and develop the international law in force; it can only adjudicate 
in conformity with international law.’55 
In the South West Africa case Judge Tanaka stated the position as follows: 
 
Undoubtedly, a court of law declares what is the law, but does not legislate. In reality, 
however where the borderline can be drawn is a very delicate and difficult matter. Of 
course, judges declare the law; but they do not function automatically. We cannot deny 
the possibility of some degree of creative element in their judicial activities. What is not 
permitted to judges, is to establish law independently of an existing legal system, 
institution or norm. What is permitted to them is to declare what can be logically inferred 
                                                   
48 The Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski held that the interests of certainty and predictability require 
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from the raison d’etre of a legal system, institution or norm. In the latter case the lacuna in 
the intent of legislation or parties can be filled.56 
 
 This passage seems to leave open the possibility that the court may have a limited 
power   of creativity. Whereas a legislature can enact legislation where no relevant 
law existed or deliberately change the accepted law, the court must proceed on the 
basis that the law it lays down is somehow implicit in the existing legal system.57 
 
Lauterpacht acknowledged the lawmaking function of judges. He writes that ‘the 
fact remains that judicial lawmaking is a permanent feature of administration of 
justice in every society’.58  According to Lauterpacht judicial caution or judicial 
hesitation59 has been a characteristic feature of the ICJ. The understanding has 
been that judges may cautiously shape and alter the law but it is not within their 
province to make law. Judges have to apply the law in force – it is not their 
function to change the law deliberately to make it conform to their own views of 
justice.60 
 
According to Lauterpacht one reason for the exercise of restraint is the 
importance of the subject matter on which courts have to decide. 61 The judges 
cannot experiment or innovate as easily in matters in which states have an interest 
as in those involving private individuals.62  This reason does not apply directly to 
the work of the Tribunals. Whereas states have direct and indirect interests in the 
work of the Tribunals, the Tribunals are primarily concerned with individual 
criminal responsibility which gives rise to its own set of reasons for practising 
restraint – one such reason being the fact that severe sentences can be imposed. 
Another reason for restraint is the importance of the principle of legality. 
Lauterpacht provides a third reason for the advisability of restraint: ‘If 
Governments are not prepared to entrust with legislative functions bodies 
composed of their authorised representatives, they will not be prepared to allow or 
tolerate the exercise of such legislative activity by a Tribunal enjoined by its Statute 
to apply existing law.’63 In the context of the Tribunals it can be asked whether the 
drafting of the Statute and Rules (which was authorised by governments) does not 
amount to authorisation of some measure of legislative activity. 
 
The ICJ, in taking a cautious approach, has been confronted with the question of 
whether it should only act on principle or whether it should also explicitly state the 
principle in question. Similarly, the ICJ has to decide whether it ought to state not 
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only the legal rule it applies but whether it should also state the wider principle 
underlying the rule. If one one supports a wide interpretation of the scope of the 
court’s work one will be in favour of the court explicitly stating the principles 
underlying its decisions. It can be argued that in its capacity as an organ which can 
be expected to develop international law, in addition to deciding cases, and to 
secure the requisite degree of certainty in the administration of justice, the court 
ought to give a wider interpretation of the scope of its task.64 The fact that 
Tribunal decisions are increasingly important for the development of international 
criminal law generally also calls for ‘wider interpretation’ of the scope of the task of 
the Tribunals. In the Celebici Appeals decision it was agreed that  
 
so far as international law is concerned, the operation of the desiderata of consistency, 
stability and predictability does not stop at the frontiers of the Tribunal […] The Appeals 
Chamber cannot behave as if the law in the international community whose interests it 
serves is none of its concern.65 
 
In spite of the arguments for restraint it is argued that the necessity for bold 
judicial action is particularly great in the international sphere. An important reason 
is that this is a system of law in which legislative opportunities for modifying rigid, 
unjust and obsolete rules are nominal.66  According to Lauterpacht the need for 
judicial lawmaking is intensified by the strong inducement to supplement and 
remedy the deficiencies and inconsistencies in an imperfect system of law.67   
 
Lauterpacht distinguishes between five different ways in which judicial legislation 
takes place at the ICJ: First, judicial legislation takes place where an appearance of 
legislative novelty has occasionally been created as the result of the application of 
a general principle of law. Secondly, judges have made law by relying on principles 
which might seem novel but have merely drawn consequences from parallel 
developments in other spheres of international law. Thirdly, in some decisions the 
court has proceeded on the assumption that there was no generally accepted rule 
of international law on the subject and has laid down principles governing the 
matter. Fourthly, it has allowed what it considers to be the flexibility of 
international law to serve as a basis for decisions of a legislative character. Fifthly, 
it has made an attempt to regulate the interests involved in the dispute before it by 
going beyond the interpretation of the existing law.68  
 
The ad hoc Tribunals have made law in similar ways. They have applied general 
principles of law and have drawn from parallel developments in other areas, most 
frequently from developments in international humanitarian law and human rights 
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law.  The Tribunals have often relied on the flexible nature of international 
criminal law. When there has been no generally accepted rule in international law 
(such as the definition of rape for example) the Tribunals have gone beyond the 
interpretation of existing law to create new law. The Tadic Appeals Chamber went 
beyond the interpretation of existing law when it decided to abandon the literal 
definition of protected persons by focusing more on the factor of allegiance than 
formal nationality in determining the protective regime.69 By finding that the 
Bosnian Serbs acted as de facto agents of another state (the FRY), (which was 
necessary to qualify the conflict as international), the Appeals Chamber expanded 
the scope of protection of humanitarian law. In order to try Tadic for grave 
breaches, such a finding was crucial for both the Trial and Appeals Chambers.  
 
4. Interpretation as Lawmaking 
It is widely acknowledged that judges make law through interpretation. In a 
common law system when judges reformulate rules in the process of applying 
them to particular cases, the reformulations become part of the body of ‘sources’ 
of law in later cases.70  
 
Adventurous interpretation is often attacked as constituting lawmaking.71 In his 
separate opinion in Tadic Judge Li described the majority decision as ‘an 
unwarranted assumption of legislative power.’ 72 But it is clear that the tools of 
interpretation have helped judges to fill gaps in the Statutes and the law. 
 
Since the ad hoc Tribunals were established by the Security Council and are 
therefore ‘derived’ from the UN Charter73 the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties on interpretation can be applied. In the Tadic 
decision it was decided that even though the Statute is not a treaty the rules of 
treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna convention are relevant.74 Even 
though Tribunal judges have not always explicitly mentioned the Vienna 
Convention they have used the interpretative scheme of the Convention,75 
including the support it provides for a purposive or contextual approach.76 For 
instance, in order to give effect to the purpose of the ICTY Statute, to prosecute 
persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Tadic Appeals 
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Chamber decided to classify the conflict as international.77 The ICTY’s use of the 
purposive approach is discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The Tribunals have also relied on the literal approach or the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
words78 but have not made law in this way. The purposive approach is of course 
the approach more suitable to making law. Nollkaemper describes the ICTY’s 
approach to the identification of law as ‘quintessentially teleological’.79 In the spirit 
of the purposive approach, the Tribunals have, for example, referred to their 
purpose in protecting ‘human dignity’. In Furundzija the Trial Chamber redefined 
rape and stated that the broader definition helped to promote the ‘fundamental 
principle of protecting human dignity.’ 80 It can be argued that the Tribunals have 
at times been more concerned with what is desirable than with what is required by 
positive law. 
 
Schabas argues that in criminal cases the rule of strict construction can be a more 
appropriate method of interpretation than purposive interpretation.81 Strict 
construction requires one to interpret a law against the state.82 The Tribunals have 
however made use of strict construction only to a very limited extent. In Tadic the 
Appeals Chamber held that ‘…in applying these criteria, any doubt should be 
resolved in favour of the Defence, in accordance with the principle in dubio pro 
reo.’83 The principle of strict construction was discussed in the Celebici case.84 
 
5. Gap Filling as Lawmaking 
The indeterminacy of law is often discussed under the doctrine of ‘gaps’ or lacunae 
in the law. Cassese describes international criminal law as a body of law which is 
still rudimentary and ‘replete with lacunae’.85 Schabas writes of the ‘laconic Statute’ 
of the ICTY.86 
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Judges often have the job of filling gaps and resolving ambiguities or conflicts in 
the law.87 The need for gap filling has perhaps been expressed most eloquently by 
American Supreme Court judges. Judge Cordozo discussed the need for judicial 
creativity and the limits on such creativity imposed by the specific and restricted 
sphere of judicial action. Cordozo asserted, paraphrasing Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
that the judge’s power of innovation is ‘[i]nsignificant …when compared with the 
bulk and pressure of the rules that hedge him on every side’. A judge, Cordozo 
maintained, ‘legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. How 
far he may go without travelling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot be 
staked out for him on a chart…’.88 Cordozo believed that a judge must respect 
‘the bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom’.89  
 
The doctrine of ‘gaps’ is premised on the idea of the law as a complete system. 
Writers as diverse as Lauterpacht and Kelsen believed in the existence of a closing 
rule underlying any legal system.90 These writers believed that anything that the 
law does not explicitly prohibit, is ipso facto permitted to its subjects.91 Some, such 
as Lauterpacht, would then argue that the existence of a closing rule makes 
international law, as a system, complete. To Lauterpacht the completeness of law 
has the status of an ‘a priori assumption’.92 
 
What is an example of a substantive gap in the law? Bodansky uses the following 
example: Two people who do not know the rules of tennis decide to invent their 
own rules and decide that if a ball hits the court inside the line the ball is ‘in’ and if 
it hits outside the line it is ‘out’. They begin playing and after a while a ball hits the 
line. Is the ball ‘in’ or ‘out’? The rules they agreed upon do not cover this case. 
This is also an example of what Bodansky calls ‘an ontological non liquet’.93 This 
illustrates the relation between the doctrine of gaps and the doctrine of non liquet. 
An ontological non liquet, according to Bodansky, could result from a substantive 
gap in the law, such that the law fails to answer a legal question.94 The inability of 
the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons to determine whether the use of nuclear weapons in an extreme 
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circumstance of self-defence is lawful or unlawful is one of the most dramatic 
examples of the finding of a non liquet in the international context.95  
 
Similar to the doctrine of gaps, the non liquet doctrine is also premised on the idea 
of international law as a complete system. The literal meaning of non liquet is ‘it is 
not clear’ - the term refers to an insufficiency in the law.96 The doctrine of non 
liquet implied that international law as a legal system was incomplete.97 According 
to this doctrine states were only subject to the rule of law in so far as they have 
consented to a certain rule. This means that not all conflicts between states could 
be resolved through the law and that international courts could refuse to 
adjudicate if they found the law to be incomplete.98 
 
 Dekker and Werner distinguish between three different types of gaps in the law: 
material gaps, jurisdictional gaps and judicial gaps.99 According to these writers the 
problem of non liquet is related to the third kind of gap: judicial gaps. A legal 
system has judicial gaps if its tribunals ‘otherwise endowed with jurisdiction to fill 
in material gaps by means of interpretation or the creation of new rules and 
principles’ can refuse to decide a legal question on the ground that the law is 
insufficient, lacking clarity or non-existent.100 To them the relevant question is 
whether a competent legal tribunal is in the position to refuse to answer a legal 
question on the basis of material gaps in the legal system.101  Lauterpacht states 
that the question of non liquet only arises when a court refuses to give a decision 
after it has already assumed jurisdiction and when the refusal is based ‘on the 
absence or insufficiency of the applicable substantive law’.102 
 
Much of the work of Hart has been concerned with the question of what happens 
when legal rules run out. He believed that judges must use their discretion to make 
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law when legal rules have ‘open texture’.103 There are a number of ways in which 
legal rules may fail to cover factual situations. Hart’s example is the rule: ‘No 
vehicles in the park’.104 Does this rule apply to motorcycles or roller skates? Hart 
argued that with all general rules there will be a core of certainty and a ‘penumbra 
of doubt’ when the application of the rule would be uncertain.105 Because of this 
‘open texture’ of language it happens that although the vast majority of cases 
brought before the courts uncontroversially fall within or without of the purview 
of established law there will remain a number of cases in which judges must go 
outside authoritative legal sources in making their pronouncements. Because of 
this indeterminacy a judge cannot be criticized on legal grounds for choosing one 
of the alternatives. In this sense a judge has a discretion.106  
 
Raz writes that a gap arises in one of two situations: ‘where the law speaks with an 
uncertain voice’ (indeterminacy or vagueness) or ‘where it speaks with many 
voices’ (unresolved conflicts).107 Raz might object to the practice of the Tribunals 
to resort to general principles to fill gaps in the law on the basis that general 
principles themselves are often vague. It is however important to keep in mind 
that Hart and Raz’s theory of gaps belongs to the school of legal positivism and 
that international lawyers and judges often refer to gaps more freely or loosely and 
outside of the context of positivism. 
 
Some believe that the prohibition of a non liquet says something about the duty of 
judges. A judge is said to have a duty never to refuse to give a decision ‘on the 
ground that the law is non-existent, or controversial, or uncertain and lacking in 
clarity’.108 In some systems the duty is explicitly stated. The French Civil Code 
provides that ‘a judge who refuses to decide a case, on the pretext that the law is 
silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted as being guilty of denial of 
justice’.109 In the context of international criminal law allowing judges to only 
apply the law would make a finding of non liquet the rule rather than the exception. 
The fact that there are areas and questions which are not covered or regulated by 
international law does not give rise to non liquet. What gives rise to non liquet is the 
existence of gaps within international law.110 Some believe that international courts 
are not absolutely prohibited from finding a non liquet and that finding a non liquet 
may be a good alternative to accepting the unsatisfactory status quo and 
undermining the credibility of a court through rampant lawmaking.111 In the 
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context of the ICTY, Nollkaemper has suggested that, instead of artificially relying 
on customary international law to fill gaps, the Tribunal could simply recognise 
that however reprehensible the acts in the former Yugoslavia might have been, the 
international community has not yet been able to adopt all the necessary rules 
criminalising such acts.112 
 
The fact that the ICJ in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons opinion eschewed a law-
creating role and took a modest view of the function of the ICJ can also be 
described as an extreme example of judicial restraint.113 President Bedjaouni stated 
that the Court should resist ‘any temptation’ to create new law.114 In his 
Declaration in this case he stated that that if there are imperfections in 
international law (as there appears to be in the area of nuclear weapons), it would 
be a task of the international community to correct these imperfections.115  
 
Koskenniemi writes that when uncertainty (gaps) arises, there seems to be two 
ways to ‘salvage’ the idea of completeness: a judge may note that the gap is only 
‘spurious’ in which case he may simply note that the law provides no remedy or he 
may refer to the use of constructive principles which provide a substantive legal 
decision.116 According to Kennedy, international courts faced with gaps may have 
recourse to such gap-filling tools as the rules of interpretation, thumb-rules and 
procedural presumptions.117 Werner and Dekker however write that the problem 
of non liquet is not whether material gaps in the law can be filled or remedied by 
extensive interpretation of rules or by resorting to general principles of law. The 
authors quote Higgins who wrote:  
 
To accept the possibility of non liquet, one has to accept not only that international law has 
gaps, but that these gaps are not remediable either by a liberal interpretation of the judicial 
function or by reference to Article 38 (1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice or the ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’.118 
 
The ICTY was confronted with a gap in the law in deciding whether Article 3 of 
the Statute was applicable in both international armed conflicts and internal armed 
conflicts. Article 3 concerns violations of the laws and customs of war and lacks 
express reference to the kind of conflict required. The Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Jurisdictional Decision made use of purposive interpretation to fill this gap in 
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the law.119 This instance of gap-filling is discussed in Chapter 6. It illustrates how 
applying purposive interpretation can be a gap- filling tool. 
 
According to Dekker and Werner it is beyond doubt that judges can decide any 
case before them on the basis of rules and principles or on the basis of 
unarticulated principles or aims and values underlying the legal system. Courts and 
tribunals will therefore in their view always have the possibility to prevent a non 
liquet. In their opinion the important questions are (a) whether a court should 
always refrain from pronouncing a non liquet and (b) whether the possibility of a 
non liquet would be ruled out by a closing rule.120 It is suggested that even though it 
would be difficult to accept that the existence of a closing rule would rule out a 
non liquet121 in all circumstances, the practical implications of pronouncing a non 
liquet would probably prevent Tribunal judges from doing so. Pronouncing a non 
liquet will probably lead to the acquittal of an accused. The argument of 
Nollkaemper, that the Tribunals should sometimes state that there is no law rather 
than resort to weak reasoning or reach for general principles to ‘find’ or create 
law,122 might have intellectual appeal but it is highly unlikely that the Tribunals 
would acquit on this basis. 
 
6. Common Law Lawmaking 
The common law has often been described as law developed by judges.123 Initially 
the common law was understood as a preexisting body of rules which judges 
merely ‘discovered’ rather than created. Some believe that it is only in the 
twentieth century with the rise of legal realism that there has been an 
acknowledgement that judges in fact ‘make’ the common law.124 But the idea that 
common law judges make law is not a recent one. In 1882 Sir James Stephen 
acknowledged that judges have a lawmaking function: ‘[E]very decision on a 
debated point adds a little to the law by making that point certain for the 
future.’125 According to Rantoul the doctrine of stare decisis is an absolute 
prerequisite of common law lawmaking: without this principle common law courts 
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University, 8 and 9 March 1995, www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/scalia  published in A Scalia 
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997). 
124 O W Holmes The Common Law (1881 new ed. 2005) 86. 
125 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, 550-551. 
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will not be making any law, they will just be resolving a particular dispute that 
comes before them.126   
 
Abraham describes common law as ‘judge-made, bench-made law’ rather than a 
fixed body of definite rules such as the modern civil codes.127 The common law, 
in the view of Pound is ‘a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating 
legal problems.’128 Because it is based on precedent, the common law grows and 
develops by virtue of judicial decisions.    
 
Since common law is predominantly judge-made law, the judge is the creator, 
interpreter and modifier of the laws.129 Abraham believes that even if a judge is 
just interpreting the law, he may be creating it. The three characteristics of the 
common law that have enabled it to develop and expand have been first, its 
vitality and capacity to sustain change, secondly, its practical quality and, thirdly, 
the rendition of law as a moral obligation to be obeyed.130 Holmes emphasised the 
fact that the common law cannot be understood ‘as a book of mathematics’ – the 
law is vital and must grow according to what is expedient for the community 
concerned.131    
 
But what are the implications of the fact that common law judges help create law 
for the field of criminal law? Judges clearly have to be more careful about making 
criminal law than civil law. Whereas the field of civil law may be inherently 
retrospective in operation and character, criminal law (because of the importance 
of the principle of legality) must be prospective.132 
      
Considerable controversy exists over the question of whether English judges still 
have power to create new offences. It seems clear that, historically, English judges 
had this power.133 In R v Shaw the House of Lords asserted a right to create new 
offences as required to enable it to carry out its role as custos morum.134 This idea 
has attracted much criticism. The House of Lords hinted in R v Knuller that it 
would not seek to exercise such powers even though it continues to possess such 
powers.135 In this case however the House of Lords gave birth to a new crime of 
conspiracy to outrage public decency. In 1975 in the Withers case the House of 
Lords conceded that it had given up this power.136 The obvious objection to the 
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court’s power to create offences was that this power is inevitably retrospective in 
character. The power to create offences will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Increasingly the Anglo-American system consists of a mixture of common and 
statutory law. Because of the constraints on judicial activism in the criminal law it 
can be argued that criminal law is not really illustrative of how common law 
works.137 Criminal law is also becoming more and more codified in common law 
countries. In certain areas of statutory law little discretion is left to the judge.138  
With regard to the application of the US Criminal Code, for example, a court only 
has discretion regarding the laws that prescribes what constitutes a crime but 
almost no discretion with regard to penalties.139  
 
7.  Sources of International Criminal Law 
(i)  Article 38 
A distinction should be drawn between law and the sources of law. In the 
introdution to this study, the term ‘law’ is defined as a system of rules.140 Brownlie 
defines a source of law as ‘[T]hose legal procedures and methods for the creation 
of rules of general application which are legally binding on the addressees.’141 
 
If one accepts that international judges make law, what are the sources of 
international criminal law Tribunal judges can legitimately draw on when making 
law? The scope of this chapter does not allow for a complete exposition of the 
traditional sources. Since the ICTY and ICTR Statutes unlike the ICC Statute do 
not contain a special list of sources, the focus will be on the lawmaking capacity of 
the sources listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. It will be argued that these 
sources can be lawmaking tools, that they have potential to develop the law when 
used creatively. 
 
Article 38 refers to the two most important sources of international law, that of 
treaties and custom. Article 38 also refers to other sources of international law, 
namely general principles of law recognised by civilised nations and, as a 
subsidiary source, judicial decisions and writings of publicists. In Bassiouni’s view 
the writings of publicists cannot be deemed a source of international criminal law 
since it could violate the principle of legality.142  Treaties as a source of 
international law will receive less attention here than custom, general principles or 
judicial decisions. The existence of a relevant treaty will usually obviate the need 
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for lawmaking. Since treaties tend to regulate only specific matters of concern to 
relevant contracting states they are also not ideally suited to be used as lawmaking 
tools. For purposes of facilitating lawmaking at the Tribunals, custom and general 
principles are resorted to most frequently.    
 
Cassese writes that resort to these sources should be made in order of 
hierarchy.143 One should first look for a treaty and, failing an applicable treaty, one 
should look for a customary rule or a general principle of international law. Only if 
no relevant rule can be found in this way can one apply general principles of law 
recognised by the domestic legal orders of states. 
 
(ii) Custom 
Article 38 (1) (b) lists ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’ as a source of law. According to Cassese the main feature of 
custom is that it is not a deliberate lawmaking process.144 Kelsen described custom 
as ‘unconscious and unintentional lawmaking’.145 When states participate in 
creating norms of custom they do not act for the primary purpose of laying down 
international rules. Their primary concern is to safeguard some economic, social 
or political interest.146 The birth of a new international rule is only the side effect 
of a state’s conduct in international relations.147 
 
The two main requirements for the existence of a rule of customary law are state 
practice (usus) and opinio juris.148 Since proof of opinio juris is often difficult to 
obtain opinio juris will often be presumed to be present when sufficient evidence of 
state practice can be found.149 It seems as if custom in international criminal law 
and specifically at the Tribunals is determined in a different way from the way 
custom is traditionally determined in international law. Mettraux remarks that 
opinio juris has played a dominant role in the determination of custom by the 
Tribunals.150 He explains that state practice often assists in explaining or justifying 
the finding by the Tribunals that a norm is a customary norm. The practice 
however rarely constitutes the rule.151 As a result customary rules in international 
criminal law have emerged even where state practice was rare and far from 
consistent. Nollkaemper comments on the fact that, in determining custom, the 
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Tribunals have often been satisfied with ‘extremely limited case law’.152 Although 
the accepted rule is that the existence of a customary norm is established ‘by 
induction based on an analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing state 
practice, and not by deduction based on preconceived ideas’ as to what the law 
should be in international criminal law the Tribunals have frequently ‘turned the 
customary process on its head’153 stating the rule first and then explaining 
subsequent state practice in light of the rule.154 Mettraux writes the following: 
 
The statement that a norm is customary is therefore only ever as good as the explanation 
referred to by the court in support of its finding to that effect. Regrettably, many a 
Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals has been too ready to brand norms as customary, 
without giving any reason or citing any authority for that conclusion.155  
 
The Martens Clause has similarly had an important influence on the 
unconventional determination of custom at the Tribunals. Cassese claims that 
because of the influence of the Martens clause,156 usus and opinio juris, as elements 
of customary law, play a different role in humanitarian law than in international 
law generally.157 The clause, which has been taken up in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the First Additional Protocol, puts the ‘laws of humanity’ and 
the ‘dictates of the public conscience’ on the same footing as the ‘usages of States’ 
(ie state practice) as historical sources of international law.158 Cassese states that as 
a consequence, it is logically admissible to infer that the requirement of state 
practice may not be strictly required for the formation of a principle or rule based 
on the laws of humanity. The Martens Clause loosens the requirement of usus 
while at the same time elevating opinio juris to a rank higher than normally 
admitted.159 The ICTY relied on the Martens clause quite extensively in the 
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Kupreskic case.160 The ICTY’s use of the Martens Clause in Kupreskic is described in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Judges look to customary law to determine the elements of the offences contained 
in the Statutes. After identifying these elements the judges will incorporate them in 
their judgments. This process of culling the elements of the offences from 
customary law is necessary to decide cases. Mundis writes that the judges are 
exercising a quasi-legislative function in so far as substantive crimes are defined or 
created in much the same way as legislatures do in a domestic context.161 
According to Mundis this means that judges go beyond simply interpreting the 
statute. Judges fill lacunae with respect to substantive crimes and evidentiary 
rules.162 Mundis is of the opinion that this quasi-legislative function resembles the 
quasi-legislative function exercised by the judges when making the rules.163 
    
The Tribunals often conclude that a rule of customary law exists or has come into 
existence after examining various national cases.164. Decisions of municipal courts 
within any particular state, when sufficiently uniform and authoritative, may be 
regarded as expressing the opinio juris or state practice within that state. When a 
point of international law is covered by a series of authoritative decisions of 
municipal courts of various states such decisions can be regarded as evidence of 
international custom.165 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
considered national judicial acts as ‘facts that express the will and constitute the 
activities of States.’166 Nollkaemper writes that large parts of customary law have 
been developed in accordance with the practice of national courts.167  
   
The Appeals Chamber in Erdemović extensively discussed to what extent national 
case law provided support for a rule on customary law regarding the availability or 
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non-availability of duress as a defence to a charge of murder.168 The Appeals 
Chamber concluded that insufficient evidence existed for the existence of such a 
rule. Erdemović is discussed extensively in Chapter 6. 
 
Although the Tribunals have relied heavily on representative municipal case law in 
determining custom, they have not regarded the lack of such case law as an 
insurmountable obstacle in determining custom. In Tadic the Appeals Chamber 
showed its resourcefulness in determining custom by making reference to 
Nigerian prosecutions and also referred to ‘many elements of international 
practice [which] show that States intend to criminalise serious breaches of 
customary rules and principles on internal conflicts’, including national military 
manuals and national legislation.169  
 
 (iii) General Principles 
Where there is no treaty provision on a particular subject or customary 
international law, general principles of international criminal law may be resorted 
to and failing such principles, general principles of international law.170 Failing any 
of these, it is necessary to look for ‘principles of criminal law common to the 
major legal systems of the world’ that may be derived, ‘with all due caution’, from 
national laws.171 General principles recognised by domestic legal orders form only 
a subsidiary source of international law. 
 
The ad hoc Tribunals have frequently resorted to general principles of law as a 
lawmaking tool. Cassese describes general principles as ‘sweeping and rather loose 
standards of conduct that can be deduced from the various rules by extracting and 
generalising some of their most significant points’.172 He has also described it as 
‘the potent cement that binds together the various and often disparate cogs and 
wheels of the normative framework of the [international] community’.173 Cassese 
addresses the following general principles of international criminal law: the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility,174 the principle of legality of 
crimes175 and the principle of legality of penalties.176 Acording to Kolb each one 
of the general principles is in itself a source of law. He calls them ‘norm sources’ 
which are not concerned with the fixed meaning of rules to be applied but with 
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the adaptation of the rules to certain constitutional necessities and to new 
developments and needs.177 
 
The role of general principles is to provide guidelines for the proper interpretation 
of the law when specific rules prove insufficient. According to Starke general 
principles were inserted into the ICJ Statute in order to provide an additional basis 
for a decision if there were no other materials to rely on.178 Lauterpacht states that 
‘Article 38 (1), providing that the ICJ is bound to apply the general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations’, was drafted in order to prevent the possibility 
of a non liquet.179 Lauterpacht even holds that Article 38(1) directly prohibits the 
finding of a non liquet.   
 
Since the very purpose of general principles could be said to facilitate lawmaking, 
general principles lend themselves to lawmaking par excellence. General principles 
enable courts to fill the gaps of written or unwritten norms.180 It is precisely the 
‘looseness’ of these principles which makes them good lawmaking tools.   
 
International courts and tribunals play an increasingly important role in 
formulating principles: they identify and set out principles ‘hidden’ in the 
interstices of the normative network. Cassese writes that it cannot be denied that 
courts which act in this manner are fulfilling a function very close to the creation 
of law.181 Apart from the gap-filling role of general principles, the purpose of 
resorting to such principles has also been to avoid a finding of non liquet. 182   
       
The following examples illustrate the use of general principles. The ICTY has 
referred to ‘general principles of law’ in order to establish jurisdiction and confer 
individual criminal responsibility. In Prosecutor v Delalic the Appeals Chamber 
enunciated: ‘it is universally acknowledged that the acts enumerated in common 
Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] are wrongful and shock the conscience of 
civilised people, and thus are, in the language of Article15 (2) of the ICCPR 
‘criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations’.’183  
 
 In Furundzija the ICTY Trial Chamber held that the definition of rape as a crime 
against humanity resulted from the convergence of the principles of the major 
systems of the world.184 The Trial Chamber stated that these principles may be 
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derived ‘with all due caution’ from national law.185 The idea that concepts from 
national law will only be applied with due caution in the international legal order 
was also recognized by the ICJ in the International Status of South West Africa case.186 
  
A good example of a case in which the Tribunal decided not to rely on national 
concepts is Kupreskic.187  In Kupreskic the Appeals Chamber relied on general 
principles to determine the standard of review of the factual findings of the Trial 
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber however decided against relying on national 
concepts in determining under what tests additional evidence reveals an error of 
fact of such magnitude as to occasion a miscarriage of justice.188 
 
The Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic extensively discussed national case law as 
evidence of general principles. After declaring the standard it applied with respect 
to the reconsideration of factual findings by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals 
Chamber examined the degree of caution required to be observed by a court 
before convicting an accused person based upon eyewitness identification made 
under difficult circumstances.189 The Appeals Chamber analysed domestic 
criminal systems under the heading ‘General Principles’ and cited cases from 
common law countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Malaysia and the 
United States). Citing cases from Germany, Austria and Sweden, the Appeals 
Chamber concluded that most civil law jurisdictions allow judges considerable 
scope in assessing the evidence before them, but that in a number of cases courts 
have emphasised that that trial judges must exercise great caution in evaluating 
eyewitness identification, particularly when the identification of the accused rests 
on the credibility of a single witness.190 
 
It is important that the ICTY has stated that the threshold for identification of 
general principles is high. It must be shown that the principle is part of most, if 
not all, national legal systems. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic noted: 
…[i]n the area [of common purpose] national legislation and case law cannot be relied 
upon as a source of international principles or rules, under the doctrine of the general 
principles of law recognised by the nations of the world; for this reliance to be 
permissible, it would be necessary to show that most, if not all, countries adopt the same 
notion of common purpose.191  
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In Blaskic the Trial Chamber held that the proportionality of the penalty to the 
gravity of the crime is a general principle of criminal law common to the major 
legal systems of the world.192 In Erdemović the Trial Chamber held that ‘there is a 
general principle of law common to all nations…whereby the most severe 
penalties may be imposed for crimes against humanity’.193 
 
(iv) Judicial Decisions 
According to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, the court ‘shall apply…judicial 
decisions…as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.’ The 
status of judicial decisions in the hierarchy of sources has been hotly debated. But 
according to Oppenheim judicial decisions have become ‘a most important factor’ 
in the development of international law.194 Because of the rudimentary nature of 
international criminal law many decisions of the most authoritative courts (such as 
the ICJ) will have an important influence in establishing the existence of 
customary rules.195 
 
It is clear that judicial decisions are only a secondary and indirect source of 
international law. Oppenheim writes: ‘Since judges do not in principle make law 
but apply existing law, their role is inevitably secondary since the law they 
propound has some antecedent source.’196 Another important reason why judicial 
decisions only have a secondary role is because of the absence of the common law 
doctrine of stare decisis in international adjudication.197 The ICJ, a court that, like 
the ad hoc Tribunals, is not bound by precedent, has in the interest of consistency 
increasingly referred to its own previous decisions. 
 
The ICTY has resorted to judicial decisions as a source of law on many occasions. 
An important example is the Tadic Trial Chamber’s reliance on the Nicaragua case 
in deciding on the criminality of violations of international laws of war in the 
context of internal armed conflict.198 The Trial Chamber in Kvocka,199 in deciding 
how to distinguish co-perpetrators from aiders and abettors in the case of the 
participation of a number of persons in a joint criminal enterprise, relied 
exclusively on case law. The court looked at various decisions of the British 200 
                                                   
192 Prosecutor v Blaskic  IT-95-14-T, 30 March 2000, para 796.  
193 Prosecutor v Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996, para 31.  
194 R Jennings & A Watts (eds) Oppenheim’ s International Law  9 ed (1992)  Vol I, 41, para 13.  
195 Cassese (note 13) 159. 
196 Ibid. 
197 See Aleksovski (note 48). 
198 Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para 585 citing Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 
199Prosecutor v Kvocka et al. IT-98-30/1, 19 December 2003. 
200 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, British Military Court, Hamburg, Germany, 1-8 March, 1946, 
UNWCC, Vol I, 93-103 (‘Zyklon B’). Trial of Max Wielen and 17 others, British Military Court, 
Hamburg, Germany, 1 July-3 September 1947, UNWCC, Vol XI,  31-53, ( ‘Stalag Luft III ‘). Trial of 
79
 
and US Military Courts 201 including the Dachau202 and Belsen203 Concentration 
Camp cases. The importance of decisions of national courts was also emphasised 
in Kupreskic. In this case the judges virtually equated national judgments given 
pursuant to treaties to judgments of international courts and tribunals.204  
 
Shahabuddeen claims that in the context of the ICJ, judicial decisions can generate 
new law but that they can do so only through the process through which 
international customary law is developed.205 In his view a decision may recognise 
the existence of a new customary law and may in that limited sense be regarded as 
the final stage of development of the new law but the decision in itself does not 
create the law.206 He argues that unless and until a new rule becomes a part of 
customary international law, it is not law.207  This view seems to be consistent with 
Secretary General's statement in his Report that the Tribunal should apply rules of 
the international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary 
law.208 
 
The ICTY has held that in order to avoid violating the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege, it should either apply rules of customary law or rules from treaties binding 
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on the parties.209 The role of national case law in determining custom was 
discussed above. The Tribunal may also consider national case law when engaging 
in treaty interpretation. 
 
In the Jelisic case, in which the ICTY interpreted the Genocide Convention, the 
Tribunal stated that the Convention’s terms should be interpreted according to 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.210 The 
Tribunal also stated that when interpreting treaties it could take account of 
subsequent practice grounded upon the Convention. The Tribunal mentioned the 
Akayesu and Kayishema judgments as ‘the only international case law on the 
issue’.211 The Tribunal then stated that the practice of states ‘notably through their 
national courts’ have also been taken into account.212 In Krstić the ICTY similarly 
interpreted the Genocide Convention pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention. But the Trial Chamber in Krstić ‘also looked for national 
guidance in the legislation and practice of states, especially their judicial and 
interpretations and decisions’.213 
 
In Krstić the judges came to the conclusion that widespread national judicial 
practice on the application of the Genocide Convention could not be found. The 
Trial Chamber in Krstić cited six national cases: three decisions of a German court, 
two of the Polish Supreme Court and one of the Unites States Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg.214 Six cases did not constitute enough practice to determine the 
interpretation of a treaty. Nollkaemper concludes that the Tribunal in Krstić 
recognised that judicial decisions should be used to supplement other sources or 
tools of interpretation such as the ordinary meaning of the terms, the object and 
purpose of the Convention, the preparatory work, and reports of the International 
Law Commission, General Assembly resolutions and international legal 
practice.215 
 
8. Procedural Lawmaking versus Substantive Lawmaking 
A distinction should be made between the making of substantive and procedural 
law. Whereas procedural lawmaking involves the drafting of new procedural rules 
                                                   
209 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 29) para 143. 
210 Prosecutor v Jelisic  IT-95-10-T, 14 December 1999, para 61. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para 541. Nollkaemper describes the analysis of the 
ICTY in both Jelisic and Krstić as ‘awkward’ because in both cases the Tribunal indicated that it used 
the Genocide Convention as customary law rather than as treaty law. It was therefore not clear why 
it had to resort to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. In his view however the cases 
remain relevant since given the fact that the Trial Chamber assumed it had to apply the Vienna 
Convention, it considered national case law to be relevant in the interpretation of treaties. See 
Nollkaemper (note 51) 280. 
214 Krstić ibid para 541. 
215 Nollkaemper (note 167) ibid. 
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and the amendment of these rules, substantive lawmaking includes deciding on 
and codifying the elements of a crime, the defining of crimes and creating new 
crimes, offences and defences. Substantive law has been defined as the law that 
provides for rights and duties whereas procedural (or adjectival) law has been 
defined as providing the procedural mechanisms by which those rights and duties 
are enforced.216 But procedural law could also provide for rights and duties as 
illustrated by procedural rights such as the right to a fair trial and the right not to 
be detained unlawfully. The distinction between substance and procedure is 
therefore not always clear.  
 
 The rudimentary nature of international criminal law has been discussed above. 
As in the case of substantive international criminal law, the procedural side of 
international criminal law is underdeveloped. The Rules of Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, the only relevant predecessors, were few in number and provided very 
little guidance. To be effective, the ad hoc Tribunals have had to draft new sets of 
procedural and evidentiary rules. The fact that the judges of the Tribunal have the 
quasi-legislative task of both drafting and amending the rules has, however, been 
criticised. The rulemaking activity of Tribunal judges is discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
The ICTY and ICTR judges have introduced innovations to many of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE), trying to fill in gaps and eliminate shortcomings 
in the Statute.217 The distinction between procedure and substance is often 
tenuous and should not be overemphasised. Whereas substantive lawmaking by 
the judges would perhaps seem more problematic than procedural lawmaking (it is 
after all quite common for courts in common law jurisdictions to make their own 
rules and regulate their own procedure) 218 frequent changes made to the RPE will 
threaten legal certainty and consistency. Amendments to the Rules could infringe 
on the nullum crimen principle in just as serious a manner as in the case of 
substantive lawmaking. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
Almost everyone will agree that lawmaking, when understood as development of 
international law, is a good thing. If, however, lawmaking takes the form of 
judicial legislation it seems less desirable. It is not clear from judicial 
pronouncements and academic writing on the topic just where development ends 
and legislating begins.One’s view of the acceptability of lawmaking will also 
depend on whether one considers oneself a humanitarian lawyer, criminal lawyer 
or international lawyer. Even more fundamentally, one’s view of the acceptability 
of lawmaking will depend on one’s jurisprudential allegiance.Only formalists, 
adherents to a classical version of natural law and an extreme positivist view of 
                                                   
216 E van der Berg ‘The Law of Evidence and Substantive Law’ in P J Schwikkard, A Skeen, SE van 
der Merwe (eds) Principles of Evidence (1997) 32. 
217 P Tavernier ‘The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda’ (1997) 321 ICRC Review 611. 
218 See the section on rulemaking in common law jurisdiction in Chapter 7.  
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law, would say that judges never make law but merely declare pre-existing law. In 
the international context a more productive question would be: How much 
discretion should an international judge have? 
 
There seems to be general agreement that the largely unwritten, rudimentary 
nature of international criminal allows for a certain amount of lawmaking. The 
development of international criminal law since the Second World War can be 
described as ‘ad hoc, piecemeal and somewhat chaotic’.219 It can be considered to 
be the task of Tribunal judges to transform the ICTY Statute from an ‘incomplete 
shopping list’ of crimes into a coherent and progressive codification.220 To do so 
the judges need a measure of freedom to make law.   
 
There seems to be general agreement that the largely unwritten, rudimentary 
nature of international criminal law allows for a certain amount of lawmaking. The 
judges of the ad hoc Tribunals can be seen as builders of a system. The sets of 
written rules (such as the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Rules) that have been 
introduced have not been sufficient for building such a new system. This is 
evident from the Tribunals’ heavy reliance upon customary law and general 
principles as tools of lawmaking. Since international law is a field of law in which 
legislative opportunities for modifying law is limited it is accepted that judges will 
play a bigger role in developing international law than would be the case with 
municipal law. In addition, Cassese and Lauterpacht have pointed out that 
international law is an imperfect or rudimentary system of law.221 The statement 
by Lauterpacht that it is the indirect purpose of the ICJ to develop international 
law indicates that international judges themselves understand lawmaking to be part 
of their duty. Tribunal judges such as Shahabuddeen and Cassese have long 
acknowledged the need for judicial activism. Because the precedents created by 
the ICTY and ICTR have wider application and significance than the territories 
they were created for, the judges should be guided by a responsible interpretation 
of the sources and respect for the principle of legality.  
                                                   
219Schabas (note 71) 848. 
220 Ibid. 






JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE TRIBUNALS 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will examine the question of judicial independence in the 
international context. The work of the Tribunals can only be legitimate if the 
judges are independent. Many believe that independence enhances the 
effectiveness of international tribunals and spreads the rule of law.1 Franck claims 
that adjudication by authentic international courts contributes to the legitimacy of 
international law and that an international court will not be authentic without 
independent judges.2 Cockayne writes that ‘judicial independence and propriety 
are at the heart of the liberal democratic project that underpins contemporary 
institution-building in international criminal justice’. 3 
In the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision the Trial Chamber stated that the question of 
whether a court is independent and impartial depends ‘not on the body that 
creates it but upon its constitution, its judges and the way in which they function’.4 
Although it is argued in this thesis that the independence of the ad hoc Tribunals is 
affected by the fact that they are created by Security Council Resolution, the 
independence of the Tribunals is measured and viewed, especially in the public 
eye, according to the behaviour of the judges. The judges’ behaviour must be 
scrutinised because they are the lawmakers. Questions of independence, 
accountability and legitimacy run through this thesis. Lawmaking by the judges can 
only be legitimate if the judges themselves have been legitimately appointed and 
adhere to standards of accountability and legitimacy. Although the fact that a 
judge is deemed impartial and independent does not in itself constitute an 
argument in favour of lawmaking, the fact or perception of judicial bias will cast 
greater doubt on the lawmaking activities of the judges.  
                                                   
1 Supporters of this view include Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘Toward a Theory of 
Effective Supranational Ajudication’ (1999) 107 Yale Law Journal 273 and  Benedict Kingsbury Neo-
Madisonian Global Constitutionalism: Thomas M Franck’s Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing 
Diversity and World Order in the Twenty-First Century 35 N.Y.U.J INT’L & POL 291, 296 (2003). Posner 
and Yoo acknowledge that the most successful supranational court is the ECJ, a relatively 
independent court. See E A Posner & J C Yoo ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ 
(2005) 93 California Law Review 13. But Posner and Yoo argue that when it comes to international 
cooperation independence reduces efficiency. They argue that independent tribunals (where judges 
are appointed in advance of hearing particular disputes and serve fixed terms) can pose a danger to 
international cooperation because they can render decisions that conflict with the interests of state 
parties. Ibid 1.  
2 T M Franck The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) 29-33. 
3 J Cockayne ‘Decision on the Recusal of Judges Robertson and Winter’ (2004) 2 JICJ 1161. 
4 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-T, para 32. 
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The standards of appointment of a judge reflect the qualities a judge should 
possess as well as the established standards of behaviour expected of him or her.5 
The processes by which Tribunal judges are elected will therefore be examined. 
Comparisons will be made to the ICJ and ICC process.   
Finally, the merit and demerit of the claims that Judge Mumba, Judge Odio Benito 
and the ‘NATO Judges’ have, for different reasons, not been impartial or seen to 
be impartial, will be examined.   
2. On Judical Independence 
The right to a fair trial is a general principle of law.6 A right to a fair trial requires 
that judges are free from bias or prejudice so that they can act impartially. Judges 
must also be institutionally and personally independent of political or 
administrative control.7 The right to an impartial and independent tribunal is 
recognised in various international instruments.8  
According to the International Bar Association Standards for Judicial 
Independence there are two fundamental aspects to judicial independence: the 
independence of the individual judge and the independence of the judiciary as a 
body.9 Shetreet writes that in considering the independence of individual judges a 
distinction is made between substantive independence and personal 
independence.10 Substantive independence means that judges should not be 
subject to any authority but the law in making judicial decisions. Personal 
independence means that their terms of office and tenure should be adequately 
secured.11 These concepts of substantive and personal independence are 
universally recognised.12 
To be independent a judge must be impartial and unbiased. The rule against bias, a 
rule of natural justice, is captured in the phrase nemo iudex in re sua and entails that a 
person cannot be a judge in his own case. The purpose of this rule is to preclude 
either the appearance or the possibility of judicial bias.13 The rule applies not only 
to cases in which a judge is a party to the proceedings, but also to those in which a 
judge has a personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome. In England this is 
                                                   
5 S Shetreet Judges on Trial (1976) 61. 
6 M C Bassiouni Introduction to International Criminal Law (2003) 604. 
7 Ibid 207. 
8 ICC Statute part IV, articles 40, 41;  ICCPR part III art 14 (1) stating that the tribunal ‘must be 
established by law’, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 10 at 73; African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights part 1, ch 1, art 7 (1) (d); American Convention on Human Rights  part 1 ch II 
arts 4 (1); 7 (1); 7(2) . 
9 S Shetreet & J Dechenes (eds) Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) 398. 
10 Ibid 598. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 599. 
13 T Jones ‘Judicial Bias and disqualification in the Pinochet case’ (1999) Public Law 394. 
85
 
sufficient to cause automatic disqualification without any further investigation of 
the likelihood or otherwise of actual bias.14 In the Pinochet case Lord Hope pointed 
out that ‘judges are well aware that they should not sit in a case where they have 
even the slightest personal interest in it either as a defendant or as a prosecutor’.15 
A second meaning attributed to the nemo iudex principle, arises where a judge, 
although he may not have an interest in a case, acts in a way that raises a suspicion 
that he might not be impartial.16    
Shetreet writes that the concept of judicial independence must recognise the 
realities as well as the perceptions.17 In the important Canadian case of R v Valente 
it was stated that ‘it is most important that the judiciary be independent and be so 
perceived by the public.’18 Public perception matters since perceptions of judicial 
bias threaten public confidence in the courts. 
In Incal v Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights identified a core of criteria 
to be used in assessing the independence and impartiality of judges within the 
meaning of Article 6 (1) of the ECHR ‘the right to be heard before an 
independent and impartial tribunal’.19 The Incal criteria include: the manner of 
appointment of judges; their terms of office; the existence of safeguards against 
outside pressure; and whether they reflect an appearance of independence.20    
Much has been written on the subject of judicial independence in domestic 
settings. Some measure the strength of the rule of law by the degree of respect 
shown for judicial independence. Judicial independence has also been described as 
an integral part of the separation of powers.21 Less attention has been paid to the 
independence of international judges.      
 
The proliferation of new international courts has been accompanied by the 
proliferation of international judges. Whereas for fifty years the number of 
international judges was limited to the 15 judges of the PCIJ and ICJ, with the 
                                                   
14 The best authority for this point is Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal 1852 3 HL Cases 759.  
15 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex Parte Pinochet (no 2) 1999 2 WLR 272 at 289I. 
16 See Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR, 30 June 1994, 41 at 47 per Mason CJ and McHugh J. 
17 Shetreet (note 5) 596. 
18 R  v Valente 2 C.C.C (3d) 417 at 423 (1983). 
19 ECHR Judgment of 9 June 1998 41/1997/825/1031 para 65. 
20 Two tests of impartiality of a judge were used in the Incal case. First, determination of a personal 
conviction of a particular judge in a given case; and secondly, ascertaining whether the judge offered 
guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect. See para 65 of the judgment 
ibid. This two part test was also used in the Piersack judgment. See Piersack v Beligum (1983) 5 EHRR 
169 para 30. 
21 See D P Kommers ‘Autonomy versus Accountability, The German Judiciary’ in P H Russell & D M O’ 
Brien (eds) Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy, Critical Perspectives from around the World (2001) 
134, 135; R Stevens ‘Judicial independence in England, A Loss of Independence’ in Russell & 
O’Brien ibid  155. 
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establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals and ICC the number has risen to 71.22 The 
international community now sees the emergence of what can be called an 
‘international judiciary’.23 Brenninkmeijer writes that in an increasingly globalised 
world, the role of the independent, impartial international judge is becoming 
increasingly significant. Referring to the judges of the ICJ, ICC and ICTY he 
writes: 
Deze rechterlijke colleges vormen een illustratie van... 
de opkomst van de rechtsstaat zonder staat. De onafhankelijke,  
onpartijdige recherlijke functie is in de zich Europeaniserende en  
globaliserende wereld van toenemende betekenis en wordt bovennationaal 
van belang.  De waarborging van de rechten van de mens met inbegrip  
van toegang tot een onpartijdige rechterlijke instantie is uiteindelijk geen  
nationale zaak omdat te vaak juist misbruik op nationaal vlak plaats vindt...de behoefte 
voor ‘bovennationale’ instrumenten voor de bescherming van mensenrechten zal alleen 
toenemen.24  
The independence required of judges in a domestic setting applies in equally 
strong measure to international judges. While still a member of the ICJ, Justice 
Tanaka wrote that judicial independence was the condictio sine qua non of an 
international judge.25 
At the core of judicial independence, as traditionally understood, lies the idea that 
the judiciary should be independent from the executive and legislative arms of 
government. It was reported in the 1991 World Jurist Association that the judiciary 
should, above all, have ‘independence from the influence of other institutions viz 
the principle of the separation of powers’.26 The need for judicial independence 
was recognised by Sir Ninian Stephen, later to be appointed as an ICTY judge, 
who asked the question: ‘of whom must the judiciary be independent?’ to which 
he answered: ‘I will be concerned only with independence from the other arms of 
government, the lack of dependence upon either the legislature or the executive.’27 
This separation between the executive or legislative branches on the one hand and 
                                                   
22 This number reflects the number of permanent judges and does not include ad litem judges. The 
Law of the Sea Tribunal has 21 judges,  ICTY and ICTR both have 16 judges. The 18 ICC judges 
increases the number of international judges to 71. See Article 36 of Rome Statute. 
23 J Allain ‘Judicial Independence in Practice: The Case of Judge Odio Benito, Vice President of 
Costa Rica’ (1999) 77 Revue de droit international 1.  
24 A F M Brenninkmeijer ‘De onafhankelijke en onpartijdige rechter; een internasionaal perspectief’ 
(2003) 29  Rechter en Sa menleving 102.  ‘These judicial bodies form an illustration of .the rise of the 
Rechtssttaat without state. The independent, impartial judicial function in the ‘Europeanising’ and 
globalising world is of increasing importance and becoming of supranational importance. 
Guaranteeing human rights, including access to an independent judiciary is ultimately no national 
matter because it is often precisely at the national level where abuse takes place ... the need for 
‘supranational’ instruments for the protection of human rights will therefore become greater and 
greater.’ 
25 K Tanaka ‘Independence of International Judges’ (1975) 14 Communicazioni e Studi 858. 
26 See Y S Yuen ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’ Report of the World Jurist Association (1991)  3. 
27 Sir N Stephen ‘Judicial Independence - A Fragile Bastion’ in S Shetreet & J Dechenes (eds) Judicial 
Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) 529.  
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the judicial branch on the other has been emphasised by various international non 
governmental actors such as the International Bar Association and the 
International Congress of Jurists. Another ICTY judge, Jules Dechenes, 
precipitated the gathering of various international actors to develop a Universal 
Declaration on the Independence of Justice. A fundamental tenet of this Universal 
Declaration is that the judiciary shall be independent from the executive and 
legislative.28  
Because of the absence of a central legislature and executive in international law 
the principle of separation of powers does not apply, at least not in its original 
form. As a result one might not be able to say that ICTY judges should be 
independent of a ‘legislature’ or ‘executive’. ICTY judges should, however, be 
independent from the influence of the UN and the governments that elected 
them. It can also be argued that because of the ‘political’ nature of international 
law29 international judges are especially vulnerable to extra-legal pressures and 
considerations and they should therefore be especially careful to avoid creating any 
impression of partiality.  
It is important that the judges be independent from the United Nations. Security 
Council Resolution 808 stated that one of the legal bases for the establishment of 
the Tribunal was that it be independent from the Security Council ‘with regard to 
the performance of its judicial functions’. The Secretary General’s Report states: 
As an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, however, the life of the international 
tribunal would be linked to the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions related thereto.30 
 
This means that the only item which the Security Council can regulate is the life 
span of the Tribunal. But the Security Council has shown its willingness to 
interfere on two occasions. The Security Council first amended Articles 11, 12 and 
13 of the Statute which had the effect of adding a Third Trial Chamber. The 
second of these Resolutions related to Judge Odio Benito’s position on the Celibici 
Bench and will be discussed below. 
 
The statutory requirements for judgeship at the ICTY and ICTR are intended to 
ensure that only judges of the highest calibre presumed to respect the principle of 
                                                   
28 Article 2.04, Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, See Shetreet & Dechenes ibid, 
450. 
29 Shaw writes that the ‘inextricable bonds linking law and politics’ must be recognised. He is of the 
opinion that politics is much closer to the heart of the international law system than is perceived 
within national legal orders and there is more evidence of the influence of power. M Shaw 
International Law (2003) 11, 12. 
30 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) para 28. 
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independence and impartiality are appointed.31 At the Tribunals, however, it seems 
as if considerations such as the nature of the appointment process, the language 
requirement and international politics could unduly influence such appointment. 
Some doubt has been expressed about the suitability and quality of the judges 
appointed. These questions will now be considered. 
 
3. Judicial Independence at the ICTY 
Article 13, which deals with the qualifications for and election of the judges in the 
ICTY Statute, provides that the judges should be persons of high moral character, 
impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices.32 Article 13 (1) further 
provides that in the overall composition of the Chambers, due account shall be 
taken of the experience of the judges in criminal law and international law, 
including international humanitarian and human rights law. The Statute provides 
that the Chamber as a whole, rather than individual judges, should reflect the 
above experience and expertise. 
 
Rule 15 of the ICTY Rules sets out the relevant principle: 
A Judge may not sit on a trial or appeal in any case in which he has a personal interest or 
concerning which the Judge has or has had any association which may affect his or her 
impartiality. The Judge shall in any such circumstances withdraw, and the President shall 
assign another Judge to the case. 
 
Morrison suggests that it should follow from the rule that ‘justice should be seen 
to be done’ 33 that the above subsection should be read as if after the second word 
‘may’ in the first sentence the phrase ‘or might appear to any observer to...’ should 
be included in the text.34 The principle has given rise to legal debate in the context 
of a few cases before the ICTY which will be discussed below. It has also led to 
various Motions to Disqualify being brought under Rule 15 (B).35   
                                                   
31 Allain asks the question whether ‘high moral character’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘integrity’ are truly the 
constitutive elements of an independent judge. He asks whether there would necessarily be a link 
between independence and impartiality. See Allain (note 7) 7. 
32 Article 13 (1) of  ICTY Statute. The requirements that the persons must be of high moral 
character’ and ‘possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to 
the highest judicial offices’ were drawn from Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 
33 Lord Hewart stated ‘Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done’ in the well known case R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy ([1924] 1 KB 256 at 
259. 
34 H Morrison ‘Judicial Independence – Impartiality and Disqualification’ in R May (ed) Essays on 
ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald (2001) 119. 
35 On 20 February 1998 the Defence in Prosecutor v Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez IT-95-14/2-PT filed 
an ‘Accuseds’ Application Requesting Disqualification of Judges Jorda and Riad’ (Official Record at 
Registry Page (‘RP’) D2741-D2742) (‘Application’). In reply, on 3 March 1998 the Prosecutor filed a 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to Accused’s Application Requesting Disqualification of Judges Jorda and 
Riad’ (RP D2754-D2759). In the Application, the Defence requested that Judges Jorda and Riad be 
disqualified, either voluntarily or by order of the Bureau, from participation in the Trial Chamber 




Judge Meron has been one of few Tribunal judges to address the question of his   
professional independence of his country of origin. He made the following 
statement in his capacity as President of the ICTY: 
 
I have never, ever been exposed to any pressure from my government, and would I be 
exposed to any pressure from my government, I would tell them that I am an 
international judge elected by the United Nations General Assembly. I have been elected 
to presidency by my colleagues, the judges, and my objective is to serve this tribunal, and 
only this tribunal. In other words, to say that I would be more subject to pressure applied 
by the United States government because I am an American is something that is 
completely unacceptable.36 
 
4. The Politics of Election: The Election of ICTY and ICTR Judges 
(i) Statutory requirements  
How do ICTY and ICTR judges get elected? Both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly have a role in the election of the judges.  Member states and 
non-member states with observer status are entitled to nominate up to two 
candidates from different countries. The Secretary General then forwards the 
nominations received to the Security Council.37 The Security Council screens the 
nominations and prepares a list of twenty-two to thirty-three candidates for 
consideration by the General Assembly. The General Assembly selects sixteen 
judges from the list of candidates. The final selection by the General Assembly is 
considered consistent with the Assembly’s character as the most representative 
organ of the UN.38 
 
The judges are elected for a four-year term after which they are eligible for re-
election. Vacancies are filled by an expedited procedure: the Secretary General in 
consultation with the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly 
appoints judges to fill vacancies.39 This means that the process of election does 
not start afresh. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
and Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘Rules’), the Application cited two grounds. 
First, the Defence submitted that the fact that both Judge Riad and Judge Jorda were currently 
sitting on the Trial Chamber hearing the case Prosecutor v Blaskic IT-95-14-T would result in the 
undue delay in the progress of the cases against Kordic and Cerkez. Secondly, the Defence 
submitted that the fact that Judges Jorda and Riad were hearing the Blaskic case jeopardised their 
ability to hear impartially the evidence presented in the case of Kordic and Cerkez, which involved 
many of the same events with which the Blaskic case was concerned.  
36 See Interview on www.freeb92.net/intervju/eng/2003/meron. 
37 Article 13 (2) (c) ICTY Statute. 
38 V Morris & M P Scharf  An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(1995) 144. 
39 In contrast, Article 14 of the ICJ Statute provides that vacancies on the ICJ shall be filled by the 
same election procedure as used for the initial election. 
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Rule 14 provides that, upon election, each judge shall make a solemn oral 
declaration to perform the duties conferred by the Statute and exercise the powers 
so conferred honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously. A similar 
declaration has to be made by ICJ judges.40 Article 13(1) provides that in the 
overall composition of the Chambers due account shall be taken of the experience 
of the judges in criminal law, international law, international humanitarian law and 
human rights law. The Statute provides that the Chamber as a whole, rather than 
individual judges, should possess all of the above-mentioned experience and 
expertise. Article 13 (4) states that judges shall be elected for a term of four years, 
that the terms and conditions of service shall be those of the ICJ and that the 
judges shall be eligible for re-election. 
 
The procedure for the election of the judges of the ICTR is set forth in Article 12 
of the ICTR Statute. The statutory provisions on the appointment of the ICTR 
judges are almost identical to the provisions on the ICTY appointment process. 
The only significant difference relates to the number of judges. Whereas in the 
case of ICTY the Security Council compiles a list of twenty-two to thirty-three 
candidates, the ICTR Statute states that the Security Council shall establish a list of 
no less than twenty two and not more than twenty three candidates41 of which the 
General Assembly must elect sixteen judges.42 Another difference is that the time 
period within which nominations could be submitted for the ICTY judges was 60 
days the ICTR Statute provides for a 30-day limit.43 
 
The necessary adjustments were made to take into account the common Appeals 
Chamber. Article 12 (2) of the ICTR Statute provides that the members of the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY shall also serve as members of the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR. This means that the first election of judges of the ICTR 
was limited to the election of the six trial Chamber judges since the five Appeals 
Chamber Judges were elected before the establishment of the ICTR. 
 
The participation of states in the election process of the Tribunals is intended to 
provide every state with an equal opportunity to have one of its nationals serve on 
the ICTY and ICTR respectively44 and is most probably intended to make the 
process more democratic and less political.  The absence of the National Group 
system followed at the ICJ45, makes the election process at the Tribunals less 
consultative. In practice however, as will be demonstrated below, the National 
                                                   
40 ICJ Statute, Article 20 and Article 4 of the Rules of Court adopted on 14 April 1978. 
41 Article 12 bis 1 (c) of the ICTR Statute. 
42 Article 12 bis 1 (d) of the ICTR Statute. 
43 The reason for this difference, according to Morris and Scharf, is that the briefer period 
recognised  the need to expedite the operation of the Rwanda Tribunal because of the thousands of 
suspects that had already been in custody. V Morris & M P Scharf The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (1998) 368.  
44 Ibid 144. 
45 For a description of the National Group system at the ICJ see below. 
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Group system does not ensure that the ICJ process is objective and based on 
merit more than on national affiliation.  
 
Ad litem judges 
In addition to permanent judges elected shortly after the establishment of the 
Tribunals the ad hoc Tribunals have appointed a special group of judges called ad 
litem judges. The appointment of ad litem judges at the ICTY was part of the 
reforms undertaken during the Presidency of Judge Jorda in response to criticism 
that the ICTY was not concluding cases fast enough. On 30 March 2000 the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1329 which approved the appointment of a 
pool of ad litem judges for the ICTY. Judge Jorda said that the implementation of 
the ad litem judges system would allow the Tribunal to conclude its work sooner 
than expected which would lead to significant savings for the United Nations.46 
Ad litem judges are assigned to Trial Chambers along with the permanent judges 
and, with some exceptions, they have the same status. The general terms and 
conditions that apply to their terms of office are the same as those applying to 
ICTY, ICTR and ICJ judges. They are also elected by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations but are not eligible for re-election. These judges sit on one or 
several specific trials for a period of up to three years.47  
           
Resolution 1329 stated that the new composition of the ICTY Chambers will look 
as follows:  The Chambers shall be composed of sixteen permanent independent 
judges and a maximum at any one time of nine ad litem judges appointed in 
accordance with article 13 para 2 of the Statute. Three permanent judges and a 
maximum at any one time of six ad litem judges shall be members of each Trial 
Chamber. Only permanent judges may be members of the Appeals Chamber. 
 
Resolution 1329 amended Article 13 to allow for the election of ad litem judges. 
The procedure is largely similar to the procedure for electing permanent judges. 
Article 13 ter states that the Secretary General shall invite nominations for ad litem 
judges from both state and non-state members of the UN. Within sixty days of the 
date of invitation of the Secretary General each state may nominate up to four 
candidates and the nominations are forwarded to the Security Council. The 
Security Council then compiles a list of at least fifty-four candidates of which the 
General Assembly elects the twenty-seven ad litem judges of the ICTY.  
  
                                                   
46 See the opening address of Judge Jorda, The Hague, 23 March 2001. See 
www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p580e.htm  
47 See the statement by the ICTY Registrar, Hans Holthuis, ibid. Article 13ter (a) of the ICTY 
Statute states however that ad litem judges shall not be eligible for election as, or to vote in the 
election of the President of the Tribunal or the Presiding Judge of a Trial Chamber pursuant to 
Article 14 of the Statute. Article 13 ter (b) states that ad litem judges shall not have the power to 
adopt rules of procedure and evidence, to review an indictment pursuant to Article 19, to consult 
with the president in relation to the assignment of judges or to adjudicate in pre-trial proceedings. 
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Security Council Resolution 1431 approved the appointment of a pool of ad litem 
judges for the ICTR.48 It was decided that at any one time a maximum of four ad 
litem judges shall be members of each Trial Chamber. On 25 June 2003 the 
General Assembly elected eighteen ad litem judges to the ICTR.49 According to the 
Article 12ter,50 each state may nominate up to four candidates, the Security Council 
compiles a list of not less than 36 candidates and the General Assembly elects the 
eighteen ad litem judges of the ICTR. 
 
(ii)  On Electoral Politics, Suitability and Independence 
The statutory requirements for judgeship of the ICTY and ICTR are intended to 
ensure that only judges of the highest calibre, who may be presumed to respect the 
principle of independence and impartiality, are appointed. At the Tribunals, 
however, it appears as if considerations such as the nature of the appointment 
process and international politics influence appointments. Some doubt has been 
expressed about the suitability and quality of the judges appointed. These 
questions will now be considered.   
 
Many believe it is inevitable that politics or other considerations may enter into the 
nomination and election processes. According to Geoffrey Nice it is not realistic 
to think that all judges are selected for nomination or voted on by the UN simply 
on the basis of ability and suitability for the particular job.51 Allegations have been 
made that some of the appointments made at the ICTY have been the result of 
excessive lobbying and political pressure from various UN member states.52 It is 
simply not true that judges who are nominated or even elected are necessarily 
suitable candidates for the position of international judge. Many Tribunal judges, 
who might have many years of relevant judicial experience, lack knowledge of 
humanitarian law and human rights law. Conversely, experts in international 
humanitarian law and human rights law may lack judicial experience. 
 
In electing the ICTY judges it was required that the judges should be impartial to 
the ‘Yugoslav situation’.53 There are no judges from the Balkans at the ICTY and 
no judges from the countries involved in the Rwandan conflict have been 
appointed to the ICTR. There have also not been any legal officers from the 
                                                   
48 Security Council Resolution 1431 amended Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the ICTR Statute and 
replaced them with Annex 1. Annex 1 (1) states: ‘The Chambers shall be composed of sixteen 
permanent independent judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same State, and a 
maximum at any one time of four ad litem independent judges appointed in accordance with article 
12ter, paragraph 2, of the present Statute,  no two of whom may be nationals of the same State. 
Annex 1(2) states: Three permanent judges and a maximum at any one time of four ad litem judges 
shall be members of each Trial Chamber.’ 
49 Press Release, ICTR/INFO-9-2-349.EN, www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2003/349.htm 
50 Article 12 of the ICTR Statute was amended by Resolution 1431. 
51 G Nice ‘Trials of Imperfection’ (2001) 14 LJIL 391. 
52 Lauren Etter ‘Call for ICC to Learn ICTY Election Lessons’, Global Policy Forum,  November 26, 
2004, available at www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2004/1126icclessons.htm 
53 Morris & Scharf (note 38) 143. 
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Balkans working in the Chambers of the ICTY or from Rwanda in the Chambers 
of the ICTR.   
 
In the context of the Eichmann trial it was the view of Defence Counsel, Dr 
Servatius, that no Jew was qualified to sit in judgment on the implementers of the 
Final Solution. Some argued that the Jewish judges as citizens of the Jewish state 
were judging their own case.54 According to Arendt the argument concerning the 
partiality of the Jewish judges was unfounded. She writes that it is difficult to see 
how the Jewish judges differed in this respect from their colleagues in any of the 
other Successor Trials where Polish judges, for example, pronounced sentences 
for crimes against the Polish people.55 It is difficult not to agree with Arendt. The 
Holocaust affected a vast number of victims. Especially in the context of a trial 
conducted in Israel, it is not realistic (and may lead to artificial results) to disqualify 
all those with an association with the victims from acting as judges.   
 
But the institutional character of the Tribunals may require more diverse 
Chambers. The ICTY and ICTR are international Tribunals. This means that the 
composition of the judiciary should be reflective of the international community 
in both a geographical and philosophical sense.    
      
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, being established not by the Security Council 
but by Special Agreement, is staffed by international judges as well as ‘local’ judges 
elected by the Government of Sierra Leone. It can be argued that impartiality is 
such an inherent, fundamental requirement for a judge that it can almost be 
presupposed and that one should not question the impartiality of a judge just 
because he or she hails from a country that was involved in the relevant conflict. A 
mixed Bench should then, in principle, be as impartial as a ‘purely international’ 
one. 
 
5. Election of ICJ Judges 
Since the ICTY, ICTR and ICJ are all judicial organs of the UN, it might be fitting 
to compare the independence and performance and process of election of the 
ICTY judges with that of the ICJ. Many of the sections in the Statutes of the 
Tribunals and the ICC pertaining to judicial election procedures, qualifications and 
representivity closely resemble the provisions of the ICJ Statute. 
 
Article 3 of the ICJ Statute states that the court shall consist of fifteen 
independent judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state. For the 
purposes of hearing a particular case, the court may also appoint one or more ad 
hoc judges.56 At the San Francisco Conference it was explained that the judges of 
                                                   
54 H Arendt Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (1994) 208, 209. 
55 Ibid 260. 
56 Article 31 ICJ Statute. 
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the ICJ ‘should be not only impartial but also independent of control by their own 
countries or the United Nations Organization.’ 57  
 
The fifteen ICJ judges are elected by both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council of the United Nations from a list of persons nominated not by 
governments but by National Groups.58 The National Groups typically consist of 
four individuals selected by their governments. The National Groups are usually 
extensions of their governments and are usually not independent of government 
control.59 
 
The involvement of National Groups is intended to make the process more 
consultative and assure good distributive representation. Article 6 of the ICJ 
Statute requires that ‘each national group is recommended to consult its highest 
court of justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies 
devoted to the study of law’. According to Damrosch the National Group should 
act as a collegial body and should exercise professional judgment.60 
 
Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the ICJ Statute govern the nomination procedure. Article 5 
paragraph 1 reads:   
 
At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration belonging to the states which are parties to the present Statute, and to the 
members of the national groups appointed under Article 4 paragraph 2, inviting them to 
undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the nomination of persons in a 
position to accept the duties of a member of the Court. 
 
Upon receiving these nominations the Secretary General arranges a list of 
candidates in alphabetical order and submits it to the Security Council and the 
General Assembly.61 . Judges are elected both by the General Assembly and the 
Security Council. The elections are held by secret ballot in separate public 
meetings. To be elected a candidate has to receive a majority in each of these 
organs.62 The results of the two meetings are then communicated to each other. If 
after the first meeting places still have to filled, the process continues for a second 
                                                   
57 See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization Vol. 13 (1945) 174 
58 Article 4.1 of the ICJ Statute states that nominations are made by ‘the national groups in the 
permanent Court of Arbitration.’ This means that the nomination is made by groups of four 
persons designated by their respective governments pursuant to the 1907 Hague Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The framers of the ICJ followed the same procedure 
established by the Permanent Court. L F Damrosch ‘The Election of Thomas Buergenthal to the 
International Court of Justice’ (2000) 94 AJIL 579. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 581. 
61 S Rosenne The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920 -1996 Vol 1 (1997) 377. 
62 S Rosenne The World Court, What It is and How It Works 4th ed (1989) 62. 
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and third meeting of each organ.63 The judges are elected for a period of nine 
years. 
 
ICJ judges are required to have certain personal characteristics. These 
characteristics are set forth in Article 2 of the Statute. The ICJ shall be composed 
of ‘a body of independent judges elected regardless of their nationality from 
among persons of high moral character who possess the qualifications required in 
their respective countries or appointment to the highest judicial offices or are 
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.’64   
   
Article 9 of the ICJ Statute states that ‘in the body as a whole the representation of 
the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world 
should be assured.’ Rosenne points out that this article is a refined version of the 
principle of ‘equitable geographical distribution’ which the UN Charter lays down 
as the governing principle for the allocation of elective seats in most UN organs.65 
According to Rosenne the element of ‘principal’ legal system is losing ground to 
the element of regional distribution expressed in the term ‘main forms of 
civilization.’66 With regard to the political nature of the ICJ elections, Robinson 
writes that while Article 9 of the ICJ Statute stipulates that ‘the many forms of 
civilization and the principal legal systems of the world’ should be represented, the 
words of the text are ‘trumped by political interests in membership distribution’.67 
  
In practice, however, the National Group system does not prevent the fact that 
five permanent members of the Security Council are automatically represented.68 
The National Groups system does also not prevent the overrepresentation of 
Europe (occupying a third of the seats). According to Chemiller-Gendreau, certain 
judges of the nationality of the permanent members of the Security Council, have 
often acted, sometimes without restraint, as if they were captives of the political 
positions of their own governments.69 He argues that these judges have confused 
the role of a judiciary - which implies the independence of the judges and the 
                                                   
63 Ibid 63. 
64 Rosenne points out that these two qualifications are not in logical order.  He writes that the ICJ is 
international not only because it is composed of Members of different nationalities but also because 
it is a court applying international law. According to Rosenne the value of its pronouncements and 
the weight of its authority ‘stands in direct ratio to the recognized competence as international 
lawyers of the judges.’ Rosenne (note 61) 367. 
65Rosenne (note 62) 53. 
66 Ibid. 
67 D R Robinson ‘The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of Judges of the International 
Court of Justice’ ASIL Proceedings (2003) 279. 
68 Even though the ICJ Statute is silent in this regard, the tradition has been for each of the five 
permanent member states of the Security Council to have a seat on the court. The other ten 
members of the ICJ are chosen on a long-standing negotiated compromise consisting of three 
members from African states, two from Latin American states, two from Asian states and three 
from European states. Ibid  278. 
69 M Chemillier-Gendreau ‘The International Court of Justice between politics and law’ Le Monde 
diplomatique, November 1996 available at www.globalpolicy.org/wldcourt. 
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authority of the court - with that of an arbiter, which represents the parties 
concerned and is concerned with satisfying their interests.70 In her opinion the 
most independent judges come from small or medium-sized countries, those not 
involved in the disputes of greater powers. At the same time a judge such as the 
US Judge Schwebel has been credited for deciding against the interests of his own 
government.71          
 
Abi-Saab, later appointed ICTY judge, sees the ICJ election process as inherently 
political. What is important, he says, is not to eliminate politics from elections but 
to improve and widen the range of nominations so that political choice can be 
exerted from among a sufficient number of highly qualified candidates.72 
 
Similar to the position at the ICTY, the election process at the ICJ is not free from 
political influence. In discussing the selection procedure of the judges of the ICJ, 
Rosenne observed that the political nature of the election process should not be 
surprising to those who understand that judicial selection in the national systems 
of virtually every nation is inevitably political.73 Franck agrees and calls the ICJ 
election process ‘openly political’.74 The ICJ Statute provides that a candidate is 
elected on obtaining an absolute majority in both the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council. Five of the fifteen judgeships are up for election or re-election 
every three years. Critics of the election process object to the fact that candidates 
campaign openly in the halls of the United Nations. It has been alleged that the 
elections result in a form of ‘political horse trading’ that does not promote the 
selection of the most highly qualified candidates.75 According to Lee, ‘it is 
inevitable that political bargaining occurs as the election of the candidate to the 
Court is traded off for support of another candidate to another body’.76 Franck 
writes that the charge that ICJ judges are biased or politicised is probably true to 
some degree.77 The appointment process seems inevitably political.  One should 
distinguish between ‘political’ in a negative sense and political in a more benign 
sense. It is clear that election politics in the form of horse trading should be 
avoided. But the fact that a strong national affiliation could render a judge less 
independent is not the sort of political consideration which threatens to upset the 
applecart of judicial independence. It is inevitable fact that a judge is a product of 
a certain national and legal background.  
                                                   
70 Ibid. 
71 See for example his dissent in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) Merits, Judgement of 27 June, ICJ Reports 1986. 
72 See his chapter ‘Ensuring the Best Bench: Ways of Selecting Judges’ in C Peck & R S Lee (eds) 
Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice (1997) 184. 
73 Franck (note 2) 6.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid 7. There is nothing in the ICJ statute which ensures the election of judges from the states 
occupying the permanent positions on the Security Council. 





6. Election of ICC Judges 
The first eighteen ICC judges were sworn in on 18 March 2003. The Rome Statute 
for the ICC has created a system in which judges are selected by the governments 
of state parties, without any independent screening process.  
 
Judges will have a large measure of control over the fundamental decision of who 
is to be prosecuted, an area normally reserved for the prosecutor. There are 
legitimate fears that this system will fail to provide the necessary safeguards to 
ensure judicial independence.78  
         
The nomination and voting procedure work as follows: Only candidates who are 
nationals of ratifying countries (or ‘State Parties’) can be nominated as ICC judges. 
Candidates may be nominated at the national level entirely by their government or 
by their ‘national groups’.79 National groups consist of four jurists acting as 
arbitrators in the Permanent Court of Arbitration.80     
   
Article 36 (5) stipulates that in the election of judges each state shall have one 
vote. There shall be two lists of candidates. List A contains candidates qualified in 
criminal law and procedure and list B contains candidates qualified in international 
law. The Statute indicates that there will be one ballot and the persons elected 
‘shall be the 18 candidates who obtain the highest number of votes and a  
two-thirds majority of the States Parties present and voting.’81 At least nine judges 
are elected from list A and five judges from list B. 
 
The Statute requires a degree of expertise in the subject matter of the court.82 The 
requirement of criminal experience is to be understood as including experience as 
judge, advocate or prosecutor in criminal cases.83 Specific reference is made to 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights. A nominee from the 
court may choose the list on which he or she will appear. At the first election of 
judges a minimum of nine judges must have a criminal law profile and minimum 
of five an international law profile. Subsequent elections are to be organised to 
keep the same proportion. The Trial Chambers shall be composed ‘predominantly 
by judges with criminal trial experience’.84           
 
                                                   
78 S de Bertodano ‘Judicial Independence in the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 15 LJIL 409. 
79 ‘Election of Judges to the International Criminal Court’ Coalition of the International Criminal 
Court Factsheet, available at www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-CICC-
ELECTIONOFJUDGES-En.pdf 
See also W A Schabas An Introduction to the ICC  2 ed (2004) 177-180. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Article 36 (6) ICC Statute. 
82 Schabas (note 79) 152. 
83 M R Rwelamira ‘Composition and Administration of the Court’ in R S Lee. (ed) The International 
Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) 159. 
84 Article 39 (1) Rome Statute. 
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ICC judges can be excused from their function by the presidency. They can also 
be disqualified from sitting in cases in which there can be reasonable doubt as to 
their impartiality.85 It is also obvious that they cannot sit in matters in which they 
have previously been involved at the national level. All eighteen ICC judges have 
been elected as full-time members of the court. It was decided that initially only 
the three judges of the presidency would serve on a full time basis - largely as a 
cost-cutting measure. Article 35 (3) provides that the president may, on the basis 
of the court’s workload, decide from time to time to what extent judges will be 
required to serve full-time.  No two judges may be nationals of the same state. 
        
The Trial and Pre-Trial divisions should be occupied by judges with primarily 
criminal law experience, and though not stated as such in the Statute, there is a 
suggestion that international law judges will lean towards the Appeals Division. 
Schabas writes that if one reads between the lines of the Statute, it seems to be 
saying that the more practically oriented criminal law specialists should focus on 
trials whereas their more professorial colleagues in the international law field 
should focus on appeals.86 During the Rome Conference, the UK delegation felt 
very strongly that it was essential to emphasise professional legal practice as a 
requirement to ensure that the court be in a position to fulfill all of its functions at 
the pre-trial, trial and appeals phases.87 The proponents of this approach were in 
favour of a court which would be predominantly constituted by judges with 
criminal trial experience particularly in the pre-trial or trial stages where 
competence in the handling and evaluation of evidence was of greater importance 
than knowledge of international law.88 
 
The question of whether representation of the main forms of civilisation should 
be specifically mentioned in the Statute was debated. While the ICJ Statute 
recognises this consideration in the selection of judges it was thought that this 
element was already covered by the requirement of geographical representation 
and representation of major legal systems of the world.89  
 
According to Robertson, the viability of the ICC will ultimately depend more on 
the calibre and experience of its judges than on the fine print of the Statute.90 In 
his opinion international appointment systems are prone ‘to throw up mediocrities 
trusted to toe the line of their nominating government: usually they are appointed 
from within government departments or are in other ways beholden to the 
State.’91 He writes that persons of real independence and imagination are often 
                                                   
85 Rome Statute Article 41, ICC RPE, Rules 23-29. 
86 Schabas (note 79) 154. 
87Rwelamira (note 83)  160. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid 165.  
90 G Robertson Crimes Against Humanity – The Struggle for Global Justice (2002) 351. 
91 Ibid. See ICC Prep Com discussion.  
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missing. He criticises the ICC appointment system: the judges are to be elected by 
an assembly of state parties which in his view is a recipe for ‘political caucusing’.92 
 
Similar to the requirements set for ICJ and ICTY judges, ICC judges must be of ‘a 
high moral character, impartiality and integrity’.93 They must be qualified for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective States and should 
have an excellent working knowledge of French and English.  
 
Article 36 (8) commits the State Parties to take into account ‘the need to ensure 
representation of the principal legal systems of the world, equitable geographic 
representation’, a ‘fair representation of female and male judges’, and (uniquely for 
an international court) legal expertise on specific issues such as violence against 
women and children. Draft provisions however spoke of ‘gender balance’.94  
Schabas writes that the requirement of fair gender representation reflects concerns 
that the ICC might resemble the ICJ, a court where only one woman, Rosalyn 
Higgins, has ever been elected in its eighty-year history. The ad hoc Tribunals have 
shown some improvement on this. Both have elected a woman to the Presidency 
of the Tribunals (Judges MacDonald and Pillay).95 The ICC represents the biggest 
achievement in this regard. Out of the first group of eighteen judges, eight judges 
are female and ten judges are male.96 
 
Judges who are required to serve on a full time basis at the seat of the court are 
not allowed to engage in any other occupation of a professional nature. All judges, 
including those who do not work full time, are forbidden from activities ‘likely to 
interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their 
independence’.97  
 
                                                   
92 According to Robertson, one of the reasons for the success oif Nuremberg was that the English, 
French and American judges had experience as criminal defenders and not merely as prosecutors - a 
sense of fairness developed from that experience which infused the proceedings. Robertson (note 
90) 351.  
93 Rome Statute (Article 36) (3), see Article 2, ICJ Statute. 
94 See F Jarasch ‘Establishment, Organization and Financing of the International Criminal Court’ 
(1998) 6  EJIL  21. 
95 Judge Pillay was elected as president of the ICTR in June 1999 and re-elected in June 2001. ICTR 
Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-268.EN Arusha (1 June 2001). Judge McDonald was elected as 
president of the ICTY and ICTR on 19 November 1997. Press Release No. 197-E on the election 
of ICTY judges (21 May 1997); ICTY Yearbook (1997) 20. On 26 January 2006 the following women 
were elected to the ICC  
during the 4th Assembly of States Parties: Ekaterina Trendafilova of Bulgaria and  
 Anita Usacka of Latvia. 
96 The eight female judges are  Maureen Harding Clark (Ireland), Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana), 
Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica), Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), Sylvia H de Fifueiredo 
Steiner (Brazil) and Anita Usacka (Latvia), Ekaterina Trendafilova (Bulgaria)  and Fatoumata 
Dembele Diarra. See www.wfa.org/issues/wicc 
97 ICC Statute  Article 40. 
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7. The Race for Re-election 
Nice writes that the work of judges should be done without seeking gratitude or 
fame.98 The work should also be done without the aim of seeking re-election.  
 
The principle that life tenure advances judicial independence is well-established. In 
England, the Act of Settlement of 1701 enshrined the principle that judges should 
be appointed for life, allowing only for their removal on the grounds of serious 
offences.99  English judges however no longer enjoy life tenure. Today the 
retirement age for judges in the UK is 75.100 In America judges are still appointed 
for life. The US Constitution grants federal judges life-tenure.101 The ad hoc nature 
of the Tribunals does not render life tenure feasible; the ICC seems to have 
followed an approach more conducive to advancing the perception of 
independence. This approach is discussed below.  
 
At the ICTY, as judges are elected for a period of four years with the possibility of 
re-election. As in the case of the ICJ, it has been feared that the possibility of re-
election could make judges more susceptible to political influence.   
 
The Statute provides that the terms and conditions of service shall be those of the 
ICJ.102 Ad-litem judges are also appointed for a period of four years but are not 
eligible for re-election. It could be argued that it is more important for judges to 
prove their independence from the states which elected them than from the 
United Nations. It is, after all, states which will re-nominate the judges. It is 
unlikely that judges who wish to be re-elected would take decisions which would 
be unpopular with their own governments, or with the UN. But this concern 
should not be overemphasised. It is very unlikely that governments will be 
affected significantly by the decisions of the Tribunals regarding the former 
Yugoslavia. Tribunal decisions, unlike the decisions of the ICJ, affect individuals 
rather than states. 
 
ICC judges are elected for a period of nine years and, with a few minor and 
transitional exceptions, they are not eligible for re-election.103 This promotes both 
actual and perceived impartiality as judges who must campaign for re-election with 
their own and other governments, might, in the words of Schabas, find it difficult 
‘to exercise their functions in a dynamic and vigorous manner’.104 According to 
Rwelamira, the question of the terms of office and security of tenure of judges are 
                                                   
98 Nice writes: ‘The work is so important and the real difficulties are so great that only the very best 
people should be recruited to do the work.’ Nice (note 41) 394. 
99 Morrison (note 34) 112. 
99 ICTY Statute Article 13 (4). 
100 Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act (1993) Ch. 8, section 26 (5).  
101 United States Constitution, Article III, section 1.  
102 Ibid. 
103 Rome Statute Article 36 (9). 
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fundamental to the independence of the judiciary.105 The prevailing view at the 
Rome Conference was that judges should be appointed for a term of nine years - 
as in the case of the ICJ. Many delegations did not, however, endorse the analogy 
with the ICJ on the ground that the ICC was essentially a criminal court and 
therefore required a unique composition.106 The final agreement was that judges 
should not be eligible for re-election although allowance was made for judges 
elected for a three-year term who would be eligible for re-election to a full term.107 
 
8. Independence: the cases of Judges Mumba, Odio-Benito and the ‘NATO  
    Judges’  
i)  The ‘NATO judges’  
The issue of the independence of ICTY judges and the political nature of the 
ICTY became critical in the Milosevic trial.108 Scharf writes that given the fact that 
the pool of Tribunal judges that were available for the Milosevic trial included 
citizens from several countries that had no stake in the Balkan conflict, the three 
judges assigned by Chief Justice Jorda to preside over the case represented ‘a most 
unfortunate selection’.109 He criticises the fact that Judge Richard May, the judge 
selected to head the panel, was from the United Kingdom, one of the NATO 
countries that led the 1999 Kosovo intervention against the Serbs. Scharf is of the 
view that May's partner of the Bench, the Jamaican Judge, Judge Patrick Robinson 
can also not be said to hail from a neutral country since Jamaica has very close 
political and economical ties to the US and UK.110 He served with Judge May on 
other trials and might have been said to be too deferential to his British associate 
on the Bench.111 According to Scharf only the third judge, O-Gon Kwan of South 
Korea, who replaced the judge originally assigned to the trial, Mohamed El Habib 
Fassi Fihri of Morocco, hails from an ‘unquestionably neutral country’.112  
 
Although Scharf suggests that it would have been appropriate for the judges to 
have recused themselves, he writes that these jurists could not be expected to 
recuse themselves from participating on the Milosevic bench because this would be 
an admission of bias and would subvert the credibility of the Tribunal as a whole. 
                                                   
105 Rwelamira (note 83) 15. 
106 Ibid. 
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international courts and tribunals, judges are eligible for re-election. 
108 See also Robertson (note 66) 323. Robertson mentions that Milosevic could object to being tried 
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victor's justice and delivering verdicts which depend on evidence rather than the national allegiances 
of judges.’ Ibid. 
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It can be asked whether Scharf is reasonable with regard to his criticism of the 
NATO judges. Accusing a judge of bias is a serious allegation requiring weighty 
substantiation.113 In deciding on the composition of chambers, the tribunal would 
appear to be attempting to ensure ‘universal representation’ in each chamber, and 
that, in general, the composition of the chambers reflect a fair distribution of 
nationalities, with two geographical regions represented on each bench.114 In 
addition Scharf does not seem to appreciate that judges get assigned to specific 
cases according to a roster and that it is highly improbable that there would be any 
sinister intent behind the allocation of specific judges to a case. The assignment of 
judges to cases is designed to be an objective process. Judges are allocated to 
specific Trial Chambers when they commence their work at the Tribunals and do 
not move between Trial Chambers.115 In addition it is submitted that the judges 
should act as professional judges and not be influenced by considerations such as 
national allegiance.  
 
Although the suggestion that Judges May and Robinson should have recused 
themselves is probably unjustified, one can ask whether the extensive media 
coverage of the case and the importance of the judges appearing impartial did not 
require the selection of a more ‘neutral’ bench.116  
 
Scharf believes that however fair and impartial these trials may turn out to be, it is 
understandable that some would perceive their outcome to be a foregone 
conclusion. Scharf quotes Professor Michael Mandel who maintains that 
‘Milosevic has about as much chance of getting a fair trial from this court as he 
had of defeating NATO in the war’.117  
 
On 31 May 2004, Judge May resigned because of illness. He died on 1 July 2004. 
He was replaced by the Scottish judge, Lord Bonomy. Lord Bonomy was sworn in 
on 7 June 2004. What are the consequences of replacing a judge mid-trial?  The 
appointment of a new judge was expected to cause delays in a trial that was already 
becoming the lengthiest Tribunal trial. In common law jurisdictions the 
resignation of a presiding judge would generally result in a mistrial. The Rules of 
Procedure provides that a new judge cannot be assigned to a case unless the 
accused consents to such a measure. Milosevic refused to accept the change of 
judge and the two remaining trial chamber judges, Judge Robinson and Judge  
                                                   
113 See E Grant ‘Pinochet 2: The questions of jurisdiction and bias’ in D Woodhouse (ed) The 
Pinochet Case, A legal and constitutional analysis (2000) 48. 
114 Interview with Senior Legal Officer in Chambers, ICTY, 1 April 2003. 
115 Interview with lawyer in Office of the Prosecutor, 19 May 2004. 
116 Scharf (note 109) 398. 
117 Ibid.  
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O-gon Kwon had to make the decision whether replacing Judge May and 
continuing with the trial was ‘in the best interest of justice’.118 In circumstances 
such as these, political expediency will probably always require the continuation of 
a trial. Like his predecessor Bonomy hails from United Kingdom.  In the eyes of 
Scharf and others, his appointment will not have made the Milosevic Bench more 
‘neutral’ . 
 
Any new judge must certify that he or she is familiar with the record before sitting 
on the case.119 A new judge has to read the record in its entirety. By the time 
Bonomy took over, the evidence in the Milosevic case already consisted of 33 000 
pages of transcripts (not including maps, audio and video tapes).120 The question 
to be asked is whether a new judge could ever be completely familiar with a record 
of such a scale.  
 
On 12 March 2006 all questions of this nature with regard to the Milosevic trial 
became academic. On this day Milosevic was found dead in his cell.121 
ii) The Case of Elizabeth Odio Benito 
The Costa Rican ICTY Judge, Judge Odio Benito seems to have violated one of 
the most fundamental rules of judicial independence: after accepting the position 
of vice-president of Costa Rica she continued to sit on the bench of the Celibici 
trial.122 She appears to have violated both conventional and customary norms of 
international law along with general principles of law precluding an international 
judge from holding a domestic executive post. 123  
 
Before becoming an ICTY Judge, Judge Benito was a professor of law at the 
University of Costa Rica and twice held the position of Minister of Justice of 
Costa Rica. She was elected to her first four-year judicial term of the ICTY by UN 
General Assembly in September 1993.  She also served as vice-president of the 
ICTY. The conflict of interest arose in the following manner: by the end of Judge 
Odio Benito's mandate she was one of the trial chamber judges hearing the Celibici 
case. Her term of office however expired during in the course of the trial. In May 
1997 the General Assembly had elected eleven judges for the second mandate of 
the ICTY. Among the eight ICTY judges vying for the eleven positions, five had 
their judicial terms renewed whereas three judges, the judges on the Celibici bench, 
did not.124 This meant that Judges Odio Benito, Karibi-Whyte and Jan were to end 
                                                   
118 See ‘Milosevic defiant over judge swap’, BBC News, Thursday 25 March 2004 available at 
www.news.bbc.co.uk 
119 C Schütz ‘Presiding Judge in Milosevic Trial resigns’,  Catherine Schütz interviews Canadian 
lawyer Tiphaine Dickson, 26 February 2004 www.globalresearch.ca/articles/DIC402A.html.  
120 Ibid. 
121 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4798702.stm 
122 Allain (note 23) 2. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See ‘The Judges' New Term Commences’ (1997) 17 Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia 1. 
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their mandates in November 1997. The legal question arose whether these three 
judges would be able to remain to hear the Celebici case beyond their judicial 
terms.125 The ICTY Statute, unlike the ICJ which allows judges to ‘finish any cases 
which they may have begun’,126 did not make provision for this kind of situation. 
The problem was resolved on 27 August 1997 by Security Council Resolution 
1126 which stated that the three judges could ‘finish the Celibici case which they 
have begun before expiry of their terms of office’.127 Since she was not re-elected 
to the ICTY Judge Odio Benito decided to pursue a career in domestic politics in 
Costa Rica and stood as one of two vice-presidential candidates of the Partido 
Unidad Social Cristiana.128 On 1 February 1998 the Presidential Candidate of the 
United Social Christian Party, Miguel Angel Rodriguez, won the election and on 8 
May 1998, Judge Odio Benito became the Vice-President of the Republic of Costa 
Rica.129  
 
Allain examines the statutory provisions, state practice and opinio juris to establish 
whether there are international legal norms which prohibit judges from sitting 
once they have become members of their respective state’s executive organs. The 
relevant international norms will be discussed in some detail since they are also 
relevant in the case of assessing the independence of other judges such as Judge 
Mumba below.  
 
According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers, Dato'Param Cumaraswamy, ‘the requirements of independent 
and impartial justice are universal and are rooted in both natural and positive 
law’.130 At the international level, the sources of this law are to be found in 
conventional undertakings, customary obligations and general principles of law.  
 
The ICTY Statute does not contain an express provision prohibiting the holding of 
a position within the executive branch of a municipal government while also 
sitting as an ICTY judge. Article 12 of the ICTY Statute states however that the 
‘Chambers shall be composed of fourteen independent judges, no two of whom 
may be nationals of the same State’.131 The notion of independence is however not 
                                                   
125 Allain (note 23) 3. 
126 ICJ  Statute Article 13 (4) . 
127 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1126, 27 August 1997, UN Doc S/RES 1126. 
128 Allain (note 23)  4. 
129 Ibid. On 21 October 1996 Costa Rica was elected to a two-year term as a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. As the holder of the second highest executive office in Costa 
Rica, Judge Benito was superior in rank to her state’s permanent representative to the United 
Nations, ibid. 
130 Report of the Special Rapporteur,  Dato'Param Cumaraswamy, submitted in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/41, 6 Feb 1995, UN Doc E/CN 4/1995/39, para 
32. Cumaraswamy was referring, of course to the sources of international law set out in Article 38 
of the Statute of the ICJ. 
131 With regard to the question of double nationality, Article 3 para 2 of the ICJ Statute states that if 
a person could be regarded as a national of more than one state, he or she shall be deemed to be a 
national of the country in which he or she ordinarily exercises civil and political rights. 
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defined in the Statute or RPE. According to Allain one can infer from the 
requirement contained in Article 13 (1) of the Statute that judges must ‘be persons 
of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications 
required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices’ that judges should not hold executive positions while being judges.  He 
argues that if ‘high moral character, impartiality and independence’ are the qualities 
of an independent judge, then one can make a case that Judge Odio Benito should 
have resigned, based on the constitutive elements of the ICTY.132 A further 
argument can be made based on the statutory provisions of the ICTY. Had Judge 
Odio Benito been Vice President of Costa Rica in 1993, she could not have been 
elected in September 1993 unless she first resigned as Vice President. The reason 
for this is that Article 13(1) of the ICTY Statute requires that its judges ‘possess 
the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices’. As Vice-President of Costa Rica, Odio Benito would have 
been disqualified from holding the highest of judicial offices.133  
 
As evidence of State Practice, Allain cites Article 16 (1) of the ICJ Statute which 
provides that ‘no member of the Court may exercise any political or administrative 
function, or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature’.134  
Opinio juris on the issue of judicial independence has been expressed recently as a 
by-product of the movement to establish the ICC.135 The International Law 
Commission completed a draft Statute for an International Criminal Court that 
included a provision which reads, inter alia, that ‘Judges shall not engage in any 
activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect 
confidence in their independence. In particular they shall not when holding the 
office of judge be a member of the legislative or executive branches of the 
Government of a state [...]’136 
 
The fact that there is both state practice and opinio juris precluding an international 
judge from being a member of a municipal executive organ, points to the existence 
of an international custom which would preclude Judge Benito from remaining as 
                                                   
132 Allain (note 23 ) 6. 
133 Article 132 of the Constitution of Costa Rica makes it clear that an individual may not hold 
positions within judicial and executive branches at the same time. Allain ibid 7. 
134 Allain (note 23) 8. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea incorporates verbatim the 
provision of Article 16 (1) of the ICJ Statute. It denies the issue further by stating: ‘no member of 
the Tribunal may exercise any political or administrative function, or associate actively with or be 
financially interested in any of the operations of any enterprise concerned with the exploration of 
the resources of the sea or the sea-bed or other commercial use of the sea or the sea-bed’. See 
Article 7, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
135 Allain (note 23) 10. 
136 Ibid. See Article 10 (1) and (2) of the International Law Commission draft Statute on the 
International Criminal Court contained in Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol II (Part 2) 
(1994) 32. In its Commentary to this article, the ILC amplifies on its understanding that a judge is 
not to be ‘a member of the legislative or executive branches ‘. 
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a judge on the ICTY. 137 Special Rapporteur Cumaraswamy stated in his Report in 
1985: 
 
the concepts of impartiality and independence of the judiciary postulate  
individual attributes as well as institutional conditions. These are not mere  
vague nebulous ideas but fairly precise concepts in municipal and international law. Their 
absence lead to a denial of justice and makes the credibility of the judicial process dubious. 
It needs to be stressed that impartiality and independence of the judiciary is more a 
human right of the consumers of justice than a privilege of the judiciary for its own 
sake.138 
 
Apart from the requirement that an international judge should not hold office 
within the executive organ of a state, Judge Odio Benito's election as Vice 
President of Costa Rica seems to create an additional conflict of interest. It is the 
President and cabinet of Costa Rica who are ‘responsible to direct the 
international relations of the Republic’.139 By virtue of her position as Vice 
President, Judge Benito would have a large say in guiding the foreign policy of that 
Republic. The conflict which emerges at the international level is that, in theory, 
Judge Benito, in her capacity as vice president, could influence the functioning of 
the ICTY and could potentially adversely affect the rights of the accused in the 
Celebici case. Although it was unlikely that the judge would have used her influence 
is such a way, it should be stressed that the mere existence of a possible conflict of 
interest should lead to a judge recusing herself. The test for impartiality is, once 
again, not actual bias but the appearance of bias.   
 
The ability to affect the functioning of the Tribunal by influencing the life-span of 
the Tribunal might be justification enough for not allowing the Vice President of a 
state holding a seat on the Security Council to remain as an ICTY judge. The 
Security Council has, however, gone beyond the recommendations of the UN 
Secretary General and has interfered with the functioning of the Tribunal. Security 
Council Resolution 1126 involves itself directly with the Celibici case and directly 
refers to Judge Benito. The resolution:   
 
[e]ndorses the recommendation of the Secretary General that Judges Karibi-Whyte, Odio-
Benito and Jan, once replaced as members of the Tribunal, finish the Celibici case which 
they have begun before expiry of their terms of office; and takes note of the intention of 
the International Tribunal to finish the case before November 1998.140 
 
Allain concludes that this means that the Security Council has used its ability and 
demonstrated its willingness to use that competence to legislate over the ICTY. 
Since a judiciary is typically self-regulating it is up to the judges themselves to 
determine if a peer is in a situation of conflict of interest or if the independence of 
                                                   
137 Allain (note 23) 12. 
138 Report of Special Rapporteur submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 1994/4 6 Feb 1995 UN Doc E/CN 4/1995/39 para 35. 
139 Article 14 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica. 
140 UN Doc S/RES/1126 (1997). 
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the judiciary might be threatened.141 In the context of the Odio Benito case, 
Morrison writes that self-disqualification sends out a clear signal of independent 
integrity.142 Simply the appearance that a judge may be in violation of conventional 
and customary norms of the law governing judicial independence should be 
enough to have an international judge step aside. 
 
(iii)  Judge Robertson 
In 2004 the Special Court for Sierra Leone heard a motion for the recusal of the 
President of the Court, Judge Geoffrey Robertson.143 Defence Counsel for the 
accused, Issa Hassan Sesay, sought the permanent removal of Robertson from the 
Special Court on the basis of comments made by Robertson about the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in his book Crimes Against Humanity.144 In his 
book Robertson accused the RUF of committing such crimes as torture,145 pillage, 
rape, looting, amputation and mutilation.146 The application of the Defence 
Counsel claimed that the statements in Crimes Against Humanity demonstrated 
grave bias or gave rise to the appearance of bias.147 The Defence demanded that 
Judge Robertson must either withdraw under Rule 15 (A) or, failing withdrawal, 
the Appeals Chamber must disqualify him.148 Subsequently, Robertson was not 
only removed from the RUF cases on 13 March 2004 but he was removed as 
President of the Court. The manner in which he was removed was by an 
amendment to Rule 18 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This amendment 
reduced the term of the President from three years to one year. The judges 
inserted a new sub-rule, Rule 18(E), which stated that the Rule shall be deemed to 
enter into force on 7 March 2003. This meant that Judge Robertson’s term as 
judge was complete. 
iii) Judge Mumba 
Another ICTY judge whose independence was questioned because of her extra-
judicial involvements was the Zambian judge, Florence Mumba. Judge Mumba 
was a member of Trial Chamber II and presided over the Furundzija trial. On 10 
December 1998 Anto Furundzija was found guilty of two counts of violations of 
the laws or customs of war. Furundzija appealed the judgment and on 3 February 
1999 submitted an application pursuant to inter alia Article 13 (1) of the Statute 
and Sub-rules 15(A), 15(B) and 15(F) of the Rules, requesting the disqualification 
of Judge Mumba. Counsel for the Defence claimed that Judge Mumba should be 
                                                   
141 Allain (note 23) 16. 
142 Morrison (note 34 ) 120. 
143 Cockayne (note 3) 1154. 
144 Robertson (note 90). See Cockayne ibid 1155. 
145 Robertson ibid  466. 
146 In addition he described Charles Taylor as the RUF’s ‘sponsor’ and Foday Sankoh as ‘the 
nation’s butcher’. Ibid 220. Robertson wrote that the RUF is ‘guilty of atrocities on a scale that 
amounts to a crime against humanity [which] must never again be forgiven’. Ibid 469.   
147 Prosecutor v Issa H. Sesay, Decision on Defence Motion seeking the Disqualification of Judge 
Robertson from the Appeals Chamber SCSL-2004-15-AR15, 13 March 2004  para 2, 4  
148 Ibid para 2, 6. 
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disqualified because she had previously been a member of the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women (UNSCW).149 The Appellant asserted that 
Judge Mumba had a personal interest in the case ‘and a number of associations 
concerning it’ which may have affected her impartiality.150 
 
The Bureau151 (the body which decides on matters of disqualification and which 
consists of the President, Vice President and Presiding Judges of the Trial 
Chambers) of the Tribunal found that it had no competence in the matter and 
therefore dismissed the application and the Motion without ruling on the merits. 
The Bureau found that an application for disqualification should be made during 
the trial up to the time the judgment is rendered. The Bureau did, however, 
consider that the issue of whether Judge Mumba should have disqualified herself 
for the trial of Anto Furundzija ‘would be relevant for the fairness of that trial’. 
 
The question of Judge Mumba's alleged impartiality was addressed extensively in 
the Furundzija Appeals Chamber Decision. The Appellant submitted five grounds 
of appeal. The fourth ground of Appeal was that presiding Judge Mumba should 
be disqualified. In setting out the factual basis for the allegations made by the 
Appellant the Appeals Chamber stated that for a period prior to her election as 
judge, Judge Mumba was a representative of the Zambian government on the 
UNCSW.152 The Chamber stated that at no time was she a member of the 
UNCSW while at the same time serving as a judge of the ICTY.153 This fact 
distinguishes her case from that of Judge Odio Benito who was Vice President of 
Costa Rica while being a judge in the Celebici case. During Judge Mumba's 
membership of the UNCSW, the war in Yugoslavia and specifically the allegations 
of mass and systematic rape was one of the concerns of the Commission.154  
 
                                                   
149 In the Furundzija Appeals Chamber decision, the section ‘Fourth Ground of Appeal’ (paras 164 -
215) deals with the question of recusal, namely whether or not Judge Mumba, the Presiding Judge in 
the trial, was impartial because of her former involvement with the UN Commission on the Status 
of Women. See Prosecutor v Furundzija IT-95-17/1-A, 21 July 2000. 
150 Decision on Post -Trial Application by Anto Furundzija to the Bureau of the Tribunal for the 
Disqualification of Presiding Judge Mumba, Motion to vacate Conviction and Sentence, and Motion 
for a new Trial, 11 March 1999. Bureau Decision pursuant to Rule 15 stating (1) that a motion for 
disqualification of a Judge of a Trial Chamber must be submitted before the Trial Chamber has 
rendered its judgment, (2) that the issue is relevant to the fairness of the trial, and (3) that the 
Bureau has no competence in this issue. 
151 The Bureau consisted of President Kirk McDonald, Judges Jorda, Rodriguez, Hunt and 
Bennouna. See ICTY Rule 23 for the definition of the ‘Bureau’. 
152 Furundzija (note 149) para. 166. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid para 167. It is stated in the judgment that this concern was exhibited in resolutions which 
condemned the practices of mass and systematic rape and it urged the International Tribunal to give 
them priority by prosecuting those allegedly responsible. The resolutions referred to are ECOSOC 
Resolution 38/9, ECOSOC Resolution 37/3 and ECOSOC Resolution 39/4. 
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The matter becomes even more interesting because three authors of one of the 
amicus curiae briefs155 later filed in the Furundzija case and one of the Prosecutors in 
the case, Patricia Sellers, attended the Expert Group Meeting following the UN 
Conference on Women held in Beijing and had been involved in the activities of 
the UNSCW.156 The Appeals Chamber stated that the extent of contact the three 
authors and Prosecution lawyer might have had and its impact on the trial is 
disputed.157 The Appellant submitted that because of Judge Mumba’s personal 
interest in, and association with, the UNCSW and with the three authors and 
Prosecution lawyer she should have been disqualified under Rule 15 of the Rules. 
The Appellant argued that the test which should have been applied is whether ‘a 
reasonable member of the public, knowing all the facts [would] have come to the 
conclusion that Judge Mumba has or had any associations which might affect her 
impartiality’.158 The Appellant emphasised that he did not allege that Judge 
Mumba was actually biased.159 The issue was whether a reasonable person could 
have an apprehension as to her impartiality.160  The Appeals Chamber stated that 
the Appellant’s contention that Judge Mumba was ‘personally involved’ in 
promoting the cause of the UNCSW had no basis since the Appeals Chamber was 
of the view that Judge Mumba acted as a representative of her country and 
therefore served in an official capacity.161 Representatives of the UNCSW are 
selected and nominated by their governments.162 In addition the founding 
Resolution of the UNCSW does not provide for its members to serve in such 
personal capacity. Judge Mumba’s view presented before the UNCSW would be 
                                                   
155 The identity of the authors of the brief is not stated in the Furundzija Appeals judgment (note 
149). Para 167 
156 Furundzija (note 149) para 167, 168. Two organisations that were granted leave to file the same 
amicus curiae brief - the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic and the International 
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development - were participants in the Beijing World 
Conference on Women that ratified the Platform for Action of the UNCSW in September 1995. As 
colleagues on the UNCSW and proponents of the Platform for Action, Judge Mumba and these 
organisations shared , or at least appear to have shared  the interest and goals of the UNCSW. 
157 Ibid para. 168. 
158 Ibid para 169. 
159 Ibid para 170 and Appellant's Reply 48. 
160 Ibid para 49. The Appeals Chamber quoted the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test used by the 
Supreme Court of South Africa in the South African Rugby Football Union case. The court in this case  
found: ‘The reasonableness of the apprehension [of bias] must be assessed in the light of the oath 
of office taken by the Judges to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry 
out that oath by reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse 
their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions. They must take into account the 
fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged to recuse themselves.’ 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others, Judgment 
on Recusal Application, 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC), 3 June 1999, para 48. The court also referred to the 
Webb case in which the High Court of Australia found that, in determining whether or not there are 
grounds to find that a particular Judge is partial, the court must consider whether the circumstances 
would give a fair-minded and informed observer a ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’. Webb (note 
16). 
161 Ibid para 198. 
162 Ibid para 199. 
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treated as the view of her government.163 The Appeals Chamber found that there 
was no substance in the Appellant’s allegation and this ground of appeal failed. 
What is the connection between the Furundzija case and Judge Mumba’s 
membership of the UNSCW? The Trial Chamber convicted Furundzija, inter alia, 
of the crime of outrages upon personal dignity, including rape.164 The appellant 
alleged that Judge Mumba’s decision (in Furundzija) in fact promoted specific 
interests and goals of the commission.165 He stated that Judge Mumba advocated 
the position that rape was a war crime, and encouraged the vigorous prosecution 
of persons charged with rape as a war crime. He claimed that the expanded 
definition of rape which emerged in the judgment, reflected the views of the 
Expert Group meeting at which Judge Mumba was present.166 
 
The matter of Judge Mumba's alleged lack of impartiality can be compared to 
Lord Hoffmann's conflict of interest in the Pinochet167 case. One of the appeal 
judges, Lord Hope stated that in view of Lord Hoffman's links with Amnesty 
International as the chairperson and director of Amnesty International Charity 
Limited he could not be seen to be impartial.168 Amnesty International was 
admitted to the proceedings in Pinochet as amicus curiae. Amnesty International 
campaigned strongly against Senator Pinochet and supported his extradition to 
face trials for his alleged crimes. Lord Hoffmann, it was held, had an interest in 
the outcome of the present proceedings because he had some involvement with 
Amnesty International Charity Limited which, in turn, had a close relationship 
with Amnesty International Limited. The Law Lords decided that the links 
between Lord Hoffmann who sat on the original panel that ruled to allow General 
Pinochet's extradition and the human rights group Amnesty International, which 
had campaigned strongly against Pinochet, were too close to allow the verdict to 
stand.169 In spite of the fact that he had no financial or pecuniary interest in the 
outcome, his relationship with Amnesty International was such that he was acting 
as a judge in his own cause. Another Appellate Judge, Lord Hutton, said that the 
links between Lord Hoffman and Amnesty International were so strong ‘that 
public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice would be shaken 
if his decision was allowed to stand’.170  
                                                   
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid para 275. 
165 Appellant’s amended brief para 135. See Furundzija (note 139) para 206.  
166 Ibid para 116. 
167 Pinochet (No 2) (note 15) 291. 
168 Ibid 291. See also BBC News ‘Pinochet Judge Under Pressure’ 15 January 1999, 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics, website visited on 15 January 1999.  
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disqualified himself and a different judge sat, the result could have gone the other way.’ C Dyer 




Amnesty’s interest in the case was not financial but lay in refuting Senator 
Pinochet’s claim of immunity and securing his eventual trial for crimes against 
humanity.  The principle against bias is not limited however to financial interests: 
‘the rationale disqualifying a judge applies just as much if the judge’s decision will 
lead to the promotion of a cause in which the judge is involved together with one 
of the parties’.171 According to the House of Lords, the Pinochet case fell under the 
category of cases where a judge is to be automatically disqualified if there is an 
interest in the case.172 Interestingly, Jones is of the opinion that Pinochet (No 2) 
should not be interpreted as precluding judicial involvement in activities outside 
the courtroom and that the public may not want judges to inhabit a ‘judicial 
Olympus’.173 Because judicial decision making often involves taking community 
views into account, some measure of involvement in public activities may not be 
undesirable.  
The first important difference between the cases of Judge Hoffmann and Judge 
Mumba is that whereas Lord Hoffmann was at the time of the Pinochet hearing a 
director of Amnesty International Charity Ltd, Judge Mumba’s membership of the 
UNCSW was not contemporaneous with her tenure as judge in Furundzija. A 
second difference would be the argument that the close link between Lord 
Hoffmann and Amnesty International is absent in Furundzija. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson stated that ‘[o]nly in cases where a judge is taking an active role as 
trustee or director of a charity which is closely allied to and acting with a party to 
the litigation should a judge normally be concerned either to recuse himself or 
disclose the position to parties’.174 Although Judge Mumba’s connection to the 
UNSCW was weaker than Lord Hoffmann’s to Amnesty International, it is 
important that the requirement of disclosure of interests in a case, and the 
appearance of impartiality be taken seriously.  
 
A similar question regarding recusal arose in the context of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. A motion for the recusal of Judge Renate Winter was filed which 
argued that the appearance of bias was created from the fact that in hearing the 
child soldier recruitment issue, the Appeals Chamber received an amicus curiae brief 
from UNICEF. Judge Winter had previously acknowledged that she assisted in the 
preparation of UNICEF publications addressing the issue of child soldier 
recruitment. In addition Judge Winter refused to provide details of her 
relationship with UNICEF. In deciding the matter, the court referred to the 
presumption of judicial independence and that the burden for displacing that 
presumption is high. The court ruled that merely commenting on a draft 
document does not give rise to an apprehension of bias sufficient to displace that 
burden. The court stated that a professional interest in a matter will also not rebut 
                                                   
171 Pinochet (No2) (note 15) 289I per Lord Browne–Wilkinson.  
172 Jones (note 13) 395. 
173 Ibid 398. See also G Henry ‘Pinochet: In search of the perfect judge’ (1999) 21 Sydney Law Review  
676–8. 
174 Pinochet (No 2) (note 15) 284. 
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the presumption.175 Interestingly, the court took the contrary view and said that 
such factors may even demonstrate that a judge is qualified for judicial office.176 
 
9. Conclusion 
In the context of the ICTY, Morrison writes that if the perception of the public is 
important in national courts, how much greater, ‘in the overall amalgam of 
jurisprudence and lay confidence’, is the need for a positive international 
perception of an international tribunal.177 Judicial impartiality will dispel any 
impression of arbitrary decision making. The Canadian Judge Jules Dechenes 
wrote that the independence of the judiciary might appear to be a worn-out 
subject but that it must be constantly affirmed and defended since independent 
courts constitute ‘the last bulwark’ against the arbitrary infringements of the 
state.178 If the international community constitutes a Rechtsstaat without being a 
state, international judges should be guided by the law and not by personal 
preference.  
 
Independence requires that judges separate themselves from the policies of 
countries they represent. Although Scharf is probably unjustifiably critical of the 
Milosevic Bench, the appearance of impartiality remains important. Since its 
inception the ICTY has been accused of Eurocentrism.179 This means that the 
Tribunals should be sensitive to this charge when composing its benches. It can be 
argued that the special circumstances surrounding Judge Odio-Benito’s position 
justified the decision to allow her to finish hearing Celebici. Any interference of the 
Security Council in the work of the judges should nevertheless be resisted and 
questioned. The ad hoc Tribunals can help establish appropriate international 
standards for the recusal of judges. It is troublesome that judges as senior as the 
President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone have had to recuse themselves.  
 
The independence of the judges and the institutional independence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals are inextricably linked. It is much more probable that the goals of the 
Tribunals, including the primary goal of restoring and promoting peace and 
reconciliation in Rwanda and the Balkans, will be achieved if the judges are 
perceived to be fair and neutral. Judicial independence has crucial implications for 
                                                   
175 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman Decision on the Motion to Recuse Judge Winter from the 
Deliberation in the Preliminary Motion on the Recruitment of Child Soldiers, SCSL-2004 -14-PT-
112, 5 April 2004. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Morrison (note 34) 115. In the context of sentencing, the Appeals Chamber in Celebici noted that: 
‘Public confidence in the integrity of the administration of the criminal justice (whether 
international or domestic) is a matter of abiding importance to the survival of the institutions that 
are responsible for that administration.’ Prosecutor v Delalic et al, IT-96-21, 16 November 1998, para 
756. 
178 J Dechenes ‘Towards an International Judiciary: Canadian and International Perspectives’ in  
Shetreet & Dechenes (eds) (note 9) 514. 
179 Michael Scharf ‘The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court’ (1996) 6 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 168. 
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the lawmaking activities of the judges. The substantive and procedural law made 
by the Tribunals will only be perceived as legitimate if the judges are independent 
and impartial. A perception that judges are biased can undermine states’ trust in 


























                                                   






  THE INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE OF THE ICTY AND ICTR  
 
1. Introduction 
Thomas Franck writes that every bench creates its own ‘cultural environment’.1 
The chapter will discuss the Chambers of the ICTY and ICTR as collegial bodies. 
From reading Tribunal judgments it seems as if the Tribunals speak as institutions 
rather than individuals. One reason for this is that the drafting of judgments at the 
Tribunals is often a collective effort. When reading these judgments, one mostly 
seeks in vain for the distinctive voice of an Oliver Wendell Holmes or a Learned 
Hand.  
 
Individual judges have left their mark. The character and work of the Tribunals 
have been dominated by prominent judicial personalities such as Judges Cassese, 
Wald and Meron. To Wald it is clear that a judge’s origins and politics will 
influence his or her judicial opinions. She writes that judges’ minds are not 
compartmentalized and their law-declaring function cannot be performed by some 
insulated, apolitical internal mechanism.2 The institutional culture of the Chambers 
is influenced inter alia by the professional backgrounds of the judges. In the early 
days of the ICTY’s work Geoffrey Robertson commented that Tribunal judges are 
mainly academics or long-serving appellate judges.3 The current group of Tribunal 
judges have more diverse personal and professional backgrounds. It remains 
instructive to look at whether the judges have experience in trying criminal cases 
or whether the judges are diplomats or judges with a more academic background 
in international law.  It is also important to look at whether a judge is from a civil 
or a common law background. 
 
Piercing the judicial veil is difficult. Whereas more outspoken judges, such as 
Judges Cassese and Wald have written extensively on their experiences as ICTY 
judges, most Tribunal judges have remained more reticent.  
 
In addition to looking at the professional backgrounds of the judges, the chapter 
will also examine questions such as the role of Tribunal presidents in shaping the 
institutions, the composition of the Appeals Chamber and the bureaucratic nature 
of the Tribunals. The drafting process and the language issue at the Tribunals will 
also receive attention. 
 
                                                   
1 T Franck Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) 320. 
2 P Wald ‘Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law 
Review and Other Great Books’ (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 895. 
3 G Robertson Crimes Against Humanity (2002) 288.  
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2.  The Role of the Presidents 
The Presidents of the ICTY and ICTR have the task set out in the Statutes of 
presiding over the proceedings of the Appeals Chamber.4 In addition to their role 
as leaders of the Tribunals, the Presidents have both an administrative and 
supervisory function. Their administrative function includes such functions as 
overseeing the Chambers and the functions of the Registry, representing the 
Tribunal at all meetings and consultations with national governments and being 
responsible for presenting the Annual Report of the work of the Tribunal to the 
UN Secretary General.5 They also have the more ideological task of providing the 
Tribunals with a longer-term vision or perspective and of leading the institution in 
accordance with such vision. The fact that the President presides over the Appeals 
Chamber puts him or her in a position of influence. Like the captain of a ship the 
President can direct the course of the Tribunal. 
 
Cassese points out that Article 33 of the Statute also gives the Presidents a non-
judicial role which can be described as a ‘political’ role.6 This is different from the 
position in national jurisdictions where (outside her judicial function) the President 
of a court usually only has an administrative and managerial  task. Article 33 
provides that the President is to report annually to the General Assembly and the 
Security Council. Part of the political function of the President is to encourage 
state cooperation. The President may also have to contact senior members of 
cabinet of the various states to persuade them to cooperate with the Tribunal.7 A 
Tribunal President’s most important political function, according to Cassese, may 
be to call on the Security Council to take whatever measures necessary to compel 
non-compliant states to cooperate with the Tribunal. This means that the 
President is vested with ‘diplomatic’ functions which do not usually attach to 
courts.8 
 
Article 14 confers certain administrative responsibilities on the President. Apart 
from presiding over the Appeals Chamber, the President has the important 
responsibility of assigning the judges to the various chambers after consulting with 
the judges. The President also performs important functions relating to the 
organization and coordination of the work of the Chambers and supervises the 
performance of various functions of the Registry.9 The President is to be elected 
by a majority of the judges.10 Singling out a few important contributions made by 
Tribunal Presidents gives one an idea of the kinds of influence Tribunal Presidents 
can have.  Although the process at the Tribunals is perhaps driven more by 
                                                   
4 This task is spelt out in Article 14 (2) of the ICTY Statute. 
5 See Curriculum Vitae of Judge Pillay (provided by Judge Pillay’s secretary).   
6 A Cassese ‘The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality’ (2004) 2 JICJ 588. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See ICTY Rule 19. 
10 Article 18 of ICTY Statute states that the President shall be elected by a majority for the votes of 
the Judges composing the Tribunal. 
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prominent personalities than necessarily by the figure of the President the 
following significant contributions stand out: 
 
As first ICTY President, Judge Cassese is often praised for his pioneering work in 
making the paper tribunal work in practice. He grappled with issues such as state 
cooperation, funding and acceptance by the international community. Cassese can 
also be described as one of the more political Tribunal presidents.11  
 
As part of the completion strategy developed by him, Judge Jorda steered the 
ICTY in a civil law direction.  Many amendments were made to the Rules during 
his Presidency.12 Most of these amendments were aimed at expediting trials and 
reflected a strong civil law approach. These amendments are examined in Chapter 
7. 
 
The South African judge, Navanethem Pillay, served as President of the ICTR for 
two terms.13 As President of the ICTR, she was complimented on her 
management ability, the better organisation during her Presidency and the fact that 
more trials took place during this period. During her Presidency of the ICTR 
Judge Pillay was strongly concerned with the advancement of women’s rights and 
the prosecution of sexual offences.14  
 
Judge Meron, the previous ICTY President, was elected as the fourth President of 
the ICTY on 27 February 2003.15 Meron has been concerned with designing a 
completion strategy for the Tribunals. In order to achieve the aim of completing 
trials by 2008 he has emphasised the need for state cooperation.16 The current pre-
occupation with an exit strategy for the ICTY is the result of the possibility of 
national courts in Balkans conducting trials (particularly through the newly 
established War Crimes Chamber) and substantial costs of maintaining the 
ICTY.17 
                                                   
11Cassese has, on occasion, argued for the reimposition of sanctions against Bosnian Serbs And in 
February 1995 he issued a press release on behalf of the judges in which they ‘wished to express 
their concern about the urgency with which appropriate indictments should be issued’ and 
continued to state that the judges ‘were anxious that a programme of indictments should effectively 
meet the expectations of the Security Council and of the world community at large.’ F Megret ‘The 
Politics of International Criminal Justice’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1277, 1278. 
12 See the article by G Boas ‘Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY 
and the Principle of Flexibility’ (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 41. 
13 She was elected President of the ICTR by a Plenary of Judges for a 2 year period in May 1999 and 
re-elected for second 2-year term in June 2001. 
14 Interview with Judge Pillay, 27 April 2005. 
15 The permanent Judges of the ICTY held an Extraordinary Plenary Session to elect successors to 
Judge Jorda and Judge Shahabuddeen. Press Release, The Hague, 27 February 2003, CC/PIS/753. 
16 For more on the completion strategy, see D Raab ‘Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion 
Strategy’ (2005) 3 JICJ 82. 
17 D McGoldrick ‘Criminal Trials before International Tribunals: Legality and Legitimacy’ in D 
McGoldrick, P Rowe, E Donelly (eds.) The Permanent International Criminal Court (2004)   ‘Criminal 




3. Common/Civil Law Backgrounds of Judges 
The institutional culture at the ad hoc Tribunals is strongly influenced by the legal 
system that dominates its procedures. The judges of the ICTY decided to follow 
the adversarial approach followed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. 18 An 
important reason for the choice of the adversarial model was the intellectual and 
psychological appeal of the Nuremberg and Tokyo models.19 The judges were 
steered into the adversarial direction by a US Memorandum containing a proposal 
of draft Rules.20 As first ICTY President, Cassese explained the reasons for the 
adoption of the adversarial process by stating that, based on the limited precedent 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and in order for the judges to remain as 
impartial as possible they would adopt a largely adversarial approach to 
procedure.21 Lawyers from civil law countries are likely to challenge the perception 
that the accusatorial system is necessarily a more impartial system than the 
inquisitorial system. It is interesting that Cassese, a civil lawyer, emphasised the 
impartiality of the adversarial system.22 Cassese writes that the Tribunals’ choice to 
follow the adversarial system might provide a better safeguard for the rights of the 
accused.23 
 
The Belgian, French and Dutch systems have been described as ‘moderately 
inquisitorial’.24 In examining the legal systems of various national jurisdictions it 
becomes clear that no purely adversarial or inquisitorial system exists today. 
Instead, one finds an increasing convergence of the two systems.25 Cassese 
suggests that the two models should therefore be understood as ‘abstract 
intellectual constructs’.26 
 
The adversarial model leaves the establishment of judicial truth to a contest 
between the parties (usually to be settled by a jury). It is also fundamental to the 
                                                   
18 The adversarial system is also called the common-law or Anglo-American system and the 
inquisitorial system is also called the civil-law system or continental European system.  
19A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 384. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Statement by the President of the International Tribunal, U.N. Doc. IT/29 (1994), reprinted in V Morris 
& M P Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Vol 2 
(1995) 649, 651. 
22 It is interesting that, whereas the Tribunals started to introduce inquisitorial elements into the 
Rules for greater efficiency, Italy ‘faced with the staggering inefficiency’ of the former system, 
introduced an adverserial trial into its judicial system. See O Kavran ‘The Sui Generis Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence’ in R Haveman, O Kavran, J Nicholls (eds.) Supranational Criminal Law: A 
System Sui Generis (2003) 164. 
23 Cassese (note 19) 384. Cassese also commended the decision of the IMT to follow the adversarial 
system. See Ibid  381. 
24 P de Hert ‘Legal Procedures at the International Criminal Court’ in R Haveman, O Kavran, J 
Nicholls (eds.)  Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (2003) 94. 
25 See A Orie ‘Accusatorial v Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings’ in 
Cassese (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 1441. 
26 Cassese (note 19) 365. 
118
 
adversarial system that the rights of the accused should be protected as much as 
possible by laying down a set of strict procedural safeguards that act as a safeguard 
against abuses by the judiciary.27 The essence of the inquisitorial system lies in the 
strong emphasis on public interest in prosecuting and punishment. In an 
inquisitorial system public institutions such as investigating judges and prosecutors 
play a significant role in the administration of justice. This means that less 
emphasis is placed on the role and rights of the accused.28 
 
 Judge Wald summarised the difference between the two systems as follows: 
common law systems rely on the parties to make their case with the judge or jury 
as umpire and is characterised by detailed rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence in court. The civil law system, on the other hand uses an investigating 
judge to supervise the compilation of a dossier that can include more wide-ranging 
evidence than permitted at common law, to which the defendant responds at trial. 
The judge actively controls the direction of the trial and often directs the 
questioning.29  
 
Tomlinson writes that the chief strength of the inquisitorial trial lies in the efficient 
and generally fair trial based on a comprehensive dossier which informs the judge 
in advance of all the evidence in the case.30 It is however generally acknowledged 
that individual rights, when confronted with the state’s investigatory authority, 
enjoy less protection than in a common-law system such as the United States.31 
 
In Celibici it was stated that the ICTY and ICTR Statutes consist of a ‘fusion and 
synthesis’ of the common law and the civil law traditions.32 Although the legal 
system applied at the Tribunals is often described as a ‘mixed system’ it is more 
accurate to describe it as essentially an adversarial system with only some civil law 
elements which were introduced for the purpose of expedition of trials. 33 Cassese 
writes that the Statute of the ICTY embodies and contains the fundamental 
features of the adversarial system.34  
Orie writes that Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the ICTY judges 
created a typical common-law structured law of procedure.35 Even though civil 
law elements have been introduced by some of the judges this does not affect the 
                                                   
27  Ibid 375. 
28 Ibid. 
29 M A Glendon et al. Comparative Legal Traditions (1994) 179-83. See also G Nice ‘Trials of 
Imperfection’ (2001) 14 2 LJIL 384. 
30 E A Tomlinson ‘Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience’ (1983) 42 Maryland Law Review 
132 
31 Ibid 133. 
32Prosecutor v. Mucic et al. IT-96-21 ‘Celebici Camp’, 16 November 1998, para. 158.  
33 Cassese (note 19) 398.  
34 Ibid 384. 
35 Orie (note 25) 1492. 
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common-law backbone of the law of procedure.36 The effect of the civil law 
changes to the Rules will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 7. 
 
The ICTY Rules provide for a typical accusatorial type of trial which proceeds as 
follows: The parties deliver opening statements and then present their respective 
cases in a traditional common law order.37 The proceedings diverge from the 
accusatorial order in that the Trial Chamber has the power under Rule 89 to order 
the parties to present additional evidence and to summon witnesses. This means 
that judges are more actively engaged in the search for truth than in a traditional 
common law system. In typical accusatorial fashion a party who called a witness 
can examine the witness followed by cross-examination and re-examination. (Rule 
85b). Another departure from the adversarial norm is that ICTY judges have the 
power to put questions to a witness not only at the end of the proceedings but at 
any stage.38 The introduction of a pre-trial judge (by Rule 65 ter) to help with pre-
trial preparation is a feature that resembles the inquisitorial system. The powers of 
the pre-trial judge (including ordering the parties to file briefs containing 
information about the nature of the case they intend to present) can however not 
be compared to the extensive investigative powers of the civil-law judge. At the 
ICTY the pre-trial judge has no powers of investigation.39 
 
President Cassese stated that, in order to make ‘a conscious effort to make good 
the flaws of Nuremberg and Tokyo’, considerable efforts have been made to put 
both the prosecution and the defense on the same footing, with full disclosure of 
documents and witnesses on both sides. It was hoped that this would help to 
safeguard the rights of the accused and ensure a fair trial. He stated that two 
important adaptions have been made to the adversarial system: firstly the judges 
will be solely responsible for weighing the probative value of the evidence before 
them. The President continued: 
 
Secondly the Tribunal may order the production of additional or new evidence proprio 
motu. This will enable us to ensure that we are fully satisfied with the evidence on which 
we base our final decisions and to ensure that the charge has been proved beyond 
reasonable doubt.40 
 
Prominent Tribunal Presidents from civil law traditions, such as Judges Cassese 
and Jorda, have left their imprint on substantive and procedural developments at 
the Tribunals. The increased use of pleabargaining at the Tribunals reflects the 
influence of common law ideas. Cassese's civil law background can be discerned in 
his unfavourable attitude towards pleabargaining41 and favourable attitude toward 
                                                   
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 1464. 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 1465. For a discussion of the role and position of the pre-trial judges, see Chapter 7. 
40 V Morris & M Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Vol. 1 (1995) 651. 
41 Separate and Dissenting Opinion, Prosecutor v Erdemovic  IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997, para. 10. 
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duress as a complete defence.42 He has also not been hesitant about expressing his 
views on such questions as the usefulness of national law in international 
prosecutions and the recourse to policy considerations by international courts.43 
The Erdemovic case is a good example of how the judges’ adherence to civil or 
common law position led to a split in opinion. Erdemovic is discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
In spite of such partisan behaviour by the judges, Judge Wald writes that the ICTY 
has set a model for how international judges ought to behave and that tribunal 
judges view their role as transcending their national origins.44 According to Megret 
international criminal tribunals allow an opportunity to symbolically test which of 
the Anglo-American or continental models of procedure will be most appropriate 
for adjudicating war crimes.45 In his view the emergence of an ‘international 
criminal procedure’ will show which of the two systems is more faithful to the 
liberal idea of a rule of law.46 
 
At the ICC an attempt was made to strike a balance between the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems. According to Orie the result of this compromise is that the 
basic elements of the procedure have lost their anchorage in a coherent system.47 
The drafters of the Statute have for example avoided the term ‘guilty plea’ and 
replaced it by admission of guilt. This means that the consequences of such an 
admission would be different from that of a guilty plea in common law. But it 
does not necessarily mean that a civil trial will follow. Significant powers are 
attributed to the judges. They can decide whether the interests of justice require a 
more complete presentation of the evidence. After making this assessment, the 
judges will decide on the type of trial that will follow.48 
 
4. Professional Backgrounds of Judges 
In the early days of the Tribunals’ work Geoffrey Robertson commented that 
judges elected to the ICTY and ICTR had inadequate judicial experience.49 He said 
that ‘none’ had had any recent hands-on experience in criminal defence work. 
According to Robertson the eleven judges originally selected had a reasonable 
range of international law experience but lacked relevant human rights experience. 
In his opinion it was worrying that there was almost a total lack of any relevant 
experience or recent experience of defending accused persons which in 
                                                   
42 Ibid. 
43 On the question of the extent to which an international criminal law can rely on national law see 
paras. 1 – 6 of his Separate and Dissenting Opinion in Erdemovic ibid. On the question of policy 
considerations see paras. 47 – 49. 
44P Wald  ‘An Appraisal from Within’ (2004) 2 JICJ 473 
45 F Megret ‘Three Dangers for the International Criminal Court. A Critical Look at a Consensual 
Project’ (2001) 12 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 244. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Orie (note 25) 1494. 
48 Ibid 1493. This is unusual in light of the fact that, in light of the the rulemaking power of the ICC 
judges has been curtailed. Ibid 1494. 
49 Robertson (note 3) 288. 
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Robertson's view, might be thought the most important qualification for a judge 
who has to decide factual issues based on identification evidence and witness 
credibility.50 
 
More recently however McGoldrick writes that the ICTY has been composed of 
experts in criminal law, human rights and civil liberties protection.51 Of the sixteen 
permanent judges and eight ad litem judges currently occupying the ICTY 
Chambers thirteen have significant judicial experience in their countries of 
origin.52 Some even have significant experience as international judges. Judge 
Shahabuddeen served as Senior Counsel in Guyana and as Judge of the 
International Court of Justice between 1988 and 1997.53 
 
The presence of judges with experience as diplomats has been criticised because 
trained diplomats have a tendency to reflect the views of their governments. The 
question of appearance of impartiality is particularly important in this context. 
What seems more problematic in practice is the fact that diplomat-trained judges 
lack court experience and might be unable to control parties in court. Those 
judges with courtroom experience are generally less easily fooled or tricked by the 
parties. Judges with extensive courtroom experience (such as Judges Hunt and 
Schomburg) have been said to be more firm with the parties and less flexible than 
the diplomats.54 
 
Although not formally required, judges who sit on Trial Chamber judgments 
should have previous trial experience. According to Judge Wald one cannot expect 
judges with backgrounds as law professors to make decisions on the admissibility 
of evidence and to decide on the relevance of evidence.55 After her term at the 
ICTY ended she expressed her views on the need for academic requirements and 
judicial skill when she said: ‘The court's image is that it is meant to develop 
                                                   
50 Ibid 
51McGoldrick (note 17) 28. 
52The following permanent judges were judges in their various national jurisdictions before they 
came to the ICTY: Judge Camel A Agius (Malta); Judge Florence Mumba (Zambia);  Judge 
Alphonsus Orie (The Netherlands); Judge Wolfgang Schomburg (Germany), Judge O-gon Kwon 
(South Korea); Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti (France), Judge Iain Bonomy (United Kingdom); Judge 
Kevin Parker (Australia);  and Judge Andresia Vaz (Senegal). The following ad litem judges have had 
judicial experience: Judge Joaquin Canivell (Spain); Judge Krister Thelin (Sweden); Judge Hans 
Henrik Brydensholt (Denmark) and Judge Claude Hanoteau (France). This reflects the state of the 
Chambers at 16 July 2005. 
53 Biographical Note Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, www.un.org/icty/judges/shahabuddeen-
e.htm. 
54 Interview with ICTY Prosecutor, August 2002. 
55 M Simons ‘An American with Opinions Steps Down Vocally at War Crimes Court’ The New York 
Times, 24 January 2002. However, by the start of 2002, out of 16 ICTY judges only three judges had 
little or no trial experience. One is Judge Wald's successor, Judge Theodor Meron who is an expert 
in international criminal and human rights law and Judge Liu Daqun who used to be China's 
ambassador to Jamaica and specializes in international law of the sea and thirdly, Mehmet Guney, 
also a former diplomat, from Turkey. See also the views of S Shetreet in Judges on Trial (1976) 58, 59. 
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notions of international laws and flesh them out. That's a very academic notion. 
But in the first place this is an international criminal court. You are dealing with 
putting people away for many years.’56 Judge Wald firmly believed that judges 
need to know how a courtroom functions and need to appreciate the basic 
elements of a crime and of evidence. In an article, written in 1987, she maintains 
that judges with no appellate experience should not sit in the Appeals Chamber 
which in turn reviews the decisions of experienced trial judges.57 She emphasised 
that a fair trial by capable judges is indispensable to the Tribunal's reputation as a 
legitimate vehicle of international accountability. Wald believed that efficiency at 
the ICTY has been hampered by judges who are legal scholars or diplomats who 
are used to pondering fine points of international law but have little hands-on 
experience.58 
 
Provision has been made for representivity and diversity (both geographically and 
in terms of the experience required to serve on the court) in the Chambers of the 
ICC. As one of the requirements for judgeship, the Rome Statute requires a degree 
of expertise in the subject matter of the court. Two categories of candidates are 
created, those with criminal law experience and those with international law 
experience. Specific reference is made to international humanitarian law and the 
law of human rights.59  
 
Tribunal judges can be divided into three categories: academics, practitioners and 
civil servants.  Judges who served as politicians or diplomats are categorised as 
civil servants. Some judges have straddled all three professions. Judge 
Shahabuddeen, for example, has had many years of judicial experience and has 
also served in the government of Guyana. The division is useful since it highlights 
the strengths (and weaknesses) of the judges. According to Steinitz the diversity 
among the judges is a way of claiming legitimacy through representivity.60 
Although a few prominent judges who sat as judges in the early years of the 
Tribunals’ existence will be considered, the focus will be on the current 
incumbents.61  
 
                                                   
56 She admits that a ‘mix’ is needed but that ‘you would not take a professor of anatomy and put 
him into an operating theatre and say ‘Now perform this brain surgery!’’. Simons ibid. 
57 P Wald ‘The International Criminal Tribunal Comes of Age’ (2001) 5 Journal of Law and Policy 95.  
58 G Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTY, similarly complained that new Tribunal Judges lacked 
experience in criminal courts. Blewitt, an experienced Australian prosecutor, was subsequently 
reprimanded by the President of the ICTY, Claude Jorda. See Simons (note 55). Michail 
Wladimiroff- who served as defence counsel at the Tribunal, said the court required a mix. ‘What is 
needed is know-how of criminal trials, knowledge of international law and overall management 
skills,’ he said. ‘Not all judges need to have the same experience.’ Simons ibid. 
59 W Schabas An Introduction to the ICC (2nd ed 2004) 177. During an election there are two lists of 
candidates, one with a criminal law profile (‘List A’) and the other with an international law profile 
(‘List B’). See the discussion in Chapter 3. 
60 Ibid. 





Judges Cassese, Li, Abi-Saab and Meron can be described as ‘Professor Judges’. 
Both in terms of his background and approach Cassese is one of the best 
examples of an academic Tribunal judge.62 Although Cassese was one of the most 
eminent Tribunal judges, he had no judicial experience before being appointed as 
the first President of the ICTY. He was well-known in Italy and internationally as 
an academic writer and international law professor. In addition to being an 
academic judge, Cassese is also an international judge. In his view it is important to 
appreciate that the Tribunals should apply and emphasise international law and 
not emphasise or show preference for the law of any one jurisdiction.63  
 
Judge Meron is another prominent academic judge. He is an internationally 
acknowledged expert in international criminal and human rights law and is one of 
the few judges on the ICTY who has very little trial experience. Before his 
appointment to the ICTY, he was the Charles L. Denison Professor of Law at 
New York University Law School.64 He is widely regarded as a leading scholar in 
international criminal law, international humanitarian law and human rights.65 
Many believe that his published works served as a legal foundation for the 
international tribunals. 66  
 
Judge Cassese is not the only Italian academic to have served on the ICTY. Judge 
Fausto Pocar was a Professor in International Law at the University of Milan, a 
position he held from 1976. He has a distinguished record in international human 
rights.67 
 
                                                   
62  See inter alia his books International Law in a Divided World ( Clarendon Press 1986); Human Rights 
in a Changing World (Temple University Press 1990); Self-Determination of peoples: A legal Appraisal 
(Cambridge University Press 1995); Violence and Law in the Modern Age (Princeton Unversity Press 
1988). 
63 Interview with Judge Cassese, 6 June 2003, Florence. 
64 Between 1991 and 1995 he was Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies in Geneva. 
65 See Curricula Vitae of Candidates nominated by States Members of the United Nations, UN Doc 
A/55/773. 
66 See inter alia ‘Extraterritoriality of human rights treaties’ (1995) 89 AJIL; ‘The time has come for 
the United States to ratify Geneva Protocol 1’ (1994) 88 AJIL; ‘The Martens Clause, principles of 
humanity, and dictates of public conscience’ (2000) 94 AJIL; ‘The Normative Impact on 
International Law of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ in Yoram Dinstein, 
Mala Taborg (eds.) War Crimes in International Law (1996); ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ 
(2000) 94 AJIL; Convergence of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (1997). See also his books Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws 
(1993); Bloody Constraint: War and Chivalry in Shakespeare (1998).  
67 For more than a decade before joining the Tribunal, Pocar was a member of the Human Rights 
Committee, the treaty body responsible for implementing the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Biographical Note, www.un.org/icty/officials/pocar-e.htm. 
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Ad litem Judge Christine van den Wyngaert is a good example of an academic 
judge. She was a Professor at the University of Antwerp in criminal law, criminal 
procedure and international criminal law from 1985 until taking up her position as 
ad litem Judge at the ICTY.68 She served as ad hoc Judge at the International Court 
of Justice between 2000 and 2002.69  Judge Albin Eser can similarly be described 
as an academic judge. Even though he spent sixteen years (1971 to 1988) as an 
Associate Judge of the Upper State Courts in Westphalia and Baden-Wurttemberg, 
his position as Director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Criminal Law in Freiburg assures his standing as an academic judge.70 In a similar 
fashion, ad litem Judge Bert Swart was for ten years a Judge of the Criminal 
Division in Amsterdam. He has held the position of Professor of Criminal Law at 
the University of Utrecht from 1980. He can therefore be described and a 
practitioner.71 Because of his prolific writing on international criminal law, he will 
be categorised as an academic judge here. 
 
The practitioners 
Some prominent judges from civil law jurisdictions have extensive courtroom 
experience. Most of the current Tribunal judges have been judges in their 
respective countries highest courts. A good example is the French Judge Jorda 
who served as ICTY President and as president of the Appeals Chamber who has 
had many years of courtroom experience as a magistrate and judge in France. 
Jorda is also a former prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeals.72 
      
Judge Schomburg, the first German judge to be appointed to the ICTY, also has 
extensive experience as a professional judge in Germany.73 Judge Schomburg was 
a Public Prosecutor in West Berlin between 1974 and 1979, a judge in criminal 
matters before the Berlin Regional Court between 1984 -1986, a Senior Public 
Prosecutor in Berlin between 1986 and 1989 and a Judge at the Federal High 
Court in Karlsruhe between 1995 and 2000 The late Judge Richard May, had 
extensive courtroom experience and has a specific interest in evidence and 
procedure in criminal cases. He headed the Rules Committee, the committee 
which makes and amends Rules of Procedure and Evidence.74 
                                                   
68Judge van den Wyngaert was appointed as ad litem judge on 15 December 2003. She holds a PhD 
from the Free University of Brussels (1979).  Biographical Note Ad Litem Judge Christine van den 
Wyngaert, www.un.org/icty/wyngaert-e.htm 
69 Judge van den Wyngaert was an ad hoc judge in the case Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium )   Preliminary Objections and Merits, Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 2002, 3. She was elected as a permanent ICTY judge in 2004 but only started in this 
position in November 2005. 
70 Biographical Note Ad Litem Judge Albin Eser, www.un.org/icty/officials/eser-e.htm 
71 Biographical Note Ad Litem Judge Albert Swart, www.un.org/icty/officials/swart-e.htm 
72 Biography of President Claude Jorda, www.un.org/icty/pressreal/biojorda.htm 
73See Curricula Vitae of candidates nominated by States Members of the United Nations, United 
Nations Document A/55/773. 
74 See www.fco.gov.uk 
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Judge Wald was one of the ICTY judges with the most extensive judicial 
experience.75 In 1979 President Carter nominated her for a position on the U.S 
Court of Appeals.76  She was the first woman to sit on this bench and served as 
Chief Justice of this court from 1986 to 1991. Altogether she spent twenty years 
on the Court of Appeals. Between 1991 and her appointment to the ICTY in 1999 
she was a Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. Judge Wald is well known as a criminal lawyer. She was involved 
in policymaking in the field of criminal law and served on numerous commissions 
on issues relating to criminal justice.77  
 
Having served as an ICJ Judge between 1988 and 1997, Judge Shahabuddeen has 
significant international judicial experience. Judge Shahabudeen has also held 
several important positions in the government of Guyana. He was Guyana’s 
Minister of Legal Affairs between 1978 and 1987. He has also held the positions 
of First Deputy Prime Minister and Vice-President of Guyana.78 One of Judge 
Shahabuddeen’s most important contributions to international law is his book 
Precedent in the Wold Court.79 
 
The Korean Judge O-Gon Kwon was elected to the ICTY in 2001. Judge Kwon 
was a senior judge at the Taegu High Court. He has held a number of senior 
judicial positions within the Republic of Korea, specialising in criminal law.80 
 
Judge Kevin Parker hails from Australia and is one of the few Tribunal judges 
with significant experience as advocate and prosecutor. Parker served as Chief 
Crown Prosecutor for Western Australia after which he was appointed as judge to 
the Supreme Court of Western Australia.81 Judge Iain Bonomy from the United 
Kingdom is another judge with significant prosecutorial experience. As Queen’s 
                                                   
75Although prior to her appointment as ICTY judge she had no international judicial experience, her 
curriculum vitae testifies to extensive legal involvement beyond the borders of the U.S. Throughout 
the 1990's Judge Wald has been involved in Judicial Workshops and seminars in Eastern Europe. 
Curriculum Vitae for Patricia McGowan Wald (Addendix to UN Doc A/53/1042 Fifty third Session 
Agenda Item 166). 
76 Before this Judge Wald served as Circuit Judge in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Election of judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Curriculum Vitae ibid. 
77To highlight some of her many prolific positions: she was a member of the President's 
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia between 1965 and 1966 and between 1966 and 
1967 she was a Consultant on the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Criminal Justice. In addition she was a Consultant for the National Advisory 
Committee on Civil Disorder in 1968, in 1969 she was a Consultant on the National Commission 
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Her involvement in social and policy issues is also 
illustrated by her position as Co-Director of the Ford Foundation Drug Abuse Research Project in 
1970. Curriculum Vitae ibid 4, 5. 
78 See Curriculum Vitae, Judge Shahabuddeen ,A/51/878. 
79 Precedent in the World Court, Cambridge University Press (1996). 
80 Biographical Note Judge O-Gon Kwon, www.un.org/icty/officials/kwon-e.htm 
81 Biographical Note Judge Kevin Horace Parker, www.un.org/icty/officials/parker-e.htm 
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Counsel in the Crown Office he was involved in the presentation of the most 
serious criminal cases and represented the Crown in criminal appeals.82 
 
The civil servants 
Judge Patrick Robinson (one of the Milosevic judges in Trial Chamber III) is a 
former deputy solicitor general in the Jamaican Attorney General’s Department 
but has significant criminal law experience. He has also served as a member of the 
International Law Commission and the Haitian Commission on Truth and Justice. 
In 1991 he was President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.83 
 
After having served as Judge of the High Court of Zambia between 1980 and 
1989, Judge Florence Mumba held the position of Investigator-General 
(Ombudsman) for Zambia.84 Before his appointment to the ICTY, Judge Liu 
Daquin was China’s Ambassador in Jamaica.   He also served in the Treaty and 
Law Department of the Foreign Ministry for many years. Mehmet Güney (the 
fifth member of the Milosevic bench) similarly spent many years in the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1989 and 1999 he was Turkey’s Ambassador 
to Cuba, Singapore and Indonesia.85 
 
5. Composition of the Appeals Chamber 
The absence of the right to appeal was one of the major shortcomings of the 
Nuremberg Trials. Article 26 of the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal clearly 
stated that the decisions were final and without the possibility for appeal.86 At the 
ICTY this has been rectified and every accused, except for Slavko Dokmanovic 
who committed suicide in custody, has made use of this right.87 In his Report the 
Secretary General described the right of appeal as a fundamental right.88 Article 25 
of the ICTY Statute affords both the convicted person and the prosecution a right 
to appeal on mattes of fact and law. One can appeal against both conviction and 
                                                   
82 Biographical Note Judge Iain Bonomy, www.un.org/icty/officials/bonomy-e.htm 
83 Biographical Note Judge Patrick Robinson, www.un.org/icty/officials/robinson-e.htm 
84 Biographical Note Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba, 
www.un.org/icty/officials/mumba-e.htm 
85 But Mehmet Güney is also an international lawyer who has served on the International Law 
Commission for many years. Biographical Note Judge Mehmet Güney, 
www.un.org/icty/officials/guney-e.htm 
86 After the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal the right of convicted persons to a review of 
the declaration of guilt or of conviction by a higher level of jurisdiction has been recognized in 
different international instruments, inter alia art 14 (5) of the ICCPR of 19 December 1966 and art. 
2(1) of Protocol n. 7 annexed to the European Convention on Human Rights adopted on 4 
November 1950. See the text of protocol n.7 in ILM (1985) 435. See P de Cesari ‘Observations on 
the Appeal before the International Criminal Court’ M Politi, G Nesi (eds.) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, A  challenge to impunity (2001) 226. 
87 See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic IT-95-13. Dokmanovic committed suicide in custody on 28 
June 1998. 
88 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of   Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993) (S/25704), presented 3 May 1993, para. 116. 
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sentence and against final judgment and interlocutory decisions. This generous 
right to appeal is in the spirit of the civil law.89  
 
The ICTY and ICTY share an Appeal Chamber, an institutional feature which 
promotes consistency and continuity between the jurisprudence of the two 
Tribunals. Because the Appeals Chamber is concerned with legal questions that 
are generally of a more academic (and less factual) nature this is the obvious forum 
for the making of Tribunal law. To be suited for this task the judges selected for 
the Appeals Chamber are generally the most senior judges with firm academic 
backgrounds in international law. The absence of any ‘outside’ review or 
supervisory body exercising an appeal function adds to the prominence and 
influence of the Appeals Chamber.  An important flaw in the ICTY system, 
however, is the fact that judges are not ‘permanently’ assigned to either a Trial 
Chamber or the Appeals Chamber. This means that it is possible that judges who 
sat on the bench of a Trial Chamber in a specific case can sit on the Appeal or 
Interlocutory appeal in that same case. This could clearly influence the 
independence and impartiality of a judge. It is unlikely that a judge would be 
impartial when reviewing his or her own decision. 
 
Judge Wald writes that different members of the same tribunal, occupying the 
same corridor, sit both as trial judges and as appeal judges. In her view this affects 
the atmosphere or cameraderie between the judges. She writes that, no matter how 
modest or humble a judge may be, it may be difficult to be on perfect terms with 
those who has to correct your errors. She believes that knowing that one’s 
decision may be overturned by the judge in the next room makes the task of 
judging even more difficult and also ‘makes it near impossible for a sense of 
collegiate solidarity to develop as it would if first instance judges were structurally 
separated from the Appeals Chamber’.90  
 
According to Judge Wald the major constraint on appellate discretion is judicial 
collegiality, which involves the criticism by one judge of another judge’s 
perceptions, values and logic.91 Wald made this statement in the context of the US 
system but it also holds true in the context of appellate decisionmaking at the 
Tribunals. 
 
According to Hammond Judge Wald's ‘remarkable appellate handiwork’ calls to 
mind one of the fundamental deficiencies of the structure of the Tribunals.92 This 
                                                   
89 Orie (note 25) 1474. However the appeal proceedings resemble common-law proceedings since 
an appeal is not a trial de novo and there are limited opportunities for presenting new evidence. Ibid. 
90 Wald (note 57) 391. Wald comments on ‘the slightly awkward situation of a relatively small 
number of judges sitting both as trial and appellate jurists and ruling on each other’s cases.’ See her 
article ‘Judging War Crimes’ (2000) 1 Chinese Journal of  International Law 195.  
91 Wald (note 2) 905. 
92Hammond Testimony of Larry A. Hammond before the House International Relations 




shortcoming is the absence of a separate and independent appellate court. In his 
view it is unrealistic that judges who must interact and cooperate with their trial 
and appellate colleagues on a daily basis would have the courage displayed by 
Judge Wald to reverse the decision of her colleagues in the Trial Chamber.93  
 
According to the Rome Statute the Appeals Division of the ICC will consist of the 
president and four other judges. Members of the Appeals Division are to serve 
their entire nine-year term in the Division. This arrangement is reflective of 
widespread dissatisfaction with the practice at the ICTY where judges move from 
one chamber to another during their terms. Judges assigned to the Trial and Pre-
Trial Division may be rotated while those assigned to the Appeals Division will 
serve in that Division for the entire term of their office.  The rationale for this is, 
of course, to avoid the possibility of a judge who had presided over a matter in the 
Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, presiding over an appeal in the same matter in the 
Appeals Division.94  All ICC judges (appellate and non-appellate judges) will share 
the same building and interact in the same environment.  
 
6. On Bureaucracy and Remoteness 
The expense of establishing and running the ad hoc Tribunals has caused 
commentators such as Zacklin to describe the tribunals as ‘extremely costly 
bureaucratic machines’.95 The Tribunals have grown and grown. By 2005 the 
Tribunals reached elephantine proportions, with the total number of posts now 
exceeding 2 200 and their combined budget exceeding $250 million.96 As a result 
many donors have become fatigued and dissatisfied. The perception exists that 
this expenditure is not justified in attaining the principal task of bringing to justice 
those responsible for the most serious crimes in a timely and expeditious 
manner.97 It can be asked whether the delays in bringing detainees to trial do not 
constitute a violation by the Tribunals of the human rights guarantees (particularly 
the right to a fair trial) contained in the ICCPR.  
 
The International Crisis Group has commented on the slowness of trials at the 
ICTR in the following terms:  
 
The poor output of the Tribunal is linked to the mediocre productivity of the judges, 
some of whom are incapable of running criminal trials…the selection of judges should be 
                                                   
93 Ibid. Hammond believes that the ICTY would have been a better court, a court in which the 
accused could have had greater confidence if errors at trial received evenhanded appellate review. 
Ibid  7.  
94 M Rwelamira ‘Composition and Administration of the Court’ in R S Lee (ed) The International 
Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) 158. See Art 39 (4) 
Rome Statute which provides for the rotation of judges. 
95 R Zacklin ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2004) 2 JCIJ 543. 




more rigorously organised and that candidates who have not had solid experience as a 
judge in criminal affairs should be rejected.98 
 
Closely related to the bureaucratic nature of the Tribunals is their remoteness 
from the scenes of the crimes. The fact that the tribunals are situated far from the 
jurisdictions for which they were created means that victims and their families do 
not have access to the trials and impacts on the Tribunals’ ability to bring about 
reconciliation.99  The physical distance also leads to emotional or psychological 
distance.   
 
Zacklin comes to the bold conclusion that the Tribunals have been ‘too costly, too 
inefficient and too ineffective.’100 As a result the international community is now 
looking for alternative methods of dispensing international justice such as mixed 
Tribunals. 
 
7. Courtroom Aesthetics 
This thesis is strongly concerned with accountability and legitimacy of the 
Tribunals. As in most domestic and international courts, the physical and aesthetic 
space in which the proceedings take place and the ritual and rhetoric employed by 
the Tribunals contribute to an atmosphere of authority and legitimacy. Elements 
such as the interior design of the court, the dress code and the particular rhetoric 
employed can add to the oracular value of judgments.101 
 
 The ICTY’s modern UN-blue courtroom consists of a single large space in the 
centre of which three crimson robed Trial Chamber judges sit on an elevated 
platform. The judges are segregated from the audience by bullet-proof glass 
partition. In the back ‘region’ (behind the judges) are the holding room for the 
accused, robing rooms for the judges and a waiting area for the witnesses.102 
Steinitz writes ‘the judges reside in a forbidden city, from which they emerge at the 
commencement of the proceedings and into which they fade away at its 
adjournment’103 The prosecution and the amici generally wear black robes. On 
occasion, English barristers have insisted on wearing wigs. The lack of uniformity 
in apparel and the multi-cultural Bench serves as a reminder of the diversity of 
legal systems represented in the Tribunal.104 The judges represent not only the 
Tribunal but the entire international community. 
 
                                                   
98See ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, An International Crisis Group 
Report’, 7 June 2001, 11. 
99 Ibid 544. 
100 Ibid 545. 
101 M Steinitz ‘‘The Milošević Trial – Live!’ ‘ (2005) 3  JICJ 109, 110. 
102 See M P Scharf  Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since 
Nuremberg (1997) 84. 
103.Steinitz (note 101) 112.  See also A Feldman ‘The Sirens’ Song: Discourse and Space in the Court 
of Justice’ 1 Theory and Critique (1991) 143. 
104 Steinitz ibid 110.  
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As in Western courts generally, the verbal interaction enhance the 
authoritativeness of the judges’ pronouncements. The speech patterns include use 
of the royal ‘we’, referring to themselves as ‘the Chamber’ and to each other as 
‘Judge’ or ‘President’.  
 
The fact that Legal Officers and judges from Chambers and the Prosecution not 
only share a building but regularly fraternise at Tribunal parties and other social 
occasions could cast doubt on their independence.105 The fact that the registry 
serves both the judges and the prosecutor has been described as the main 
organisational problem of the ICTY.106 Sensitivity to the idea that justice should 
be seen to be done and fairness to the defence calls for a complete separation of 
the judicial from the prosecutorial function. 
 
8. Babylonic Confusion? The Language Issue at the Tribunals 
Judge Wald writes that the judges of the ICTY ‘speak a dozen languages more 
fluently than the official French and English of the Tribunal.’107According to 
Article 33 of the ICTY Statute and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the ICTY, the working languages of the Tribunal are English and French. This 
means that in the nomination process almost every judge from a common law 
background will qualify whereas few from civil law countries would be similarly 
qualified. This has influenced the selection of judges. Some argue that the language 
requirement places a limit on those who are eligible to be elected as judges and 
explains why some highly qualified judges from civil law jurisdictions are not 
considered for Tribunal judgeships.108  
 
Whereas most judges from common law countries have English as their mother 
tongue, it is difficult to find judges from civil law backgrounds who are proficient in 
English. Candidates from civil law countries who are proficient in English or 
French tend to be diplomats or academics. There are many important exceptions 
to this rule such as  the French Judge Jorda and the German Judge Schomburg 
who are proficient n the languages of the Tribunals and both have practical 
experience. As illustrated in the section on ‘professional backgrounds’ they have 
both had many years of extensive courtroom experience. Because of this language 
barrier candidates from common law countries tend to have more judicial 
experience. Because of the difficulty in finding Chinese judges or prosecutors who 
are fluent in English, Chinese ICTY judges for example have always been 
diplomats. This lack of judicial experience amongst judges tends to be more 
problematic at the Trial stage than at the Appeals stage.  
 
                                                   
105 This is reminiscent of the situation in Nuremberg where judges and prosecutors fraternised to 
the exclusion of German defense lawyers. Robertson (note 3) 300.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Wald  (note 57) 92. 
108 Interview with ICTY Prosecutor,  2002. 
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Some such as Geoffrey Nice believe that the fact that the judges are required to be 
proficient in either English or French may amount to a form of ‘cultural 
imperialism.’109 It can be argued that because of its exclusionary nature, the 
language barrier makes the Tribunal less ‘international’. Judge Wald’s criticism is of 
a different kind: she believes that the lack of fluency in English and French and to 
an extent in the native languages of the witnesses and defendants at the Tribunal 
has turned out to be a greater obstacle that she would have anticipated.110 In her 
view the lack of a common language makes out-of-court communication less 
spontaneous and memorialising the proceedings more difficult. All internal 
memoranda have to be translated in French and English. Sending a document for 
official translation is time-consuming. According to her ‘[t]he translations of 
decisions and other documents prepared by the judges...[is]a major problem’111 
The translation of documents caused sufficient delays in ICTR trials that the 
Tribunal recently amended its rules to allow defendants to use outside translation 
services instead of relying on the ICTR translation section. Language difficulties 
can also impede the speedy issuance of judgments because the judges are not all 
fluent in English and French and prefer to work in the language in which they are 
proficient. Judges must wait for drafts of the Tribunals' lengthy judgments to be 
translated before they can be discussed.112 
 
The Akayesu judgment shows how the ICTR judges had to wrestle with the 
subtleties in the way Rwandans expressed themselves.113 These subtleties made it 
difficult to tell whether witnesses had actually witnessed acts that they were 
reporting or whether they were reporting what others had seen and told them.114 
Thus it is difficult to know whether the judges come to the correct conclusions 
concerning such culturally sensitive questions.115 The Trial Chamber in Akayesu 
noted that the interpretation of oral testimony of witnesses from Kinyarwanda 
                                                   
109 Nice points out that the cultural base of English-speaking judges is narrower than the bases of 
those who have to work with a foreign culture. He believes that the development of the ICC, ICTY 
and ICTR may reflect a cultural imperialism not just of language. G Nice ‘Trials of Imperfection’ 
(2001) 14  LJIL 386. 
110 An example of this is the fact that the defendant and his counsel may speak Serbo Croatian and 
the prosecution and their counsel speak French or English. 
111 See Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of neighbouring States between 1 January and  31 December 1994, 
U.N. ICTY, 56th sess, at para. 5 U.N Doc. A/56/351-S/2001/863 (2001) (ICTR 2001 Annual 
Report) at para. 58 acknowledging that although the written judgment in the Kayishema appeal was 
ready in June 2001, ‘it has not been made available for distribution, due to translation difficulties.’ 
112 N A Combs ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide: the Plea Bargaining of International Crimes’ (2002) 
151  University of Pennsylvania Law Review 101, 102. See also Cassese ‘The ICTY: A Living and Vital 
Reality’ (2004) 2 JICJ 595.  
113 Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, paras. 145-154.  
114 J E Alvarez ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’ (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 




into one of the official languages of the Tribunal has been a great challenge since 
the syntax and everyday mode of expression in the Kinyarwanda language are 
complex and difficult to translate.116  
 
Although the ad hoc tribunals have only two official languages, as a general rule 
they have been unable to issue judgments in both languages simultaneously. 
During ICTY trials interpreters provide simultaneous audio interpretations in 
English, French and Serbo-Croatian.  
 
Nijboer points to the untranslatability of certain legal terms.117 How does one, for 
instance, translate a multifaceted term such as due process? It is difficult to translate 
a term that has both procedural and substantive connotations (such as due 
process) into a language other than English.118 Language problems such as these 
reflect differences in criminal law culture. 
 
The language barrier at the ICTY and ICTR also affects the style, and possibly the 
quality of judgments. Cassese calls the difficulties inherent in having different 
working languages one of the inherent problems in international criminal 
justice.119 
 
International criminal courts and tribunals are usually multilingual and have sought 
to regulate their language regimes in their Statutes or Rules. Rule 3 (A) of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone states that the working language of the Court will 
be English. Rule 3 (C) makes provision for any person appearing before the court 
who is not proficient in English to use his or her own language.120  
 
The ICC has two working languages, English and French. According to the 
Statute the Tribunal may however designate other working languages on a case-by-
case basis.121 In addition the court has six official languages: Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish. The Rules provide that ICC judgments and 
decisions ‘resolving fundamental issues before the Court’ are to be published in 
the official languages.122 According to Schabas this requirement is consistent with 
United Nations practice but may become cumbersome in the case of judgments 
running into several hundreds of pages, as has been the custom of the ad hoc 
tribunals.     
                                                   
116 Akayesu (note 113) para. 145. For a discussion of the expressions used in Kinyarwanda for ‘rape’ 
see paras. 145 – 154. 
117 Nijboer argues for the development of an artificial language. See Johannes F. Nijboer Een 
verkenning in het vergelijkend straf- en procesrecht  (1994) 31. 
118 De Hert (note 24) 92. De Hert states that French attempts to translate due process (including 
descriptions such as ‘garanties légales suffisantes’ or ‘conformément au droit’) do not do justice to the 
meaning of due process. Ibid. 
119 Cassese (note 6) 593, 594. 
120 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence on the website www.sc-sl.org. 
121 Rome Statute Art. 50 (2) See Schabas (note 60) 184. 




Article 39 of the ICJ Statute determines that the official languages of the ICJ shall 
be French and English. The parties are free to agree on whether the case shall be 
conducted in English or French. If the parties agree that a case shall be conducted 
in a certain language, the judgment shall be delivered in that same language. Article 
39 (3) provides that the Court shall, at the request of any party, authorize a 
language other than French or English to be used by that party. 
 
9.  Ghost-written Judgements? The Drafting Process 
US courts have ‘stoutly defended themselves’ against charges that law clerks carry 
too much responsibility for preparing opinions.123 It is said that contemporary US 
Supreme Court judges are merely ‘editor-Justices’. According to Edward Lazarus, 
a former Supreme Court clerk, judgments are ‘ghostwritten’ by the clerks and the 
judges merely edit the judgments and often display ‘excessive deference to the 
author.’124 As a result some argue that contemporary Supreme Court Justices lack 
the distinctive voice of Holmes, Brandeis or Cardozo whose published opinions 
each bore the unique stamp of their great legal minds.125 Drafting of this kind 
deprives commentators and the public from discovering how a judge reasons and 
comes to terms with the hidden complexities of a case. In his controversial book 
on the US Supreme Court, former Supreme Court clerk Edward Lazarus writes: 
 
And it is here, in wielding the enormous power of the first draft and,  
specifically, in the selection of words, structure and materials, that  
clerks exercise their greatest influence. For while everything they  
write passes through the filter of the Judges’ scrutiny, this scrutiny is 
directed at an essentially complete product and often amounts to little 
more than a surface polish.126 
 
The idea of substituting the judgments of law clerks for those of judges makes 
many feel uncomfortable. Ideally a judge should retain responsibility for 
decisionmaking but the clerk must ‘carry the adversary process into the chambers’, 
forcing the judges to justify each step of the decision-making process.127 
 
                                                   
123 Wald (note 57 )  93.  
124 E Lazarus Closed Chambers, The first Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court 
(1998) 272. 
125 Ibid. 
126  Ibid  273. 
127 See J Bilyeu Oakley & R S Thompson Law Clerks and the Judicial process, Perceptions of the Qualities 
and Functions of Law Clerks in American Courts (1980) 37. Oakley and Thompson write that the 
traditional model of the relationship between law clerk and judge is expressed in the case Fredonia 
Broadcasting Corp v. RCA Corp., 569 F. 2d 251, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1978):  
A judicial clerkship provides the fledgling lawyer insight into the law, the judicial process, and the 
legal practice. The association with law clerks is as valuable to the judge; in addition to relieving him 
of many clerical and administrative chores, law clerks may serve as sounding boards for ideas, often 
affording a different perspective, may perform research, and may aid in drafting memoranda, orders 
and opinions.  
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At the ICTY the task of initially drafting the Chambers' judgments to a very 
considerable degree is frequently delegated to a pool of legal assistants who are 
commonly selected by the Presiding Judge or the Senior Legal Officers. There are 
two reasons for this: firstly, the fact that ICTY trials are long and often 
procedurally complex and secondly the fact that legal assistants are often assigned 
to Chambers as a whole, with only one junior legal assistant assigned to any 
individual judge.128 Because of the magnitude of cases currently before the ICTY it 
may be argued that it would be impossible for a judge to do all the work herself or 
himself. More importantly, the vast amount of paperwork in each ICTY case 
might make it impossible for a judge to work without assistance. Tribunal judges 
have to consider thousands of pages of transcripts, affidavits, exhibits etc. The 
decision of the Croatian government, for example, to open and give the Tribunals 
access to the Croatian archives has led to an avalanche of new documentation 
being submitted as additional evidence in the Blaskic and other cases. 
 
According to Judge Wald, if one reads some of the ‘several-hundred-pages-long, 
format-stylized judgments’ of the ICTY one can guess that many of the judgments 
are the work of a committee rather than an individual judge or judges.129 
Sometimes the staff assistants prepare first drafts with guidance from the judges 
who then review, revise and approve the judgment. But Judge Wald's experience 
has been that ICTY judgments are not the individualised one-on-one opinions of a 
federal trial or appellate judge in the United States.  She makes her preference clear 
for such individualised judgments but writes that she recognizes the need for a 
division of responsibility in ‘large-scale productions’. She believes that even 
though it is not necessary for a judge to write every word of a judgment herself, 
she sees the risk of losing control of the process if the judge does not monitor the 
process closely. The judge should define the issues and work out the reasoning 
and responsibility in advance with law clerks. In addition a judge should 
meticulously analyze, revise, and edit every draft presented to her.130 
 
Cassese is of the view that the Tribunal has reached a stage in its existence where 
judgments may be less lengthy and detailed.131 The reason for this is that the law 
laid down in the Statute has by now been sufficiently clarified and fleshed out by 
the various Chambers.132  He believes that the time has come for facts to be 
summed up more concisely and for the appraisal of evidence to be set forth more 
stringently.133 
 
Wald believes the purpose and format of a judgment is influenced by judicial 
culture. Whereas in the US the emphasis is on telling the parties why the judges 
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came to a particular result in light of the relevant facts and law, in the culture of 
‘some of my new colleagues’(presumably those representing the civil legal systems) 
seems to accept a format which is more ‘ritualistic’ and seems to place less of a 
premium on putting forth the judges' reasoning as to how the law applies to the 
facts and making this transparent. The author of the judgment is not identified in 
the judgments and it is signed by the presiding judge or by three judges. Except in 
the case of Dissenting Opinions, it is therefore left to the cognoscenti around the 
Tribunal to make informed guesses. For these reasons ICTY judgments are often 
criticised for being stilted, bureaucratic, and insufficiently reasoned, making them 
largely inaccessable to the reader and frustrating to the press and legal scholars 
trying to analyse them. Judge Wald suggests that legal officers should be assigned 
to individual judges and that judges should be given specific responsibility for 
drafting the entire or at least a significant part of the judgment and that judgments 
would profit from being shorter than their current length.134 
 
According to a Senior Legal Officer at the ICTY, the drafting practice varies from 
Chamber to Chamber. In Trial Chamber 3,135 for example, no staff is involved in 
the deliberations. But in another Chamber staff is involved in the deliberations. 
The degree of personal involvement will also tend to depend on the judges 
themselves and the presiding judge of a Chamber. In some Chambers there is an 
open discussion with staff members and the staff members will work as a team. 
There seems to be no uniform practice of drafting judgments. In Trial Chamber 2 
the idea is that during each pre-trial case one Associate Legal Officer is primarily 
responsible for keeping an eye on developments. Whereas a Senior Legal Officer 
can have an impact on the distribution of the pre-trial work there is less 
involvement by Senior Legal Officers in the actual trial stage. During the trial the 
Judge, Associate Legal Officer and Legal Officer work as a team. The drafting of 
judgments proceed in two phases: a factual analysis and a legal analysis. In terms 
of the distribution of work it does not seem that the legal analysis ‘carries more 
weight.’ The relationship between the judge and the chamber depends very much 
upon the personality of the judge. Some judges, such as Judge Hunt, seems to 
have a very hands-on approach and seem to be more directly involved in the 
drafting process. Other judges rely more on their staff. 
 
Judge Wald has written much on the subject of judicial writing. She emphasises 
the need for providing reasoned decisions as one of the ways in which judges 
justify their power over citizens.136 She also emphasises the ‘quest for credibility 
and consistency’ as a reason why judges should write opinions. She has been 
critical of the practice of US courts to dispose of opinions because of the pressure 
of accelerating caseloads. US courts are turning out more and more unpublished 
                                                   
134Wald  (note 57)  94. 
135 Interview with Senior Legal Officer, ICTY, 8 April 2003. This comment reflects the state of 
Chambers on this date. 
136P  Wald ‘The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings’ (1995 ) 62 
University. of Chicago Law Review 1372. 
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cases. The need for a court to rationalise its results becomes more important the 
higher a court’s place in the judicial hierarchy.137   
Cassese believes it is good if one judge drafts the whole judgement taking into 
account the views of other judges.138 
  
With regard to her personal drafting style, Judge Pillay says that she wrote 
most of the Akayesu 139 and the ‘Media’140 cases, two of the judgments she feels 
most proud of. In the Media case her Senior Legal Officer and a Registry 
Consultant contributed to the writing. On occasion the research done by some 
legal officers is presented or written in such a focused way that it may be 
incorporated into the judgment. On a three judge bench, however the views of 
all three judges are influential.141 The Presiding judge uses the ideas, 
deliberation  and the words of other judges in her judgment. 
 
Although the drafting process at the ICTY is often dominated by one judge (most 
commonly the presiding judge) ICTY judgments seem to reflect more the voice of 
an institution than the views or voices of individual judges. Other international 
courts such as the European Court of Human Rights also have a more 
technocratic drafting style. The language of the judgments of the European Court 
are moderate and understated and perhaps influenced more by civil law. The 
European Court's judgments are drafted by drafting committees consisting of 
three judges. The style of the Inter American Court of Human Rights, on the 
other hand, is grander and more colourful even though it still speaks as a court.142  
 
It has been argued that the drafting of international judgments, because they are 
still fairly limited in number compared to domestic judgments, is more important 
than the drafting of domestic judgments.143 Judgments of the ICJ are first drafted 
by a Committee and the Judgment is the result of the ‘prolonged collective effort’ 
of the Court as a whole. Because the ICJ decides fewer cases than national courts 
the judges enjoy the luxury of having more time for reflection. This method of 
drafting provides a means of reconciling the diversities of judicial opinion present 
in an international court.144 It therefore does not seem that the fact that 
international courts speak as institutions necessitates a technocratic style of 
drafting. 
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138 Interview, June 2003, Florence. 
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140 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. ICTR-99-52-T,  3 December 2003. 
141 Interview with Judge Pillay, 27 April 2005. 
142 See for example Veláquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (series 
C), July 29, 1988, No. 4. 
143 E Hambro ‘The Drafting Procedure of the International Court of Justice’ (1968) Vol. XII Part 
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10. Obiter Statements 
On the question of whether courts should limit themselves to simply laying out 
their view on a matter or whether courts should provide reasons for their judicial 
findings, Cassese believes that too many international courts take an oracular 
approach by stating their legal views ‘through propositions written as if they were 
enouncing necessary and absolute truths’, without explaining the foundations 
upon which their views are grounded.145 Cassese highlights an important reason 
why international courts have more reason to engage in obiter dicta. Because of the 
lack of an international lawmaker international courts need to spell out the 
contents of rules - one way of doing this is through obiter dicta.146 
 
Cassese has addressed the interesting question of whether the Tribunals should 
exercise judicial restraint and confine themselves to passing judgement solely on 
the legal issues raised by the parties or whether, through obiter dicta, they should 
also address issues which are incidental to the main questions of law but the 
clarification of which might have value for the future development of international 
criminal law.147 He believes that obiter dicta can be good for development of new 
law.148 But he is aware that there may be a point at which Tribunal judges could be 
described as of being too creative.149 
 
Like Judge Cassese, Wald has strong views on the role of obiter statements or 
‘dicta’. Wald’s comments in this regard were made in the context of her experience 
in US courts but can be applied to the context of international adjudication. She 
writes that dicta are useful for the development of law because one judge’s dicta 
may be another judge’s coherent rationale. Everything in an opinion which does 
not strictly involve the application of a legal principle to the critical facts is dicta.150  
 
11. Conclusion 
The Appeals Chamber is the arena of Tribunal lawmaking. From an international 
lawmaking point of view it is the appellate judges who are the most interesting and 
influential. A balance exists between academic heavyweights such as Cassese and 
judges with substantial and longstanding domestic court experience such as Wald. 
Whereas Judges Cassese, Meron and Shahabuddeen (who can be described as 
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148 A subheading in an article in which he discusses this phenomenon reads: ‘Judicial Restraint 
versus Profusion of Obiter Dicta: Too Much Judicial Creativity?’. 
149 Ibid. Cassese mentions the following examples of lengthy and elaborate obiter dicta by the 
Tribunals: the Furundzija Trial Chamber decision (paras. 159-164) considered at length the notion of 
torture and its legal implications, in the Kupreskic case (paras. 134-164) the Trial Chamber discussed 
the issue of tu quoque and other defences (paras. 515-520), in Blaskic the Appeals Chamber examined 
the question of the immunity of state officials (paras. 39-43). 
150 Wald (note 136) 1410 
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modern day ‘fathers of international criminal law’) focus on the humanitarian 
function of the Tribunals and have grappled with the questions surrounding the 
legitimacy and place of lawmaking in the international arena, Judges Wald and 
Pillay have taken a more pragmatic approach and have focused on procedurally 
correct outcomes and the best solutions considering the available evidence and 
law.  
 
When reading ICTY judgments one rarely recognises the distinctive voice of an 
individual judge. ICTY judgments seem to reflect the voice of the institution more 
than the voices of individual judges. Perhaps as a result of this, ICTY judgments 
have been criticised for being stilted, bureaucratic and impersonal.151 There have 
been very few instances of dramatic dissenting opinions – opinions which 
challenge the substance or pith of a judgment or contentious issue in international 
law. Instead, dissenting opinions often focus on procedural issues or issues which 
are not central to the majority decision. Reluctance to dissent has unfortunate 
results. One result is that jurisprudence becomes blander. Another result is that 
the judges may miss opportunities to develop international law. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, dissenting opinions reflect independence of mind.  
 
According to Cassese ‘amalgamating’ judges from different cultural and legal 
backgrounds is one of the main problems of international criminal proceedings.152 
It is also what gives international adjudication its distinct flavour. The Tribunals 
have ambitiously undertaken the amalgamation of judges from civil law and 
criminal law traditions, various professional and personal backgrounds, creeds and 
convictions. The challenges this presents are reflected and concretised not only in 
the lawmaking activities of the judges but also in the constitution, composition 
and institutional culture of the Chambers. A proper assessment of individual 
judicial performances should ideally be made when the Tribunals finish their work. 
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 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
 
1. Introduction1 
If it is accepted that Tribunal judges do make law, respect for the principle of 
legality should act as an inhibitor. This principle, a general principle of 
international law, was raised by the defence at Nuremberg2 and in almost every 
subsequent prominent national prosecution of individuals for war crimes or 
violations of international humanitarian law.3  
 
The specific nature, application and applicability of the principle of legality in 
international criminal law could be described as one of the features which 
distinguish this branch of the law from municipal law and even international law. 
The principle of legality, expressed in the formulation nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
praevia lege poenali,4 no crime and no punishment without previous law, is one of 
the leading principles of criminal law and has been described by the European 
Court of Human Rights as an ‘essential element of the rule of law’.5 From the 
practice of the Tribunals and from the writings of important scholars in this field 
there seems to be general consensus that the context of international criminal law 
calls for a more lenient and flexible approach to the application of this principle 
than would be the case in municipal systems. Some go as far as to argue that the 
principle should not apply at all in international criminal law.6 Others, such as 
Triffterer think differently. According to Triffterer the core of the principle of 
legality should be that, in order to prevent arbitrariness, every state infringement 
                                                   
1 I am indebted to Machteld Boot for the inspiration I derived from her book Genocide, Crimes 
Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (2002). In writing this chapter I was especially influenced by the structure 
and approach of Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 2 of her book. 
2 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945- 1 
October 1946, Published at Nuremberg, Germany  (1948) (‘International Military Tribunal’) Vol.  22, 461.  
3 See in particular In Re Goering and Others Annual Digest 13  (1946) 203. Alstötter and Others (Justice 
case) US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment of 4 December 1947; Ohlendorf and others 
(Einsatzgruppen case) US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment of 10 April 1948; Krupp 
and Others, US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment of 30 July 1948; Streletz, Kessler and 
Krenz v Germany ECHR Judgment of 22 March 2001; Attorney-General of Israel v Eichmann, District 
Court of Jerusalem (1961) 36 ILR 18; Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, Israel Supreme Court 
(1968) 36 ILR 277,  R  v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701; Polyukhovich  v The Commonwealth  (1991) 172 CLR 
501;  91 ILR 1; Bouterse, Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Hof Amsterdam) 3 March 2000 NJ 2000, 
266; Bouterse, Hoge Raad, Criminal Chamber, Judgment of 18 September 2001, nr 00749/01. 
4 The German scholar and criminal lawyer, Anselm von Feuerbach gave this rule its Latin wording. 
Von Feuerbach Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen peinlichen Rechts (1847) para 20. 
5 SW  v United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment of 22 November 1995, Ser A-335-B (1995) para 34. 
6 See the views of H Kelsen in ‘Will the Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunals constitute a 
Precedent in International Law?’ (1947) 1 International Law Quarterly 153, 165. 
140
 
on individual liberty must be bound to an existing norm.7 Some argue that only 
this core needs to be preserved and that extracting the core and freeing the 
principle of requirements of form, if done with sufficient sensitivity to the legal 
values the principle was meant to protect, would not necessarily weaken the 
principle. 
 
The principle of legality is a close cousin of the rule of law.8  According to Raz it 
is one of the principles derived from the rule of law that the law should conform 
to standards designed to enable it to effectively guide action.9 Laws should be 
relatively stable. If they are changed too often people may find it difficult to be 
guided by law in their decisions.10 The question of whether frequent changes to 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence violate the principle of legality will be 
addressed in Chapter 7. 
  
Although Bassiouni refers to principles of legality (referring to nullum crimen sine lege 
and nulla poena sine lege)11 this chapter will refer to the principle of legality in the 
singular.  The nullum crimen and nulla poena formulations both give expression to 
the same underlying principle or doctrine: no retroactive criminalization or 
punishment. The principle of legality is a collective term which includes the 
requirements of certainty, written law and the prohibition against analogous 
application.12 Many prominent authors have referred to the principle in the 
singular.13 Different articulations of the principle of legality (in national and 
international fora) will be discussed. 
  
In the search for the conception of the principle of legality that would best suit 
international criminal law and specifically the law of the ad hoc Tribunals, attention 
will be paid to the history, position and elements of the principle in German law. 
Because of Germany’s particular history and the abuse of the law during the Nazi 
era the principle of legality is now a foundation of German criminal law. The 
requirements of specificity, written law and the prohibition of analogous 
application which form part of the German Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip of principle of 
legality are also features of the principle of legality in other jurisdictions. Because 
                                                   
7 O Triffterer ‘Die völkerrechtlichen Verbrechen und das staatliche Strafrecht’ (1989) 30 Zeitschrift 
für Rechtsvergleichung 83-128, 218. 
8 The ideal of the Rule of Law has been thoroughly examined by Lon Fuller. Fuller considers the 
condition that  rules must not be retroactive or ex post facto as one of the conditions  that will make 
it possible for men to guide their actions (and that constitute “the morality that makes law 
possible”).  L Fuller The Morality of Law 2ed (1964) 33 - 39. 
9 J Raz The Authority of Law (1979) 213. 
10 Ibid. 
11 M C Bassiouni & P Manikas The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(1996) 265. 
12 Bassiouni writes: “That the principles of legality constitute a general principle of legality is beyond 
question.” MC Bassiouni “The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A theoretical 
framework” in K Koufa (ed.) The New International Criminal Law (2003) 74. 
13 See the Von Feuerbach formulation in note 3 above. Cassese similarly refers to the principle in 
the singular. See A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 139. 
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the German principle has wide relevance it is instructive to look at the 
development of the principle in this jurisdiction. 
 
The role of the principle in international human rights instruments and the way 
the principle has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights will be 
examined. The chapter will look at the way the principle has been applied at the ad 
hoc Tribunals and ask whether the approach taken in the Secretary General’s 
Report - to circumscribe the subject-matter jurisdiction with regard to crimes 
against humanity by customary international law - shows adequate consideration 
for the values protected by the principle of legality.   
 
The principle of legality has an important political function: that of protecting the 
citizen against the state. Many believe that it is in the sphere of criminal law that 
the hand of the state is most pervasive and intrusive. With the development and 
growing importance of the notion of individual criminal responsibility in 
international law, the ‘hand of states’ seems to interfere more and more in the lives 
of individual citizens (or in the fate of individual criminals against humanity). 
According to Allen the legality ideal faces its sternest test in the field of criminal 
justice. He points out that the severity of the sanctions administered by criminal 
law (together with the freedom-depriving and status-degrading potential of 
criminal proceedings) on the one hand and the outrage produced by crime on the 
other hand could lead public officials to be careless towards the principle of 
legality.14 In the context of the serious crimes of which the accused before the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunals are accused this problem is magnified. This 
raises an important question: should adherence to the principle be absolute? 
Should the severity of the crimes and the context in which they were committed 
justify viewing the principle as merely discretionary? It will be argued that the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, by referring to the principle as a ‘maxim’ and by appealing 
to ‘natural justice’ to justify infringing the principle, did not set the correct 
precedent for subsequent generations of prosecutions.15 
  
This chapter will explore different conceptions of the principle of legality. It will 
distinguish between the application of the principle in common law and civil law 
and in municipal law and international law. The criminal nature of the Tribunals 
cannot be stressed enough. It is of crucial importance that the guarantees of a fair 
trial and due process are respected as well as the relevant guarantees included in 
international human rights instruments. The Tribunals are international Tribunals. 
Considering the way the principle has been interpreted in international human 
rights instruments which reflect the consensus of the international community is 
therefore more instructive than considering its role in national systems. 
 
                                                   
14 F Allen The Habits of Legality (1996) 5. 
15International Military Tribunal (note 2) 461 – 62.  
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2. Origins  
The principle of legality should be understood as a corollary of the rule of law. In 
De l'esprit des lois Montesquieu reacted to the arbitrary exercise of power during the 
Ancien Regime.16 In 1764 the Italian criminal jurist Beccaria applied 
Montesquieu's ideas to criminal law.17 According to Beccaria, it should be the 
legislative branch that decides what conduct is punishable. The principle of legality 
is therefore often seen as a consequence of the theory of the separation of powers. 
The most important German formulation was the formulation of Von Feuerbach 
in the Bavarian StGB of 1813. Feuerbach explained the phrase nullum crimen sine 
lege as follows: 
 
Jede Zufügung einer Strafe setzt ein Strafgesetz voraus (nulla poena sine lege), denn 
lediglich die Androhung des Übels durch das Gesetz begründet den Begriff und die 
rechtliche Möglichkeit der Strafe.18 
 
According to Von Feuerbach punishment is only justifiable if the threat of 
punishment has preceded the act. The fact of punishment has to be known before 
the conduct is committed.  
 
An important rationale behind the principle of legality is its possible deterrent 
effect.19 The greater the familiarity of citizens with criminal law, it is believed, the 
greater its deterrent effect. Autonomous human beings should be placed in a 
position to foresee the implications of their actions.  
 
It is important to distinguish between retroactivity and retrospectivity. These 
terms are often used interchangeably but have distinct meanings. A retroactive 
statute is one which is proclaimed to have effect as of a time prior to its 
enactment. The statute operates backward and changes the law as of some date 
prior to its proclamation. A retrospective statute is one which proclaims that the 
consequences of an act done prior to proclamation are to be given a different legal 
effect after proclamation as a result of the enactment of the statute.20 
 
3. German Law and the Principle of Legality 
The German legal system has the oldest and most consistent tradition of 
recognising the principle of legality.21 During the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century the principle was applied strictly in Germany and other parts of 
Continental Europe. Subsequent to the initial Feuerbach formulation, the 
                                                   
16 De l'esprit des lois (1748) book XI, Chapter 6 (1950). 
17 R A Cosgrove Scholars of the Law (1996) 5. See Bassiouni Introduction to International Criminal Law 
(2003) 183. See also C Beccaria Over Misdaden & Straffen (2nd ed) (1971)55-58. 
18 Von Feuerbach (note 4) para 20.  
19 R Haveman “The Principle of Legality” in R Haveman, O Kavran, J Nicholls (eds.) Supranational 
Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (2003) 51. 
20 This distinction was drawn by D H Doherty in 26 CR (3d) 121 at 125. R v Finta  72 CCC (3d) 
127.  
21 Bassiouni & Manikas (note 11) 275. 
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principle appeared in Article 2 of the German Penal Code of 1871. It also featured 
in the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Article 116 of the Weimar Constitution 
stated:  
 
Punishment can be inflicted for only such acts as the law had declared punishable before 
the act was committed. 22 
  
With the rise of National Socialism in the 1920’s and 1930’s strict adherence to 
nullum crimen sine lege was considered not reconcilable with the ‘juridical sense of the 
German nation’.23  
(i) nullum crimen and the Nazi era 
 
The perversion of justice and abuse of judicial power during the Third Reich 
shows the dangers of abolishing or disrespecting the principle of legality and helps 
to explain the present importance of the principle in German law.  All aspects of 
the principle of legality were abolished and perverted during the Third Reich. 
Retroactive punishment became possible with the Law on the Imposition and 
Implementation of the Death Penalty.24 This law was also called the ‘Lex van der 
Lubbe’ and introduced the death penalty for arson after the Reichstag fire.25  More 
than twenty other statutes and ordinances during this era contained provisions for 
retroactive penalties.26  A possibility for sanctions outside the criminal courts was 
created by the institution of ‘preventative detention’ over which the police had 
sole control. It has been said that Nazi law was not designed to protect the 
individual against the state but to protect the state against the individual.27  Laws 
were purposely formulated in vague wording and legal certainty was lost. 
According to Freisler ‘[g]eneral provisos, admission of analogy, recognition of 
healthy popular opinion as a source of law, and admission of direct and immediate 
recognition of what is just … are criteria of Nationalist Socialist criminal law’.28  
Schmitt wrote in support of this policy: ‘In the decisive case of political crime, the 
                                                   
22 Der Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 11.8.1919. In this regard see P C Caldwell Popular Sovereignty 
and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law, The Theory & Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (1997). The 
‘will of the people’ became the foundation of the constitutional system. According to Kelsen the 
‘will of the people’ was a retroactive construct. Ibid 85, 86. 
23 The term ‘nach gesundem Volksempfinden’ was found in the Law of 28 June 1935, entered into 
force 1 September 1935, RGB1, 839, Article 1. 
24 I Muller Hitler’s Justice (1991) 74. 
25 ‘Lex van der Lubbe’ 29 March 1933, RGBl 1, 1951.  
26 W Naucke Die Aufhebung des strafrechtliche Analogieverbots, NS Rechts in historischer Perspektive: 
Kolloquien des Instituts fur Zeitgeschichten (1981) 87. 
27 H Gerland ‘Neues Strafrecht’ (1933) 38 Deutsche Juristen- Zeitung  860. 
28 National Socialist criminal law was ‘less concerned with the clarity of statutory provisions than 
with material justice’. R Freisler ‘Der Wandel der politischen Grundanschauungen in Deutschland 




use of norms and procedures merely means that the Fuhrer’s hands are tied, to the 
advantage of the disobedient.’29 
 
The drafters of the Nazi Law of 28 June 1935 which repealed Article 2 of the 1871 
law were aware of the German attachment to the principle of legality. They 
preserved the principle but extended it at the same time by stating: 
 
Whoever commits an action which the law declares punishable or which is deserving of 
punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal law and the sound perception of 
the people, shall be punished, if no determinable penal law is directly applicable to the 
crime, it shall be punished according to the law, the basic idea of which fits it best.30 
 
Analogy was therefore permissible if the judicially created crime was within the 
scope of the penal law and foreseeable because it was based on the ‘sound 
perception of the people’. The prohibition of the application of analogy, as will be 
explained below, is however one of the central elements of the principle of 
legality. The Nationalist Socialist notion of the ‘sound perception of the people’ 
also appeared in a proposed decree adopted by the Senate of the Free City of 
Danzig in 1935. The City of Danzig case is discussed below. 
 
 (ii) Modern German Criminal Law 
In reaction to the perversion of justice and to the atrocities that flowed from it 
during the Third Reich, the post-war German legal order not only showed great 
respect for the principle of legality but the principle came to be regarded as the 
foundation of the new German criminal law.31 Jescheck writes that the 
constitutionalisation of the Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip is proof of its fundamental 
importance to the modern German state.32 In modern German law the principle 
of legality reflects both the function of criminal law as protecting citizens against 
arbitrary state power as well as the guarantee that it is the legislature that decides 
on punishability.33 The principle of legal certainty together with the ban on 
retroactive laws has become one of the five most important principles of the 
German rule of law.34 
                                                   
29 C Schmitt Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit (1933) 41. There was even 
some discussion of whether a criminal code could not be dispensed with entirely – the fact that it 
would then become impossible for an individual to ‘comprehend the law and to calculate its 
consequences’ was expressly welcomed by Henkel, a Professor of Criminal Law, as a desirable aim, 
since uncertainty about the possible repercussions of an act would increase the pressure to 
conform. H Henkel Strafrichter und Gesetz im neuen Staat (1934) 37. 
30The German wording is:  ‘nach dem Grundgedanken eines Strafgesetzes und nach gesundem 
Volksempfinden.’ Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuchs vom 28 Juni 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt 
(1935) 1 839.  
31 Boot (note 1) para 76. 
32 H-H Jescheck Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Algemeiner Teil (1982) 104. Jescheck writes that the principle 
now has Grundrechtsrang, the status of a constitutional norm. Ibid. 
33 Boot (note 1) para 79. 
34 S Michalowski, L Woods German Constitutional Law (1999) 25, 26. 
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(iii) Art. 103 (2): Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip 
 The Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip in the German Basic Law is included in Article 1 of the 
German Criminal Code (Article 103(2) GG and Article 1 StGB). According to the 
Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip conduct can only be punished if the conduct as well as the 
accompanying penalty were determined before the offence was committed. The 
principle is generally considered to include three separate elements. First, the 
criminal conduct and penalty have to be captured in written law (lex scripta). As a 
second requirement, the statutes have to be clear and certain (lex certa) and thirdly, 
the statutes may not be applied by analogy (lex stricta).35  
 
The requirement of written law  
Does certainty require written statutes? Certainty of the law is required to protect 
citizens against judicial arbitrariness. In German law it is expected that conduct is 
declared punishable in statutes. ‘Statutes’ include not only ‘formal statutes’ but all 
written norms emerging from a source of law that has been constitutionally 
recognised.36 Moreover Article 104 (1) GG requires a formal statute (förmliches 
Gesetz) in the case of deprivation of freedom.37 
 
Because the common law is often described as ‘judge-made’ law it is not required 
that law be written, at least not written by the legislator.  In the Sunday Times case, 
the European Court of Human Rights stated that, in the UK, the word ‘law’ 
covers 
 
not only statute but also unwritten law. It would clearly be contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
freedoms] to hold that a restriction imposed by virtue of the common law is not 
prescribed by law on the sole ground that it is not enunciated in legislation… 38 
 
In common law jurisdictions the role of the judiciary in determining that certain 
conduct is criminal cannot, however, be excluded completely because of the 
continuing existence of common law crimes besides statutory crimes and because 
of common law methods of legal reasoning. It is generally believed that there are 
no, and can be no, federal common law crimes. This was decided in an early 
Supreme Court judgment, United States v Hudson and Goodwin.39 In Liporata v United 
States, a more recent judgment, it was decided: ‘The definition of the elements of a 
                                                   
35Jescheck (note 32) 106, 107. See Haveman (note 18) 40. See also Susan Lamb “Nullum Crimen, 
Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law” in The Rome Statute of the ICC A Cassese, P 
Gaeta & J Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A  Commentary Vol 1, 734. 
Lamb writes that the nullum crimen principle is founded on the following four attributes: (a) the 
concept of written law; (b) the value of legal certainty; (c) the prohibition on analogy; and (d) non-
retroactivity. 
36 Boot (note 1) para. 95. 
37 Jescheck (note 32) 105. 
38 Sunday Times v United Kingdom ECHR, Judgment of 26 April 1979, Ser A-30 (1979) para 47. 
39 11 US 32 (1812). 
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criminal offence is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal 
crimes, which are solely the creatures of statute.’40 
 
Principle of specificity 
The lex certa requirement is also understood as the principle of specificity 
(Bestimmtheitsgebot). A penal statute has to define the punishable conduct and the 
penalty with sufficient certainty. Certainty is required to protect the citizen against 
judicial arbitrariness.  
 
In common law one can speak of a softening of the lex certa aspect. The lex certa 
requirement is not only satisfied by statutory law but also by case law. It is, 
however, still required that the rule is reflected in written law in order for it to be 
foreseeable and accessible. What is important is not the form in which the law is 
couched but the certainty. It is critical that 
 
the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with 
the assistance of the courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him 
liable.41 
 
In Sunday Times v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights 
emphasised that law must be adequately accessible and that a law must be 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct and 
to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences of his actions.42 
 
In American law the lex certa requirement is reflected in the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. An important criterium in deciding on vagueness is ‘the impact of 
indefinite laws on constitutionally protected rights’.43  The consequences of 
vagueness in American law will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
Analogous application 
This element of the principle of legality prohibits the analogous application of law. 
This applies especially to civil law. Many jurists believe that the acceptance or non-
acceptance of analogous application is a fundamental difference between the way 
the principle of legality is applied in codified systems and case law based legal 
systems. Bassiouni writes that even in those systems which reject analogy in 
judicial interpretation, there are still exceptions within systems which profess to 
reject the application of analogy.44  
 
It is important that German Law prohibits the use of analogy only in instances of 
where analogy is used to base or establish or aggrevate punishment (Article 103 (2) 
                                                   
40471 US 419 (1985). It also follows from the rule of ‘lenity’, requiring courts to construe ambiguous 
criminal statutes narrowly that there are no federal common law crimes.  
41 Kokkianis v Greece ECHR 25 May 1993, para 52. 
42 Sunday Times (note 38) para 49. 
43 See International Harvestor Co v Kentucky 234 US 216 (1914).  
44 M C Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1999) 103, 104. 
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GG and Article 1 StGB concerns the prohibition of strafbegründender or 
strafschärfender analogy).45  It is not prohibited to apply criminal law by analogy in 
favour of an individual defendant.      
 
Where to draw the line between extensive interpretation and application by 
analogy is of course very difficult. It might be consistent to argue that extensive 
interpretation (interpretation which goes beyond what a law could reasonably be 
foreseen to mean) also violates a strict conception of the principle of legality. 
Cassese writes that questions regarding the extension of rules of law to cover 
matters previously unregulated by law are often framed as questions of 
interpretation rather than analogy.46 One such question involves the phenomenon 
of international courts and tribunals relying on general principles of international 
criminal law to establish whether an international rule covers a specific matter. 
Cassese writes that ‘whatever the terminology employed’ gaps or lacunae have 
been filled by resorting to these principles.47      
 
In common law judicial interpretation by analogy is not only permissible but has 
been described as the basis for development and evolution of the common law. 
Common law textbooks which discuss the legality principle are generally silent on 
the prohibition on analogous application.  The application of crime definitions by 
analogy is seen as part of the ‘discovery’ process of common law and ‘the basis for 
the development and evolution of the common law’.48 In common law systems 
analogous reasoning is the technique for applying the ratio decidendi of a precedent 
to a new case.49 Because of the belief that international law resembles the 
common law in its developing character, application by analogy is more accepted 
in international law than in civil law jurisdictions.  
4. City of Danzig case 
The question of legality arose only once in the history of the PCIJ, namely in the 
court’s Advisory Opinion on the Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative 
Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City.      
    
On 29 August 1935 the Senate of the Free City of Danzig adopted two decrees 
which were promulgated on 31 August and came into force on 1 September 1935. 
These decrees became the subject of a constitutional storm. On 4 September 1935 
the National German Party, the Centre Party and the Social-Democrat Party at 
Danzig presented a petition to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations 
                                                   
45 BVerfGE 25, 269 ff, (NJW 1969, 1059). Jescheck writes: ‘Doch bestehen gegen den Gebrauch 
des Ausdrucks kein Bedenken, wenn man sich darüber klar ist, dass mit dem Analogieverbot 
Analogie zum Zwecke der Rechtsneuschöpfung gemeint ist.’ (emphasis in original) Jescheck (note 32) 106. 
46 A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 155. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Bassiouni & Manikas (note 11) 278. 
49 See Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal 
Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (1987) 118-127. 
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contending that amendments made to the Penal Code by the decrees of 29 August 
1935 altered the whole system of the administration of justice in criminal cases 
fundamentally and ‘opened the doors wide to arbitrary decisions’.50 The Council 
of the League of Nations requested the PCIJ to give an advisory opinion on the 
question of whether these decrees are consistent with the Constitution of the Free 
City of Danzig.51       
 
The first article of this decree amended certain provisions of the Penal Code of 
Danzig and read as follows: 
 
Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be punishable or which is 
deserving of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of a penal law and sound 
popular feeling, shall be punished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act, it shall 
be punished under the law of which the fundamental conception applied most nearly to 
the said act.52 
 
Prior to September 1935 part 1 of Article 2 of the Penal Code applying to Danzig 
read: 
An act is only punishable if the penalty applicable to it has been prescribed by a law in 
force before the commission of the act.53 
 
The PCIJ looked at the consistency of the contents of the decrees with those 
clauses of the Constitution conferring fundamental rights upon the Free City. The 
object of the new provisions was said to be to enable the judge to create law to fill 
up gaps in the penal legislation.54 This can be seen in the title of Article 1 of the 
decree: ‘Creation of law [Rechtsschöpfung] by the application of penal laws by 
analogy’ and in the words ‘wider latitude accorded to judges’ in the title of Article 
I of the second decree.55   
 
The PCIJ considered the ‘sound popular feeling’ to be a very elusive standard.56 
An alleged test of ‘sound popular feeling’ even when coupled with the condition 
providing for the application of the fundamental idea of a penal law, could not 
afford to individuals any sufficient indications of the limits beyond which their 
                                                   
50 Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the constitution of the Free City Advisory Opinion, 
PCIJ reports, 4 December 1935, Series A/B No. 65, 48.  
51 The Secretary-General of the League of Nations in pursuance of the Council Resolution of 23 
September 1935 transmitted a Request to the Court for the advisory opinion. Ibid 42. It was 
pointed out in the Opinion that the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig occupies a special 
position with regard to the League of Nations. The Constitution was drawn up by ‘duly appointed 
representatives’ of the Free City in agreement with a High Commissioner appointed by the League 
of Nations. Secondly, the Constitution was placed under the guarantee of the League which meant 
that the Constitution had to obtain the approval of the League of Nations and that the Constitution 
could only be changed with the League’s permission.  Ibid 49. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 45. 
54 Bassiouni & Manikas (note 11) 284.  
55 Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees (note 50) 52. 
56 Ibid 53. 
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acts are punishable. The court stated that legislation is necessary ‘to lay down the 
precise limits between morale and law.’57 The court acknowledged that a judge’s 
opinion of what is condemned by sound popular feeling is a matter of individual 
appreciation.58 Accepting such a standard would leave too wide a discretion to the 
judge and would not be compatible with the principle nullum crimen sine lege.59 The 
court held that the fundamental rights of individuals may be restricted:  
 
in the general interest and only in virtue of a law which must itself specify the conditions 
of such a restriction, and in particular, determine the limit beyond which an act can no 
longer be justified as an exercise of a fundamental liberty and becomes a punishable 
offense.60  
 
Under the criminal law previously in force in Danzig the penal law was equally 
clear to the judge and the accused party. Under the new decrees there was a 
possibility that a man may find himself placed on trial and punished for an act 
which the law did not enable him to know was an offence.61 The principle of 
legality requires that an individual should be in a position to know beforehand 
whether his acts are lawful or liable to punishment. The court acknowledged that 
it may be difficult to determine the point beyond which a judge’s application of 
the criminal law comes into conflict with the principle that fundamental rights can 
only be restricted by law.62 In the opinion of the court the discretionary power left 
to the judge in this case was too wide to allow of any doubt that it exceeded its 
limits.63 The decrees of August 1935 were found to be inconsistent with the 
constitutional guarantees in Danzig providing for fundamental rights.64 
 
5. Legality at Nuremberg 
The way in which the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg treated the 
principle of legality had profound implications for the way the principle was 
treated in subsequent trials. It is indeed one of the most important criticisms of 
the process at Nuremberg that it infringed upon the principle of legality.65  
 
Concerning the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the Nuremberg judgment stated that 
the Nuremberg Charter was created by the signatory powers in the exercise of 
their sovereign legislative power under international law. The Tribunal anticipated 
the objection regarding legality when it stated in the judgment that: 






62 Ibid 56. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 57. 
65 See for example Q Wright ‘The Law of the Nuremberg Trial’ (1947) 41 AJIL 45; D Luban ‘The 
Legacies of Nuremberg’ (1987) 54 Social Research 797 and H von Hebel ‘An International Criminal 
Court - A Historical Perspective’ in H von Hebel, J G Lammers, J Schukking (eds) Reflections on the 




The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but 
in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the expression of international law 
existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to 
international law.66 
 
The Nuremberg Charter contained many innovative provisions and it was argued 
that these provisions were not the expression of international law existing at the 
time and might be seen (both at the time of the trials and in retrospect) as 
violating the principle of legality. The critical Charter Articles containing the most 
significant innovations were Articles 6, 7 and 8. Article 6 set out the crimes over 
which the Tribunal had jurisdiction. These were: (a) Crimes against the Peace (b) 
War Crimes and (c) Crimes against Humanity. Article 7 stated that the official 
position of officials shall not free them from responsibility. Article 8 stated that 
the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a 
superior should not free him from responsibility. The crimes contained in Article 
6 were international crimes for which there would be individual criminal 
responsibility. These formed the core of the Charter and represented a sharp 
departure from customary law or conventions existing at the time which 
emphasised the duties of states.67 
 
The IMT described nullum crimen sine lege as merely a ‘maxim’, suggesting that the 
Tribunal was not bound by this principle.68 The Tribunal stated: ‘In the first place 
it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of 
sovereignty but is in general a principle of justice.’69 According to Wright this 
statement meant that the Tribunal treated the ex post facto issue as one of 
substantive law and not of procedure or jurisdiction.70 
 
The Nuremberg Charter constituted the source of law applied by the IMT.71 
Whether the Charter drew sufficiently or substantially on previously recognized 
sources is a matter of debate. The Tribunal emphasised that it did not have to 
draw on written law only. It stated that the law of war was not only to be found in 
treaties but also in the practice and custom of states and from the general 
principles of justice applied by jurists. The court stated: ‘This law is not static but 
by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.’72 
 
One of the most significant features of Nuremberg is the fact that the defendant 
was not the German state but those leaders of the German State considered to be 
the major war criminals. The IMT’s finding that individuals could be the subjects 
                                                   
66 International Military Tribunal (note 2) 461. 
67 H Steiner & P Alston International Human Rights in Context 2nd ed (2000) 114. 
68  International Military Tribunal (note 2) 461 - 462.  
69 Ibid 462.  
70 Wright (note 65) 53. 
71 Boot (note 1) 189. 
72 International Military Tribunal (note 2) 463. 
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and bearers of obligations under international law and even be held criminally 
responsible under international law was the first nail in the coffin of the doctrine 
that only states possessed legal personality under international law.73 Shortly after 
the Nuremberg trial Kelsen wrote that the IMT infringed upon nullum crimen sine 
lege in one respect only: holding individuals accountable for the Charter crimes.74 
But since the acts for which the London Agreement established individual 
criminal responsibility were also morally objectionable Kelsen believes that the 
retroactivity of the law could not be absolutely incompatible with justice.75 The 
question of whether the international law existing at the time provided for 
individual criminal responsibility arose in the context of all three categories of 
crimes.  
 
The two categories of crimes which were the most controversial in terms of their 
compliance with the principle of legality were Crimes against the Peace and 
Crimes against Humanity. These two categories will therefore receive the most 
attention. 
(a) Crimes against the Peace 
 According to the US Prosecution everything else was ‘incidental, or subordinate 
to the supreme crime against peace’.76 The Tribunal itself stated that initiating a 
war of aggression was the ‘supreme international crime’.77 According to Article 6 
(a) of the Nuremberg Charter crimes against the peace were defined as ‘planning, 
preparing, initiation or waging a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’.  
 
 It was argued that by criminalising the ‘starting of a war or engaging in war’ the 
Tribunal was applying ex post facto law. It was argued on behalf of the defendants 
that ‘no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time the alleged 
crimes were committed, that no state had defined aggressive war, that no penalty 
had been fixed for its commission, and no court had been created to try and 
punish offenders’.78 The Tribunal rejected, and to some extent evaded, this 
argument. It stated: ‘in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing 
wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his 
wrong were allowed to go unpunished…’.79 The Tribunal stated that the 
defendants, by virtue of occupying certain positions in the German Government, 
                                                   
73 H-H Jescheck  ‘The General Principles of  International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as 
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74 Kelsen (note 6) ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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must have known of the treaties signed by Germany which outlawed recourse to 
war and must have known that they were defying international law when they 
carried out their ‘designs of invasion and aggression’.80 The Tribunal stated that 
on this view of the case the maxim had no application to the present facts.81 
 
The Allied Powers made repeated efforts to prove that the law of the Charter was 
declaratory of existing rules of general international law.82 The Tribunal looked at 
the state of international law in 1939 with regard to aggressive war and referred 
specifically to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand 
Pact) which was binding on 63 parties, including Germany, and renounced war as 
an instrument of national policy. In the opinion of the Tribunal the renunciation 
of war necessarily meant that such a war was illegal in international law.83 In 
response to the argument that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not expressly make such 
wars crimes the Tribunal referred to the Hague Convention of 1907 which 
prohibited resort to certain methods of waging war.84 Whereas the Hague 
Conventions did not expressly criminalise such practices the prohibitions 
contained in the conventions were ‘certainly’ crimes since 1907.85 Because neither 
the Hague Convention of 1907 nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact expressly criminalised 
war or contained any sanction many commentators have argued that the IMT 
could not ground the criminalisation of crimes against the peace in existing 
customary law.86 In Cassese’s view the reasoning resorted to by the IMT to prove 
that aggression amounted to an international crime as early as 1939 is 
unconvincing.87 
 
How did the Tribunal explain the nexus between the obligation of states not to 
resort to aggressive war and the criminal liability of individuals? It has been argued 
that if an individual act is of a criminal character that is mala in se and in violation 
of the state’s international obligation, it is also a crime against the law of nations.88 
Lord Wright pointed out that the Pact of Paris converted the principle that 
aggressive war is illegal from a rule of ‘natural law’ to a rule of ‘positive law’.89 
Jackson stated:  
 
The principle of personal liablity is a necessary as well as a logical one if International Law 
is to render real help to maintenance of peace…Only sanctions which reach individuals 
can peacefully and effectively be enforced…Of course the idea that a state, any more than 
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a corporation, commits crime, is a fiction. Crimes are always committed only by 
persons.90 
 
(b) War Crimes    
  
 The inclusion and definition of ‘war crimes’ in the Charter was less 
controversial.91 No one seriously questioned the fact that war crimes were crimes 
long before the acts charged against the defendants were committed.92 Article 6(b) 
of the Charter defined war crimes as ‘violations of the laws or customs of war’. 
The Tribunal stated that the Hague Convention on land warfare was declaratory 
of customary international law binding on all the belligerents and that it bound 
Germany in all the territories it had occupied.93 Because of the acceptability of war 
crimes the Tribunal was careful to find defendants guilty not only of the new, 
legally precarious crimes against humanity but of war crimes as well. 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity 
The drafters of the Nuremberg Charter created a new category of crimes: ‘Crimes 
against humanity’.94 The reason for the creation of this category of offences was 
to cover atrocities committed by members of the German government against 
their own nationals.95 The term crimes against humanity was however not entirely 
new. The term appeared for the first time in the 1915 Declaration by the 
governments of France, Great Britain and Russia denouncing the massacre of the 
Armenians.96 
 
                                                   
90Record (Daily Record  of the Trial) 70-71 as cited by Wright (note 65) 64. 
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 The Tribunal only commented directly on the ex post facto problem in relation to 
crimes against the peace and failed to address it explicitly in the context of crimes 
against humanity. However when the content of the Charter was negotiated the 
International Conference on Military Trials showed an awareness of the 
importance of the nullum crimen principle. As a result, as part of the definition of 
this category of crimes, it was required that crimes against humanity (atrocities 
beyond the scope of traditional war crimes) would have to have occurred in 
connection with war.97 The definition of crimes against humanity therefore linked 
crimes against humanity to the other two categories of offences. The IMT also 
preferred to find defendants guilty of both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity – a fact which indicates the Tribunal’s awareness of the novelty of this 
category of crimes. 
     
 The Tribunal also referred to national laws which often provided for punishment 
for the crimes enumerated under crimes against humanity. In the absence of 
national laws98 the Tribunal could resort to the express exclusion of the principle 
of non-retroactivity at the end of Article 6 (c): ‘whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law’.99 
 
Bassiouni describes the Charter’s extension by analogy of certain prohibited 
conduct which constituted ‘war crimes’ to the newly defined ‘crimes against 
humanity’ as ‘a logical and necessary step’.100 The IMT held that Article 6 (c) 
crystallised or codified a nascent rule of general international law that prohibits 
crimes against humanity. According to Lamb this is a difficult argument to sustain 
and it would seem more correct to contend that this provision constituted new 
law.101 The justification offered by the IMT that the specific crimes contained in 
Article 6(c) were also crimes according to the general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations, also fails to convince. Not all the specific crimes listed in this 
article are universally found in the world’s major criminal justice systems. In 
addition ‘general principles’ have never been relied upon as a source for 
international criminalisation.102 
 
The argument that the law of the Charter should be applied because it was ‘the 
expression of international law existing at the time of its creation’ did not 
convince as far as crimes against humanity were concerned. Cassese comments 
that it is striking that the Tribunal did not set out a general view with regard to the 
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legality of this category of offences.103 The IMT addressed the issue of 
retrospectivity only with regard to crimes against the peace and did not pronounce 
on the question of whether crimes against humanity constituted a new category of 
offences. 
 
Cassese argues that the IMT would have been wise not to impose the harshest 
penalty, the death penalty on defendants guilty only of the ‘new crimes’ ie crimes 
against humanity.104 The IMT did however find two of the accused, Streicher and 
von Schirarch, guilty exclusively of crimes against humanity.105 This was the view 
defended by Judge Röling in his dissenting opinion in the Tokyo judgment.106 
Suggested Solutions 
The drafters of the Charter and the judges of the IMT suggested a few possible 
solutions to the nullum crimen problem. Almost all fail to convince. 
 
First, it was argued that the principle of legality is a non-binding principle of 
national criminal justice. It was argued that, since nullum crimen is an ethical 
principle, rather than a rule of law, it may be set aside if considerations of justice 
demand it. To use the language of Radbruch, it was argued that the principle of 
Rechtssicherheit must yield to Gerechtigkeit.107 Shortly after Nuremberg Kelsen wrote 
that nullum crimen sine lege was a principle of justice and that justice demanded the 
punishment of the Nazi criminals.108 As a principle of justice, the principle of 
legality has to have general application and has to be respected at all times.  
 
Secondly, the IMT argued that the Tribunal was bound by its own law and could 
not inquire into the legality of this law. This argument is clearly tautological and 
self-serving. Bassiouni writes that the principal reason why the Charter was self-
legitimising, was to avoid protracted defence arguments on legitimacy and 
compliance of the Charter with existing international law.109 Implicit in this 
consideration must have been the drafter’s concern that existing international law 
was vague and ambiguous and contained many lacunae all of which could have 
been argued (possibly with some success) at length by the defense.110 The novel 
and political character of the IMT and its fragile institutional nature prevented the 
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Tribunal from inquiring into its own legitimacy. Bassiouni believes that the delays 
caused by such ‘technical legal questions’ could have diverted world opinion from 
the horrendous crimes committed.111 
 
Their third suggested solution was that the Charter was an expression of 
international law existing at the time. Some argue that the Nuremberg trials were 
given a ‘sufficient patina of legality’ and that the ‘unconventional’ charges had 
valid foundations in international law and were binding even during Hitler’s rule in 
Germany.112  This is a stronger argument but not altogether convincing in the case 
of the ‘new crimes’ of crimes against the peace and crimes against humanity. 
 
A fourth solution put forward was the appeal to a ‘higher law’ and an ‘inner sense 
of justice’ as a justification for not relying on strict legal principles. But reliance on 
an unarticulated ‘higher law’ is arbitrary in itself and subject to abuse. Many of the 
defendants before the IMT indeed argued that their ‘higher law’ was obedience to 
the Fuhrer.113 
 
Bassiouni acknowledges that the Charter did not intend to facilitate a clear guide 
of conduct. In his view it appears from the insufficiency of the general 
requirements and the specific proscriptions of the Charter that it was not an 
instrument intended to provide the public with a framework for permissible 
behaviour as would be required by the principles of legality of the world’s major 
criminal justice systems.114 He argues that selective and occasional enforcement of 
rules does not contribute to a viable and equitable international criminal justice 
policy.115 
 
It is difficult not to agree with Bassiouni who argues that the outcome of the 
discussion relating to the nullum crimen obstacle at the IMT was far from 
satisfactory and that one would have expected that such ‘distinguished drafters’ as 
the drafters of the Charter and the IMT judges would have addressed the question 
in a more scholarly or convincing way.116 It is submitted that, far from ‘taking 
care’ of the problem of legality (as Schabas suggests)117 the Nuremberg judges 
failed to take the principle seriously. 
 
                                                   
111 Ibid. 
112 See B D Meltzer ‘A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate’ (1947) 15 University of 
Chicago Law Review 455; Q Wright ‘Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment’ (1948) 42 AJIL 
405. 
113 See Bassiouni (note 44) 114. 
114 Ibid 563. 
115 Ibid. 
116 According to Bassiouni ‘the drafters knew that the issue of legality was a major weakness of the 
undertaking’. Although the IMT judgment shows that the issue was consistently raised by the 
defence, the judgment dealt with the question only superficially.  See Bassiouni (note 44) 290, 291. 
117 W A Schabas ‘Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ (2000) 11 EJIL 538. 
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6. National Prosecutions and the Principle of Legality 
(i) Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann 
The prosecution of Adolf Eichmann is the most famous example of a post World 
War II national prosecution of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Schwarzenberger described the trial as ‘one of the greatest dramas of legal 
history’.118 Eichmann was prosecuted in Israel under the Nazi and Nazi 
Collaborators (Punishment) Law and it was argued that this law constituted ex post 
facto penal legislation since it prescribed as offences acts committed before the 
State of Israel came into existence.119 
 
The District Court of Jerusalem stated that it would be difficult to find a more 
convincing instance of a just retroactive law than the legislation providing for the 
punishment of war criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and 
against the Jewish people. The court asked: ‘Can anyone in his right mind doubt 
the absolute criminality of such acts?’120 According to the court all the reasons 
justifying the Nuremberg judgments justified eo ipse the retroactive legislation of 
the Israel legislator. 121 The court referred to the Netherlands Law of July 1947 
which in the opinion of the court served as an example of municipal retroactive 
legislation.122 On the strength of this retroactive legislation a special tribunal in the 
Netherlands sentenced Rauter, the Senior Commander of the SS in Holland, to 
death.123 
 
The District Court addressed a second aspect of the retroactivity dilemma - 
namely the retroactive application of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law to a period prior to the establishment of the State of Israel – 
which it held was not a problem different from that of the ‘usual 
retrospectivity’.124  The court relied on an article by Goodhart to support this 
proposition: 
Many of the national courts now functioning in the liberated countries have been 
established recently, but no one has argued that they are not competent to try the cases 
                                                   
118 G Schwarzenberger ‘The Eichmann Judgment: An Essay in Censorial Jurisprudence’ (1962) 15 
Current Legal Problems 248. 
119 Eichmann District Court of Jerusalem (note 3) 10. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid para 27. 
122 Article 27A of the Law of 10 July 1947 states:  ‘Any person who, during the present war, while in 
the military service of the enemy is guilty of a war crime or any crime against humanity as defined in 
Article 6, subsection (b) and (c), of the Charter annexed to the London Agreement of August 8, 
1945…shall, if such crime contains at the same time the elements of an act punishable according to 
the Netherlands law, receive the punishment laid down for such act.’ Ibid. 
123 The accused appealed the decision but the appeal was dismissed by the Special Court of 
Cassation. Ibid. 
124 Ibid para 37. 
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that arose before their establishment... No defendant can complain that he is being tried 
by a court which did not exist when he committed the act.125 
 
 The court emphasised that the crimes of which Eichmann was accused were 
universal in character, relying on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the 
Genocide Convention which stated that the Convention was intended to be ‘universal 
in scope’.126 The court stated: ‘there was therefore no doubt that genocide was 
recognised as a crime under international law, ex tunc, and therefore jurisdiction 
over it was universal’.127 In making this argument the court reflected the approach 
followed at Nuremberg, invoking the judgment of the IMT which stated that 
crimes against humanity and war crimes were ‘the expression of international law 
existing at the time of its [the Tribunal’s] creation.’128 
 
The Israeli Supreme Court discussed the question of whether the principle of 
legality formed part of international law. 129 According to the court the principle in 
so far as it negates penal legislation with retroactive effect, has not yet become a 
rule of customary international law.130 The court relied on Kelsen for the 
proposition that: 
 
There is no rule of general customary international law forbidding the enactment of 
norms with retrospective force, so called ex post facto laws.131 
 
The court acknowledged the respect the principle enjoys in the criminal codes and 
Constitutions of many states ‘because of the considerable moral value inherent in 
it’,132 but pointed out that in the United Kingdom there is no constitutional 
limitation of the power of the Legislature to vest its criminal law with 
retrospective effect.133 Whereas English law recognises the salutary aspects of the 
principle including the moral value of the principle and the value of the principle 
as a rule for statutory interpretation the principle is not adhered to in an absolute 
sense.134 The court emphasised that one’s sense of justice should recoil from the 
non-punishment of a person who participated in outrages such as the odious 
crimes committed by the appellant135 and held that in such a case the maxim ‘loses 
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its moral value and is deprived of its ethical foundation’.136 With regard to the 
question of retroactivity the court concluded: 
 
In the absence therefore of a positive rule of international law prohibiting criminal 
legislation with retroactive effect, and in the absence also of a moral justification for 
preventing the application of such legislation to the offences … it follows that the second 
part of the argument of counsel for appellant – that the State of Israel did not exist when 
these offences were committed and its competence to impose punishment therefore is 
limited to its own citizens – is equally unfounded.137 
 
According to the court the deeds for which the appellant were convicted must be 
regarded as having been prohibited by the law of nations ‘since time 
immemorial’.138 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
In his assessment of the case Professor Green argued that because the dates 
mentioned in the Nazi and Nazi Collaborator Law all related to the period before 
the establishment of the State of Israel it could not be denied that this law was 
prima facie retroactive.139 Green referred to the case of Honigman v Attorney 
General140 which justified the retroactivity of the act by stating that the 
circumstances in which the crimes were committed were ‘extraordinary’ and 
therefore it was right and proper that the purpose and application of the law 
should also be extraordinary.141 Green argued that the Nazi and Nazi 
Collaborators Law did not create new offences but ‘introduced a new 
nomenclature for long recognised offences’.142 He referred to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s description of nullum crimen sine lege as a ‘principle of justice’ and stated 
that as such the principle must be balanced against other principles.143 The 
principle of legality, according to Green is one principle among many. 
 
Green makes the interesting point that even if the laws under which Eichmann 
purported to have acted were lawful and if the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Act 
did therefore amount to retroactive legislation this would only be true of actions 
committed in the territory of the German Reich and against German nationals.144 
With regard to Eichmann’s activities outside of Germany or the activities directed 




139 L C Green ‘The Maxim Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Eichmann Trial’ (1962) 38 British 
Yearbook of International Law 458, 459. 
140 International Law Reports (1951) 542. 
141 Green (note 139) 459. 
142 Ibid 461.  In this regard Green quotes the Netherlands case of Cassation in the case of In re 
Rauter: ‘However there is nothing absolute about that principle. Its operation may be affected by 
other principles whose recognition concerns equally important interests of justice.’ In re Rauter, 
Annual Digest  (1949) 526. Ibid.  
143 Ibid 461.  
144 Ibid 470. 
160
 
against the nationals of occupied states within Germany his actions had to 
conform with the international law of military occupation as expressed in the 
Hague Regulations and customary law.145 
(ii) R v Finta 
The prohibition on retrospective punishment was discussed in one of the most 
prominent  post-war national war crime prosecutions, the Canadian case R v 
Finta.146 In this case the respondent, a Hungarian member of the SS, was charged 
pursuant to section 7 (3. 71) of the Criminal Code of Canada with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (enslavement and deportation of Jews) committed in 
Hungary in 1944. In terms of this provision a person who had committed an act 
or omission constituting a war crime or a crime against humanity outside of 
Canada which, if committed in Canada, would have constituted an offence against 
the laws of Canada in force at the time would, subject to certain conditions, be 
deemed to have committed that act or omission in Canada.147 Without this 
deeming provision the acts or omissions alleged to have been committed abroad 
by the respondent would not be culpable in Canada.   
 
It was argued on behalf of Finta that although he had participated in certain of the 
acts alleged, he had not been in a position of authority but had been subject to the 
command of the German SS and that he acted pursuant to orders. The 
respondent submitted that section 7 (3.71) of the Criminal Code contravened 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights because it ‘retroactively’ created 
criminal liability in respect of acts or omissions which were lawful at the time and 
place of their occurrence.148  
 
The Supreme Court responded to the retroactivity charge by looking at the 
sources of international law and emphasised that international law need not be 
codified. It pointed out that the definition of ‘war crime’ and ‘crime against 
humanity’ requires that the act ‘at the time and …place, constitutes a 
contravention of customary international law or conventional international law’. 
The definition of ‘crime against humanity’ allows for a third alternative, namely 
that the act be ‘criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by 
the community of nations.’149 
 
                                                   
145 Ibid 470, 471. 
146 Finta (note 3) 701. 
147 See the challenge to the constitutional validity of legislation, ibid 659, 660. It was decided that 
the legislation in question does not contravene section 7 of the Charter merely because it gives 
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The Supreme Court found that international law in this area did not violate the 
Canadian Charter of Rights on the ground of vagueness. It stated that it is in the 
nature of the decentralized international system that international law cannot be 
conveniently codified in some sort of transnational code.150 According to the 
court even on the basis of international convention or custom there were many 
individual documents that signaled the broadening prohibitions against war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.151 International law before 1944 provided fair notice 
to the accused of the consequences of breaching the still evolving international 
law offences. The court stated: ‘The legislation is not made uncertain because the 
entire body of international law is not codified and that reference must be made to 
opinions and legal writing in interpreting it.’152  
 
The court considered the views of both Bassiouni and Schwarzenberger in 
reaching its decision. It quoted Bassiouni who stated that arguments challenging 
the Charter’s enunciation of ‘crimes against humanity’, whether they were raised at 
Nuremberg, Tokyo or in the Eichmann or Barbie trials, have always been rejected.153 
Judge La Forest preferred the view of Schwarzenberger who emphasised that the 
strongest source in international law for crimes against humanity was the common 
domestic prohibitions of civilized nations.154 
 
The court emphasised the fact that the internationally illegal acts for which 
individual criminal responsibility had been established were the most morally 
objectionable and seemed to take a natural law position when it stated that 
everyone has inherent knowledge that certain actions are wrong whether this 
knowledge arises out of a moral, psychological or religious stance.155 According to 
the court the persons who committed these crimes were certainly aware of their 
immoral character and for this reason the retroactivity of the law applied to them 
could not be considered as incompatible with justice. Justice required the 
punishment of those committing such acts in spite of the fact that under positive 
law they were not punishable at the time they were performed.156 The Supreme 
Court also stressed that there was near-universal agreement about the 
punishability of crimes against humanity. It stated that the strongest source in 
international law for crimes against humanity were the ‘common domestic 
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prohibitions of civilised nations’.157 According to the court no modern civilized 
nation was able to sanction the conduct listed under crimes against humanity.158 
The court stated that it was therefore appropriate that the acts were made 
punishable with retroactive force. The Finta court therefore acknowledged that 
section 7 operated retroactively but that the retroactivity of the law was not 
incompatible with justice.159 The application was however dismissed and Finta was 
acquitted because of the Prosecution’s inability to prove that Finta had the 
requisite mens rea. 
(iii) Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth   
Another national case in which an accused was unsuccessfully prosecuted for war 
crimes was the Polyukhovich trial.160 The facts in the Polyukhovich case were the 
following: the plaintiff, who had become an Australian citizen after the Second 
World War was charged with having committed war crimes while serving in the 
German army in the Ukraine between 1941 and 1943. Charges were brought 
under the War Crimes Act 1945 (as amended in 1988) which provided for the trial 
and punishment of persons who had committed serious war crimes in Europe 
during World War II and had entered Australia and became Australian citizens 
after 1945. The Act dealt with acts which had taken place outside of Australia and 
that had been committed by persons who were not at the time citizens or 
residents of Australia. The Act thus makes acts performed by a person who at the 
relevant time had no connection with Australia a criminal offence under 
Australian law. 
 
The plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of provisions of the Act,161  
submitting in particular that section 9 which made war crimes an offence under 
the Act, was beyond the legislative powers conferred upon the Commonwealth 
Parliament by sections 5 (vi) and (xxix) of the Australian Constitution. The 
plaintiff also contended that at the time the alleged offences were committed there 
had been no Australian legislation in force which made it a criminal offence for 
someone who was not then an Australian citizen to commit such acts in the 
Ukraine. He therefore contended that section 9 of the Act involved retrospective 
criminal legislation and was an invalid attempt to usurp the power of the courts.  
 
The plaintiff’s submission was that one of the central elements in the exercise of 
judicial power is the determination by a court of the issue whether the accused 
infringed a rule of conduct prescribed in advance.162 It was contended by plaintiff that 
the power of Parliament to enact a retrospective or retroactive law dealing with 
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substantive rights or liabilities does not extend to a law which makes past conduct 
a criminal offence.163  
 
The High Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act and held that, although the 
Act was retrospective and applied to people who had no connection with 
Australia, it was still law with respect to ‘external affairs’.164 The court also held 
that the Act was not retrospective in operation because it only criminalised acts 
which were war crimes under international law as well as ‘ordinary crimes’ under 
Australian law at the time they were committed. Whereas there was no obligation 
under customary international law to prosecute individuals, there was a right to 
exercise universal jurisdiction and the War Crimes Act facilitates this right. Justice 
Dawson stated that ‘the ex post facto creation of war crimes may be seen as 
justifiable in a way that is not possible with other ex post facto criminal laws … the 
wrongful nature of the conduct ought to have been apparent to those who 
engaged in it even if, because of the circumstances in which the conduct took 
place, there was no offence against domestic law…’.165  
 
Justice Brennan dissented, holding that the Commonwealth was not entitled to 
enact laws governing affairs outside Australia with which Australia had no 
connection.166 The plaintiff had not been an Australian citizen when the alleged 
acts were committed and the alleged acts took place in the Ukraine and ‘had not 
involved Australian victims or interests in any way’.167 He stated further that there 
was no evidence of any rule of international law which required Australia in 1988 
to enact legislation for the prosecution of war crimes allegedly committed outside 
Australia during World War II. The statutory offence created by section 9 of the 
Act did not correspond with international law definitions of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.168 He concluded that crimes which were created by 
retrospective municipal law and which differed from international crimes could 
not be tried under universal jurisdiction.169 
(iv) East German Border Guard Cases (Mauerschützenprozesse) 
The trials of the East German wall guards stand as a symbol of the German 
judiciary’s response to state-sponsored violence. They also provide a good 
illustration of how national law and international courts interpreted the principle 
of legality. The approach of the German federal courts with regard to the principle 
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of legality will first be discussed after which the view of the European Court of 
Human Rights will receive attention. 
 
One of the ways in which the German courts tried to resolve the problem of 
retroactivity was by employing a formula developed by the philosopher Gustav 
Radbruch, the Radbruchschen Formel. According to this formula the laws of the Nazi 
period were null and void if they constituted serious violations of fundamental 
principles of justice and humanity which must be respected by any state. If laws 
infringe on these principles positive law must yield to justice.170 The violation in 
question must be so grave that it contradicts the idea of law as being based on the 
value and dignity of men, common to all nations; the contradiction of the order or 
statute with the idea of justice must be so intolerable that the order or statute, 
being wrongful law, has to give way to justice. This formula served as the 
theoretical justification for the German courts’ decision in several cases. In one of 
the most important of the Mauerschützenprozesse, the Streletz and Kessler judgment,171 
the German Federal Constitutional Court invoked the Radbruchschen Formel.  
 
The former GDR defence minister Kessler and his deputy Streletz, were charged 
with incitement to commit intentional homicide. The question at issue was 
whether they could invoke as ground of justification the fact that their actions 
were legal under the law applicable in the GDR. The defendants submitted that 
holding them liable would run counter to the prohibition on the retroactive 
application of criminal law and Article 103(2) of the German Constitution laying 
down the nullum crimen principle and the terms of the Unification Treaty which 
clearly states that no former GDR citizen shall be punished for an act that was not 
criminally prohibited in the GDR.172  
 
                                                   
170 The Radbruchschen Formel reads as follows: ‘Der Konflikt zwischen der Gerechtigkeit und der 
Rechtssicherheit dürfte dahin zu lösen sein, daß das positive, durch Satzung und Macht gesicherte 
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Muller (note 24) 656. 
165
 
The defendants relied on two justification grounds: first, section 27 para 2 of the 
East German Border Act (Grenzgesetz) which provided that border guards may, if 
necessary, shoot at a person to prevent or to stop the commission of a major 
crime;173 and second, the East German state practice of not prosecuting the use of 
deadly force in the enforcement of the border regime. The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) 
denied the validity of both justification grounds. It held that a ground of 
justification has to be disregarded by the courts if it implies a patent violation of 
fundamental principles of justice and humanity.174 This was the case in the 
Mauerschützenprozessen: section 27 was aimed at willfully killing unarmed people for 
the sole reason that they tried to cross the border. The object of making the 
border ‘inviolable’ had absolute priority over the life of the refugee. The BGH 
emphasised the differences between the Nazi regime and East German regime but 
still employed Radbruch’s formula.175 The court stated that in spite of the 
difficulties of transposing Radbruch’s formula from the context of National 
Socialism to the present context, the Formel applies to cases of this type. The BGH 
found Streletz and Krenz criminally liable on the basis of intentional homicide as 
indirect principals.176 Kessler and Streletz were sentenced to seven years and six 
months imprisonment respectively. Krenz, as a member of both the Political 
Bureau and the NDC, was sentenced to six years and six months imprisonment.177 
After unsuccessful petitions to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) the defendants 
filed an individual application against the Federal Republic of Germany on the 
basis of a violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights.178 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that the German convictions of 
Streletz, Kessler and Krenz did not constitute a violation of Article 7(1) of the 
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Convention179 which provides that ‘no one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed’. 
The court stated that the purpose of the provision is to ensure that no one is 
subject to arbitrary prosecution, conviction or punishment.180 Unlike the German 
courts the European Court did not rely on the Radbruchschen Formel. Instead it 
relied exclusively on the terms of the East German law to find that the 
inapplicability of the asserted justifications was foreseeable by the applicants. 
 
The European Court emphasised the importance of the rule of law and held that 
 
It is legitimate for a State governed by the rule of law to bring criminal proceedings 
against persons who have committed crimes under a former regime; similarly, the courts 
of such a State, having taken the place of those who existed previously, cannot be 
criticized for applying and interpreting the legal provisions in force at the material time in 
the light of the principles governing a State subject to the rule of law. 181  
 
The European Court held that, at the time the acts were committed, the 
applicants’ acts constituted offences defined with sufficient accessibility and 
foreseeability in East German law.182 A practice by a state which flagrantly violates 
human rights, such as the border policy of the GDR, could not be covered by the 
protection of Article 7(1) - as such practice could not be described as ‘law’ within 
the meaning of the article.183 
 
(v) Bouterse 
Pursuant to the request by the relatives of two victims, Colonel Desi Bouterse was 
prosecuted in the Netherlands for the torture and killing of fifteen political 
opponents of the Surinam government in 1982. This was the first prosecution in 
the Netherlands of a non-national for crimes committed extraterritorially. On 20 
November 2000 the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam ordered the public prosecutor 
to prosecute Bouterse for the crime of torture committed in Surinam.  But on 18 
September 2001 the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) reversed this decision.184 
The Supreme Court emphasised that the alleged torture committed by Bouterse 
did not constitute a criminal offence under Dutch law at the time it was 
committed in 1982. The Supreme Court further ruled that the Netherlands lacked 
jurisdiction over the offences at that time.185 The Supreme Court interpreted 
Article 5 of the 1984 Torture Convention and Article 5 of the Dutch Torture 
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182Streletz, Kessler and Krenz (note 3) para 89 
183 Ibid para 87 
184 Bouterse, Hoge Raad, Criminal Chamber, Judgment of 18 September 2001, nr 00749/01 (CW 
2323). 
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Convention Implementation Act of 1988186 as only permitting prosecution and 
trial if a jurisdictional link is present. This interpretation by the Supreme Court 
considerably restricted the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts to exercise universal 
jurisdiction. 
 
 The Amsterdam Court of Appeal asked Professor Dugard whether the 
prohibition against torture had the status of customary international law in 1982. 
Dugard relied primarily on the practice of international bodies to establish that a 
customary rule prohibiting torture existed. This approach to identifying custom 
was accepted by the Court of Appeal and allowed it to determine that torture was 
prohibited in international law in 1982.187 In his Opinion Professor Dugard wrote 
that torture was a crime against humanity and a crime under international law, 
involving individual responsibility well before 1982 (the date of the Torture 
Convention).188 Dugard argued that even though the Netherlands only became a 
party to the Torture Convention in 1989 the conduct of Bouterse fell within the 
definition of a crime against humanity under customary international law in 
1982.189 Dugard therefore implied that since serious international crimes such as 
torture had been accepted as crimes under customary international law, the 
principle of legality, at least in its strict form (requiring written law) was not 
applicable in the case of crimes against humanity in international criminal law. 
 
Zegveld argued that the Court of Appeal, following Dugard, circumvented the 
principle of legality in an inventive manner by distinguishing between 
retrospective and retroactive law.190 Whereas retroactive law is prohibited by the 
principle of legality, retrospective law could be regarded as merely declaratory of 
existing customary law.191 The court held that the 1984 Torture Convention and 
the 1988 Implementation Act might be applied retrospectively to cover conduct 
that was unlawful under Dutch law before 1989 but was not criminalised 
specifically.192  
 
The Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) rejected the distinction between retrospective 
and retroactive law. It held that the principle of legality stipulated in Article 1 of 
the Criminal Code and Article 16 of the Constitution unreservedly prohibited the 
trial and punishment under Dutch law of a trial that was not an offence under 
Dutch law at the time it was committed.193  Article 16 of the Dutch Constitution 
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states: ‘Geen feit is strafbaar dan uit kracht van een daaraan voorafgegane 
wettelijke strafbepaling.’ The court held that the Implementation Act did not grant 
retroactive force to the jurisdictional rules in Article 5 of the Act and Article 16 
was not set aside by the Torture Convention. In addition the court held that the 
history of the Act also did not offer any points of contact for the permissibility of 
granting retroactive force to Article 5.194  The court explained the difficulties 
inherent in prosecuting Bouterse: 
 
Voor het standpunt dat de Nederlandse rechter niet op grond van ongeschreven 
volkenrecht een universele strafrechtsmacht mag uitoefen die de wetgewer hem niet heeft 
gegeven vind ik niet alleen steun in de Grondwet en in de rechtspraak maar daarvoor 
pleiten ook staatkundige oorwegingen. Die rechter zou zich aldus begeven op de terrein 
van buitenlandse betrekkingen…195 
 
(vi) Conclusion 
Of the cases discussed in this section Bouterse was the only case in which a national 
court decided not to prosecute on the basis of a violation of the principle of 
legality. One explanation for this could be that, with the exception of Streletz and 
Kessler, the other cases all dealt with the prosecution of war crimes committed 
during World War II. Most post World War II national prosecutions were 
conducted on the basis of laws that copied the provisions of the Nuremberg 
Charter.196  In the Streletz and Kessler case the German courts relied on the 
Radbruchschen Formel which was formulated with the kind of atrocities committed 
during World War II in mind, to justify the infringement of the principle of 
legality. Bouterse did not commit a war crime and the Dutch courts did not link 
the acts of torture committed by him to war crimes committed during World War 
II. A second explanation could be that the Torture Convention Implementation 
Act is fundamentally different from the national legislation relied on in Eichmann, 
Finta and Polyukhovich. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law, the Australian War 
Crimes Act and section 7 of the Criminal Code of Canada all made provision and 
could be said to have been specifically tailored for the ex post facto punishment of 
war crimes committed in Europe during World War II. However, since torture is a 
jus cogens crime one could reason that the arguments in favour of ex post facto 
prosecution raised in the context of war crimes may be equally applicable to cases 
of torture. 
 
7. The Principle of Legality in American Law 
The nullum crimen principle in the US is based on very different historical 
foundations than the German version of the principle. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the ‘reception of the English common law in America included the English 
                                                                                                                                 
Convention could be applicable to Bouterse’s acts in 1982 and reversed the Appeals Court decision. 
Bouterse (note 3)  paras 24, 42. 
194 Bouterse (note 3) para 63. 
195 Ibid para 75. 
196 Boot (note 1) para 249. 
169
 
disregard of nullum crimen’.197 The modern importance of the principle of legality in 
America sprang from the European intellectual movement known as the 
Enlightenment.198 American reformers who tried to replace the common law with 
legislative codification embraced the ideas of the Enlightenment which included 
the legality ideal.199 
 
The relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and the principle of 
legality forms part of the historical origins of the principle and was discussed 
above. The separation of powers doctrine forms an integral part of American 
constitutional theory and American law has long recognised the principle of 
nonretroactivity in the criminal law.200  
 
La Fave and Scott point out that undue vagueness in a statute will result in it being 
held unconstitutional.201 But because of the inherent limitations in the use of 
language the authors write that there is no ‘simple litmus-test’ for determining 
whether a statute is void for vagueness.202 
 
Some have asserted that the American ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine and the ‘rule 
of strict construction’ are corollaries of the principle of legality.203 It might be 
more correct to understand the ‘void-for-vagueness doctrine’ and the ‘rule of strict 
construction’ as rules used to implement the notions underlying nullum crimen.204 
The rule of strict construction (also called the rule of lenity) requires that penal 
statutes must be construed against the state.205 Today the rule of strict 
construction is employed less frequently than the void for vagueness doctrine.206 
The American Supreme Court has held that a federal or state statute which 
vaguely defines a punishable offence violates the Fifth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses and is therefore unconstitutional.207 
A criminal statute which is so vague that ‘men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application’ is considered 
unconstitutional.208 The void for vagueness doctrine aims to eliminate laws that 
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invite manipulation.209 In his classic analysis of the void-for-vaguenss doctrine 
Professor Amsterdam writes that ‘[Vagueness] is a means for securing the Court’s 
control over the methods by which governmental compulsion may be brought to 
bear on the individual’.210 
 
Factors taken into account in deciding whether a law is vague and therefore void 
include considerations such as the nature of the governmental interest, the 
feasibility of being more precise and whether the vagueness affects the fact or 
merely the grade of criminal liability.211 The first purpose of the void for 
vagueness doctrine is that a vague statute cannot serve as adequate warning to 
people. Fairness requires that citizens should have prior notice of what is 
forbidden. A vague statute also fails to provide uniform criteria for law 
enforcement authorities.212  
 
It is difficult to find many examples of crime creation by judges in modern 
American criminal law.213 The courts however continue to employ the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to reign in judicial creativity.     
  
In the seminal case of Winters v New York214  it was held that subsection 2 of para 
1141 of the New York Penal Law which prohibited the distribution of a magazine 
made up of news and stories of ‘criminal deeds of bloodshed and lust so massed 
as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes’ was so vague and 
indefinite that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment which protects freedom of 
speech and the press.215 The court stated that a statute violated an accused’s right 
to procedural due process and freedom of speech and the press if it fails to give 
fair notice of what acts will be punished.216   
 
United States v Cohen Grocery Co,217a case decided during the First World War,  
involved the constitutionality of section 4 of the Food Control Act. This section 
penalised the making by any person of ‘any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge 
in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries’. The court decided that these 
words must be construed as forbidding and penalising the exaction of an excessive 
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price upon the sale of a commodity.218 The court decided that the section was 
ambiguous and therefore repugnant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the 
Constitution which require due process of law and that persons accused of crime 
shall be adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. In the 
view of the court the section did not contain any ascertainable standard of guilt.219
           
 
The connection between the void for vagueness doctrine and the principle of 
legality is clear. If a law is so vague that it is necessary for the courts to decide 
whether an act is criminal, the courts are given the discretion to create liability and 
usurp the legislative function. Because of the close association between popular 
sovereignty and legislative primacy in the US,220 judicial innovation in the field of 
criminal law is seen as illegitimate. 
 
8. Common Law Crimes: Scottish Law 
In contrast to the position in England and Wales where there are no criminal 
codes but much of the law is defined in criminal statutes, much of Scottish 
criminal law is not the product of legislation. Rather, the definitions of crimes 
arise from successive decisions of criminal courts or from the writings of highly 
respected legal authors.221 Scottish criminal law is therefore predominantly of a 
common law nature. Other sources of criminal law are legislation (Acts of 
Parliament), secondary legislation and extra-national legislation by which Scotland 
is bound. Common law crimes in Scotland include the most serious crimes such as 
murder, robbery, rape, assault, theft and fraud as well as less serious crimes such 
as breach of the peace.222 The common law basis of Scots law lends great 
flexibility and adaptability to the system and enables it to develop without recourse 
to legislation.223 In theory this means that the criminal justice system can respond 
to new situations quickly by referring to an existing common law crime made to 
cover a form of behaviour which is causing concern. At the same time the lack of 
a criminal code leaves the system open to criticism – as being less definite and less 
certain than in other jurisdictions.   
 
There exists some confusion as to whether the High Court of Justiciary is 
prevented from applying the law retroactively owing to the courts enjoying what is 
known as ‘declaratory power’ which is the power vested in the High Court to 
declare conduct to be a crime even if it has not previously been considered 
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criminal.224 This power of the court is exercised retrospectively. It is possible for a 
person to act on sound legal advice that his action is not criminal, only to 
subsequently discover that he is to be penalised. Because of the incorporation of 
the European Convention in Scotland and the importance of Article 7(1) it is not 
permissible to apply law retroactively.225 According to McCall Smith and Sheldon, 
the resulting infringement of the principle of legality is self-evident.226 
 
In the case of McLaughlan,227 the crime of shameless indecency was recognised by 
the court. According to McCall Smith and Sheldon, this case set remarkably broad 
boundaries for criminal law because although the precise definition of crimes may 
be an unrealistic goal it is ‘quite another thing to use broad moral categories, such 
as dishonesty or falsehood as the basis for criminalisation’.228 More recently in 
Webster v Dominick229 the High Court had to decide whether the charge of 
shameless indecency disclosed any offence recognised by Scots law, the court held 
that it did not. In so deciding, the court did not rely on Article 7 (1) of the 
Convention but instead relied on the intrinsic vagueness and uncertain 
foundations in precedent of the crime of ‘shameless indecency’.230 
 
The use of the declaratory power is, however, subject to various restrictions which 
safeguards it against abuse. The decisions of the courts should, for example, as a 
fundamental constitutional rule not conflict with a rule laid down by Parliament.231  
 
9. The Principle of Legality in Regional and International Human Rights 
Instruments 
 
(i) Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Forrmulations of nullum crimen sine lege are included in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in 
three important regional human rights treaties: the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. The provision containing the  nullum crimen principle in the Universal 
Declaration of Independence will briefly be discussed. More attention will be paid 
to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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In the Eichmann case Counsel for the Defence, Dr. Servatius, argued that 
retroactive legislation is contrary to the very basis of the rule of law.232 He relied 
inter alia on Article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Green 
points out that this plea by the defence in Eichmann ignored the fact that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a declaration of policy only and not a 
binding legal instrument.233 
 
Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains the following 
formulation of the principle of legality: 
 
1. Every one charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the 
guarantees necessary for his defence. 
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was 
committed. 
 
There has been considerable debate surrounding the interpretation and content of 
the term ‘international law’ as a basis for individual criminal responsibility in the 
Universal Declaration.234 It was not clear whether “international law” referred 
only to codified law or whether it also included customary law. 
(ii) European Court of Human Rights  
The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that the principle of 
legality, as formulated in Article 7 (1), occupies a prominent place in the 
Convention system of protection. This is illustrated by the fact that no derogation 
from it is permissible under Article 15 in times of war and other emergency. 
According to the court Article 7 should be applied ‘in such a way as to provide 
safeguards against prosecution, conviction and punishment’.235 
 
According to the European Court criminal laws have to be ‘accessible and 
foreseeable’ while not excluding common law as a basis for individual criminal 
responsibility. To understand the way in which the Court has interpreted Article 7 
one civil law case and one case from common law will be examined. 
 
In Baskaya and Okçuoglu v Turkey the court took a flexible approach to the principle 
of legality. The facts were the following: Mr Okçuologu was the owner of a 
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publishing house and Mr Baskaya a professor of economics and a journalist. The 
publishing house had published a book written by Mr Baskaya. The book was an 
academic essay addressing the socioeconomic revolution of Turkey since the 
1920s, which included a criticism of the ‘official ideology’ of the state, and the 
Kurdish problem. Mr Baskaya and Mr Okçuologu were charged under section 8 
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 with disseminating propaganda against 
‘the indivisibility of the State’.236 The Turkish Court of Cassation upheld the 
finding of the Istanbul National Security Court and found the applicants guilty. 
Both the applicants were sentenced to imprisonment and fines.237 Mr. Baskaya 
and Mr Okçuologu complained that their convictions and sentences, under section 
1 and 2 of section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 violated Article 7 of 
the European Convention. 
 
The relevant section of this Act prohibited ‘written and spoken propaganda, 
meetings, assemblies and demonstrations aimed at undermining the territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Turkey or the indivisible unity of the nation’. 
 
The complainants argued that because of the vagueness of the words 
‘dissemination of propaganda against the indivisibility of the State’ and the lack of 
clarity of the wording of section 8 it was not foreseeable at the time that the 
relevant publication constituted an offence. The court decided however that 
section 8 did not confer an overbroad discretion on the national courts to 
interpret the scope of the offence, that it was difficult to frame laws with absolute 
precision and that a certain degree of flexibility was called for.238 It was decided 
that the interpretation of the law by the national court did not go beyond what 
could reasonably be foreseen in the circumstances. The European Court did 
therefore not find a breach of the principle of legality.239 The court did however, 
find that Article 10 of the Convention which protects freedom of expression was 
violated since the limitation of expression was disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.240 
 
The European Court stated that a law may still satisfy the requirement of 
foreseeability even if the person concerned has to obtain legal advice to assess ‘to 
a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances’ the consequences of a given 
action.241  
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In S W v United Kingdom242 the European Court was confronted with an alleged 
retroactive application of criminal law. The Court had to consider the common 
law offense of rape in England. This case concerned the controversial question of 
marital rape and was decided together with the case C R v United Kingdom.243 The 
defendants in both cases were charged with raping their wives. A difference 
between the two cases was that Mr R had left his wife following marital difficulties 
whereas Mr W and his wife were still living together at the time of the alleged 
conduct. In both cases the defendants had sexual intercourse with their wives 
against their will. Mr W invoked the marital immunity which existed in English 
common law. English common law provided that a husband who forces his wife 
to have sexual intercourse could plead immunity against charges of rape because 
of the ‘implied consent’ included in the state of marriage. According to constant 
case law in England forcible sexual intercourse with one's wife was not unlawful. 
Mr W was convicted on the basis of a development in the case law - the existing 
offence of rape was extended to include conduct which until then was excluded by 
the common law. The House of Lords declared that the common law is capable of 
evolving in the light of changing social, economic and cultural developments.244  
 
The court found that there is an element of interpretation in all law, including 
criminal law. According to the Court elucidation of doubtful points and 
adaptation to changing circumstances is acceptable, provided that the resultant 
development of the criminal law through judicial law-making is reasonably 
foreseeable.245  
 
The court stated that the decisions of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
did no more than continue a perceptible line of case law development which 
dismantled the immunity of a husband from prosecution for rape.246 The court 
spoke of an ‘evolution’ of the criminal law through judicial interpretation towards 
treating the conduct of a husband who forcibly has sexual intercourse with his 
wife as within the scope of the offence of rape.247 The court held that there has 
therefore been no violation of Article 7 (1).248 
A minority of the European Commission was not prepared to accept the 
correctness of the reform by the national courts and stated that the conviction was 
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based almost wholly on the abolition of marital rape and not on the exception 
thereto.249 
 
In both the S W and C R cases the European Court adopted a strong moral 
position. In S W v United Kingdom it held: 
 
The essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the result of the decisions of 
the Court of Appeals and the House of Lords…cannot be said to be at variance with the 
object and purpose of Article 7 of the Convention, namely to ensure that no one should 
be subjected to arbitrary prosecution, conviction or punishment…250 
 
The significance of these cases for the application of the principle of legality in the 
context of the Tribunals lies firstly in the importance of the European Court’s 
decisions and secondly in the reliance of the court on moral considerations and 
the Tribunals’ appeals to morality. The moral repulsion expressed by the judges at 
the IMT and at the Tribunals respectively is often used as a justification for not 
adhering to strict principles of justice.  
 
The above statement of the European Court may be criticised on the ground that 
it is possible to argue that Article 7 could be violated even if the end result was 
moral. In their commentary on the case Lawson and Schermers ask whether one 
can accept such a development of the law without violating the principle of 
legality.251 They write that the door would be wide open for abuse if the moral 
repulsion of an act would be sufficient basis for its retrospective criminalisation.252 
Although it is true that moral values change over time and it is necessary for the 
law to reflect these changes, the use of moral repulsion as a justification for 
violating the principle of legality should be questioned. 
 
10. Relevance of the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law  
The idea that the principle of legality does not apply in international law as it does 
in national law was expressed in the Nuremberg judgment. It was stated that ‘this 
[international] law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the need of a 
changing world.’253 Many commentators have argued that the principle of legality 
does not apply in a legal system such as international law that develops by practice 
and that international law resembles the common law in its developing character. 
The sources of international law are conventions, customs and general principles. 
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Nullum crimen sine lege fits more comfortably into a system of written, statutory law. 
It was stated in the Justice case: ‘to have attempted to apply the ex post facto 
principle to judicial decisions of common international law would have been to 
strangle that law at birth.’254 
 
Bassiouni points out that, because of the fact that the drafters of international law 
and conventions are diplomats and not experts in international criminal law one 
can not expect the same technical rigour from the international process as from 
national legislative bodies. He points out that the international legislative process 
has been imprecise and international crimes have often been defined in broad 
general terms without regard for the enunciation of the elements of the crime.255 
Haveman writes that open-ended provisions such as Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY 
Statute are not examples of clearly and strictly defined crime definitions.256 In the 
context of crimes against humanity, for example, it is not clear what is meant by 
‘other inhumane acts’. 
 
Kelsen believed that the principle of legality does not apply ‘at all’ in international 
law.257  He wrote: ‘It does not apply to customary law and to law created by 
precedent for such law is necessarily retroactive in respect of the first case to 
which it is applied.’258  He continued to describe the principle of legality as a 
principle of justice as follows: 
 
Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established 
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, 
and the persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral 
character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as 
absolutely incompatible with justice. Justice required the punishment of these men,  
in spite of the fact that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they 
performed the acts punishable with retroactive force. In case two the postulates of  
justice are in conflict with each other, the higher one prevails; and to punish those  
who were morally responsible for the international crime of the second World War  
may certainly be considered more important than to comply with the rather relative  
rule against ex post facto laws, open to so many exceptions.259 
 
One such exception to the rule against retroactive law, in Kelsen’s opinion, is a 
retroactive law which provides individual punishment for acts which were ‘illegal 
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though not criminal’ at the time they were committed.260 In his view the London 
Agreement was an example of such a law.261  
 
The jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal was also challenged on the ground that the 
provisions of the Charter are ‘ex post facto’ legislation and therefore illegal.262 The 
Tokyo Tribunal rejected the challenge and stated that the ‘law of the Charter is 
decisive and binding on the Tribunal’263 and stated its ‘unqualified adherence’264 to 
the Nuremberg reasoning. The Phillipine judge of the Tokyo Tribunal, Judge 
Jaranilla, rejected objections that the IMTFE applied ex post facto law.265 He 
emphasised that, long before the war, the acts of Japan and its leaders has been 
the subject of repeated warnings on the part of the Allied Powers and Japan had 
signed the Kellogg-Briand treaty in April 1929. Japan therefore knew that it would 
be brought to justice. According to Jaranilla, the fact that Japan accepted the terms 
of surrender of the Allied Powers made the nullum crimen defence unsustainable.266  
 
The Dutch Judge, Röling, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he held that crimes 
against peace were not regarded as true crimes before the London Agreement. His 
view on the applicability of the nullum crimen argument was: 
 
However this maxim [nullum crimen sine lege] is not a principle of justice but a rule of 
policy, valid only if expressly adopted…As such the prohibition of ex post facto law is an 
expression of political wisdom, not necessarily applicable in present international 
relations. This maxim of liberty may, if circumstances necessitate it, be disregarded even 
by powers victorious in a war fought for freedom. It is, however, neither the task nor 
within the power of the Tribunal to judge the wisdom of such policy.267 
 
 
Judge Pal, the Indian Judge, also dissented. He maintained that the rule concerning 
crime against peace constituted ex post facto legislation and that a victor nation 
under international law is not competent to legislate on international law.268 
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Bassiouni is of the opinion that the application of the principle of legality is 
different in international law from that in national law. In 1992 Bassiouni wrote: 
‘[T]he principles of legality in international law are necessarily sui generis: they must 
balance the needs of justice for the world community and fairness for the accused 
in the context of the Rule of Law.’269 He believes that in order to achieve this 
balance, one would have to take into account various factors such as the lack of 
international legislative policies and standards, the ad hoc process of technical 
drafting and the assumption that international criminal law norms will be 
embodied in the national criminal law norms of various states.270 Bassiouni 
suggests that the principle of legality in international law is therefore best 
expressed as nullum crimen sine iure - no crime without some law. This implies the 
existence of some legal prohibition arising under conventional or customary 
international law but the precise meaning of this suggested requirement is not 
clear. 
 
According to Triffterer only the core of the principle of legality is relevant in 
international law. He regards the core as the idea that to prevent arbitrary 
punishment, every state infringement on the liberty of individuals must be bound 
to an existing norm.  
 
Der Kerngehalt dieses Satzes, der sich zu einem Teilaspekt des Menschenrechts auf 
persönliche Freiheit entwickelt hat und durch dessen Verankerung im Völkerrecht 
bestätigt worden ist, beinhaltet dass zur Beseitigung von Willkur jeder Staatliche Eingriff 
in die Freiheitsphäre des Einzelnen an das Vorhandensein einer Norm gebunden sein 
muss; diese kann dem gesetzten oder dem ungesetzten Recht angehören. Sie muss bereits 
zum Tatzeit existent sein, ein näher bestimmtes Verhalten festlegen und durch den 
Hinweis auf dessen Strafbarkeit eine an den Einzelnen gerichte generelle Strafdrohung 
enthalten; eine konkrete Strafdrohung, die Art und Höhe der Strafe genau bestimmt, wird 
dagegen nach ganz überwiegende Meinung nicht gefördert.271  
 
Triffterer writes that the strict form or function of the principle of legality has 
been designed or tailored for domestic legal orders. He argues that unlike 
domestic law, international law does not have a need for control by the 
democratically elected legislatures over legal norms. This is why only the core of 
the principle is valid in international law. This view is confirmed by Article 11(2) 
of the ICCPR and Article 7(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights.272 
 
Luban offers a fresh perspective and challenges the notion that what violates the 
principle of legality violates the rule of law. He also challenges the idea that the 
                                                   
269 Bassiouni & Manikas (note 11) 265. 
270 Ibid 289. 
271Triffterer (note 7) 218. 
272 Triffterer writes: ‘Im Volkerrecht dagegen bestand für die Kontrolle der Volksvertretung über 
alle Rechtsnormen, keine Bedurfnis. Deshalb gilt dort allein die Kerngehalt. Das kommt auch in 
Art. 7 Abs. 2 der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention und Art. 11 Abs. 2 des Paktes über die 
Burgerlichen und Politischen Rechte von 1966 zum Ausdruck.’ Ibid  219. 
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same philosophy regarding human behaviour underpins the principle of legality in 
domestic law and international law. In his view it is possible to say that 
Nuremberg violated the nullum crimen principle and still view Nuremberg as an 
advance on the Rule of Law.273 He disagrees with Fuller’s close association 
between the Rule of Law and the principle of legality and states that the denial 
that Nuremberg embodied the Rule of Law results when one begins ‘at the wrong 
end’.274 Starting at the wrong end to Luban means starting with Fuller instead of 
Hobbes.  To Fuller ex post facto law is wrong because it violates the legitimate 
expectations of people to know the content of the law which then enables them to 
guide their actions.275 If Hobbes forms the baseline however, and Luban argues 
that his views should, one would argue that in the state of nature (and especially in 
the state of war) individuals do not try to guide their actions by trying to make 
them correspond to rules.276 Apart from the question of legality, Luban argues 
that Nuremberg constitutes a clear advance on the rule of law in most other 
respects.277 He argues that individual behaviour and expectations are different in the 
context of peacetime domestic law from that of international criminal law and that 
this should influence our understanding of the principle of legality and our 
assessment of the fairness of trials.  
 
For the purposs of this study the principle of legality has to be understood in the 
context of international criminal law. It is argued here that Bassiouni is correct in 
insisting on the existence of some legal prohibition arising under conventional or 
customary international law. Insisting on a strict interpretation of the principle will 
make it impossible for the Tribunals to carry out their mandate. 
 
11. The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Principle of Legality  
 
(i) Legality at the ICTY  
 
Neither the ICTY Statute nor the ICTR Statute contains a provision embodying 
the nullum crimen sine lege principle. Cassese writes that the principle of legality has 
been laid down ‘implicitly’ in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.278 In support of this 
view Cassese refers to para 29 of the Secretary General’s Report: ‘It should be 
pointed out that in assigning to the International Tribunal the task of prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, the 
Security Council would not be creating or purporting to ‘legislate’ that law. Rather 
                                                   
273D Luban ‘The Legacies of Nuremberg’ (1987) 54 Social Research 803. 
274 Ibid. 
275 See Fuller (note 8) 33-9. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid 806. In support of his argument Luban mentions the salient features of  Nuremberg such as 
the contrast between Nazi justice and the justice meted out by the IMT.  He also believes that the 
IMT’s adoption of individual criminal responsibility enforces the Rule of Law by making possible 
the first realistic deterrent in the history of international law. Ibid  807. 
278 Cassese (note 46) 145 fn 18. 
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the International Tribunal would have the task of applying existing international 
humanitarian law.’ The principle does however feature explicitly in Article 23 of 
the ICC Statute.  
 
An appropriate starting point for an analysis of the principle of legality in the case 
law of the tribunals is the statement of the Secretary General: 
 
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum  
crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of  
international humantarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary 
law so that the problem of adherence to some but not all States to specific  
conventions does not arise. This would appear to be particularly important in  
the context of an international tribunal prosecuting persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law.279  
 
The statement seems to be a compromise between founding the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the basis of treaties and founding the jurisdiction 
on customary international law or perhaps even general principles of law.  
 
One of the most important differences between the application of the principle at 
the Tribunals and in municipal systems, (particularly civil law systems) is that 
certain civil law systems excludes customary law as a basis for punishment.280 
Whereas the Tribunals’ resort to customary law was intended to avoid violating 
the principle of legality, the use of customary law to found punishment would be a 
violation of the legality principle in civil law. 
 
It was out of concern for the legality principle that the Security Council decided to 
use customary international law as the framework for the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae of the ICTY.281 By making use of international customary law, the ICTY 
could avoid creating new offences, applying law established a posteriori, or 
confronting the problem of the adherence of some but not all states to specific 
conventions.282  The Secretary General observed that in assigning to the Tribunal 
the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian 
law, the Security Council was not creating or purporting to ‘legislate’ the law.283 
Reminiscent of Nuremberg, he emphasised that the ICTY would apply existing 
international humanitarian law.284 It is also interesting that in contrast to the 
Nuremberg Tribunal which (in its only general exposition on the principle of 
legality) described the principle as a ‘maxim’, the Secretary General (in his 
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statement quoted above) regards the application of nullum crimen sine lege as 
‘particularly important’.  
 
As Lamb points out, the difficulty with the Secretary General’s formulation is that 
it is easier to state than to apply.285 Since the nullum crimen principle is based on the 
value of legal certainty, it sits uneasily with the fact that customary international 
law is uwritten and often difficult to define.286 
 
The Secretary General’s Report was silent on the question of retroactivity. The 
ICTY Statute clearly provides for retroactive jurisdiction since it states in Article 8 
that ‘the temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal shall extend to a 
period beginning on 1 January 1991.’ But without such a retroactive provision it 
would probably be impossible to fulfill the mandate of the Tribunal to prosecute 
those most responsible for violations of humanitarian law. 
 
The issue of retroactive jurisdiction was however addressed in a preliminary CSCE 
study which affirmed the nullum crimen principle and suggested the test of 
foreseeability.287 The study concluded that nullum crimen is satisfied provided ‘no 
act is criminal unless this is laid down by law and no act be punished unless 
punishment is prescribed by law’.288 The ICTY addressed the issue of reconciling 
retroactive jurisdiction with nullum crimen by using the fairness standard and by 
referring to Article 15 of the ICCPR.289 The requirement of procedural fairness 
was emphasised in the Tadic judgment which stated that ‘what is important is that 
it be set up by a competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal procedures 
and that it observes the requirements of procedural fairness’.290  
 
In spite of its omission from the Statute there can be little doubt that the principle 
of legality applies to the practice of the Tribunals inter alia because of its inclusion 
in many human rights instruments. This can be said to be the case even though 
the Tribunals cannot become parties to general international human rights 
instruments. Since the Tribunals have been established as subsidiary organs of the 
Security Council, the Tribunals should not act contrary to the principles included 
in various United Nations instruments. The Preamble of the UN Charter calls for 
conditions under which ‘respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained’. Article 24(2) of the Charter 
obliges the Security Council to act ‘in accordance with the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations’ and one of those, the maintenance of peace and security, 
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directs the Security Council to act ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law’. 
 
Commentators have argued that the open-ended crime definitions in the ICTY 
Statute violate the principle of legality.291 Article 3 of the ICTY Statute states that 
the Tribunal ‘shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or 
customs of war’ and that such violations ‘shall include, but not be limited to’ five 
crimes. Article 5 lists a seemingly limited amount of crimes directed at the civilian 
population but ends with the clause ‘other inhumane acts’. Even when crimes are 
mentioned explicitly, their meaning might still be unclear. Wladimiroff, defence 
counsel in the Tadic case, said the following in the context of the Tadic: 
 
Neither the prosecutors nor the counsel for the defence knew before the start of the trial 
which would be the facts and circumstances to be proved by the prosecution…The 
prosecutor did not know the extent of the burden of proof, while for the defence it was 
not clear beforehand which the borders of the combat in court were.292 
 
Morris and Scharf write the ‘authoritative pronouncement by the first international 
criminal tribunal since Nuremberg that the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law applicable in internal 
armed conflicts constitutes customary international law’ was supposed to take care 
of the principle of legality.293 The authors find no violation of nullum crimen sine lege 
as long as the rules applied are part of international customary law. But saying it 
does not make it so. And this might be begging the question. Determining the 
content of international customary law is one of the most vexing questions in 
international law. The Celebici judgment attempted to provide substance to the 
phrase ‘existing international customary law’ by referring to paragraph 35 of the 
Secretary General’s Report which specified the customary law applicable as being 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Fourth Hague Convention and the Regulations 
attached thereto of 18 October 1907, the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 
Nuremberg Charter.294 The judgment reiterated that the Security Council is not a 
legislative body and cannot create offences. It was emphasised in Celebici that the 
Statute does not create substantive law but merely provides a forum and 
framework for the enforcement of existing international humanitarian law.295 
 
The principle of legality has been considered or discussed in many ICTY cases. In 
Aleksovski the Appeals Chamber described the nullum crimen principle as meaning 
that a person might be found guilty of a crime only if the relevant acts constituted 
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a violation of the law at the time of their commission.296 The court continued by 
stating that the nullum crimen principle ‘does not prevent a court from relying on 
previous decisions which reflect an interpretation as to the meaning to be 
described to particular elements of a crime.’297 Statements such as these indicate 
that the Tribunal sees itself as identifying rather than making the law. But the view 
that the Tribunal declares rather than makes the law is optimistic in cases where 
there are very few limited conventional or customary sources from which to 
determine the law.298 As will be illustrated in Chapter 6, the chapter on lawmaking 
through the case law, the Tribunals’ image of itself is not borne out by what 
happens in the Trial and Appeals Chambers in Arusha and The Hague. In most of 
the cases before it, the Tribunals have made law. 
 
The nullum crimen principle was also discussed extensively by the Trial Chamber in 
Vasiljević:  
 
However, the Trial Chamber must further satisfy itself that the criminal conduct in 
question was sufficiently defined and was sufficiently accessible at the relevant time for it 
to warrant a criminal conviction and sentencing under the criminal heading chosen by the 
Prosecution, in this case ‘violence to life and person’. From the perspective of the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle, it would be wholly unacceptable for a Trial Chamber to convict an 
accused person on the basis of a prohibition which, taking into account the specificity of 
customary international law and allowing for the gradual clarification of the rules of 
criminal law, is either insufficiently precise to determine conduct and distinguish  
the criminal from the permissible, or was not sufficiently accessible at the relevant time. A 
criminal conviction should indeed never be based upon a norm which an accused could 
not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the acts, and this norm must make it 
sufficiently clear what act or omission could engage his criminal responsibility.299 
 
Vasiljević stressed the need for precision and the need for international criminal 
law to be grounded on the principle of specificity. The Chamber also emphasised 
that offences have to be defined with sufficient clarity to be foreseeable and 
accessible.300 
 
The problem of the retrospectivity of crime definitions is vividly illustrated by the 
Furundzija case, in which it was held that oral penetration amounts to rape in 
international law despite the fact that it was regarded as sexual assault (a lessor 
offence) in many national systems.301 The court also held that a person might be 
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convicted for the war crime of ‘cruel treatment’ as a crime recognized by 
customary international law, while admitting that ‘no international instruments 
defines cruel treatment’ and that ‘no narrow or special meaning’ should be given 
to this expression.302 The Furundzija case and other instances of lawmaking in 
Tribunal case law will be discussed more extensivelyinChapter 6. 
 
But adherence to the principle of legality does not have to stifle development of 
the law. In Aleksovski the ICTY stated that the non-retroactivity of criminal rules 
does not bar courts from refining and elaborating upon existing rules through a 
process of ‘interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a particular 
crime’.303 In Ojdanić the ICTY stated that respecting nullum crimen does not 
preclude progressive development of the law:  
 
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is, as noted by the International Military Tribunal, 
first and foremost, a ‘principle of justice’…This fundamental principle ‘does not prevent a 
court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime’. Nor does it 
preclude the progressive development of the law by the court. But it does prevent a court 
from creating new law or from interpreting existing law beyond the reasonable limits of 
acceptable clarification. This Tribunal must therefore be satisfied that the crime or the 
form of liability with which an accused is charged was sufficiently foreseeable and that the 
law providing for such liability must be sufficiently accessible at the relevant time, taking 
into account the specificity of international law when making the assessment.304 
 
The court’s emphasis on the fact that nullum crimen is a principle of justice is of 
course reminiscent of Nuremberg. It is also significant that the Tribunal once 
again stated that the crime must be foreseeable – an approach which is in line with 
the approach taken by the ECHR. 
 
Despite what Jescheck describes as the ‘relaxed attitudes’ of the IMT305 towards 
the principle of legality the ad hoc Tribunals are treating the principle with more 
seriousness. Article 11 (1) of the ICC Statute which provides unequivocally: ‘The 
Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into 
force of this Statute’ seem to be the culmination of a process which had its 
                                                                                                                                 
In para 184 of the judgment the Trial Chamber states that ‘due to the nature of the International 
Tribunal’s subject - matter jurisdiction, in prosecutions before the Tribunal forced oral sex is 
invariably an aggravated sexual assault as it is committed in time of armed conflict on defenseless 
civilians; hence it is not simple sexual assault but sexual assault as a war crime or crime against 
humanity. Therefore so long as an accused, who is convicted of rape for acts of forcible oral 
penetration, is sentenced on the factual basis of coercive oral sex – and sentenced according to the 
sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia for such crimes, pursuant to Article 24 of the Statute 
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hesitant start at Nuremberg and was refined by the jurisprudence of the ICTY and 
ICTR. 
 
Cassese is of the opinion that after ten years of work, the ICTY is at a stage where 
to state the law (dire la droit) is perhaps less indispensable than to do justice 
(administrer la justice).306 He writes that in the past the judges might have dwelt on 
the law at length because it could perhaps have constituted a means of establishing 
the Tribunal’s legitimacy and authority as a court of law.307 According to Cassese 
this need is felt less because of the profuse case law generated by the Tribunals 
and the moral authority acquired by the Tribunals. But the legitimacy and 
authority of the Tribunals need to be affirmed continuously and Cassese’s 
pronouncement should not be interpreted or understood to mean that judges 
should become any less diligent in upholding principles of justice such as the 
principle of legality. 
 
It can be argued that the frequent amendments made to the ICTY and ICTR 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence constitutes a violation the principle of legality. 
This view will be discussed in Chapter 7, the chapter on Rulemaking. 
(ii) The Principle of Legality and the ICTR 
The ICTR Statute is the first international Statute which expressly criminalises acts 
committed in the context of an internal armed conflict. By the time the ICTR 
Statute was adopted, Additional Protocol II had not yet been recognised as a part 
of customary international law. Until this time, it was of course also not accepted 
that individual criminal responsibility could flow from violations of Protocol II. 
The Secretary General explained this development by stating that the Security 
Council ‘had elected to take a more expansive approach to the choice of the 
applicable law than the one underlying the Yugoslav Tribunal’.308 Significantly, the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal includes international 
instruments regardless of whether they were considered part of customary 
international law or whether they have customarily entailed the individual criminal 
responsibility of the perpetrator of the crime.309  
 
In his Report the Secretary General acknowledged that the question of whether 
common Article 3 entails the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator 
is ‘still debatable’.310 It was stated that some of the crimes included in the article 
‘when committed against the civilian population, also constitute crimes against 
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humanity and as such are customarily recognised as entailing the criminal 
responsibility of the individual’.311  
 
Because the Security Council did not consider itself competent to legislate, it must 
be concluded that the Council considered the content of the Statute to be existing 
law. In light of the fact that Rwanda ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1964 and 
the two Protocols in 1984 it could be argued that the Security Council was not 
legislating but simply laying down substantive rules which were already in force in 
Rwanda.312 The content of the subject matter jurisdiction, and specifically the 
possibility of individual criminal responsibility for violations of humanitarian law 
in internal armed conflicts has however been criticised as an ‘unrestricted 
approach to the applicable law’ taken by the Security Council.313 The mere 
statement by the Tadic Appeals Chamber that individuals can incur individual 
criminal responsibility for violations of humanitarian law committed in internal 
armed conflict314 does not in any way explain or condone the violation of the 
possible violation of the principle of legality. 
 
12. ICC  
From the point of view of legality, the ICC's approach to crime definitions is an 
improvement on that of the ad hoc Tribunals. The principle of legality is included 
in Article 22 of the Rome Statute which includes the prohibition on retroactivity, 
the extension of crime definitions by analogy and the lex certa principle. The Rome 
Statute also contains a clause stating that the definition of a crime shall be 
interpreted in favour of the accused.315 Apart from Article 22, Article 21(1), 
setting out the applicable law of the ICC, could also be said to provide support for 
the application of the principle of legality. The ICC should apply the law, such as 
the Statute, Rules316 traditional sources of international law317 and the principles 
and rules of law as set out in its previous decisions318 and not go outside of these 
sources. 
 
The principle of legality was relied upon by those seeking to have the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC defined expressly in the Statute rather than 
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leaving it to the Court to interpret general international law. The rationale for this 
was that general international law might not set out elements of the offences with 
sufficient precision, particularly where the crime in question was not defined by a 
general treaty (as in the case of aggression).319  
 
According to Boot the formulation of the nullum crimen principle in the Rome 
Statute emphasises the limited extent to which states have ceded some of their 
sovereignty to the ICC.320 She writes that ‘recognition by states of the criminality 
of a particular norm’ was necessary for the drafting of an international code of 
crimes as well as for the establishment of the court.321 In her view the Article 22 
formulation was perhaps too strict and could prevent the court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over violations of international humanitarian law beyond the limits set 
by the ICC Statute.322 
 
13. Nulla Poena Sine Lege 
Nulla poena sine lege, no punishment without law, has been described as the 
sentencing counterpart of nullum crimen sine lege.323 International human rights 
instruments prohibit the imposition of a criminal sanction heavier than the one 
applied at the time the offence was committed.324   
 
Out of concern for the prohibition on retroactive sentencing the statutes of the ad 
hoc Tribunals require judges to establish prison terms in light of the national 
practice in the place where the crimes took place. 
 
Article 25 (1) of the ICTY Statute states: 
The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In 
determining the terms of imprisonment the Trial chambers shall have recourse to the 
general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Article 23 (1) of the ICTR Statute and Rule 101(B) (iii) of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of both Tribunals directs the Tribunal to have recourse to the 
general practice regarding prison sentences in Rwanda in determining terms of 
detention.  
 
The above provisions seem very difficult to implement. One reason for this is the 
fact that there had only been a few isolated national prosecutions for crimes 
against humanity in the former Yugloslavia and Rwanda. Implementation is also 
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complicated by the fact that Rwandan and Yugoslav law provide for the death 
penalty. In practice the reference to national practice has largely been ignored by 
the Tribunals.325 
 
Although the national law of Yugoslavia provided for the death penalty326it 
considered life imprisonment to be cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
limited its maximum custodial sentences to 15 or 20 years.  Because the ICTY 
Statute excluded the death penalty ‘general practice’ would seem to dictate a 
maximum available sentence of 20 years.327 In the Security Council, the United 
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, 
declared that her government considered life imprisonment to be the maximum 
penalty, because in a sense it replaced the death penalty.328 She made this 
statement in spite of the fact that Yugoslavia’s criminal legislation does not 
provide for life imprisonment. The judges of the ICTY however accepted 
Albright’s position. Rule 101 (a) of the ICTY Rules state: ‘A convicted person may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of his 
life.’ Bassiouni has written that this provision ‘may violate the principles of legality 
and the prohibition against ex post facto laws’ at least with respect to Yugoslavia.  
He argued that the provision should be amended, presumably to limit sentences to 
20 years.329 In the sentencing of Dusko Tadic the ICTY declared that it was 
authorized to impose sentences up to and including life imprisonment, even 
though such sentence was not part of Yugoslav law. The Tribunal stated that this 
would not be a violation of the principle of legality.330 It is not clear why the 
judges did not regard imposing life imprisonment as violating the principle of nulla 
poena. In the Delalic case the Tribunal affirmed that the Tribunal was entitled to 
depart from Yugoslav practice because it did not consider the reference to 
national practice as mandatory or binding.331 The Trial Chamber in this case stated 
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General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of SC Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc S/25704 (3 May 1993) 
para36. 
326 Yugoslavia’s criminal legislation provided for capital punishment in the case of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. The death penalty was however abolished in Slovenia, Croatia and 
Macedonia in 1990 and 1991 and in Bosnia in 1995. 
327 This issue was well-known to the Security Council when it adopted the Statute and had been 
discussed in the CSCE draft. See H Correll, H Turk and G Hillestad Thune Proposal for an 
International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993) 49-53. 
328 UN Doc S/PV. 3217 (1993). 
329 Bassiouni &  Manikas (note 11)  701-2 
330 ‘Consequently for crimes which, in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, would receive the death 
penalty, the International Tribunal may only impose imprisonment but it may impose a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment in its stead, consistent with the practice of states that have abolished 
the death penalty and with the commitment by States progressively to abolish the death penalty 
under the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…’ 
Prosecutor v Tadic  IT-94-1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 14 July 1997, 112 ILR (1999)286 para 8, 9. 
331 Prosecutor v Delalic et al. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para 1192. 
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that Professor Bassiouni’s criticism was based on ‘an erroneous and overly 
restricted view’ of the principle of legality.332  
 
Schabas points out that it is ironic that especially in the context of Rwanda, the 
nulla poena principle is applied not to protect the accused but to support the 
imposition of harsh sentences.333 In Prosecutor v Kambanda, the ICTR has noted that 
the reference to national practice is not binding and merely a guide for the 
Tribunal.334 In Kambanda, the Trial Chamber stated that it would prefer to ‘lean on 
its unfettered discretion’ each time it has to pass sentence.335 In the sentencing 
decision of Kayishema and Ruzindana, another ICTR Trial Chamber stated: ‘In light 
of the findings of the Judgment against Kayishema and Ruzindaba, this Chamber 
finds that the general practice regarding prison sentences in Rwanda represents 
one factor supporting this Chamber’s imposition of the maximum and very severe 
sentences, respectively.’336 When sentencing, the Rwanda Tribunal also repeatedly 
makes reference to the fact that the criminal statutes of Rwanda provided for 
capital punishment – the implicit message being that offenders before the ICTR 
should consider themselves lucky to receive terms of life imprisonment.337 Article 
25 however speaks of ‘the general practice regarding prison sentences’. Nothing in 
the ICTR Statute or Rules indicates that the Tribunal should attribute any 
relevance to the existence of capital punishment in Rwanda.  
 
In Schabas’s opinion the provisions requiring the Tribunals to have ‘recourse’ to 
‘national practice’ are virtually unworkable.  In the former Yugoslavia some of the 
crimes before the Tribunals were not defined even in national law. Because of the 
fact that in Rwanda, there had been no domestic implementation of international 
crimes, the ICTR came to the conclusion that the crimes under their jurisdiction 
were subject to the most severe penalties. The ICTY came to a similar conclusion. 
According to Schabas the provisions requiring recourse to national practice were 
meant to protect the accused from abusive punishment but ‘has been stood on its 
head’.338  He believes the Tribunals have ‘twisted it into an additional argument 
for severity’.339 
 
But does nulla poena sine lege apply to international criminal law at all? According to 
the Romanian jurist Vespasian Pella, the nulla poena sine lege principle applied to 
international criminal law as much as to domestic law ‘par la force de l’equité et de 
                                                   
332 Ibid para 1209. 
333 Schabas (note 325) 522. 
334 Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S, 4 September 1998, 37 ILM (1998) 1411 para 23. Also 
Prosecutor v Serushago ICTR-98-39-St., 2 February 1999 para 18. 
335 Ibid para 25 
336 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana ICTR-95-1-T,  21 May 1999  para 7. 
337Kambanda (note 334) para 4, Prosecutor v Kayishema (ibid) para 6. 




la raison’.340 A 1951 proposal by the International Law Commision for the Draft 
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind stated that the 
penalty ‘shall be determined by the tribunal exercising jurisdiction over the 
individual accused, taking into account the gravity of the offence’. This proposal 
was criticized as being contrary to the nulla poena principle.341 The General 
Assembly agreed that it was desirable that the court, in exercising its power to fix 
penalties, should take into account the penalties provided in applicable national 
law to serve as ‘some guidance for its decision’.342 In the 1996 Draft Code of 
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind the ILC did not specify any 
precise penalties. It stated only that ‘punishment shall be commensurate with the 
character and gravity of the crime’.343 The commentary accompanying the draft 
stated that it was ‘not necessary for an individual to know in advance the precise 
punishment as long as the actions constitute a crime of extreme gravity for which 
there will be severe punishment’. This, according to the ILC, is in accord with the 
precedent of punishment for a crime under customary international law or general 
principles of law as recognized in the Nuremberg judgment and in Article 15(2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’344 
  
According to Schabas, the retroactivity argument can only be invoked once. He 
believes it suffices that the argument was invoked at Nuremberg and that from the 
time of the International Military Tribunal’s judgment potential offenders have 
been ‘put on notice’ that war crimes and crimes against humanity are subject to 
the most severe sanctions. All that is required is that the law should be foreseeable 
and accessible.345 The European Court of Human Rights has supported this 
position in recent decisions such as S W v United Kingdom and CR v United 
Kingdom.346 This view can, of course, be criticized. If one accepts Schabas’ view it 
will mean that, for all practical purposes, the principle of legality has been made 
redundant and that subsequent to Nuremberg it has no ‘inhibiting’ role to play in 
future decisions, lawmaking and sentencing. An important function of the 
principle of legality is to advance legal certainty by requiring specificity, clarity, 
foreseeablity and accessibility. It is doubtful whether the existence and memory of 
Nuremberg solves the problem of the principle of legality. 
 
14. Conclusion 
In his opening statement at the IMT Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson stated that 
it cannot be denied that ‘these men [the defendants] are surprised that this is the 
                                                   
340 V V Pella ‘La Codification du droit penal international’ Revue general de droit international public 
(1952) 337. 
341 Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc A/2645, para 118, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol II (1950) 314. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Report on the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Seventh Session UN Doc A/51/10. 
29-30. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Schabas (note 117) 538. 
346 Ibid. See the discussion of these cases above. 
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law; they really are surprised that there is any such thing as law’.347 The principle 
of legality seeks to prevent defendants being ‘caught by surprise’. From this point 
of view the proceedings at the Nuremberg trials failed to fully meet the demands 
of justice. Even criminals against humanity who may seem ignorant of any law, 
deserve the benefit of this principle.  
 
A similar danger exists in the context of lawmaking at the Tribunals. The judges 
seem to use the abhorrent actions of the defendants before the ICTY and ICTR 
as justification to disregard technical legal requirements or fundamental principles 
of justice such as the principle of legality. The judges at the Tribunals should be 
wary of invoking natural law arguments concerning a ‘higher law’, as was done in 
the Mauerschützenprozesse,348 since this could render their decisions arbitrary and 
unprincipled. Although there might be some merit in Cassese’s view that it is no 
longer necessary for the Tribunals to discuss the applicable law at great length 
because of the ‘moral authority of the court’349 this should not mean that the 
principle of legality is neglected. One should be similarly cautious of accepting the 
European Court’s appeal to morality in the context of the Court’s interpretation 
of the principle of legality.  
 
The exercise of Allied jurisdiction on the basis of the London Agreement was 
described as a ‘legal innovation of the first magnitude’.350 The Tribunals have 
similarly been praised for being innovative. But the more innovative and creative 
the judges, the more serious the danger of violating the principle of legality. The 
nullum crimen dilemma is the dilemma at the heart of international criminal 
prosecutions:  meeting the demands of (natural) justice on the one hand and 
respecting the rights of the accused on the other. 
 
In the post World War II national prosecutions the courts failed to satisfactorily 
address the question of retrospectivity. The courts also failed to develop 
independent reasoning or justification for applying ex post facto law. The plea of 
violations of nullum crimen sine lege was rejected in the Eichmann, Finta and 
Polyukhovitch cases on the basis of Nuremberg jurisprudence and according to 
Lamb, no new arguments were raised in supporting this conclusion.351 The courts 
in all these cases endorsed the views of the IMT.  In Eichmann the court quoted 
the IMT which stated that crimes against humanity and war crimes were ‘the 
expression of international law existing at the time of its [the Tribunal’s] 
creation’.352 It seems as if the issue of nullum crimen was simply dealt with in 
reliance on the IMT’s judgment that the Charter was declaratory of international 
                                                   
347 International Military Tribunal Vol. 2,143, 144; See Jackson The Nuremberg Case (1971) 81. 
348See BGHSt 39, 1 (16-22); NJW 1993, 141 (paras 145 –147); 100 ILR 364 (paras 380 –388); 
BGHSt 40, 241 (paras 244-249); NJW 1995, 2728 (paras 2730 – 2731). 
349 Cassese (note 306) 265. 
350 Schick (note 82) 785.  
351 Lamb (note 101) 739. 
352 Eichmann (note 3) 
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law and was not ex post facto law. Following Nuremberg, most national 
prosecutions regarded the principle as a non-binding ‘maxim’. Bassiouni has 
written that it was ‘as if the accumulation of time and precedents relying on the 
IMT’s judgments had cured all possible legal defects. This leads to the legally 
incongruous conclusion that ‘reiteration of the same argument confirms its 
validity’.353 It would be consistent with this (flawed) reasoning to argue that the 
‘moral authority’ Cassese writes of has legitimising value in itself. If the ‘moral 
authority’ of Nuremberg caused and justified subsequent prosecutions to follow 
the precedent set by the IMT, the moral authority of the ad hoc Tribunals might 
legitimise the ICC’s possible future reliance on the precedent set by the ICTY and 
ICTR.   
 
During her time as chief prosecutor at the ICTY Louise Arbour remarked: 
‘Collectively we’re linked to Nuremberg. We mention its name every single day.’354 
But did the ad hoc Tribunals approach the nullum crimen dilemma in a new way? Or 
did they simply repeat the arguments devised at Nuremberg and the subsequent 
national prosecutions? It seems as if the Tribunals took note of the criticism of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal and as if significant progress has been made. Unlike the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY and ICTR do not simply dismiss the principle of 
legality as a ‘maxim’ but treat it more seriously. Unlike the IMT, the ICTY and 
ICTR have never rejected the applicability of nullum crimen and the attempt by the 
Secretary General and the Tribunals to solve the quandary of legality by resorting 
to customary international law, though not unproblematic, is new. The Tribunals 
have also taken greater care to prove that the law they apply was customary 
international law and therefore lex lata. The concern with the principle of 
specificity raised in cases such as Vasiljević,355as well as the concern with the 
requirements of foreseeability and accessibility is in line with approach taken by 
ECHR and shows an awareness on the part of the Tribunals that they are part of a 
greater family of international courts and tribunals. The problem concerning the 
clarity of crime definitions in the respective Statutes remains a serious one. But the 
greater specificity of crime definitions in the ICC Statute is probably a direct result 
of the ad hoc Tribunals’ flaws and inexperience. 
 
Cassese declares that the principle of non-retroactivity ‘is now solidly embedded in 
international law’.356 However, many questions remain. The exact position of 
nullum crimen in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals and in international criminal law 
generally is uncertain. Mégret makes the critical observation that all debates 
regarding whether the Nuremberg verdict was based on ex post facto law reflect the 
vision that this is a question which can be answered ‘within the law’ when all 
serious reflections on the issue invariably seem to lead to debates on what law 
                                                   
353 Bassiouni (note 44) 145- 146.  
354 O Ward ‘War Crimes Tribunal on a Roll’ Toronto Star, 23 March 1998, A2. 
355 See Vasiljević (note 299). 
356 Cassese (note 46) 149. 
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is.357 One can only answer the question of whether the principle of legality has 
been violated once consensus exists on what constitutes already existing law. 
 
Triffterer and Bassiouni present strong arguments for moving away from the strict 
formal requirements of the principle of legality in the context of international 
criminal law. What seems clear from the case law of the ECHR is that the 
requirements of accessibility and foreseeability form the core of the principle of legality 
and has universally been accepted as standards against which criminal law and 
international criminal law should be tested.  It is argued here that the peculiar 
nature of international criminal law calls for a reinterpretation of the meaning of 
the principle of legality. Because of the rudimentary nature of international 
criminal law it is unreasonable to insist on a strict interpretation of the principle. 
This does not mean that one should take a relaxed view. The standards of 
accessibility and foreseeability should be respected.  With time, as international 
criminal law becomes more developed and codified one may once again insist on 
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LAWMAKING THROUGH THE CASE LAW 
 
1. Introduction 
Judges speak through their judgments. The growing body of Tribunal case law can 
be described as the arena where the activism or restraint of the judges can be 
detected and dissected. All questions and considerations regarding the concept of 
judicial lawmaking in the context of the Tribunals, the backgrounds, qualifications, 
activism or restraint of Tribunal judges as well as the position of the nullum crimen 
principle at the Tribunals are ultimately reflected in the cases.  The present chapter 
will focus on substantive lawmaking and will look at the way Tribunal judges have 
made law in specific cases. 
 
The ICTY and ICTR have often found themselves in unknown or uncertain 
territory. Robert Jackson wrote that one of the chief obstacles to the Nuremberg 
trial was the ‘lack of a beaten path’.1 The historical significance of the ad hoc 
Tribunals can be attributed to the fact that it is the first time international tribunals 
have had to adjudicate certain international crimes.  Some hold the view that the 
judges, since they are operating in the context of international law, are prohibited 
from finding a non liquet2 and have no choice but to ‘make’ law and set new 
precedent. Lauterpacht’s belief that the principle of completeness of the legal 
order was one of the ‘general principles’ referred to in section 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ 
Statute was discussed in Chapter 2. He believed that finding a non liquet would be 
inconsistent with the completeness of the international legal order. Although 
Judge Vereshchetin has argued in the context of the ICJ, that the prohibition on 
non-liquet does not mean that a court is necessarily asked to fill gaps,3 many 
recognise that international criminal tribunals, to be effective at all, need to be 
entrusted with wide discretion including the discretion to develop law and extend 
the application of the law to new areas.4 If one takes the view that it is the task of 
                                                   
1 Mr. Justice Jackson in his Report to the President of  7 October 1946 on the Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, available at 
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson 
2 See N Ronzitti ‘Is the non-liquet of the Final Report of the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FRY acceptable?’(2000) 82 International Review of the Red 
Cross 840. See Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, 
Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 279 and J Stone ‘Non-Liquet and the Functions of 
Law in the international community’ (1959)  25 BYIL123 . 
3 Declaration, Judge Vereshchetin, ibid. Lauterpacht was a strong proponent of the view that 
international courts have the duty never to refuse to give a decision ‘on the ground that the law is 
non-existent, controversial or uncertain or lacking in clarity.’ See H Lauterpacht ‘Some observations 
on the prohibition of non liquet and the completeness of the legal order’ in Symbolae Verzijl (1958) 
196-9.  
4 In 1923 Brierly stated: ‘For the greater part of English criminal law is now statutory; and in any 
case the discretionary powers which our law, statutory or not, allows to a judge in defining the 
constitution of a crime or fixing the sentence is not in the least comparable in extent to the 
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the Tribunals to clarify and develop humanitarian law this should be balanced with 
the demands of legal certainty and the principle of legality.  
 
This chapter will address lawmaking in the context of the establishment of the 
ICTY and in classifying the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. It will address issues 
of participation in the commission of crimes and the definition of specific crimes. 
The judges have also made law incidentally or in obiter statements – when 
pronouncing on matters not central to the legal question before them. Judge 
Cassese’s elegant exposition of the relationship between municipal and 
international law in the Erdemovic case5 is a good example of such incidental 
lawmaking.  
 
The Tadic case is an example of groundbreaking lawmaking and a significant part 
of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of lawmaking in this case. The 
three ‘rape cases’ Akayesu, Furundzija and Kunarac substantially developed the law 
relating to gender crimes. The crime of rape, never before defined in international 
law, was defined in Akayesu. Subsequent to this decision the Furundzija and Kunarac 
Trial Chambers each developed its own definition of rape - sparking debate and 
controversy among commentators. The definition of torture was developed in the 
Kunarac case. The question of whether duress constitutes a defence in international 
criminal law is canvassed in the context of the Erdemovic decision.  
 
The Tribunals have also made law in many cases other than the ones discussed in 
this chapter. The above cases were chosen merely as a sample of Tribunal 
lawmaking. The cases are illustrative of different methods of lawmaking: the cases 
selected show inter alia how the tribunals formulated and expanded definitions, 
applied purposive interpretation and filled gaps in the Statutes. The cases were 
also chosen because of the academic debate they triggered. The description of the 
facts and lawmaking in each case will be followed by academic comment. Finally, 
the question of whether a particular instance of lawmaking constitutes legitimate 
or illegitimate lawmaking is explored. 
 
2. Lawmaking in Tadic 
Dusko Tadic was not only the first accused to be tried before the ICTY but also 
the first accused to be tried before any international criminal tribunal since 
Nuremberg. The Tadic case presented a unique opportunity for the ICTY to clarify 
and develop international criminal law. The bold approach taken by the judges in 
the Tadic Appeals Chamber decisions6 set the tone for similarly adventurous future 
                                                                                                                                 
extraordinarily wide discretion which would have to be entrusted to an international criminal court 
attempting to apply and develop such laws of war as exist at present.’ J L Brierly ‘Do we need an 
International Criminal Court?’ (1923)  8 BYIL  86-7. 
5 Prosecutor v Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997, para 59. 
6 This includes both Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999 (Tadic Appeals Judgment) and the 
Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-AR72A, A 2 October 1995, (hereinafter Tadic Jurisdictional Decision). 
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lawmaking. The Appeals Chamber cases were, however, criticised by academic 
commentators for developing the law too much.7  
 
According to Judge Cassese, the Presiding Judge in the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision, 
the Tadic Appeals Chamber decisions constitute clear examples of lawmaking by 
ICTY judges.8 The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision, consisting 
of Judges Cassese, Li, Dechenes, Sidhwa and Abi Saab made international law in 
four respects in this case. First, the court decided that Security Council 
Resolutions are subject to judicial review and that the ICTY was lawfully 
established. Secondly, the court found that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
were both of an international and of a non-international nature and blurred the 
distinction between the two by finding that war crimes may be committed in non-
international armed conflicts. Thirdly, the court held that the concept of protected 
persons should be redefined. The fourth instance of lawmaking involved the 
extension of the concept of criminal responsibility for participation in a group 
with a common purpose. The lawmaking by the judges in this case can be seen as 
one of the most important legacies of the ICTY. 
 
(i) competence de la competence  
Three grounds of appeal were raised in the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision. These 
can be summarised as: 
a) the unlawful establishment of the Tribunal; 
b) the unjustified primacy of the International Tribunal over competent 
domestic courts; 
c) a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
 
This section will concentrate on the alleged unlawful establishment of the 
Tribunal. The question before the Tribunal was whether the establishment of the 
ICTY was an appropriate measure to be taken by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.  The Tribunal was essentially asked to 
decide whether it had the jurisdiction to decide on its own jurisdiction. Since the 
legality of the establishment of the Tribunals was discussed in Chapter 1, this 
section will focus on the judges’ application of the doctrine of competence de la 
competence. The Tribunal relied on this principle to legitimize the establishment of 
the ICTY. 
 
Both the Trial and Appeals Chambers of the ICTY decided that the Security 
Council did not act arbitrarily in establishing the ICTY. Although the two 
                                                   
7 See J E Alvarez ‘Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 EJIL 245 , M Sassoli and L M 
Olson ‘The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber on the merits of the Tadic case’ (2000) 82 
International Review of the Red Cross 734; A Nollkaemper ‘The legitimacy of International law in the 
case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugolslavia’ in TAJA Vandamme & 
J-H Reestman (eds) Ambiguity in the Rule of Law, The Interface between National and International Legal 
Systems (2001) 13. 
8 Interview, 6 June 2003, Florence. 
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chambers arrived at a similar result, the majority opinions of the two presiding 
judges, Judge McDonald at the trial stage and Judge Cassese at the appellate stage 
were very different.  
 
The Trial Chamber took a limited view of the competence of the Tribunal and 
held that the competence of the Tribunal is precise, narrowly defined and 
described in Article 1 of its Statute.9 This competence entails prosecuting persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, subject to 
spatial and temporal limits, and to do so in accordance with the Statute. According 
to the Trial Chamber, this is the full extent of the competence of the Tribunal10 
and the Security Council simply did not ‘intend’ to permit Tribunal judges to 
‘question the legality of the law which established it’.11 The Trial Chamber 
emphasised the fact that the Tribunal was a subsidiary organ of the Security 
Council12 and that the Tribunal should not go beyond what its judges considered 
to be its strictly defined mandate. 
 
 The Appeals Chamber disagreed with this view and held that the principle of    
competence de la competence (or Kompetenz-Kompetenz in German) gave jurisdiction to 
any international judicial body to determine its own jurisdiction13 that therefore 
the Tribunal was empowered to decide the question of whether it had been validly 
established by the Security Council.14 The Appeals Chamber stated that although 
the ICTY (like the ICJ) does not have the power of judicial review over the actions 
of the Security Council, the ICTY can ‘collaterally’ examine the legality of the 
Security Council's decision in deciding whether it has jurisdiction to proceed with 
a case.15 It is not clear what this ‘collateral’ examination means and why, in the 
absence of the competence to review, the Tribunal may determine its own 
jurisdiction when this question is dependant on the ability to review the Security 
Council's decision. 
 
The Appeals Chamber drew comparisons with the Effects of Awards case.16 In this 
case the ICJ had to decide on the judicial nature of the United National 
Administrative Tribunal (UNAT), a judicial body established by the General 
                                                   
9 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995 
(hereinafter Tadic Trial Decision ).  
10 Ibid para 8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The ICJ has discussed the view that the United Nations Administrative Tribunal is a subsidiary, 
subordinate organ of the Security Council and that the Tribunal’s judgment, as a result, cannot bind 
the General Assembly which established the Administrative Tribunal. Effects of Awards of 
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954, ICJ 
Reports 1954, (hereinafter Effects of Awards) para 56-61. See also the Tadic Trial Decision (note 9 ) para 
32. 
13 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 6) para. 18 
14 Ibid  para. 19. 
15  Ibid paras. 8-10. 
16 Ibid para. 16-18. Effects of Awards (note 12). 
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Assembly.17 The ICJ held that the power to determine its own jurisdiction 
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz) is contained in the Statute of UNAT: ‘In the event of a 
dispute as to whether the Tribunal has competence, the matter shall be settled by 
the decision of the Tribunal.’ 18 
 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the Tribunal is a ‘self contained system’ 
whose ‘inherent’ or ‘incidental’ jurisdiction derives automatically from the exercise 
of the judicial function.19 The Appeals Chamber went even further, Kompetenz-
Kompetenz was not only a power but an obligation in international law.20 In support, 
the court quoted Judge Cordova who stated that it is the ‘first obligation of the 
Court’ as it would be of any other judicial body to ascertain its own competence.21  
 
Unlike the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber found that examining the 
Security Council’s action in establishing the Tribunal was not an unreviewable 
‘political’ question but was within its ‘inherent’ judicial powers.22 The Tribunal 
refused to limit its inherent power without express derogation from this ‘well-
entrenched principle of general international law’23 and suggested that to decide 
otherwise would undermine both its judicial character and the intention of the 
Security Council to create an independent body, comparable to the UN 
Administrative Tribunal.24  
 
Gaeta supports the view of the Appeals Chamber that the Tribunal, being a self-
contained system, has inherent jurisdiction to determine certain matters 
unregulated by Statute.25 Since international judicial bodies (such as the Tribunal) 
are not assisted by the means and instruments found in domestic jurisdictions 
such international judicial bodies can not be expected to fullfil their mandate by 
exercising only the limited powers expressly contained in their constitutive 
instruments.26 She makes the following interesting statement:  
 
In the international legal system, the lack of an institutionalized and integrated judiciary 
means that each court or tribunal constitutes a kind of unicellular organism. It is therefore 
inevitable that such ‘monads’ often…find within themselves the means and powers that 
                                                   
17Effects of Awards (note 12) 60 -61. 
18 Article 2 para. 3 of the Statute of the United National Administrative Tribunal 
19 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 6 above) para 14. 
20Ibid para 18. 
21 Judge Cordova, Dissenting Opinion, Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon complaints 
made against the UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1956, 77, 163. 
22 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 6) para 24. See in this regard P Gaeta ‘Inherent Powers of 
International Courts and Tribunals’ in L C Vohra, F Pocar, Y Featherstone, O Fourmy (eds) Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man (2003) 356. 
23 Ibid para 19. 
24 The question of the legality of the creation of the UN Administrative Tribunal was considered in 
the Effects of Awards case (note 12). 
25 Gaeta (note 22) 365. 
26 Ibid 366. 
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enable them to tackle the procedural problems that may emerge in the course of judicial 
proceedings, and thus safeguard their judicial character.27 
 
In Gaeta’s view the doctrine of inherent powers enables international judicial 
bodies to fill the lacunae in their constitutive instruments.28 
 
Alvarez has been particularly critical of the reasoning in Tadic. He argues that the 
Appeals Chamber used the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine as a ‘license’ to review the 
legality of the Security Council acts.29 He claims that Kompetenz-Kompetenz became 
the ‘linchpin’ to a whole series of extraordinary limitations on the power of the 
Security Council in Tadic. In his view Tadic suggests limitations on the power of 
the Security Council which not even the ICJ has ‘dared to suggest’.30 Alvarez 
writes that the decision that the Tribunal could determine its jurisdiction was 
transformed into a ‘general vehicle’ for making pronouncements on some of the 
most contentious issues in the international community concerning the power and 
functions of the Security Council.31 
 
Alvarez criticises the Appeals Chamber’s consideration of Kompetenz-Kompetenz as a 
general principle applicable within international tribunals without indicating 
precisely where this rule is found. It is not clear from the judgment whether 
kompetenz kompetenz is a general principle of law applicable in domestic courts, an 
implied term of the ICTY’s Statute or a rule of custom that applies among 
international tribunals.32Alvarez suggests that reaching for ‘general principles’ 
means the Tribunal is relying on ‘soft law’ - it displays a tendency to resort to 
norms whose status among the traditional sources of international law is not 
precisely defined.33 In his opinion the trial judges in Tadic resorted to a variety of 
non-binding materials to define the offences at issue or to consider questions of 
jurisdiction - these non-binding materials being the Report of the  
Secretary-General, the Report of the ad hoc Committee of the Permanent 
International Criminal Court and the ILC Draft Articles on the Peace and Security 
of Mankind.34 The problem with ‘soft law’ is that it lacks the legitimisation of 
traditional sources of international law. ‘Soft’ norms have not been consented to 
by States nor are they the product of general international consensus.35 
                                                   
27 Ibid 365, 366. 
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29 Jose E Alvarez  Law-Making in International Organisations (Part III)  LLM Course Materials (Fall 
2003) 20.  
30 See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v UK, Libya v US) Provisional Measures, 14 April 1992 ICJ Reports 1992, 3, 
114. 
31 Alvarez  (note 29 ) 21. 
32 Ibid  22. 
33 Ibid. The ICTY is not the only international institution who does this – Alvarez mentions the 
WTO and regional human rights courts’ reach for comparable ‘general principles’, ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Chinkin includes as ‘soft law’ laws that (1) have been articulated in non-binding form; (2) contain 
vague and imprecise terms; (3) emanate from bodies lacking international law making authority; (4) 
201
 
Importantly, he writes that reliance on soft law does not alleviate the concerns 
surrounding judicial lawmaking but may even aggravate concerns regarding 
legitimacy.  
 
In spite of initial objections to the establishment of the ICTY and the academic 
criticism of the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision, with time, the method of establishment 
has been accepted. The ‘resort to soft law’ criticised by Alvarez is not unusual in 
international adjudication. Many commentators have agreed with the decision of 
the Appeals Chamber. According to Fischer the arguments of the Appeals 
Chamber are today widely regarded as the correct interpretation of the UN 
Charter.36 In the context of discussing the legality of the ICTR Morris and Scharf 
state that the ICTR complied with the requirements set out in Tadic that a Tribunal 
has to be ‘established by law’ in accordance with ‘proper international standards’ 
set forth by the Appeals Chamber and provide ‘guarantees of fairness, justice and 
evenhandedness’.37 By using the standards developed in Tadic, the authors lend 
their implicit approval and support to the establishment of the ICTY and to the 
arguments of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic.38 
 
The Appeals Chamber’s stance that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the 
Tribunal had been lawfully established raises the possibility that the Appeals 
Chamber could have decided that the Tribunal had been unlawfully established. It is 
difficult to determine the legal consequences in such a situation.39 According to 
McGoldrick the political consequences of such a decision would be devastating.40  
 
The decision that the acts of the Security Council were reviewable could be 
described as an instance of judicial lawmaking. The ICTY was the first 
international judicial body to engage in a form of ‘judicial review’ over the actions 
of the post-Cold War Security Council.41 The use of Kompetenz-Kompetenz by the 
Appeals Chamber can be described as one of the most innovative aspects of the 
Tadic Jurisdictional Decision and, perhaps of the entire body of ICTY and ICTR 
jurisprudence.  
 
The case is also a good example of obiter lawmaking by appellate judges. The 
judges went beyond the strict legal question and discussed inter alia the possible 
                                                                                                                                 
are directed at non-state actors whose practice cannot constitute customary international law; (5) 
lack any corresponding theory of responsibility and (6) are based solely on voluntary adherence. See 
C Chinkin ‘Normative Development in the International Legal Systems’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) 
Commitment and Compliance (2000) 21, 30, 36. 
36H Fischer ‘Comment’  in A Klip and B Sluiter Annotated Leading Cases of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 1993-1999 Vol. 1 (1999)  140. 
37 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 6) para 14. 
38V Morris & M Scharf The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998)109. 
39 See H Lauterpacht ‘The Legal Effects of Illegal Acts of International Organisations’ in Cambridge 
Essays in International law: Essays in Honour of Lord McNair (1965) 88-112. 
40 D McGoldrick, P Rowe, E Donelly (eds) The Permanent International Criminal Court (2004) 34. 
41 Alvarez (note 7) 250.  
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limitations on the power of the Security Council. Ultimately it can be argued that 
the ends justify the means. The positive consequences of the establishment of the 
Tribunals legitimised their establishment. If the Tadic Appeals Chamber had not 
made law by approving the establishment of the ICTY, the ICTY could not have 
made law in other cases. Some say that without the ICTY there would have been 
no ICTR or ICC.42 However, the recent tendency towards creating 
internationalised courts or mixed Tribunals (such as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone) and the fact that the ICC was established by treaty and not by Security 
Council Resolution might indicate that establishment purely by Security Council 
fiat is not ideal.  
(ii) Distinction between international and internal armed conflict 
The Tadic Jurisdictional Decision was the first opportunity the Appeals Chamber had 
to classify the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Trial Chamber concluded 
that it did not have to determine whether the conflict was internal or international. 
 
Before the Appeals Chamber, Tadic asserted that no armed conflict existed in the 
former Yugoslavia.43 He alleged that there had been movement of tanks in the 
Prijedor region but no actual combat. The Appeals Chamber however decided that 
it was only necessary to show that ‘the alleged crimes were closely related to the 
hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the 
conflict’ and that an armed conflict did exist in the region.44  
 
The court then decided the question of whether the Statute refers only to 
international armed conflicts. The Appeals Chamber immediately pointed out that 
on the face of it, some provisions in the Statute do not make it clear whether they 
are limited to offences occurring in international armed conflicts only or whether 
they also apply in internal armed conflicts. Article 2 is one such provision. Article 
2 refers to ‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions’.45 Grave breaches are 
widely understood to be committed only in international armed conflicts. The 
Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1 define grave breaches as occurring only in 
international armed conflicts. Article 3 of the Statute, concerning violations of the 
laws and customs of war, lacks any express reference to the kind of conflict 
required and contributed to the uncertainty.46 Article 5, dealing with crimes against 
humanity, expressly confers jurisdiction over crimes committed in either internal 
or international armed conflict.47 For the purpose of Articles 2 and 3 it was 
                                                   
42 See McGoldrick (note 40 ) 35. 
43 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 6) para 66. 
44 The Appeals Chamber stated that an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between groups in a State. According to the Appeals Chamber the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia fulfilled these criteria. Ibid para 70. 





therefore necessary for the Appeals Chamber to classify the conflict as either 
internal or international. 
 
The Appeals Chamber indicated that such classification was a complex issue:  
 
[W]e conclude that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both i 
nternal and international aspects, that the members of the Security  
Council clearly had both aspects of the conflicts in mind when they  
adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal, and that they intended  
to empower the International Tribunal to adjudicate violations of  
humanitarian law that occurred in either context.48  
 
The court therefore decided that the conflict was of a ‘mixed character’, 
containing both internal and international aspects.49 The court adopted a 
teleological approach to the interpretation of the Statute. Since it was the object of 
the Statute ‘to prosecute and punish persons responsible for certain condemned 
acts being committed in a conflict understood to contain both internal and 
international aspects’ the Security Council intended the subject-matter jurisdiction 
to extend to both internal and international armed conflicts.50 
 
With regard to article 3 the Appeals Chamber held that the Statute was not 
confined to international armed conflicts but included violations of humanitarian 
law applicable to internal armed conflicts.51 Judge Cassese stated that the ‘primary 
purpose of the establishment of the International Tribunal [was] not to leave 
unpunished any person guilty of any serious violation, whatever the context within 
which it may have been committed’.52 The Tribunal once again relied on a 
purposive approach to extend the protection of humanitarian law.  
 
According to Horst Fischer, Article 3 was interpreted by the Appeals Chamber as 
being the ‘residual clause’ which was designed to ensure that no serious violation 
of international humanitarian law will escape the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.53 Since 
the Appeals Chamber intended Article 3 to confer jurisdiction over any serious 
offence not covered by articles 2, 4 or 5 it is fitting that it held that article 3 
applied to non-international armed conflicts. This helped to make article 3, in the 
words of Fischer ‘watertight and inescapable’.54 
                                                   
48 Ibid para 77, 78. The Appeals Chamber stated in para 72: ‘As members of the Security Council 
well knew, in 1993, when the Statute was drafted, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could have 
been characterized as both internal and international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict 
alongside an international one, or as an internal conflict that had become internationalized because 
of external support, or as an international conflict that had subsequently been replaced by one or 
more internal conflicts, or some combination thereof.’ 
49 Ibid para 74. 
50 Ibid para 78. 
51 Ibid para 91. 
52 Ibid para 92. 





The Appeals Chamber in this decision adopted a relatively conservative approach 
to Article 2 of the ICTY Statute when it decided that ‘in the present state of 
development of the law, Article 2 of the Statute only applies to offences 
committed within the context of international armed conflicts.’55 Cassese referred 
to the statement contained in the amicus curiae brief of the US government that 
Article 2 applied to armed conflicts of a non-international as well as an 
international character.56 Although Cassese recognised that the views of a 
permanent member of the Security Council provides a possible indication of a 
change in opinion juris, he concluded that this was not sufficient ‘in the state of 
development of the law’ to lead to the conclusion that the grave breaches 
provisions applied during non-international armed conflict.57  
 
The Tadic Jurisdictional Decision was however not memorable for what it said about 
Article 2. With regard to Article 2 the Appeals Chamber merely confirmed the 
status quo. The lawmaking in this decision occurs with regard to Article 3. By 
holding that article 3 could apply in internal armed conflicts, the ICTY broke new 
ground. 
 
The ICC Statute takes the developments in Tadic further. Article 8 (2) (c) of the 
ICC Statute, the ‘war crimes’ article, stipulates that the ICC shall have jurisdiction 
over violations of article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. Article 8 (2) (e) 
provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction over ‘other serious violations of the 
laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international 
character’.58 This article is far more detailed and extensive than the article on 
‘violations of the laws and customs of war’ in the ICTY Statute which does not 
state whether the violations had to take place in an international armed conflict or 
internal armed conflict. The fact that states finally agreed to explicitly attach 
international criminal responsibility to certain war crimes committed in internal 
                                                   
55 Ibid para 84. 
56Ibid para 83.  See the discussion by C Warbrick and  P Rowe in ‘The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction in the Tadic Case’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly  698 
57 Ibid para 83. In a Separate Opinion Judge Abi-Saab adopted a more progressive approach arguing 
that the ICTY should assume jurisdiction under Article 2 of the Statute for acts committed in 
internal conflicts in one of two ways. It could either assume such jurisdiction on the basis of a new 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions or it could do so by the establishment of a new 
customary rule ancillary to those Conventions. He held the view that the practice of applying the 
grave breaches regime also in internal conflicts had already attained the status of a new customary 
rule. According to Judge Abi-Saab there is an evolution in the law within the system of sources 
containing the grave breaches regime. See R Kolb ‘The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
Criminal Tribunals on their Jurisdiction and on International Crimes’ (2000) 71 BYIL 274. 
58 The list of such violations include intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, pillaging a town or place, even 
when taken by assault; committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary. See article 8 (e) ICC Statute. 
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armed conflict can be described as a tremendous achievement of the Rome 
Conference. 
 
(iii) Redefinition of ‘protected persons’ by Appeals Chamber 
The question whether the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was of an internal or 
international nature was discussed extensively in the subsequent Tadic Trial 
Chamber59 and Appeals Chamber decisions in answering the question of whether 
the Bosnian Muslims were ‘protected persons’.  
 
The indictment charged Tadic with a list of crimes allegedly committed in the 
Prijedor region of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 25 May 1992 and early August 
1992. Many of the counts in the indictment concerned events said to have taken 
place at a camp at Omarska, where large numbers of Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
were detained by Serb forces. The charges dealt with accusations of rape, unlawful 
killing, torture and cruel treatment. In respect of each of the alleged incidents the 
indictment charged the defendant under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Statute of the 
Tribunal.60 Article 2 of the ICTY Statute gives the ICTY the power to prosecute 
persons committing or ordering the commission of grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. The grave breaches contained in Geneva Conventions and 
Protocol 1 can be committed only in international armed conflicts.61 In order for 
the grave breaches regime to apply a conflict must not only be international - the 
Geneva Conventions require in addition that the victims of the conflict must be 
‘protected persons.’ Article 4(10) of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines 
‘protected persons’ as those ‘in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying 
Power of which they are not nationals.’  
 
The defendant maintained that the Tribunal lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in 
respect of all these charges, on the ground that none of the acts alleged in the 
indictment had taken place in the course of an international armed conflict.  In 
order for the Appeals Chamber to try Tadic for grave breaches, it was therefore 
crucial for both the Trial and Appeals Chambers to qualify the conflict in which 
Tadic committed those crimes as international.  
 
The majority of the Trial Chamber in Tadic held that, throughout the period of the 
indictment, the Geneva Conventions applied in Bosnia because of the existence of 
an ongoing international conflict between Bosnia and the SFRY.62  The Trial 
Chamber had to decide on a standard according to which outside support can 
render the law of international armed conflicts applicable to the behaviour of 
                                                   
59 Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997. 
60 Tadic  ibid.  (note 59). See the factual findings in paras 194 - 477. 
61 The Appeals Chamber held that the concept of grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions 
was inseparable from the concept of protected persons and that neither concept featured in 
common Article 3 (the only article in the Conventions applicable to internal armed conflicts) Tadic 
Appeals Judgment (note 6) para. 79-85. 
62Ibid  para 572. 
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rebels. It was argued that the International Court of Justice had clarified this 
standard when it had to decide whether the violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by the Nicaraguan contras could be attributed to the 
United States.63 The Trial Chamber declared that the ICJ in the Nicaragua case set 
a particularly high standard for determining whether the United States could be 
said to be responsible for the activities of the contras.  The ICJ states: 
 
United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organising, 
training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or 
paramilitary targets and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in 
itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purposes of 
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their 
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua…For this conduct to give rise to legal 
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that the State 
had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the 
alleged violations were committed.64 
 
The Trial Chamber decided that the law applicable to state responsibility was 
relevant in determining the law concerning international criminal liability. To 
establish state responsibility, it was necessary to establish that the FRY exercised 
effective control over the Bosnian Serb army or the Republika Srpska. The provision 
of personnel, logistical support and common aims was not enough. To establish 
effective control the Prosecution had to establish that the FRY controlled the 
Bosnian Serb army by the giving of orders and by directing its operations. 
According to the majority the prosecution merely established that the Republika 
Srpska and the Bosnian Serb army received financial and other support from the 
FRY and armed forces of the FRY and that they coordinated their activities to 
reach common goals.65 The effective control test was not satisfied. The majority 
found that the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Serb army could not be regarded 
as de facto organs of State or agents of the FRY. As a result, the civilian victims in 
the Tadic case could not be regarded as protected persons within the meaning of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention because they were not in the hands of a party of 
which they were not nationals. The Bosnian Muslims were in the hands of their 
fellow Bosnian Serb nationals.66 The grave breaches provisions were therefore 
held not to apply. 
 
In a cross–appeal the Prosecution suggested that the definition of protected 
persons should be adapted to ‘the principal challenges of contemporary conflicts’. 
The Appeals Chamber subsequently abandoned the literal interpretation of the 
definition of protected persons followed by the Trial Chamber. Instead, the 
Appeals Chamber replaced the requirement of nationality with the factors of 
                                                   
63 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 
64  Ibid para 115. 
65 Tadic (note 59) paras 602, 605. 
66 Ibid para 608. 
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allegiance and effective protection.67 The Appeals Chamber justifies this step by 
citing some cases which held that under specific provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, nationality is not decisive, namely for refugees and neutral nations.68 
Although the victims in Tadic were not refugees or neutral nationals, the Appeals 
Chamber used the example of refugees and neutral nationals to illustrate the point 
that, in these cases the lack of allegiance to a State and diplomatic protection by 
this State were considered as more important than the formal link of nationality.69 
The Appeals Chamber also referred to the inadequacy of applying the nationality 
criterion to contemporary conflicts and stated that international humanitarian law 
must apply according to substantial relations rather than formal bonds: 
 
This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations rather than on formal bonds, 
becomes all the more important in present-day international armed conflicts. While 
previously wars were primarily between well-established States, in modern inter-ethnic 
armed conflicts such as that of the former Yugoslavia, new States are often created during 
the conflict and ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds for allegiance.70 
 
The Appeals Chamber found that since it had been shown that the Bosnian Serb 
forces acted as de facto organs of another State (the FRY), the requirements of Art 
4 had been met: the victims were ‘protected persons’ as they found themselves in 
the hands of armed forces of a State of which they were not nationals.71 The 
Chamber took a purposive approach: It looked at the purpose of Article 4 which, 
according to the Appeals Chamber, is to ensure the safeguards afforded by the 
Convention to those civilians who do not enjoy diplomatic protection, ‘and 
correlatively are not subject to the allegiance and control of the State in whose 
hands they may find themselves.’ It held that it would frustrate the object and 
purpose of the Geneva Convention if nationality was kept as the only criterion in 
such conflicts.72 This seems to be a good example of the Appeals Chamber using 
the ‘maximum protection’ justification to extend the protection of the Geneva 
Conventions to those not previously protected. 
 
According to the Appeals Chamber State responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility are different issues and the ICJ, in Nicaragua, did not have to 
determine whether the law of international or non-international armed conflict 
applies because it considered Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to apply to 
both kinds of conflict.73 In the view of the Appeals Chamber the test applied by 
the ICJ in Nicaragua is unconvincing because it is at variance with State and judicial 
practice. The Appeals Chamber was of the view that overall control by a foreign 
State over an organisation is sufficient to render the foreign State responsible for 
                                                   
67 Ibid paras 163-169. 
68 See Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 4 (2), 44 and 70 (2). 
69Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 165. 
70 Ibid para 168. 
71 Ibid . 
72 Ibid paras 163 ff. 
73 Nicaragua (note 63) para 219. 
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all acts of that organisation and to activate international humanitarian law relative 
to international conflicts.74 The Appeals Chamber came to the conclusion that the 
Bosnian Serbs were under such overall control by the FRY.75 
 
Both the Trial and Appeals Chambers relied on Article 8(a) of the 1996 ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, the 2001 revised version of which reads as 
follows: 
 
The conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.76 
 
This provision means that a State may opt to act through private individuals or 
groups of private individuals, or persons not enjoying the status of an organ of 
State, rather than acting itself through its organs.77  
  
The dramatic result of the redefinition of ‘protected persons’ by the Appeals 
Chamber is that, in the future, all victims of international armed conflict, if it can 
be proven that they pass the new test formulated by the Appeals Chamber, can 
benefit from the protection provided by the protected person status under the 
Geneva Conventions.  
 
In Tadic the ICTY Appeals Chamber went beyond the interpretation of existing 
law to create new law.78 The Appeals Chamber’s blurring of the distinction 
between international and internal armed conflicts called for a redefinition of 
protected persons. The traditional definition of protected persons was 
incompatible with the Appeals Chamber’s decision on the classification of the 
conflict. This would be an example of commendable lawmaking or development 
of the law, lawmaking by which the Tribunals extended the protection of 
humanitarian law and an example of what Meron would call the humanisation of 
humanitarian law. The Trial Chamber in Blaskic stated: ‘In a nation that had 
                                                   
74 Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, para. 156. The Celebici Trial Chamber came to the same 
conclusion. In its view the Nicaragua test was not applicable to the question of individual 
responsibility. See Prosecutor v Delalic IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998 (Celebici Trial Judgment )    paras 
233 and 234. In this case the court again faced the ‘classification’ question. Concerning the 
international nature of the conflict, the Trial Chamber adopted a very flexible and generic standard, 
avoiding the technical point of attribution. The Chamber simply states that with regard to the 
involvement of outside Croat and Serb forces and the degree of control exercised, the conflict was 
clearly international. The grave breaches regime did therefore apply if it could be said that the 
victims were protected persons. Ibid, paras 204 ff. 
75 Ibid para. 162. 
76 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) 103 available at  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf 
77 Andre de Hoogh ‘Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC articles on state responsibility, the Tadic case 
and attribution of acts of Bosnian Serb authorities to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (2002) 72 
BYIL 277. 
78 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) paras 163-169.  
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crumbled, ethnicity became more important than nationality in determining 
loyalties’.79 The intricacy of the situation in the former Yugoslavia (of a state 
dissolving into many states) calls for a new response to the question or test of 
allegiance to nationality and perhaps a rethinking of the usefulness of the notion 
of nationality and of what it is that that notion really means.  
 
Many academic commentators have questioned the reasoning and conclusion 
reached both by the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber. Special Rapporteur 
James Crawford questioned whether Article 8 (a) of the Draft Article on State 
Responsibility as it then stood ‘should extend beyond cases of actual authorisation 
or instruction to cover cases where specific operations are under the direction and 
control of the State’.80 Crawford proposed to attribute conduct to a State if a 
specific operation was carried out under its direction and control, provided that 
the complaint related to conduct constituting a necessary, integral or intended part 
of the operation.81 The 2001 Commentary on the Articles on State Responsibility 
incorporates this suggestion. It states that conduct ‘under the direction or control’ 
of the State will be attributable to the State ‘only if it directed or controlled the 
specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of that 
operation.’82 
 
De Hoogh criticises the Trial Chamber decision. He believes it is inadequate and 
illogical to impose the same kinds of standards applicable to organs of State to de 
facto organs or agents. He points out that the Trial Chamber notion that control 
must actually have been exercised is inconsistent with the Chamber’s observation 
that ‘there was little need for the VJ and Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia …to attempt to exercise any real degree of control over…the VRS.’83 
In his view both the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber misread the Nicaragua 
case and equated the criterion of effective control (concerning violations of 
human rights law and humanitarian law) with that of dependence and control (for 
agency determination).84  
 
The text and commentary of the new Article 8 require the exercise of direction or 
control over specific conduct engaged in by the (group of) persons.  The ILC 
requires that control must be exercised in regard to the specific conduct of the 
person or entity concerned. This seems be contrary to the notion, expressed by 
the Appeals Chamber, that overall control is sufficient.  
 
In their comments on the lawmaking of the judges when classifying the conflict in 
Tadic, Sassoli and Olson write that it is doubtful whether it is appropriate for the 
                                                   
79 Prosecutor v Blaskic, IT-95-14, 3 March 2000, paras 125-133. 
80 Crawford First Report on State Responsibility A/CN.4/490/Add. 5, 22 July 1998, 16 - 24. 
81 Ibid 23. 
82 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (note 76) 108.  
83 Tadic Trial Decision (note 9) paras 603-604. 
84 De Hoogh (note 77) 290. 
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ICTY to provide an answer to general international law different from the answer 
given by the ICJ. They are concerned that double standards may result if the ICTY 
continues to apply its own theory to inter-State disputes.85 It may be asked 
whether the principle of completeness of the legal system, insisted on by Hersch 
Lauterpacht86, does not presuppose the expectation of consistency between 
different international courts. The ILC’s revised Commentary on the Draft 
Articles takes note of the different approaches taken by the ICJ and ICTY and 
merely states that in each case it is a matter of appreciation whether conduct was 
or was not carried out under the control of the State.87 
 
Meron also finds the ICTY’s reliance on Nicaragua problematic. He expressed 
reservations on whether the Nicaragua case and its criteria were of any relevance in 
characterising the conflict. In his view applying the Nicaragua test leads to artificial 
and incongruous conclusions.88 Interestingly, the Trial Chamber in Celebici warned 
of the dangers of relying on the reasoning and findings of a very different judicial 
body concerned with rather different circumstances from the case at issue – for 
example the ICJ’s reasoning on the issue of State responsibility should not be 
transposed wholesale into the context of conflict classification.89 Meron does 
however support the softening of the line between international and non-
international armed conflicts.90 He applauds the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning that 
‘the impetuous development and propagation in the international community of 
human rights doctrines’91 calls for a blurring of the distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflicts which results from it.92 
 
Fenrick similarly agrees with the blurring of this distinction and writes that as long 
as humanitarian law remains in two boxes, an internal box and an international 
box, courts addressing criminal responsibility would have to undergo ‘similar 
analytical contortions’ to that of the Appeals Chamber.93  
 
The judgment can be criticised on the ground that both the Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the situation of a State 
dissolving into several States, where the armed forces of the former central state 
                                                   
85 Sassoli & Olson (note 7 ) 3  
86H Lauterpacht ‘Some Observations on the Prohibition of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the 
Law’ in Symbolae Verzijl (1958) 216. See Chapter 2.   
87 See the Commentary on Article 8 in James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on 
State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002) 112. See also the Commentary on the 
website of the International Law Commission (note 76). 
88  T Meron ‘Classification of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s fallout’ (1998) 92 
AJIL 236-42.  
89 Celebici Trial Judgment (note 74) paras 230-231.  
90 T Meron ‘Cassese’s Tadic and the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts’ in L C Vohrah et al 
(note 22) 535. 
91 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision (note 6) para. 97. 
92 Ibid 535. 
93 W J Fenrick ‘The Application of the Geneva Conventions by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia’ (1999) 834 International Review of the Red Cross 317. 
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necessarily have many links with the former central authorities. It can be argued 
that such links are not necessarily an indication of control. 94 By finding that the 
Bosnian Serbs acted as de facto agents of another state (the FRY), (which was 
necessary to qualify the conflict as international), the Appeals Chamber expanded 
the scope of protection of humanitarian law and made law. But was this a 
legitimate interpretation of the Article 2 of the ICTY Statute?  
 
With regard to the question of conflict classification and with regard to all aspects 
of lawmaking in Tadic one can argue that the Tribunal exercised a choice. 
Confronted with the choice between a literal or purposive interpretation of the 
Statute, the Appeals Chamber did not follow the literal interpretation but instead 
preferred the purposive approach.95  
 
Had the ICTY not qualified the conflict in which Tadic committed those crimes as 
international the Appeals Chamber could not try Tadic for grave breaches. When 
taking a purposive interpretation the ICTY and ICTR must take the objects and 
purpose of the Statutes into consideration as well as the social and political 
considerations which gave rise to their creation.96 In order to give effect to the 
purpose of the ICTY Statute ie to prosecute persons for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, it was therefore crucial for both the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers to classify the conflict as international.  
 
Although the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber’s reliance of the Nicaragua case 
and adoption of the overall control standard can legitimately be criticised it can be 
argued that the decision led to a correct outcome. In order for Article 2 to fulfill its 
purpose the Tribunal had to find a way of classifying the conflict as an 
international conflict. The judges needed to make law to make Article 2 functional.  
                                                   
94 Interestingly, Sassoli and Olson consider the standard the Appeals Chamber applies an 
unintended form of ‘judicial ethnic cleansing’. Instead of constituent peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina groups such as the Serbs and Croats are considered as ‘agents’ of a foreign state. 
Sassoli & Olson (note 7 ) 3, 4. The important question here is whether the fact that the acts of the 
Serbs and the Croats can be legally attributed to a foreign State means that they themselves should 
also be ‘attributed’ to that State, ie considered as foreigners. This question is particularly important 
in the context of determining ‘protected person’ status. This was the conclusion in Celebici (note 74) 
para 259 where it was argued that Bosnian Serbs detained by the Bosnian government were 
protected persons because they had not accepted the nationality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
95 One can apply the rules of customary international law on treaty interpretation as codified in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
96 Celebici Trial Judgment  (note 74) para 170. See also Meron (note 90) 535, 536. 
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(iv) Extension of Common Purpose Doctrine 
Tadic was one of many accused before the ICTY charged with participating in a 
joint criminal enterprise (or common criminal purpose).97 The systemic nature of 
the violations committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda resulted in many 
individuals being charged with crimes that were committed in the context of a 
group.98 Van Sliedregt comments that at the ICTY joint criminal enterprise has 
become the concept par excellence to construct the criminal responsibility of 
senior political and military leaders.99 Other ICTY accused charged with 
participating in a joint criminal enterprise include Kordic/Cerkez100, Krstic101, 
Kvocka102, Krnojelac103, Blaskic104, Vasiljevic105, Furundzija106 and Milosevic.107 The only 
ICTR case in which an accused was charged with participating in joint criminal 
enterprise was Kayishema.108 
                                                   
97 The two terms seem to denote the same concept. See W J Fenrick’s chapter ‘The ICTY and the 
development of international humanitarian law’ in K Koufa (ed) The New International Criminal Law 
(2003) 937. The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin and Talic noted that the Appeals Chamber has labelled the 
concept as a common plan, a common criminal purpose, a common design, and a common 
concerted design. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and 
Prosecution Application to Amend, IT-99-36, 26 June 2001 para 24. 
98 It is clear that joint criminal enterprise is becoming increasingly important at the ICTY. 
Indictments are increasingly resting the accused’s liability on this basis. Of the fourty-two 
indictments filed between 25 June 2001 (the date on which the first indictment relying explicitly on 
joint criminal enterprise was filed) and 1 January 2004 twenty-seven (64%) relied explicitly on joint 
criminal enterprise. For more statistics see A M Danner, J S Martinez ‘Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal 
Law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 107.  
99 E Van Sliedregt Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(2003) 101. 
100 Prosecutor v Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001. 
101 Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001. 
102 Prosecutor v Kvocka et al, IT-98-30/1-T, 28 February 2005. 
103 Prosecutor v Krnojelac, IT-97-25, 15 March 2002. 
104 Prosecutor v Blaskic IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004. 
105 Prosecutor v Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-A, 25 February 2004. 
106 Prosecutor v Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998. 
107 Prosecutor v Milosevic, IT-01-51-I (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 22 November 2001 on line at 
http://www.un.org.icty/indictment/english/milii011122ehtm The Prosecutor submitted that 
Milosevic participated in a joint criminal enterprise whose objective was to forcibly lead out from 
certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina all the non-Serb population with the purpose of achieving 
the creation of a ethnically homogenous Serbian state. 
108Prosecutor v Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999 paras 203-204. Based upon the ICTY's JCE 
jurisprudence, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has found that joint criminal enterprise may also be 
employed at the ICTR.  Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana,  Judgment, ICTR-96-10-A, 13 December 2004, 
para 468. Danner and Martinez speculate that the relative lack of jurisprudence relating to joint 
criminal enterprise at the ICTR may be due to a variety of factors (note 82). First, conspiracy to 
commit genocide is included within the ICTR Statute and has been frequently alleged by the 
prosecution, thus removing much of the need for recourse to JCE. See eg Prosecutor v Musabyimana, 
ICTR Indictment, ICTR-2001-62-I, 15 March  2001, paras 35-39,  Prosecutor v Kamuhanda, ICTR 
Indictment, ICTR-99-54-A, 15 November 2000, para 1, Prosecutor v Bisengimana, ICTR Indictment, 
ICTR-2000-60-I, 10 July 2000 para 1; Prosecutor v Rugambarara, ICTR  Indictment,  ICTR-2000-59, 




Tadic is important because as the first decision it set the foundation stone for 
liability for common purpose.109 It was the Tribunal decision which developed 
most dramatically the law with regard to common purpose. Significantly, the 
Appeals Chamber in Tadic extended the concept of ‘common purpose’ to cases 
involving a common design where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, 
while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the effecting of that common purpose. This particular from of 
‘common purpose’ has been described as ‘third category’ common purpose (after 
its description by the Tadic Appeals Chamber) or extended common purpose.110 
 
Although the ICTY Statute does not expressly refer to joint criminal enterprise the 
ICTY has held in several cases that this form of liability can be inferred from 
Article 7(1).111 Article 7(1) provides that: 
 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in 
the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 and 5 of the 
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.  
 
The absence of express provision for common purpose is a lacuna in the Statute. 
Ideally of course international criminal law requires clear and certain definitions 
for the various bases for liability.112 The Tadic Appeals Chamber considered joint 
criminal enterprise to be a form of ‘commission’ under Art 7(1).  This view was 
upheld by the Appeals Chamber in the Krnojelac Appeals Judgment113 and the 
Ojdanic Motion Challenging Jurisdiction.114 The Tadic Appeals Chamber 
established that the notion of joint criminal enterprise was firmly established in 
customary law and was recognized by the ICTY Statute.115 
 
Common purpose (or ‘aiding and abetting’) was referred to in the Tadic Trial 
Chamber decision116 and focused on in the Tadic Appeals Chamber decision.117 
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic emphasised that joint criminal enterprise is a 
                                                   
109 E Katselli ‘The notion of individual criminal responsibility for participation in a joint criminal 
enterprise in the new international law with respect to the crime of genocide and in view of the new 
charges for Bosnia against Slobodan Milosevic’ in K Koufa (ed) The New International Criminal Law 
(2003)  1032. 
110 Danner & Martinez (note 98) 108. 
111 Ibid 102-6. 
112 S Powles ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial 
Creativity’ (2004) 2 JICJ 606. 
113 Prosecutor v Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, 17 September 2003, para 73. 
114 Prosecutor v Ojdanic. Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 2 May 2003, para 20. 
115 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 220. 
116 Tadic (note 59) paras 681- 687. 
117 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6). 
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necessary component of Art 7 (1) and firmly rooted in international customary 
law.118 
  
Since the Appeals Chamber’s development and extension with regard to the third 
category is the most innovative and controversial this section will focus on this 
category of common purpose. Unlike the ICTY Statute, the ICC Statute contains 
an explicit provision incorporating joint criminal enterprise and does not extend to 
crimes beyond the scope of the joint criminal enterprise. The drafters of the ICC 
Statute therefore did not seem to accept the third category of common purpose 
developed by the Tadic Appeals Chamber. For conceptual clarity it is important to 
understand the distinction made by the Tribunals between ‘joint criminal 
enterprise’ and the crime of ‘aiding and abetting’.  
 
According to the Tadic Appeals Chamber the aider and abettor is always an 
accessory to the crime perpetrated by the principal (in common purpose no 
‘principal’ is required). The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed 
to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a specific crime. 
By contrast, by acting in pursuance of a common purpose it is sufficient that the 
participant performs acts that in some way are directed to the furthering of the 
common plan. In the case of aiding and abetting the requisite mens rea is 
knowledge that the acts performed assisted in the commission of the crime.119 
 
The Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac stated that the acts of a participant in a joint 
criminal enterprise are more serious than those of an aider and abettor to the 
principal offence since a participant in a joint criminal enterprise shares the intent 
of the principal offender whereas an aider and abettor need only be aware of that 
intent.120 
 
The Trial Chamber found that Dusko Tadic participated in ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
operations within an armed group in the Prijedor Region by helping to remove 
non-Serb men from the villages of Sivci and Jaskici. In the village of Jaskici five 
men were later found to have been killed. There was no evidence that Tadic took 
part in the killings in the village of Jaskici. The Trial Chamber therefore concluded 
that Tadic could not be sentenced for them. This conclusion was overturned by 
the Appeals Chamber. It was found beyond a reasonable doubt that the five 
victims had been killed by members of the armed group to which Tadic 
belonged.121 It was further held that under the common purpose doctrine, Tadic 
                                                   
118 Ibid para 189. 
119 Ibid para 229. 
120 In the Krnojelac Appeals Judgment a further distinction was made between an accomplice and a 
co-perpetrator. The Appeals Chamber referred to a co-perpetrator as a participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise who is not the principal offender. An accomplice in a joint criminal enterprise is a person 
who shares the intent to carry out the enterprise and whose acts facilitate the commission of the 
agreed crime. Krnojelac (note 103) para 75. 
121 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) paras 178-184. 
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could be held responsible for those killings even if they were committed by other 
members of his group and even if the killing of the inhabitants of the village was 
not necessarily part of their common plan. The Appeals Chamber decided that 
such responsibility exists once the risk of death becomes a predictable 
consequence of the execution of the common plan and the accused was either 
reckless or indifferent to that risk.122      
     
According to the Appeals Chamber the relevant case law shows that the notion of 
common design encompasses three categories of collective criminality.123 The actus 
reus and mens rea required differs according to the category of common purpose.124 
The first category represents cases where all the co-defendants who act pursuant 
to a common design possess the same criminal intention.125 The second category, 
which can be seen as a variation of the first, embraces the so-called ‘concentration 
camp’ cases. In these cases it was held by the court that the offences charged have 
been committed by members of the military or administrative units such as those 
running concentration camps.126 Examples of the second category of common 
purpose can be found in the Krnojelac (involving crimes committed in the KP 
Dom detention facility) and Kvocka cases. With regard to the Kvocka case, regarding 
crimes committed in the Omarska camp, the Trial Chamber stated: ‘the second 
category, which embraces the post-war ‘concentration camp’ cases, best resonates 
with the facts of this case…’127 
 
The third of these categories concerns cases where an act is committed by a co-
perpetrator outside the common design which is a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the effecting of the common purpose.128  
 
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic came to the conclusion that all co-perpetrators are 
responsible for acts committed by one co-perpetrator outside the common design, 
if it was foreseeable that they might be committed and the accused willingly took 
the risk.129 For the purpose of category three common purpose, the relevant 
mental state required is therefore lowered from intention to recklessness or 
                                                   
122 Sassoli & Olsen (note 7) 6. 
123 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 195 
124 The actus reus required for common purpose is set out in para 31 of Krnojelac (note 103) and the 
mens rea requirement is set out in para 32 of Krnojelac ibid. 
125Ibid para 196. With regard to this category the Appeals Chamber refers to the Georg Otto Sandrock 
case. See Trial of Otto Sanders and three others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, 
held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24th –26th November 1945, UNWCC, vol I,  35. 
126 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 202. In the ‘concentration camp’ cases the accused held some 
position of authority within the hierarchy of the concentration camps. The Chamber refers to the 
Dachau Concentration Camp case ( US  v  Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine others, General Military 
Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15th November-13th December, 
1945, UNWCC, vol. XI.) and the Belsen case (Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British Military Court, 
Luneberg, 17th September –17th November, 1945, UNWCC, vol II, 1). 
127 Kvocka (note 102) para 84 
128 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 204. 
129 Ibid paras 204-226. 
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knowledge. The Trial Chamber in  Kayishema suggested that the accused may be 
responsible for crimes that were objectively foreseeable, even if he did not himself 
foresee them.130 This has the effect of lowering the standard even further, to that 
of negligence. The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin and Talic stressed that the Appeals 
Chamber in Tadic did not require the prosecution in such a case to establish that 
the accused intended any further crime to be committed or that he shared with the 
other participant the state of mind required for the further crime.131 
 
The Appeals Chamber did not base its extension of common purpose on a 
provision of the ICTY Statute or on a rule of international humanitarian law. 
Instead, the Appeals Chamber based its conclusion on its own analysis of 
precedents and national legal systems. The Chamber looked at the Essen Lynching 
case,132 a case brought before a British military court, as well as the Kurt Goebell et 
al (Borkum Island ) case,133 the decision of a United States military court.  
 
Sassoli and Olsen comment that it is not clear why the Appeals Chamber chose to 
review the Borkum Island case as a precedent for the third category of common 
purpose. In their view the case fits more neatly under category one since this was a 
clear case of common design to kill.134 
 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber also cited a number of Italian cases in support of 
third category common purpose. Of these, the only case that clearly sets out third 
category common purpose is D’Ottavio et.135 In light of the fact that the Appeals 
Chamber cited only one case which unequivocally serves as an example of third 
category common purpose it is difficult to see how the Tribunal can conclude that 
third category common purpose is ‘firmly established in international customary 
law’.136 
 
Resorting or referring to cases from other fora or contexts can be problematic. To 
determine the authoritative value of a case it must be appraised within the context 
of the forum in which it was heard as well as in the context of the law it applied.137 
Case law from British military courts for the trials of war criminals whose 
jurisdiction was based on the rules and procedure of the domestic military courts, 
for example, were less helpful in establishing rules of international law than case 
law of tribunals set up specifically to apply international law.138 Also it can be 
                                                   
130 Kayishema (note 108) paras 203 -204. 
131 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 30. 
132 Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 18th-
19th and 21st-22nd December 1945, UNWCC, vol I, 88, at 91. 
133 US v Kurt Goebell et al, 6 February  – 21 March  1946 (Borkum Island case). 
134 Sassoli & Olson (note 7) 7. 
135 D’Ottavio et. (an unpublished judgment) is a case on Appeal from the Assise Court of Terano (on 
file with the ICTY library). Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 215. 
136 Ibid para 220.  




argued that international tribunals are not bound by past doctrines; they must 
apply customary international law as it stands at the time of the commission of the 
offences. The Trial Chamber in Tadic was of the opinion that it must interpret the 
notion of crimes against humanity as it stood at the relevant times when the 
offences were committed and not at the time of WW II or soon thereafter when 
the notion was being developed.139 
In its examination of national jurisdictions the Trial Chamber found that British 
and US military courts in Germany, Italian courts judging World War II events, 
common law jurisdictions, France and Italy adopt the approach favoured by the 
Appeals Chamber.140 In Dutch law liability in third category common purpose 
cases can be constructed by using the dolus eventualis standard. This type of liability 
is referred to as co-perpetration (medeplegen).141 Van Sliedregt points out that in The 
Netherlands, as in other civil law systems, common purpose liability can exist as 
way of prosecuting those who jointly commit a crime in circumstances where it is 
unclear which person ‘gave the final blow’.142  
 
Sassoli and Olsen criticise the approach of looking at national jurisdictions. They 
say that by doing so the Appeals Chamber is comparing apples to oranges. It also 
seems as if the definition of the ‘third category’ seems to vary throughout the 
Chamber’s discussion. The Chamber first considers it sufficient that the result not 
covered by the common plan is predictable and that the accused was indifferent to 
that risk.143 The Chamber reviews Italian cases and concludes that ‘it would seem 
that [the Italian court of Cassation] either applied the notion of an attenuated form 
of intent (dolus eventualis) or required a high degree of carelessness (culpa)’.144 But 
these are two distinct concepts: dolus eventualis entails responsibility for a deliberate 
crime and culpa is negligence. In the next paragraph however it is stated by the 
Chamber that ‘more than negligence…the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also 
called advertent recklessness in some legal systems)’.145 In summing up the chapter 
the Chamber mentions yet another standard, ie that the crime was foreseeable and 
the accused willingly took that risk.146 But this standard implies less than dolus 
eventualis, where the result and not only the risk is accepted. At the same time it 
also implies much more than the initially mentioned standard, ie that the risk is 
predictable (this includes unconscious negligence) and the accused is indifferent to 
such risk. It is not clear which standard the Appeals Chamber finally applied. 
Taking into account how the standard was applied to Tadic it seems as if the 
standard adopted in the conclusion, namely that the crime was foreseeable and the 
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accused willingly took the risk was the standard the Appeals Chamber decided 
upon. 
 
The Appeals Chamber referred to two conventions which, at the time of the 
judgment, were not yet in force. It first mentions the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing of 15 December 1997, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly, which criminalises an intentional contribution ‘either ... made 
with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group 
or…made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
offence…concerned’147 Secondly, it refers to the ICC Statute which at the time of 
the judgment was not yet ratified by the required amount of States. The Appeals 
Chamber considered the Statute to express the opinio juris of the States which 
adopted the Statute. In Article 25 (3) (d) the ICC Statute stipulates that a person 
shall be criminally responsible for a crime if that person in any way ‘contributes to 
the commission of a crime…by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) be made with 
the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group…; or 
(ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’.  
Sassoli and Olsen are critical of the Appeals Chamber decision. They believe the 
wording of the Statute does not necessarily cover the third category, as it requires 
the intention of the group to commit the crime, while in the third category, only 
one member has the intention to commit the additional crime.148 
 
The Appeals Chamber came to the following conclusion: 
the consistency and cogency of the case law and the treaties referred to above, as well as 
their consonance with the general principles on criminal responsibility laid down both in 
the Statute and general international criminal law and in national legislation, warrant the 
conclusion that [that] case law reflects customary rules of international criminal law.149 
 
It is not at all clear that the third category of common purpose is as firmly 
established in international law as the Appeals Chamber suggests. The Appeals 
Chamber’s conclusion that the third category of the common criminal purpose 
was considered customary in character can therefore be questioned. Danner and 
Martinez are of the view that the cases referred to by the Appeals Chamber (post-
Nuremberg prosecutions conducted by military authorities) do not support the 
‘sprawling’ form of joint criminal enterprise employed by the ICTY.150 The 
authors criticise the Appeals Chamber’s analysis of the Essen Lynching case. They 
point out that the summary of the case relied upon by the Tadic Appeals 
Chamber151 provides no statement of the legal basis for the conviction. In 
addition there is no indication in the case that the prosecutor explicitly relied on 
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the concept of common purpose. The case is simply not an example of common 
purpose liability and does not provide support for third category common 
purpose.  In neither of the ‘POW mob violences cases’ (Essen Lynching and Borkum 
Island) cases were the defendants charged with participation in some larger plan 
outside of the unlawful treatment of the prisoners involved. These cases do not 
provide authority for the sweeping forms of extended common purpose. With 
regard to the reference to national jurisdictions, it is important to recognise that 
many countries (such as Germany ) do not recognise extended common purpose 
and that in countries such as Britain and Canada where such liability is recognised, 
the doctrine has been subject to significant criticism because it lowers the mens rea 
required for the commission of the principal crime without affording a diminution 
in the sentence imposed.152 
 
If there is less supporting national case law to rely on than the Appeals Chamber 
purports, the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion that the third category of common 
purpose has become part of international customary law may be false. It may then 
be asked whether extended common purpose is compatible with the principle of 
legality. It was argued in Ojdanic that joint criminal enterprise did not fall in the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction and infringed the principle of nullum crimen.153 It is also 
important that the prosecutor must specifically plead joint criminal enterprise in 
the indictment in order not to surprise the accused.154 Sensitivity to nullum crimen is 
especially important in light of the myriad ICTY cases and indictments relying on 
common purpose. 
 
But even if one does accept the third category it is not clear that this would be a 
desirable development of international law. Sassoli and Olsen point out that an 
essential element of combatant status is immunity from punishment for those who 
respect that law.155 A soldier for example cannot be convicted of rape because 
some of his comrades committed rape. Exceptions to this rule should only be 
made in extreme cases. It should also be kept in mind that membership in the 
armed forces is not always voluntary. It might be crucial to take into account the 
circumstances under which a combatant joined the armed forces.It should be 
stressed that it is fundamental to international criminal law and the aims it seeks to 
achieve that criminal responsibility is imposed on individuals. Many believe that 
the significance of the whole recent movement of establishing international 
criminal Tribunals lies in the development of the notion of individual criminal 
                                                   
152 Danner & Martinez (note 98) 109. 
153 Ojdanic (note 114) para21.  
154 Powles (note 112) 618. According to Powles the prosecution has been errant in effectively 
alleging joint criminal enterprise in indictments to enable the accused to fully appreciate the nature 
of the charges against him. In Krnojelac the Trial Chamber refused to consider whether the extended 
form (third category) of criminal purpose applied, as it had not been pleaded in the indictment. 
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155 Sassoli & Olson (note 7) 8. 
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responsibility. Holding individuals accountable discards the notion of collective 
guilt and makes it clear that crimes were committed by individuals. According to 
Sassoli and Olsen the common purpose doctrine should not lead to a ‘re-
collectivisation’ of responsibility.156  
 
Although many national jurisdictions might have expanded the common purpose 
doctrine to combat collective crime one needs to be sensitive to the international 
context in which the Tribunals adjudicate crimes. Danner and Martinez warn that 
international tribunals should proceed cautiously and show awareness of the fact 
that the law they develop may be applied in other contexts they cannot yet foresee. 
Courts should be sensitive to the implications or ripple effects of extending 
liability in this manner. In the context of extended common purpose, national 
governments may use the doctrine to prosecute, for example, persons who 
provide any form of support to a terrorist organisation, however loosely 
defined.157 Care should be taken not to stretch criminal liability to a point where 
the legitimacy of international criminal law will be threatened.  
 
It is argued here that the extension of common purpose by the Appeals Chamber 
is an example of unwarranted judicial lawmaking. One reason for this is that the 
Appeals Chamber failed to take the culpability principle seriously. According to 
the culpability principle individuals can only be punished for their individual 
choices to engage in wrongdoing.  An individual’s liability should not be 
dependant on how broadly or loosely a prosecutor describes the criminal goal of 
the enterprise or how loosely judges construe foreseeability. Another objection to 
the extended form of common purpose is that it fails to distinguish between the 
liability of senior commanders or political leaders and low-level perpetrators. This 
type of lawmaking by the ICTY also seems to violate the ICTY’s own mandate 
and view of lawmaking: that a new rule only becomes new law if it becomes part 
of customary international law – the view expressed in the Secretary General’s 
Report.158 It is clear that the absence of an explicit provision for joint criminal 
enterprise is a gap in the ICTY Statute. The gap (particularly pertaining to 
circumstances described as third category common purpose by the Tadic Appeals 
Chamber) cannot be filled by finding support in two or three national 
jurisdictions. 
 
3. Rape as Crime Against Humanity: Akayesu, Furundzija, Kunarac 
The lawmaking with regard to the crime of rape is one of the most dramatic 
contributions of the Tribunals. Rape was not expressly included as a crime against 
humanity in the Nuremberg Charter. Rape was however covered by the phrase 
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‘other inhumane acts’.  Control Council Law No. 10 did include rape as a crime 
against humanity but there were no prosecutions on the basis.159 In cases such as 
Akayesu160 and Furundzija161 the ad hoc Tribunals prosecuted, charged and 
convicted accused for the crime of rape. 
Whereas previously rape was too often regarded as a spoil of war it can now be 
said to been firmly criminalised and prosecuted in international law. Meron 
describes the prosecution of rape as crime against humanity as a ‘normative 
development’ of the Tribunals.162 He writes that both the legal and moral 
importance of the fact that the ICTY Statute goes beyond the Nuremberg Charter 
to provide that rape can constitute a crime against humanity cannot be 
overestimated.163 It is also important that rape can be prosecuted as a war crime or 
a grave breach (as recognised by the ICRC and United States).164 The crimes of 
rape and sexual violence are included in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, Article 3 of 
the ICTR Statute and Article 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute. Whereas gender-based 
crimes were largely ignored during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, crimes of 
sexual violence are being charged in the ICTY and ICTR as violations of the laws 
and customs of war, genocide, crimes against humanity and as grave breaches of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. But the judges’ lawmaking in the rape cases has 
also been subject to strong criticism. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that three 
different trial chambers defined rape in three different ways with the need for legal 
certainty and the principle of legality. The first of the three rape definitions was 
formulated by the Akayesu Trial Chamber.165  
 
Jean Paul Akayesu was the mayor of Taba commune – a position which gave him 
the exclusive control over the communal police and responsibility for maintaining 
public order. It was alleged in the indictment that, when Tutsi civilians sought 
refuge at the bureau communal, female displaced civilians were regularly taken by 
armed local militia or communal police and subjected to sexual violence, or beaten 
on or near the bureau communal premises.166 According to the indictment many 
women were forced to endure multiple acts of sexual violence which were at times 
committed by more than one assailant. These acts of sexual violence were 
generally accompanied by explicit threats of death or bodily harm.167 Although 
Akayesu was not alleged to have committed these crimes himself, it was alleged 
that Akayesu was present at the time of the acts of sexual violence and had 
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knowledge thereof. At trial Akayesu denied that any rapes were committed at the 
bureau communal in his presence or otherwise.168 
 
Until the judgment in Akayesu, rape and other forms of sexual violence had never 
been defined under international law. The Trial Chamber in Akayesu formulated a 
broad and sensible definition of rape and sexual violence. While rape has been 
defined in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual intercourse, variations 
on the act of rape may include acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or 
the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual. 
 
The Chamber defines rape as a physical insertion of a sexual nature, committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence [,] which includes rape is 
considered to be any act of as sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive.169 
 
The Trial Chamber considered rape to be primarily a form of aggression and that 
the central element of rape ‘cannot be captured in a mechanical description of 
objects and body parts’.170 Instead, the Chamber decided to take a ‘conceptual 
approach’. In taking this approach the Trial Chamber examined the object in 
carrying out the rape – whether this object is intimidation, degradation, 
humiliation, control or discrimination. The Chamber stated that the fact that rape 
is a crime against personal dignity can be considered torture under certain 
circumstances.171 In following a conceptual approach the Chamber decided that 
‘force’ does not have to be described as physical behaviour per se, but can also be 
assumed to be inherent in the circumstances.172 Psychological force will therefore 
also be understood as force. Because proving rape is not dependent on physical 
force the victim is spared the ordeal of having to describe the alleged rape in 
detail. This was one of the considerations that led the Trial Chamber to define 
rape in this way. The Chamber mentioned the ‘painful reluctance and inability of 
witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details’ of sexual violence.173  
Significantly, the Akayesu decision also stated that rape can constitute a separate 
crime of torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official.174 
 
The Akayesu case was considered groundbreaking because it was the first time in 
history a defendant was tried and convicted by an international tribunal for 
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genocide.175  The Akayesu decision has been described as historic because it 
affirmed the ‘intricate linkage’ between sexual violence and genocide in Rwanda.176 
Akayesu developed the law relating to gender-based crimes in at least three 
respects: (1) the Trial Chamber recognised sexual violence as an integral part of 
the genocide in Rwanda, and found the accused guilty of genocide for crimes that 
included sexual violence; (2) the Chamber recognised rape and other forms of 
sexual violence as independent crimes constituting crimes against humanity; and 
(3) the Chamber enunciated a broad, progressive international definition of both 
rape and sexual violence. The Tribunal stated that when the ‘intent to destroy a 
group’ is present, rape and sexual violence can be considered genocide. It 
concluded that in this specific case sexual violence did constitute a step in the 
process of the destruction of the Tutsi group – this destruction encompassing 
‘destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.’177 The ICTR in 
Musema178 and the Celibici case adopted the Akayesu-style definition.179 
 
The Furundzija180 case was the first ICTY case which focused on sexual offences. 
Furundzija was the local commander of the Jokers, a Croatian paramilitary force. 
The indictment alleged that the following events took place at the headquarters of 
the Jokers. Furundzija and co-accused B interrogated Witness A.  While being 
questioned by Furundzija, Accused B rubbed his knife against Witness A’s inner 
thigh and lower stomach. Accused B threatened to put his knife inside Witness A’s 
vagina if she did not tell the truth.181 Accused B then forced witness A to have 
sexual intercourse with him. Furundzija was present during the entire incident and 
did nothing to stop him.182 
 
The Trial Chamber found Furundzija guilty of both crimes alleging violations of 
the laws or customs of war, and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment for 
torture and eight years imprisonment for outrages upon personal dignity, including 
rape.183 
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As in Akayesu, the Trial Chamber in Furundzija was faced with the problem of how 
to define rape. It is interesting that the Trial Chamber in Furundzija (decided 
subsequent to Akayesu) stated that no definition of rape existed in international 
law which might be an indication that the Furundzija Trial Chamber did not accept 
or consider itself bound by the Akayesu definition.184 The Chamber quoted the 
definition formulated in Akayesu but did not seem satisfied with this definition.  
The Trial Chamber found it necessary to find an accurate description of rape to 
meet the requirement of specificity (Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz) inherent in the principle 
of legality.185 For this purpose the Chamber found it necessary to look at the 
‘principles of criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world’ in 
both the common and civil law systems, as can be derived from national laws.186 
After the Chamber considered international treaties and the relevant case law to 
see whether a customary rule on the matter could be said to exist, the Tribunal 
came to the conclusion that no elements other than the few disclosed by such 
examination could be drawn from international treaty or customary law, nor is 
resort to general principles of international criminal law or to general principles of 
international law of any avail. The Trial Chamber therefore considers that, to 
arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on the criminal law principle of 
specificity it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the 
major legal systems of the world.187  
 
The Trial Chamber decided that ‘in spite of inevitable discrepancies, most legal 
systems in the common and civil law worlds considered rape to be: ‘the sexual 
penetration, however slight of a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis 
of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) the mouth of 
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs 
without the consent of the victim.188 Consent to such conduct must be given 
voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances. Although national law definitions seemed to vary 
considerably on the aspects of the sex of the victim and the question whether 
penetration is a necessary element, the element of force seemed common to all 
jurisdictions.189 The Appeals Chamber concurred with the definition of the Trial 
Chamber. 
 
On the important point of whether forced oral penetration could be defined as 
rape or sexual assault, the Trial Chamber found that there was no uniformity in 
national legislation. Instead major discrepancies existed with some states treating 
the crime as sexual assault.190 In the view of the Trial Chamber the gravity of the 
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offence accounts for its being treated as rape.191 Perhaps anticipating criticism, the 
Trial Chamber stated  the accused will not be adversely affected by the 
categorisation of oral sex as rape rather than the ‘lesser offence’ of sexual assault if 
he is convicted and sentenced according to the sentencing practices of the former 
Yugoslavia.192 
 
In its consideration of national case law the Trial Chamber found that most legal 
systems in common law and civil law States consider rape to be forcible oral 
penetration of any object into either the vagina or the anus. There is however a 
lack of uniformity in the criminalisation of forced oral penetration with some 
states treating it as sexual assault and other states treating it as rape. The Trial 
Chamber then resorted to general principles of international criminal law and 
failing this, general principles of international law.  After finding that the general 
principle of respect for human dignity forms the fundamental principle of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Trial Chamber decided 
that the definition of rape should be broadened to include ‘such an extremely 
serious outrage as forced oral penetration.’193 
 
In the subsequent Kunarac case the judges made reference to the definition of rape 
as formulated in the Furundzija case but thought it necessary, in the particular 
circumstances of this case, to elaborate on the element of force.194 In contrast with 
Akayesu and Furundzija, rape was the exclusive basis for the indictment in Kunarac.195 
The Kunarac judgment was the first time all defendants in an indictment were 
convicted as primary actors or rapists. The Kunarac Trial Chamber expanded the 
definition of rape with regard to the element of force.  
 
The element of force was described in the Furundzija definition as ‘the sexual 
penetration, however slight…(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the 
victim or a third person.’196 The Kunarac Trial Chamber was of the opinion that 
the force demanded for rape is was more narrowly defined in Furundzija than 
international law requires.197 In particular, the Furundzija definition does not refer 
to factors other than force which could contribute to making behaviour ‘non-
consensual or non-voluntary’, which should be included in the definition of 
rape.198 A narrow focus on force could permit perpetrators to evade liability be 
taking advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on physical force.199 
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Whereas the Furundzija definition concentrated on the element of physical force, 
in Kunarac Trial Chamber moved away from a definition of rape which is 
dependent on physical force and a description of physical circumstances. 
 
In Kunarac the judges re-examined the overview of national law in Furundzija and 
came to the conclusion that the true common denominator for rape is the 
‘violations of sexual autonomy’.200  The Trial Chamber in Kunarac decided that the 
punishable behaviour is not confined to force but includes other forms of 
pressure such as circumstances that make a victim vulnerable or deprive her of the 
possibility of informed refusal. In Kunarac the definition of rape was expanded by 
the Trial Chamber to encompass all situations in which consent is not ‘freely’ and 
‘voluntarily’ given.201 Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, 
as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
 
Significantly, the Kunarac Trial Chamber found that the rapes committed in this 
case also constituted a violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. 
The Chamber noted that ‘it is well-established in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal 
that common Article 3, as set out in the Geneva Conventions, has acquired the 
status of customary international law’.202 Since the Tadic Appeals Chamber held 
that ‘customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of 
common Article 3…’ and since, in the view of the Kunarac Trial Chamber, rape 
constitutes a serious violation of common Article 3, the crime of rape will entail 
criminal responsibility under customary international law.203 
 
The Kunarac judgment was praised by human rights organisations because the 
judgment unequivocally defined rape during wartime as a crime against humanity 
and a war crime.204 It is also significant that the Kunarac definition is gender 
neutral. The Kunarac decision ensures that rape is a crime against humanity 
regardless of whether the victim is male or female.205 In the ICC Statute, it is made 
explicit that the requirement of any physical force element to establish rape is 
rejected, and that inferring consent from the absence of proof of the use of 
physical force by the accused is at odds with international standards on evidence in 
cases of sexual violence.206 
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How is one to assess these definitions? All three instances of rape definition have 
positive aspects. Akayesu’s broad definition of rape promotes more respect for 
personal dignity. Furundzija, on the other hand provides a more specific definition 
satisfying the lex stricta component of the principle of legality. What appeals about 
the Akayesu definition is its context sensitivity in appreciating that physical force is 
not always required: coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances such as 
armed conflict in which the victim finds him or herself.207 But can the decisions of 
the various Trial Chambers in this regard be considered legitimate instances of 
lawmaking? 
 
In his commentary on Akayesu Haveman writes that it is problematic that (a) the 
Chamber formulates yet another definition and (b) that the definition of force is 
so broad. He emphasises the importance of clearly worded predetermined criminal 
law definitions.208 Haveman criticises the methodology of the court. He believes 
that whereas in the field of international humanitarian law it might be acceptable 
to search for ‘world trends’ to determine what the greatest common denominator 
might be, it cannot be said to be acceptable in criminal law.209 Criminal law 
requires concrete rules as well as serious consideration for the rules and law of the 
territory where the offence was committed. 
 
It is argued here that the fact that rape has been defined in three different ways by 
the Tribunals can be seen as a violation of the principle of legality. Civil lawyers, 
especially, would object to the fact that the judges both define crimes and apply 
those definitions themselves. The law that was ultimately applied by the judges 
was neither previously written law nor law that was certain. In the case of the 
Tribunals’ treatment of rape both the lex scripta and the lex certa aspects of the 
legality principle seem to have been violated.  
 
It is argued here that the rudimentary, incomplete nature of international criminal 
law called for some lawmaking. For the Tribunal to have defined rape once (as in 
Akayesu) would have constituted legitimate lawmaking – the lack of a definition of 
rape in international law was a gap in the law and the ICTR filled this gap. When 
the Tribunals define rape three times we can no longer speak of legitimate 
lawmaking. The Kunarac case should perhaps be seen as having expanded or 
developed the already existing definition of rape and not as having redefined rape. 
But whether one describes Kunarac as redefinition or merely expansion, difficulties 
remain in practice. 
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It is problematic that behaviour which can lead to conviction in one case, would 
not lead to conviction in another case tried by another chamber of the same 
Tribunal. The Tribunals have stated on more than one occasion that they strive 
towards consistency in their jurisprudence – consistency both between the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR and within the jurisprudence of the 
individual Tribunals. One solution to this problem lies in the Tribunals’ approach 
to stare decisis. Even though the Tribunals are not bound by any system of 
precedent or stare decisis the Tribunals can choose to follow a system of stare decisis 
whereby the first Chamber to be faced with a question such as the definition of 
rape under international law will decide on a definition and this definition will then 
be applied in future cases.210 This system can be followed by both the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers. The Appeals Chambers of the Tribunals can follow the 
definition of a crime formulated by an Appeals Chamber in a previous case of the 
same Tribunal. Failing such precedent, an Appeals Chamber can follow the 
decisions of the Appeals Chambers of a brother or sister Tribunal (the ICTY can 
for example follow the precedent of the ICTR). This will contribute to coherence 
and consistency in international criminal law. 
 
A second solution would have been for the Tribunals to have followed the 
approach taken by the ICC. In the ICC Statute crime definitions have been 
formulated in detail. The definitions are refined further in the ‘Elements of 
Crimes’.211 According to the Draft Elements of rape, the perpetrator must have 
‘invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, 
of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or 
of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of 
the body.’212 The specificity of this definition seems to reflect the Furundzija 
definition. The Elements of Crimes adopted by PCNICC follows more or less the 
Furundzija description and permits the victim to be male or female. The Elements 
also took the Kunarac developments into account since it states that the consent of 
the victim must have been given voluntarily, taking into account the context of the 
surrounding circumstances.213 The conceptual Akayesu definition was found to be 
too vague to be satisfactory for criminal prosecution.214  
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Although, in accordance with Aleksovski,215 the Tribunals are not bound to follow 
their own previous decisions since no strict system of stare decisis applies, the court 
should not depart from its own previous decisions. Considerations of certainty, 
stability and predictability should be taken seriously. In principle, the Appeals 
Chamber should only depart from its previous decisions when it has cogent 
reasons for such departure such as that a previous decision has been decided on a 
wrong legal principle or given per incuriam because the judges were ill informed 
about the applicable law.216 This was not the case in Furundzija, there was no clear 
error. Previous decisions should only be dismissed with good reason. It is the 
function of the Appeals Chamber to definitively settle questions of law (provide 
finality) in order to ensure a single, unified, coherent and rational body of law.217 
 
The expansive understanding of rape adopted in Kunarac can be described as an 
instance of purposive interpretation by the tribunals. In the field of human rights 
purposive interpretation is nothing new. Human rights courts have frequently 
employed the idea of the object and purpose of the treaties they interpret to 
support an expansive interpretation of the rights contained in those treaties.218 A 
former President of the ECHR has observed that ‘the object and purpose of 
human rights treaties may often lead to a broader interpretation of individual 
rights’.219 In Furundzija the ICTY adopted a purpose-oriented approach to 
‘protecting human dignity’ to broaden the definition of the crime of rape.220 It 
should be borne in mind that the Tribunals are criminal Tribunals. A method of 
interpretation which is commendable in the context of human rights law cannot 




Cassese writes that a customary rule has developed in the international community 
prohibiting individuals from perpetrating torture.222 In Filartiga a US court held: 
‘the torturer has become, like the pirate or the slave trader before him hostis humani 
generis, an enemy of all mankind’223 This statement vividly reflects the sentiments 
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which led to development of norms and instruments codifying the prohibition 
against torture. The most important of these instruments is the 1984 UN Torture 
Convention.224  The Furundzija Trial Chamber stated that no definition of torture 
exists in international humanitarian law but that such definition can be found in 
the Torture Convention225: 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person had committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for ay reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
  
The Trial Chamber in Furundzija however pointed out that Article 1 of the Torture 
Convention explicitly limits the purport of the definition by providing that the 
definition contained therein is ‘for the purposes of this Convention.’226  In 
Furundzija the Trial Chamber had to decide whether threats and physical attacks 
(including rape) inflicted during interrogation by a paramilitary group constituted 
torture. Before the judgment in Furundzija, a disputed question in torture cases had 
been the courts’ use of the definition of torture under human rights law to fill the 
gaps left by humanitarian law. The Trial Chamber held that the absence of an 
express definition of torture under international humanitarian law permitted the 
Chamber to have recourse to human rights law in order to flesh out the 
definition.227 
 
In considering whether the relevant acts constituted ‘torture’ the Trial Chamber 
conducted an extensive review of international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law, and then determined that the war crime of torture: 
 
i) consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental; in addition 
ii) this act or omission must be intentional; 
iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, 
intimidating, humiliating, coercing the victim or a third person, or at 
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person; 
iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict 
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v) at least one of the persons involved in the torture process must be a public 
official or must at any rate act in a non-private capacity, e. g as a de facto organ of 
a State or any other authority-wielding entity.228  
 
The Trial Chamber emphasised that in spite of its reliance on human rights law 
the important structural differences between human rights law and humanitarian 
law should be kept in mind. Two such differences would be the role and function 
of the state under each regime and the criminal nature of each body of law as 
applied by the Tribunal.229  
 
As can be seen in subsection (iii) of the above enumeration of the elements of 
torture, the Furundzija Trial Chamber considered that the humiliation of the victim 
must also be one of the possible purposes of torture.230 The Trial Chamber 
justified the inclusion of ‘humiliation’ by referring to ‘the general spirit of 
international humanitarian law’.231  stating that the primary purpose of 
international humanitarian law was to safeguard human dignity.232 The Trial 
Chamber stated that the term ‘humiliation’ was close to the term ‘intimidation’ 
(the term found in the Torture Convention). The Trial Chamber also referred to 
the Geneva Conventions which consistently aim at protecting persons not taking 
part, or no longer taking part, in the hostilities from ‘outrages upon personal 
dignity.’233 This approach by the Trial Chamber is consistent with a purposive 
interpretation of the ICTY Statute. 
 
In addition to setting forth the elements of the crime of torture, the Furundzija 
Trial Chamber found that the prohibition of torture imposes obligations erga omnes 
upon states and has acquired the status of ius cogens.234 According to Cassese, the 
Furundzija judgment is proof of the emergence of a customary rule on torture.235   
 
Torture as a discrete crime, ie not a crime against humanity or a war crime, may be 
perpetrated either in time of peace or in time of armed conflict. This was held in 
Kunarac.236 The Furundzija Trial Chamber also stated that there was a momentum 
towards addressing rape as a means of torture if the rape is resorted to by the 
interrogator himself or by persons associated with the interrogation.237 But as is 
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evident from the above section on rape, the ICTY also treated rape as a crime 
distinct from torture.238 
 
Significantly, the Kunarac Trial Chamber, after undertaking a detailed analysis of 
definitions and interpretations of torture in human rights law, abandoned the 
element that a public official instigate, consent or acquiesce in the torture (as 
required under the Torture Convention). The Chamber stated that for the 
definition of torture under international law the presence of a state official is not 
necessary. The Trial Chamber found it inappropriate to require such an element 
and stated: ‘The issue then is the nature of the act committed rather than the 
status of the person who committed it.’239 The Trial Chamber therefore concluded 
that under international humanitarian law,240 a private individual acting in a private 
capacity may commit an act of torture. (In so finding, Kunarac agreed with Cassese 
who disagreed with the Trial Chamber’s statement in Furundzija which requires 
that a public official be involved in the torture process.241) The Kunarac Trial 
Chamber held that: ‘the characteristic trait of the offence in (the context of 
humanitarian rather than human rights law) is to be found in the nature of the act 
committed rather than in the status of the person who committed it.’242 
 
The suggestion made by the Furundzija Trial Chamber, that rape can be treated as 
a means of torture was accepted and developed in Kunarac. The Trial Chamber 
expanded the definition of torture within international humanitarian law. In the 
course of doing so the Tribunal was required to reconsider the relationship 
between rape and torture for the purposes of cumulative charging and 
conviction.243 Kunarac held that rape and torture could be cumulatively charged on 
the implicit basis that rape does not inherently require gender discrimination as a 
‘constituent mental element’.244 In Kunarac the Trial Chamber held that the rapes 
were a form of torture, because they were committed with an intent to 
discriminate against ‘Muslims in general’ and ‘the victim in particular’.245 
According to Dixon this meant that any suggestion that the victim’s identity 
embraced her femaleness was ruled out at a definitional level.246 
 
The ICC Statute defines torture as ‘the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody or under the 
                                                   
238 Ibid para 163. 
239 Kunarac (note 194) paras 493-494. 
240 Ibid paras 471, 496. 
241 Furundzija (note 106) para 162. See the comments by Cassese (note 34 ) 118. 
242 Kunarac (note 194) para  495. 
243 R Dixon ‘Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law; Where to From Here?’ (2002) 13 
EJIL 700. 
244 Kunarac (note 194) paras 443 -460. See Askin (note 176) 700.  
245 Kunarac ibid paras 711, 816. 
246 Dixon (note 243) 701 It was not only ruled out, it was explicitly dismissed by the Tribunal when 
it held that ‘the complainants were ‘taken out’ to be raped on the basis only of their Muslim 
ethnicity’. Paras 654 and 659 emphasis added. 
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control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.’  The Rome 
Conference considered that crimes against humanity could be instigated by state 
or non-state actors. The requirement of official involvement is therefore not 
included in the definition of torture.247 This is consistent with the way the ICTY 
developed the law of torture and lends support to the ICTY decisions. 
 
The development of the law by the ICTY, particularly with regard to the dropping 
of the requirement of state official as the perpetrator, is in line with developments 
by the European Court of Human Rights on the law of torture. The general 
trajectory of development by the European Court is towards an expansive 
understanding of the prohibition of torture. There has, for example, been a 
dramatic broadening of what falls within the scope of an ‘act of a public official’. 
It is no longer necessary that ill-treatment must have been meted out by state 
actors themselves. There is an increasing tendency to focus on what the state can 
be held responsible for (failing to prevent torture for example) and to present its 
reasoning through the lens of state responsibility.248 
 
The lawmaking with regard to torture consists in the expansion of the definition 
of torture and in the acceptance that rape can be regarded as a form of torture. 
The ICTY expands and alters the definition found in the Torture Convention in 
two ways: (i) the requirement that torture must be perpetrated by a ‘state official’ 
was abandoned and (ii) the list of prohibited purposes was expanded.  
 
The abandonment of the requirement that torture must be perpetrated by a state 
official in Kunarac can be regarded as an instance of legitimate lawmaking. It was 
appropriate for the ICTY to adopt a definition of torture that suited the aims of 
humanitarian law and was in line with the development of the law by the ECHR 
and accepted by the ICC. There is widespread consensus that torture is now a ius 
cogens crime. This special status conferred on the crime of torture justifies a 
broadening of liability. An advantage of accepting rape as a form of torture is that 
this could elevate rape to a ius cogens crime and the special stigma and implications 
for prosecution249 associated with the crime of torture could rub off on the crime 
of rape. 
 
                                                   
247 Article 7(2) of ICC Statute.  See H von Hebel and D Robinson ‘Crimes within the Jurisdiction of 
the Court’ in R Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court (1999) 99. 
248 M D Evans ‘Getting to Grips with Torture’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 378. See A v UK, Judgment, 23 
September 1998, RJD 1998-VI, 2692 (ECHR 611) para 22; Assenov v Bulgaria, Judgment, 28 October 
1998, RJD 1998-VIII, 3264 (28 ECHR 652), para 95. 
249 States have universal jurisdiction over torture. Victims of torture can bring proceedings before a 
competent national or international body or the victim could bring a civil suit for damage in a 
foreign court. Furundzija (note 106) para 155 In addition it is one of the consequences of the ius 
cogens character of the prohibition of torture that every state is entitled to investigate, prosecute and 
punish or extradite individuals accused of torture.  
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Finally, with regard to the Furundzija Trial Chamber’s expansion of the list of 
prohibited purposes by the inclusion of the word ‘humiliation’ which results in a 
more expansive definition, one can consider this as a good example of purposive 
interpretation of the ICTY Statute. Since the word humiliation is so close in 
meaning to that of intimidation it will not disadvantage an accused or catch an 
accused by surprise and therefore does not threaten the principle of legality. 
 
5. Duress: Erdemovic  
From a lawmaking point of view, Erdemovic is particularly interesting. In the course 
of deciding whether duress should be accepted as a defence, the Appeal Chamber 
judges analysed two important issues. They first discussed the question of the 
relevance of national law decisions. Secondly, the judges made law in their 
treatment of the role and relevance of policy considerations in international 
criminal law. Since these questions were addressed as obiter dicta, Erdemovic is an 
excellent example of obiter lawmaking. This section will focus on the judges’ 
treatment of policy considerations and the determination of custom in this case. 
 
Drazen Erdemovic, a corporal in the Bosnian Serb army, admitted to killing ‘from 
10 to 100’ Bosnian Muslim men at Pilica collective farm in the area of Srebernica. 
During the killings in which Erdemovic and other members of the 10th Sabotage 
Detachment of the Bosnian Serb army participated, approximately 1200 unarmed 
Muslim men were killed.250 
 
Erdemovic pleaded guilty to having participated in the execution squads but 
argued that  if he had refused to execute the orders, he would also have been shot. 
He also claimed that if he refused the orders, his family would be in danger.251 If 
one takes the view that duress is a complete defence, his guilty plea was equivocal. 
 
Erdemovic was charged with a crime against humanity and, in the alternative, with 
a violation of the law or customs of war. He pleaded guilty before the Trial 
Chamber to a crime against humanity and the Trial Chamber dismissed the 
alternative charge. Erdemovic expressed remorse for his actions at all times. Both 
the Prosecution and Defence appealed against the sentence.252  
 
                                                   
250Erdemovic (note 5) para 3 (setting out the facts stated in the indictment). 
251 At his initial appearance Erdemovic added this explanation to his guilty plea: 
‘Your Honour, I had to do this. Had I refused, I would have been killed together with the victims. 
When I refused, they told me: ‘If you are sorry for them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill 
you too.’ I am not sorry for myself but for my family, my wife and son who then had nine months, 
and I could not refuse because then they would have killed me.’ Erdemovic (note 5)  para 4. 
252 The Appeals Chamber was asked to revise the sentencing judgment.  The appeal was filed on 14 
April 1997.  
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In its judgment of 7 October 1997, the majority of the Appeals Chamber held that 
Erdemovic’s guilty plea was not informed and remitted the case to a Trial 
Chamber in order that he might replead.253 
 
The central problem that had to be addressed in the Erdemovic trial was whether 
the defence of duress is a plea in mitigation of the sentence or a complete defence 
absolving criminal guilt. If duress were found to be a complete defence, the guilty 
plea would be void since one cannot plead guilty and not guilty at the same 
time.254  
 
The judges constituting the majority and representing the common law tradition, 
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, believed that duress can only be a ground for 
mitigation and that duress can not be a complete defence. The common law 
judges started by stating that in post-World War II jurisprudence there is no 
authority for duress as a complete defence for the killing of innocent civilians, the 
only exception being the unsubstantiated dictum in the Einsatzgruppe case.255 The 
judges adopted a policy-oriented approach, deducing general normative purposes 
for the law ‘in light of its social, political and economic role…in relation to the 
most heinous crimes known to humankind.’256 According to McDonald and 
Vohrah allowing duress as a defence would be to undermine the aims and 
objectives of international humanitarian law.  
 
Judge Li concurred in this result.257 He argued that duress can be a complete 
defence if certain conditions are met but it cannot be a complete defence in the 
case of the most serious crimes such as the killing of the innocent.258 Li 
determined that there was no applicable or conventional international law and that 
national laws and practices of various states were so divergent that no general 
principle of law recognised by civilised nations could be deduced from them.  
                                                   
253 Erdemovic’s plea indicated that he did not appreciate that the denial of criminal responsibility is 
incompatible with an admission of guilt In addition both Erdemovic and his counsel seemed to be 
unaware of substantive concepts of international humanitarian law and their distinctive qualities. See 
‘Commentary’ by H van der Wilt in Klip and Sluiter (eds) (note 36) 654. 
254 A separate question in this regard was whether the guilty plea was made in an informed way. 
Four of the judges (Judges McDonald, Stephen, Cassese and Vohrah) denied this. Erdemovic (note 5) 
para. 20. 
255 Ibid, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah para 43. McDonald and Vohrah 
state that the value of this authority is cast substantially into doubt by the fact that a US Military 
tribunal in the Einsatzgruppe case did not cite any authority for its opinion that duress may constitute 
a complete defense to killing an innocent individual. See also Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, vol. XV, 174.  
256Erdemovic ibid, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah para 55. See the analysis 
of David Turns ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: The Erdemovic Case’ 
(1998) 47 2 ICLQ 470. 
257 Erdemovic ibid, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, para 5. 
258 Ibid. These conditions would be (i) the act was done to avoid an immediate danger both serious 
and irreplaceable; (ii) there was no other adequate means to escape; and (iii) the remedy was not 




The Appeals Chamber in Erdemovic extensively discussed to what extent national 
case law provided support for a rule of customary law regarding the availability or 
non-availability of duress as a defence. The Appeals Chamber found that 
insufficient evidence existed for such a rule.259 Judges McDonald and Vohrah 
examined the case law of various national jurisdictions and came to the conclusion 
that there is no consistent concrete rule which supports the notion of duress as a 
complete defence.260 It did however not dispute the view that had the case law 
been more consistent and uniform, a rule of customary law could have been based 
on that case law. The Appeals Chamber concluded that state practice (consisting 
mostly of national case law) was far from consistent and that no rule of customary 
law could be based on that practice.261 In their joint separate opinion Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah emphasised that the courts had to establish not only 
state practice but also opinio juris: 
 
Not only is State practice on the question as to whether duress is a defence to murder far 
from consistent, this practice of States is not, in our view, underpinned by opinio juris. 
Again to the extent that State Practice on the question of duress as a defence to murder 
may be evidenced by the opinions on this question in decisions on national military 
tribunals and national laws, we find quite unacceptable any proposition that States adopt 
this practice because they ‘feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation’ at an international level. 262 
 
The two judges proceeded to look at policy considerations and decided that it 
would be naïve to believe that international law develops wholly divorced from 
social and economic policy.263 They believe that if national law denies recognition 
of duress as a defence in respect of the killing of innocent persons, international 
criminal law ‘can do no less than match that policy.’264 They state that rejecting 
duress as a defence avoids having to judge proportionality when it is human lives 
that are weighed in the balance.265 
 
The Australian judge, Judge Ninian Stephen, dissented and did not follow a 
traditional common law position. Stephen concluded that despite the exception 
which the common law makes for murder, duress can be a defence in international 
law. Stephen points out that the exception in the case of murder only applies 
where the choice ‘truly’ lies between one life and another.266 According to Stephen 
Erdemovic was not a case in which the accused was in a position to make a choice 
                                                   
259 Ibid para 55. 
260 Ibid, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah para 72. 
261 Erdemovic (note 5) para 50. 
262 Ibid 
263 In paragraph 73 of their Opinion, under the heading ‘Normative mandate for international 
criminal law’ 
264 Ibid, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, para 73. 
265 Ibid para 81. 
266 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, para 66. 
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concerning innocent life.267 In Erdemovic the choice presented to the accused was 
not between one life or another.268 
 
Judge Cassese, in his Separate and Dissenting Opinion, represents the civil law 
position.269 He questions the extent to which an international tribunal may rely on 
national law for the elucidation of the notion of a ‘guilty plea’.270 In his view legal 
constructs and terms of art found in national law should not be automatically 
applied at the international level.271 Influenced by his civil law background, Judge 
Cassese also objected strongly to this ‘upholding of ‘policy considerations’ 
substantially based on English law.’  He states that it is extraneous to the task of 
the Tribunal to discuss policy-considerations and to uphold particularly those of 
the common law. He describes these policy considerations as meta-legal and 
contrary to the nullum crimen principle.272 He writes that if international law was 
really uncertain on the point in issue recourse should be had to the position in the 
former Yugoslavia and not to policy considerations.273  
 
In Cassese’s view duress should be a complete defence. This should however be 
subject to a few important conditions: an accused must have acted under the 
threat of imminent harm, both serious and irreparable, to his life and limb (or that 
of his family); there must have been no adequate means of averting the evil; the 
crimes committed must not have been disproportionate to the evil threatened; and 
the situation leading to the duress must not have been brought about by the 
person coerced.274 
                                                   
267 Ibid para 64, 65.  
268 Ibid para 33. In para 55 of his Opinion Judge Stephen states: ‘However he chose, the lives of the 
innocent would be lost and he had no power to avert that consequence. It is in this sense that it can 
be said that the Appellant had no moral choice.’ 
269 Ibid, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, paras 11 ff. 
270 Ibid  2. 
271 Cassese provides three reasons for this: firstly, he believes that it would normally prove 
incongruous and inappropriate to apply a national concept in an inter-State legal setting.  His 
argument is one of difference. He emphasises that the legal system of a State is ‘radically different’ 
from that of international law.  A second reason why he believes great circumspection should be 
applied before transposing national law concepts ‘lock stock and barrel’ to the international field is 
that international criminal law does not originate from a unified body of law.  International criminal 
procedure results from an amalgamation of the civil law system and common law systems and 
international criminal proceedings do not uphold the philosophy behind one of the two national 
criminal systems to the exclusion of the other. This unique amalgamation begets a ‘legal logic that is 
qualitatively different from that of each of the two national systems’. Thirdly Cassese points out that 
the mechanical importation of national law notions into international criminal proceedings may alter 
or distort the specificity of these proceedings. He points out that the philosophy behind national 
criminal proceedings is strongly influenced by the fact that national courts operate in a context 
where the three fundamental functions (lawmaking, adjudication and law-enforcement) are 
discharged by central organs partaking of the State’s direct authority over individuals. This logic 
cannot simply be transposed to the international level. Ibid para 4, 5. 
272 Ibid para 11. 
273 Ibid para 49. 




He admits that these conditions will seldom be met but insisted that the defence 
should not be rejected a priori.  In at least one case, he argues, the defence is clearly 
applicable: If, by refusing to obey, the accused could not have saved the victims – 
who would have been killed by other persons – but would only have forfeited his 
own life as well, the law cannot treat him as a criminal.  Cassese goes on to show 
that the post -World War II decisions which seems to rule out the defence are not 
as categorical as it was claimed and that other cases, not examined, support the 
view of duress as a complete defence.275 He disagrees with the majority’s 
interpretation of the Stalag Luft III,276 the Feuerstein277 and the Holzer278 cases. He 
writes that the Stalag Luft III case ‘left open the possibility that duress could be a 
defence to an unlawful killing’ and points out that in Feuerstein the Judge-
Advocate’s dictum on duress was obiter since in that case none of the accused 
raised the defence of duress.279 With regard to the Holzer case he states that even 
thought the Judge Advocate in this case upheld the traditional common law 
position, the weight of this case is reduced by the fact that the Judge Advocate 
stated that the court should apply Canadian War Crimes Regulations and Canadian 
law and not international law. 
 
Regarding policy considerations Judge Cassese contrasts the considerations 
inherent in the civil law tradition with those claimed by the common law judges. 
He writes that law is based on what society can reasonably expect from its 
members, it does not require, by criminal sanction, acts of martyrdom. Treating 
duress as a mitigating factor is not sufficient since the acts are then still viewed as 
criminal.  Interestingly, Judge Stephen, a common law lawyer, joined the civil law 
position.280 He stated that the common law exception for murder in pleading 
duress as complete defence had been applied to positions where the accused had a 
choice between his life and the life of the victim, not where such choice did not 
exist.281 The law cannot compel someone to die, even for the highest ethical 
principles. 
 
The question of whether duress is a ground of mitigation or a complete defence 
resulted in a deep split in the Appeals Chamber and seems to have caused friction 
                                                   
275 Ibid paras 19 ff, 30 ff. 
276  Trial of Max Wielen and 17 Others, Proceedings of a Military Court held at Hamburg (‘Stalag Luft III’) (1 
July 1947 – 1 September 1947), judgment of 2-3 September 1947, files WO 235/424-32 in Public 
Record Office, Kew Richmond Law Reports, vol XI, 31. 
277  Trial of Valentin Feurstein et al, Proceedings of a Military Court held at Hamburg (4-24 August 1948), 
Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, file WO 235/525. (‘Feurstein et al’) Law Reports vol XV, 173 
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279Erdemovic (note 5)  para 22 
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between the judges. 282  All the judges agreed that neither customary law nor the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations provide the answer to the 
question whether duress can be pleaded as a defence to the killing of innocent 
civilians. What the judges disagreed about was the consequence of this finding. 
Judges McDonald and Vohrah relied upon the need to ‘facilitate the developments 
and effectiveness of international humanitarian law.’283 Judge Cassese was of the 
view that if customary international law did not preclude duress as a defence it could 
be a defence, subject to stringent conditions.284 
 
What should an international criminal tribunal do in light of such a lacuna in the 
law? It could seek to determine the matter by resort to policy, as did the majority 
in their pursuit of the goal of preventing the undermining of international 
humanitarian law. Alternatively a tribunal could apply the national law most 
applicable to the accused. Cassese took this position. He argued that where the 
majority found a gap in the law, or where the law was genuinely ambiguous, they 
should have drawn upon the law applicable in the former Yugoslavia.285  
 
But Cassese only discusses Yugoslav law very briefly after extensively discussing 
foreign case law.286 Cassese’s discussion of the use and relevance of national case 
law was necessary since this has not been clarified in the case law before. His obiter 
comments can be seen as an example of legitimate lawmaking. After expressing 
reservations about the relevance of national case law however, Cassese proceeds 
to discuss instances of national case law (a small collection of little-known Italian 
and better-known German cases).287 Cassese motivates his survey of ‘copious case 
law’ 288 by stating that the manifest inconsistency of state practice warrants the 
conclusion that duress can be admitted as a defence. 
 
Disappointingly, Cassese does not explain on which basis the cases were selected 
which makes the selection appear to have been arbitrarily made. Cassese stated in 
                                                   
282 According to Kolb it led to a clash between the traditions of the common law and the civil law 
(note 57 ) 312.  
283 Erdemovic (note 5) Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, 7 October 1997 para 
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284Erdemovic (note 5) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese para 41. 
285 P Rowe ‘Duress as Defence to War Crimes After Erdemovic: A Laboratory for a Permanent 
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his Opinion that a policy-oriented approach in the area of criminal law would run 
counter to the fundamental customary principle nullum crimen sine lege.289 But 
undisciplined, unmotivated reference to case law could similarly run counter to 
nullum crimen. The Erdemovic case not only highlights the problems surrounding 




Additional Protocol 1 clarified the law pertaining to reprisals. This Protocol 
prohibits reprisals and leaves no doubt that reprisals against civilians and civilian 
targets constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law. In the view of 
Obradovic it is now clear that those who carry out reprisals are no longer able to 
claim in front of a national or international tribunal that they were responding to a 
similar violation by the enemy.290 
 
In spite of the large number of states that ratified Protocol 1, a cloud of ambiguity 
hangs over the question whether the prohibition of belligerent reprisals against 
certain classes of people, such as civilians have become part of international 
customary law.291Although it is by now clear that the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions have crystallised into norms of customary international law, it is 
much less clear whether the reprisal provisions of Protocol 1 have also attained a 
similar status.292  
 
The ICTY discussed the legality of belligerent reprisals in the Martic293 and 
Kupreskic 294 cases. Both judgments strained to argue that the provisions of 
Protocol 1 have become part of customary international law. However, 
commentators such as Kalshoven and Greenwood have argued that neither the 
Trial Chamber in Martic nor the Trial Chamber in Kupreskic needed to address this 
question at all.295 Since the determination of this question was not central or 
necessary for the resolution of the cases both judgments analysed the law of 
reprisals as obiter dicta. The lawmaking in Kupreskic is therefore an example of obiter 
                                                   
289 Ibid, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese para 11. 
290 K Obradovic ‘The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol 1: Greater protection for War Victims’ 
(1997) 320 International Review of the Red Cross 2. 
291 S Darcy ‘The Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals’ (2003) 175 Military Law Review 244 
292 Ibid 243. Darcy points to arguments for and against the claim that the reprisal provisions in 
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lawmaking. Since the judges in Kupreskic (incorrectly) treated the question of the 
legality of belligerent reprisals as a matter central to the case and did not intend to 
address it as obiter their pronouncements in the case can be described as 
unintended obiter lawmaking.  
 
The lawmaking with regard to reprisals in the Kupreskic case took place in an 
innovative and controversial way as the ICTY resorted to the ‘demands of 
humanity’ and the ‘dictates of public conscience’ (found in the enigmatic Martens 
Clause) to supplement the requirements for custom.  
 
The Kupreskic case concerned an attack on the village of Ahmici. In the early 
morning of 16 April 1993, Croat forces attacked the Muslim population of the 
Bosnian village of Ahmici. The Kupreskic brothers were accused of participating 
in the attack and of killing and raping 116 Muslim civilians. Zoran Kupreskic held 
the rank of HVO Commander and his brother Mirjan, was an HVO soldier. The 
Trial Chamber found that the village contained nothing that could be classed as a 
military objective and that the purpose of the attack had been ethnic cleansing.296 
The Trial Chamber convicted five of the accused of the crime against humanity of 
persecution and found two of them guilty of murder and other inhumane acts.297 
 
The Defence argued that the attack on the civilians in Ahmici could be justified 
because Muslim forces had earlier attacked Croat civilians in other villages in that 
area. The Trial Chamber found that such attacks had occurred but rejected the 
notion that contemporary international law recognise a defence of tu quoque.298 
The Trial Chamber also rejected a defence of belligerent reprisals.299  
 
The Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that customary international law 
prohibited reprisals against civilians. The Chamber reasoned that the provisions of 
Article 51 (6) and 52(1) of Additional Protocol 1, respectively prohibiting reprisals 
against civilians and civilian objects, had not been declaratory of custom when 
they were adopted in 1977.300 These provisions had become part of customary 
international law in the years since 1977. The Chamber stated that the fact that 
both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia had become parties to the 1977 Protocols 
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by succession meant that the Convention’s provisions were applicable to the 
conflict in Ahmici.301  
 
In considering the question of the legality of reprisals against civilians, the Trial 
Chamber examined whether states not party to Protocol 1302 were nevertheless 
bound by the rules on reprisals. The Trial Chamber conceded that state practice 
did not support the proposition that custom had evolved on this subject but 
nevertheless found that in this area the imperatives of humanity or public conscience 
weighed heavily in its favour and that from those imperatives it was possible to 
deduce opinio necessitatis, which was sufficient to establish customary law. 303  After 
considering the Martens Clause, it stated: 
 
…principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process 
under the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even 
where State practice is scant or inconsistent […] Opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result 
of the imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive 
element heralding the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.304 
 
The Trial Chamber concluded that reprisals against civilians are an ‘inherently 
barbarous means of seeking compliance with international law’305 and that a 
customary rule of international law had emerged prohibiting all reprisals against 
civilians.306 
 
Was it appropriate for the Trial Chamber to reach for the Martens Clause in 
proving customary international law? The influence of the Martens Clause is 
discussed in Chapter 2. For convenience the wording of the Clause will be 
repeated: 
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued…the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule…of the principles of the law of 
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws 
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.307 
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English translation of the Clause was reported in JB Scott (ed) The Hague Conventions and Declarations 




Whether the Martens Clause should be used a source of law creation is debatable. 
In an article on the origins and significance of the Martens Clause, Cassese writes 
that the Martens Clause is not only vague and ambiguous but has been interpreted 
in various, sometimes conflicting, ways.308  In his opinion the clause does not 
directly transform the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience 
into international legal standards or sources of international law.309 He rejects the 
‘radical’ idea that the clause has a norm-creating character and elevates humanity 
and the dictates of conscience to a new source of international law. After 
surveying instances of national case law310 in which the clause has been 
considered, Cassese concludes that mention of the clause was made primarily to 
‘pay lip service to humanitarian demands’ rather than for the purpose of 
supporting the idea that it constitutes a new source of international law.311 The 
clause may however be construed as having an indirect impact on traditional 
sources of international law in that it may be inferred from the clause that the 
requirement of state practice for the formation of a principle based on the laws of 
humanity or dictates of the public conscience may not be as high as in the case of 
principles or rules having a different rationale.312 It is generally recognised that the 
Martens clause loosens the requirement of usus while elevating opinio juris to a rank 
higher than normally admitted.313  But it does no more. It is not a magical, instant 
creator of custom. 
 
Kalshoven describes the discussion of reprisals in Kupreskic as ‘out of order’.314  
Greenwood agrees that it was not necessary for the Tribunal in this case to assert 
that customary international law contains an absolute ban on reprisals.315 He 
points out that both belligerents in this case were parties to Protocol 1 and bound 
by its provisions. In addition the Trial Chamber recognised that the attack on 
Ahmici did not meet the requirements for a lawful reprisal in any event.316 It is 
therefore not clear why the Trial Chamber chose to embark on the controversial 
                                                   
308 A Cassese ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ (2000) 11 EJIL 188. 
309 Ibid 192. 
310 Cassese discusses the use of the clause in the Klinge case (1946 Annual Digest and Reports of Public 
International Law Cases  263) decided by the Supreme Court of Norway in 1946, the Rauter case 
decided by the Dutch Special Court of Cassation (English translation in 1949 Annual Digest 541), 
and the Martic decision (note 293) .  
311 Ibid  208. 
312 Ibid 214.  
313 See Cassese (note 222) 122.  
314 Kalshoven (note 295) 505. 
315 C Greenwood ‘Belligerent Reprisals in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia.’ in: H Fischer, C Kreß, S R Lüder (eds) International and National 
Prosecution of Crimes under International Law (2001) 540. 
316 There was no evidence that the attack was undertaken for the purpose of deterring future 
Bosnian violations of the law of armed conflict, that notice of it was ever given to the Bosnian 
forces as to put pressure on them to end their violations and that any attempt was made to ensure 
that the attack was proportionate to the wrong which was said to have caused it or that it was 
undertaken as a last resort. Ibid. 
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question of the state of customary international law on belligerent reprisals. 
Greenwood finds the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that an absolute ban on reprisals 
against civilian targets had emerged in customary law since 1977, unconvincing. 
The Trial Chamber cited almost no examples of state practice and those it does 
cite do not seem to support its conclusions.317  The Chamber refers to the number 
of States that ratified the Additional Protocol, but this in itself does not turn the 
provisions of the Protocol into rules of custom. The Trial Chamber recognised 
that the weight of state practice did not support its conclusion318and relied on the 
Martens Clause in an attempt to fill the gap. Greenwood states that the ICJ, in its 
treatment of the Martens Clause in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons319 case has made it clear that the ICJ does not treat the Clause ‘as relieving 
it of the need to establish that not only opinio juris but also state practice existed’.320 
Meron has commented that ‘given the scarcity of practice and diverse views of 
states and commentators, the invocation of the Martens Clause can hardly justify 
[the Trial Chamber’s] conclusion.’321 
 
The position taken in Kupreskic, that an absolute ban on reprisals can be justified 
by reference to custom, can be considered an example of illegitimate lawmaking. 
The Tribunal’s method of establishing custom by reference to the Martens Clause 
is questionable. According to Nollkaemper, the Tribunal felt satisfied to draw 
conclusions on such a thin basis precisely because of the ‘moral strength’ of the 
norms it formulated.322 However, it is doubtful whether the ‘moral strength’ of the 
Martens Clause, on its own, can serve as a substitute for state practice. Although 
employing such innovative reasoning can be seen as an ingenuous way of 
extending the protection of humanitarian law to civilian targets of reprisals, it is 
not appropriate for the Trial Chamber to abandon the existing conventional 
method of determining custom. To do so not only threatens legal certainty but 




                                                   
317 Greenwood criticises the State practice cited by the Chamber. The Chamber refers to passages 
from the Netherlands and United States Military Manuals. According to Greenwood the quoted 
1956 United States Field Marshal Manual leaves open the question of whether reprisals may be 
taken against civilians who are not protected persons under Geneva Convention I. Ibid 551. 
318The Chamber states:  ‘Admittedly there does not seem to have emerged recently a body of state 
practice consistently supporting the proposition that one of the elements of custom, namely usus or 
diurnitas has taken shape.’ Kupreskic (note 294) para 527. 
319 In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ did not take sides. It did not upgrade the Clause to the rank of a 
norm establishing new sources of law. It also did not confine itself to ‘attaching an exclusively 
interpretative purport to the clause’. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (note 2) 66.  
Cassese (note 309) 211. 
320 Greenwood (note 315) 554. 
321 T Meron ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 239, 250. 
322 A Nollkaemper ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of 
the Practice of the ICTY’ in G Boas & W Schabas (eds) International Criminal Law Developments in the 




From as early as the Tadic trial, judges in the ICTY were faced with gaps in the 
Statute and the existing law. The instances of lawmaking discussed in this chapter 
indicate that the Tribunal has resorted to different methods or forms of 
lawmaking. These methods include extending the protection of humanitarian law, 
the redefinition of certain crimes (or the extension of existing definitions), the use 
of purposive interpretation, relying on the Martens Clause and obiter lawmaking.         
From the discussion of the various cases, it seems clear that not all instances of 
lawmaking can be described as legitimate. The most common and most important 
reason for illegitimacy is infringement of the principle of legality and the 
corresponding lack of legal certainty. Another important way in which lawmaking 
can be described as illegitimate is the inappropriate use of national case law. In 
almost all cases the judges undertook the task of establishing or proving 
customary international law. In order to prove the state practice requirement the 
judges have had to find instances of national case law to support their arguments. 
Both the establishment of custom by the judges and the use of national case law 
have often been controversial. Mostly because of a lack of state practice or 
incorrect understanding of how to prove state practice, judges have often not been 
successful or convincing in establishing custom. 
 
The extension of the protection of humanitarian law serves as a rationale for 
lawmaking. The extension of such protection can also be seen as one of the most 
important achievements of the Tribunals. When Sassoli and Olson write of a 
‘breathtaking evolution’ of international justice for war victims they refer to the 
extension of humanitarian law to those not previously protected.323 The use of 
purposive interpretation, the redefinition of crimes and reliance on the Martens 
Clause are ways of extending the protection of humanitarian law.  
 
With regard to the maximum extension of the protection of humanitarian law 
Tadic provides one of the best examples. In the Tadic Appeals Judgment it is stated 
that Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is directed at protecting civilians 
to the maximum extent possible.324 It seems as if the Appeals Chamber uses the 
‘maximum protection’ argument as a justification to extend the law at the possible 
risk of violating the principle of legality. 
 
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic also extended the concept of ‘common purpose’ to 
cases involving a common design where one of the perpetrators commits an act 
which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of effecting the common purpose.325 The authority relied 
on for this extension of the law has been criticised. Many have argued that the 
ICTY’s interpretation of third category common purpose is over-expansive and an 
                                                   
323 Sassoli & Olson (note 7 ) 13.   
324 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6 ) para 168. 
325 Ibid paras 204 - 226. 
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example of illegitimate lawmaking.326  It has been argued that the enhanced 
accountability brought about by the acceptance of this category of common 
purpose comes at the expense of key criminal law principles such as legality and 
culpability. 
 
One way of extending the protection of humanitarian law is through the use of 
purposive interpretation.327 The object and purpose of the ICTY Statute is to 
provide a criminal forum for the punishment of all those who have perpetrated 
especially serious violations of international humanitarian law.328 Consonant with 
this objective the Tribunals have sought to ensure that such violations are 
punished despite gaps in either the definition of substantive crimes or in the 
liability provisions of the Statutes.  
 
In the Tadic case the Appeals Chamber decided to abandon the literal definition of 
protected persons by focusing more on the factor of allegiance than formal 
nationality in determining the protective regime.329 By finding that the Bosnian 
Serbs acted as de facto agents of another state (the FRY), the Appeals Chamber 
expanded the scope of protection of humanitarian law.330 The ICTY and ICTR 
have used the teleological purpose of ‘protecting human dignity’ to broaden the 
definition of the crime of rape.331 In the absence of an express definition of 
torture in international humanitarian law the Furundzija Trial Chamber turned to 
international human rights law to flesh out the definition.332 In developing the law 
on torture the Furundzija Trial Chamber referred to the ‘general spirit of 
international humanitarian law’ and stated that it is the primary purpose of 
international humanitarian law to safeguard human dignity. 333  
 
The Tribunals further extended the protection of humanitarian law through the 
redefinition of crimes. It has been suggested that the expansive definitions 
adopted by the ICTY and ICTR in the case of rape and torture can be regarded as 
an example of borrowing human rights law’s most expansive interpretative 
methodologies as has been done by the ECHR.334  
 
The respective Appeals Chambers in Akayesu, Furundzija and Kunarac formulated 
three different definitions of rape in international law. Many have regarded this as 
a violation of the principle of legality. Especially in the realm of international 
                                                   
326 See I Bantekas & S Nash International Criminal Law 2 ed (2003) 360-5. 
327 For more on how judges find and determine  the basic values of a legal system needed for 
purposive interpretation see Aharon Barak Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005) 164, 165. 
328 Danner & Martinez (note 98) 132 
329 Tadic Appeals Judgment (note 6) para 163 – 169. 
330 Ibid  para 168. 
331 Furundzija (note 106 ). 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid para 162. 
334 Danner & Martinez (note 98) 132. 
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criminal law, it is important that criminal definitions be precise and clear.335 The 
formulation of three different definitions does not contribute to consistency in the 
law. 
 
The judges also made law by relying on the enigmatic Martens Clause.  In 
considering the question of the legality of reprisals the Kupreskic judges resorted to 
the Martens Clause to support its conclusion that there is an absolute ban on 
reprisals in international humanitarian law.336 It seems as if the judges elevated the 
imperatives of humanity or public conscience to an independent source of international 
law. The judges strained to prove that an absolute ban on reprisals can be justified 
by reference to custom and reached for Martens Clause to justify its conclusion in 
spite of the lack of state practice. Nollkaemper has suggested that, instead of 
artificially relying on customary international law to fill gaps, the Tribunal could 
simply recognise that however reprehensible the acts in the former Yugoslavia 
might have been, the international community has not yet been able to adopt all 
the necessary rules criminalising such acts.337 In the context of Kupreskic such an 
admission would not go against the principle of completeness since it was not 
necessary to decide on the legality of belligerent reprisals to decide the case.  
 
Kupreskic was therefore an example of obiter lawmaking. The best example of an 
extensive obiter pronouncement is Judge Cassese’s Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion in Erdemovic. The Tadic Jurisdictional Decision is another example of obiter 
lawmaking. its exposition of the relationship between the Security Council and the 
Tribunal. 
 
The lawmaking in Erdemovic occurs mainly in the exposition in the Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Cassese on the place and role of national case law in 
international criminal law.338 Judge Cassese explains why notions and concepts 
derived from national law jurisdictions cannot be mechanically transplanted to 
international law. Secondly, the judges make law when they decide about the role 
and relevance of policy considerations in international criminal law. In the Tadic 
Jurisdictional Decision the judges went beyond the strict legal question of the legality 
of the establishment of the ICTY and discussed inter alia the possible limitations 
on the powers of the Security Council. 
 
                                                   
335 The definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute are widely considered to improve upon those used 
in the ad hoc Tribunal context. The definitions contain more detail and the definitions are developed 
further in the ‘Elements of Crimes.’ Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, addendum, Finalised Draft of the Elements of Crimes, 
PCNICC/2000/inf/3/add2. 
336 Kupreskic (note 294) para 527 
337 Nollkaemper (note 7) 13. 
338 Erdemovic (note 5) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese paras 4, 5. See the 
discussion of the treatment of duress as a defence in national systems (both civil law and common 
law jurisdictions) in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Vohrah, paras 59 – 62. 
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The legitimacy of the different instances of lawmaking can be measured by the 
extent to which the various developments were followed (and therefore endorsed) 
by the drafters of the ICC Statute. The ICC followed the approach of the ICTY 
with regard to common purpose, rape and torture. 
 
With regard to the extension of common purpose the Tadic Appeals Chamber 
relied on Article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute which in the view of the Appeals 
Chamber expresses the opinio juris of the States which adopted the Statute.339  
 
In the ICC Statute crime definitions have been formulated in detail. The 
definitions are refined further in the ‘Elements of Crimes’.340 The specificity of the 
definition of rape formulated by the ICC Statute seems to reflect the Furundzija 
definition. According to the Draft Elements of rape, the perpetrator must have 
‘invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, 
of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or 
of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of 
the body’.341 The Elements also took the Kunarac developments into account since 
it states that the consent of the victim must have been given voluntarily, taking 
into account the context of the surrounding circumstances.342 
The ICC Statute defines torture as ‘the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody or under the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.’  The requirement 
of official involvement is therefore not included in the definition of torture.343 
This is consistent with the way the ICTY developed the law of torture and lends 
support to the development of the law by the Trial Chamber in Kunarac. 
 
The ICC’s adoption and implicit endorsement of some of the law made by 
Tribunal judges is important and lends (retrospective) legitimacy to the work of 
the judges. Because of the novel nature of the Tribunals the success of its 
lawmaking initiatives can only be assessed as time passes and more trials are heard. 
On a normative level however it is important to develop principles and standards 
                                                   
339 In Article 25 (3) (d) the ICC Statute stipulates that a person shall be criminally responsible for a 
crime if that person in any way ‘contributes to the commission of a crime…by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) be made 
with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group… or (ii) be made in 
the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’.   
340 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, addendum, 
Finalised Draft of the Elements of Crimes, PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add2. 
341 Draft finalised text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000),  
12. 
342 Kunarac (note 194) para 460. In the Omarska case before the ICTY the definition making seemed 
to come to an end. The judges chose definitions as constructed in Kunarac while referring to Akayesu 
for a definition of sexual assault.  Prosecutor v  Kvocka et al  IT-98-30/1, 2 November 2001, 
(‘Omarska’). 
343 Article 7(2) of ICC Statute.  See H von Hebel and D Robinson ‘Crimes within the Jurisdiction of 
the Court’ in R Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court (1999) 99. 
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against which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the judges’ lawmaking can be 
measured. 
 
Because of its implications for the principle of legality and legal certainty the 
determination of custom is the most controversial aspect of Tribunal lawmaking.  
Nollkaemper comments that the ICTY has attempted to mitigate the tension 
between its own reading of the desirable law and its commitment to uphold the 
principle of legal certainty by justifying and explaining its policy goals in constructs 
of customary international law.344  Judge Cassese has referred to the Tribunals’ 
‘discovery’ of rules of custom as ‘revealing the hidden law of custom’.345 The 
determination of custom should not, however, be shrouded in mystery. The 
Tribunals need to clearly state and justify their methodology in choosing national 







                                                   
344  Nollkaemper (note 322) 9. In the opinion of Nollkaemper, the Kupreskic case is a good 
illustration of a case where the Tribunal virtually directly translated its policy objectives into 
customary law. Ibid 10. 






RULEMAKING AT THE TRIBUNALS 
 
1. Introduction 
ICTY and ICTR judges make both substantive and procedural law. The judges 
derive their power to make procedural law from the Statutes of the Tribunals, in 
terms of which the judges have the power to both draft and amend the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence1 (the Rules or RPE) of the ICTY and ICTR.2 This 
chapter is concerned with various aspects of the judges' rulemaking power as well 
as with the legitimacy of the rulemaking power itself. The power to make rules, 
described as a quasi-legislative function, infringes upon the principle of separation 
of powers and threatens the independence of the judges. It has been argued at 
different points in this study that the principle of separation of powers3 - the 
traditional objection to the lawmaking power of judges - does not apply in the 
field of international law because international law lacks a central legislature and a 
central enforcement body.4 The danger that judges, endowed with rulemaking 
power, could abuse this power and risk reducing legal certainty remains. The 
judges violate another principle. They seem to depart further and further from the 
Tribunal's initial commitment to the principle of legality expressed, inter alia in the 
Secretary General's Report on the establishment of the Tribunal.5  
 
Some argue that since the principle of legality is a substantive law principle it does 
not find application in the field of procedural law. It will be argued here that the 
principle of legality has relevance to both substantive and procedural law and can 
                                                   
                                  
1 The ICTY Rules of Procedure of Evidence are available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-
e/index.htm. The ICTR Rules are available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Rules/260600/1.htm. 
2 The Secretary General’s Report stated that ‘the judges of the international tribunal as a whole 
should draft and adopt the rules of procedure and evidence’. Report of the Secretary General pursuant to 
paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 S/25704 (‘Secretary General’s Report’) para. 21. 
3 The idea that the different functions of government should be divided amongst different organs 
of state (the Trias Politica) originated in the writings of Locke and Montesquieu. See J Locke Two 
Treatises of Government (1690), C de S Montesquieu De l’esprit des lois (1738). 
4 J Dugard International Law, a South African Perspective (2001) 2, 3. Dugard explains why the United 
Nations can not be considered a world government -it lacks the power to direct states to comply 
with the law; and it lacks a permanent police force to punish violations of the law. The United 
Nations can raise forces to police certain situations, such as the United Nations Protection Force in 
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) created to oversee the cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia, but there is 
no permanent force at the disposal of the Security Council that can enforce the decisions of the 
Tribunals. 
5 The Secretary General’s Report (note 2) para. 34 stated that ‘the international tribunal should apply 
rules of the international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so 
that the problem of adherence of some but not all states to specific conventions does not arise’. 
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be violated if procedural rules are amended too frequently.6 This approach is 
supported by Knoops who regards the quasi-legislative power of the judges, 
particularly in respect of judicial amendment to the rules7, as problematic from a 
procedural point of view. He raises the question whether the quasi-legislative role 
of tribunal judges may infringe upon the doctrine of separation of powers and 
concludes that because of the close relationship between the separation of powers 
and the legality principle8 it can be said that a violation of one principle often 
constitutes a violation of both principles.9  
 
Since the original adoption of the ICTY Rules on 1 February 1994, new rules have 
been adopted and amendments have been made on no less than thirty seven 
occasions.10 The frequency with which the Rules are being amended has become a 
matter of widespread criticism and controversy. The proliferation of rules11 and 
the number of amendments have led to one commentator describing the Tribunal 
as a ‘rogue court with rigged rules’.12 Frequent amendments run counter to the 
principle of legality and its cousin, the rule of law. The principle of legality requires 
that an accused should not be punished without the existence of previous law. The 
rule of law requires that a society be governed by rules that are fixed, knowable 
and certain. It is difficult to reconcile the original intention of the ICTY of 
adhering to the principle of legality with its present zeal for increasing and 
changing the Rules. An important implication of the amendment of a rule is that 
certain of the Decisions of Chambers lose their value as precedent insofar as the 
decision may relate to a Rule that no longer exists.13 Since the decisions of the 
ICTY and ICTR are not subject to review by an outside body the existence and 
the exercise of the judges' power to make and amend rules must be carefully 
scrutinised. 
 
                                                   
6 Others have made a similar argument. See R Haveman in “The Principle of Legality” in R 
Haveman, O Kavran, J Nicholls Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (2003) 75. 
7 G J A Knoops Theory and Practice of International and Internationalised Proceedings (2005) 343. 
8 See Chapter 5 above. 
9 Ibid 
10 The latest amendments were made on 29 March 2006. 
11 G Boas ‘Development in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court’ (2001) 12 Criminal Law 
Forum 90.  
12 See J Laughland ‘The Anomalies of the International Criminal Tribunal are Legion’ (letter) The 
Times 17 June 1999. 
13 The ICTY does not adhere to the traditional system of precedent accepted in common law 
jurisdictions. Decisions of other international criminal tribunals are not precedents for the Tribunal. 
See C Harris ‘Precedent in the Practice of the ICTY’ in R  May, D Tolbert, J Hocking  (eds) Essays 
on ICTY Procedure and Evidence (2001) 344. The Trial Chamber regarded judicial decisions as being 
relevant only as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, using the expression of the 
International Court of Justice. Therefore, ‘subject to the binding force of decisions of the Tribunal’s 
Appeals Chamber upon the Trial Chambers, the International Tribunal cannot uphold the doctrine 
of binding precedent (stare decisis) adhered to in common law countries.’ Prosecutor v Kupreskic, IT-95-
16-T, 14 January 2000, para 540. 
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Fuller has argued that the legitimacy of adjudication derives from the particular 
moral force of the decisions of an impartial tribunal14 and that procedural 
conditions combined to form ‘an internal morality of adjudication’.15 Procedural 
rules therefore affect the judicial enterprise as a whole. One could argue that the 
legitimacy of the ad hoc Tribunals depend to some extent on the correctness or 
soundness not only of the procedural rules themselves but also of the procedure 
and process by which the procedural rules are made. 
 
The Rules are important in that the establishment of judicial norms, procedures 
and jurisprudence at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals develop 
principally through its Rules and case law. Together with the Nuremberg 
Principles, the Rules of the ICTY combine to be one of the first coherent bodies 
of principles governing the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian 
law. It amounts to a code of procedure for international criminal law16 and it 
expresses the guarantee of a fair and expeditious trial that is based inter alia on 
article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.17 The 
relevance of the ICTY Rules extends beyond the context of the former 
Yugoslavia. The ICTY Rules were adopted as the rules of the Rwanda Tribunal.18 
In turn, the ICTR Rules were recently adopted by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.19 Many of the amendments made to the ICTY Rules have been adopted by 
the ICTR.20 What happens to the ICTY Rules happens to the ICTR Rules and 
could potentially happen to the rules of internationalised courts.21 In addition the 
                                                   
14 C Covell The Defence of natural law: law and justice in the writings of Lon L Fuller, Michael Oakeshott, F A 
Hayek, Ronald Dworkin and John Finnis (1992) 44. 
15 L Fuller The Problems of Jurisprudence (1949) 706. 
16 Boas (note 11) 41. 
17 The Appeals Chamber has observed that the ‘fair trial guarantees in Article 14 of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights have been adopted almost verbatim in Article 
21 of the Statute’. Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1-72.  
18 See ‘The Rules of the ICTR’ below. 
19 Article 14 (1) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that the RPE of the ICTR 
obtaining at the time of the establishment of the Special Court shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to 
the conduct before the Special Court. Article 14 (2) states that the judges of the Special Court as a 
whole may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or adopt additional rules where the 
applicable Rules do not, or do not adequately, provide for a specific situation. The Special Court 
was established by Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000 to prosecute persons 
for crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law within 
the territory of Sierra Leone. See Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, UN Document S/2000/915, 4 October 2000. 
20 The first eight sets of amendments to the ICTY Rules were incorporated in the initial ICTR Rules 
adopted in June 1995. During the second and third plenary sessions, the ICTR Rules were amended 
in response to the amendments to the ICTY Rules. V Morris & M Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998) 423. For the text of the amended Rules, see UN Doc 
ICTR/PLN-10-2-001 (1996) and UN Doc ICTR/3/L.5 (1996). These amendments are reflected in 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR, UN Doc ICTR/3/Rev.2. 
21 The term ‘internationalised court’ applies to courts being set up by joint efforts of the United 
Nations and national governments to try violations of international humanitarian law as is 
happening in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and East Timor. However, the effect of amendments to the 
ICTY Rules and ICTR Rules will most probably be felt only indirectly by these courts. 
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Rules and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals had an impact on the drafting of 
the Rules for the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
Since the rulemaking procedure of the Tribunals constitutes a clear example of 
procedural lawmaking by the judges, it merits close attention. The procedure by 
which the Rules are made and amended will be discussed as well as the limitations 
on the scope of the Rules. The following questions will be addressed: (a) Are the 
Rules exhaustive or do the Chambers possess inherent powers not enumerated in 
the Rules? (b) Can the Rules be ultra vires the Statute? (c) Can the judges reverse a 
decision by enacting a subsequent amendment to the Rules? The nature of and 
reasons for the frequent amendments made by the judges will be discussed. The 
question will be posed whether the Rules can not be clarified in ways other than 
by effecting amendments. Because limited precedent existed for the adoption of 
the Rules22 and because of the unique nature of the ICTY it is argued that the 
Rules needed a ‘breaking in’ period and that it is somehow inevitable that some of 
the Rules would have to be amended. Judge Cassese, the first President of the 
Tribunal, listed some seemingly commendable reasons for effecting amendments. 
These include enhancing the rights of the accused, helping to protect victims and 
witnesses, taking account of the views of the host country and improving the 
consistency, clarity and comprehensiveness of the Rules.23  It is necessary, but 
often difficult, to distinguish between instances where the judges have made 
amendments to clarify or elaborate the rules - an ostensibly harmless, even 
desirable exercise of their powers - and instances where the judges have made 
amendments because of political pressure. The Barayagwiza Reconsideration 
Decision24, which will be discussed, is an instance of the latter.  
 
There are two ways in which the judges can exercise their power to amend. 
Having had the benefit of observing how a specific Rule they had drafted had 
been interpreted, the judges may realise that the Rule did not function in the way 
they intended, necessitating amendments. This could be uncontroversial, even 
wise. The decision to amend a rule may however be the direct result of a Chamber 
Decision that the majority of judges seek to overrule. This would be more suspect. 
In this regard the Barayagwiza case will be examined25 - an example of a case where 
a precedent set by the Appeals Chamber was overturned by a subsequent 
amendment of the Rules. The question whether the reasons offered by the 
                                                   
22 The Rules adopted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg offer little guidance since 
they were few and of a very general nature. The rulemaking procedure of the Nuremberg Trials was 
governed by Article 13 of the Nuremberg Charter. International Military Tribunal, Rules of 
Procedure, adopted on 29 October 1945 in (1946-1949) 1 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.10,  19 - 23. 
23 Morris & Scharf (note 20) 423.  
24 Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, Decision (Prosecution’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), ICTR-97-AR72, 
ICTR A. Ch, 31 March 2000 (‘Barayagwiza Reconsideration Decision’). 
25 Barayagwiza v The Prosecutor, ICTR-97-19-AR72,  3 November 1999 (‘Barayagwiza Decision’). 
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Tribunal for the flexibility pursued by the Judges in the making of amendments 
are satisfactory will also receive attention.  
 
The forum in which the Tribunals' Rules are made and amended is the Plenary 
Sessions of the judges. The fact that the records of the Plenary Sessions are not 
public makes it difficult to establish the reasons and motives behind such 
amendments.26 Since the Plenary Sessions are held in private and the minutes of 
these meetings are not disclosed to the public, it is also not possible to refer to the 
traveaux preparatoires of the judges. No other documents referring to the reasoning 
of the judges are available either. To understand or speculate about the judges’ 
intent when making amendments one has to be satisfied with looking at the 
chronology of the cases and their public statements.27 
 
The procedure by which the Rules of the ICTY and the ICTR are drafted and 
amended will be examined as well as the possible motivations of the judges in 
doing so. In discussing the procedure of drafting and amending rules, the 
approach of the ICTY and ICTR will occasionally be compared to the approach 
taken in the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).28 
 
2. Rulemaking at Nuremberg and Tokyo  
As the first international criminal jurisdiction, the Nuremberg Tribunal provides 
the benchmark for assessing the international Tribunal and its prospects for 
success. The Nuremberg Tribunal was guided by a small set of very general rules 
of procedure and evidence. These rules were contained in the Nuremberg Charter 
which provided for the elaboration of somewhat more detailed procedural rules in 
a subsequent instrument.29 The Nuremberg Rules of Procedure consisted of 
eleven rules comprising little more than four pages of text.30 These rules were 
adopted shortly after the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter. The Nuremberg 
Charter entrusted the Chief Prosecutors with the task of preparing draft rules of 
procedure which the judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal, according to Article 14 
(e), were authorised ‘to accept, with or without amendment or to reject’.  
                                                   
26 Neither the legal officers at the Tribunal, nor the Press and Information Unit of the ICTY have 
been able to provide me with an official reason for the confidentiality of these documents. 
27  Kavran suggests looking at these two sources. See O Kavran ‘The Sui Generis Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence’ in R Haveman, O Kavran, J Nicholls (eds) Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui 
Generis (2003) 34. 
28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Ad. 1, 12 July 2000 (officially called the 
‘finalised draft text’). 
29 Article 13 of the Nuremberg Charter states: ‘The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. 
These rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter.’ 
30 The Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10 later adopted the Uniform Rules of Procedure 
on the basis of these Rules. See International Military Tribunal, Rules of Procedure, adopted on 29 
October 1945 in (1946-1949) 1.  Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under 




Some believe that the procedures adopted by the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals (as well as by the various tribunals set up by the Occupying Powers after 
World War II) were not very instructive since the right to a fair trial was the only 
recognised principle of international criminal law at the time and this right was 
defined only vaguely.31 Because of the small number of rules in the Charter and 
possibly also because of the fact that procedural regularity was generally neglected 
at Nuremberg, the literature on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials concentrates on 
the adversarial approach followed by these Tribunals. 
 
An important feature of the rules of procedure adopted by the post-war military 
tribunals is that they proved to be more flexible than those of national criminal 
courts. It was believed that procedural questions should never enable the guilty to 
escape justice.32 The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were held before the adoption 
of international instruments specifying more detailed rights for the accused. 
Important examples of such instruments in the field of humanitarian law are the 
Geneva Conventions with the Additional Protocols and in the field of human 
rights law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights33. 
 
The Rules of Procedure of the Tokyo Tribunal were also extremely brief, 
constituting nine provisions.34 Like the Nuremberg Trials the Tokyo Tribunal was 
not to be bound by technical rules of evidence. It was to apply ‘to the greatest 
extent possible expeditious and non-technical procedure’, and was to admit 
evidence deemed to have probative value.35 
 
3. Adversarial v Inquisitorial Approach  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the judges of the ICTY decided to follow the 
adversarial approach of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.36 According to 
Morris and Scharf the adversarial system was chosen predominantly because of 
the role envisaged for the judiciary and Prosecutor in the Statute and the influence 
of the detailed and comprehensive United States proposal for the Rules.37 With 
                                                   
31A-M la Rosa ‘A tremendous challenge for the International Criminal Tribunals reconciling the 
requirements of international humanitarian law with those of a fair trial’ (1997) 37 321 International 
Review of the Red Cross 635. 
32 One important example is that evidence given by affidavit, which does not permit cross-
examination and is generally inadmissible under common law, was widely used. See La Rosa  ibid 
635, 636. 
33 In addition, the right to a fair trial had not yet been made subject to international monitoring by 
competent international bodies with either regional or universal jurisdiction. Ibid. 
34 See Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, reprinted in R J 
Pritchard,  S M Zaide (eds.) The Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1981). 
35 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Article 13, 19 January 1946, TIAS 
No 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (as amended 26 April 1946, 4 Bevans 27). 
36 See Chapter 4. 
37 Morris & Scharf (note 20) 416. 
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regard to the rules it would however, be more accurate to describe the approach as 
‘mostly adversarial’ since there have been some inquisitorial elements introduced 
right from the start.38 
 
Judge Wald writes that the ICTY employs a sometimes uneasy and frequently 
awkward blend of the common and civil law systems.39 Though the ICTY Rules 
initially tilted in favour of the common law adversarial trial it is inevitable that 
interstitial questions arise in response to which judges from different systems will 
tend to apply ‘what comes naturally’. Judge Jorda is known for steering the ICTY 
in a civil law direction by supporting many rule amendments reflecting civil law 
practices during his presidency.40 Prominent common law judges such as Judges 
McDonald, May, Hunt and Wald have similarly left their mark. These judges have 
all shown particular concern for the fact that rule changes made to expedite trials 
should not infringe on due process and fair trial guarantees.   
       
According to Boas, the tendency to expedite proceedings at the ICTY has led to 
the Tribunal implementing more and more civil law innovations into an 
‘ostensibly adversarial system’.41 Boas argues that the ICTY has a structure which 
lends itself more to the process of re-codification of changes in legal practice, 
stating that ‘this characteristically civil law approach’ has evolved at the ICTY 
which has often adopted the approach of amending rules the meaning of which 
has been clarified in decisions of the Tribunal.42 
 
Since the creation of the Tribunal there has been much discussion about whether 
the modeling of the Tribunal on the adversarial system has been wise. According 
to Ackerman and O'Sullivan, the fact that all the accused and most of the lawyers 
representing them comes from ‘inquisitorial’ civil law systems have caused 
tremendous difficulties.43 The making of formal statements by the defendants is 
                                                   
38 Kavran points to the fact that the ICTY has no jury to be protected from prejudicial information 
and thus no technical rules for admission of evidence. See Kavran (note 28) 134. 
39 P Wald ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Comes of Age’ (2001)5 
Journal of Law & Policy 90.  
40 The reform programme set forth by Judge Jorda was contained in the ‘Jorda Report’. See Letter 
dated 12 May 2000 from the President of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
addressed  to the Secretary General and enclosed report (the ‘Jorda Report’) Annexure I to UN 
Doc A/55/382-S/20000/865 14 September 2000. 
41 According to Boas, it is clear from the structure and content of the ICC Statute that the drafters 
have also opted for a system which is basically adversarial. This means that the prosecutor will be 
exclusively responsible for searching and collecting evidence to present to the Court and to decide 
which cases to prosecute or not to prosecute. Other procedural features are more in line with the 
civil law process, whereby the court maintains significant control over the investigative phase of the 
proceedings. See Article 15 (3) of the ICC Statute. G Boas ‘Comparing the ICTY and ICC, Some 
Procedural and Substantive Issues’ (2000) 47 Netherlands International Law Review  281. 
42 See for example Rule 62 bis (ii) requiring that a guilty plea be ‘informed’, a matter clarified by the 
Appeals Chamber in the case of Prosecutor v Erdemovic IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1999, 20. 
43 See the Commentary on Article 15 in J E Ackerman & E O’Sullivan (eds) Practice and Procedure of 
the ICTY  (2000). 
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an example of this. Under the law of the former Yugoslavia, defendants are 
encouraged to make formal statements. Under the law of the Tribunal, however, 
giving a statement to the Prosecutor pursuant to rules 42 and 43 has generally 
been detrimental to the interests of the accused.44 
 
Mundis remarks that although the first few trials at the ICTY closely resembled 
common law trials, the level of control exercised by the Trial Chambers in recent 
cases resembles the civil law approach and that the practice of the Tribunal, 
generally, is moving in the direction of a civil law approach.45 Since the ICTY 
Statute contains clear references to adversarial or ‘common law’ elements46 the 
ICTY will never fully acquire a civil law character but it can be said that a truly 
mixed jurisdiction is emerging. Examples of rule amendments modeled on the 
inquisitorial system civil law will be discussed below. 
 
4. Rulemaking at the ICTY  
Although the international community has taken great strides forward in the 
codification and development of international standards with respect to the 
substantive international law applied at the Nuremberg trials, similar progress has 
not been made in the codification and development of international standards 
with respect to the rules of procedure and evidence. The obvious reason for the 
difference in attention devoted to procedural and substantive aspects of 
international criminal law since Nuremberg is the fact that no international 
criminal court was established in the intervening years that would have required 
considering the procedural and evidentiary rules of law governing its 
proceedings.47 This changed with the establishment of the ICTY in 1993.  
 
Security Council Resolution 827 and Article 15 of the ICTY Statute48 clearly laid 





                                                   
44 There is no practice at the Tribunal that provides for a sentence reduction for accused that make 
statements, unless it amounts to ‘substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor’ under Rule 101. To 
date, Erdemović is the only accused who has received such credit. 
45 D Mundis ‘From ‘Common Law’ Towards ‘Civil Law’: The evolution of the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence’ (2001) 14 LJIL  368. 
46 Article16 (1) of the ICTY Statute, for example, vests in the prosecutor, rather than the judges, the 
responsibility for investigation and prosecuting functions which ensure that the judges will never 
fully control the presentation of the cases that they hear. Other examples include Article 21(4) (e) 
which guarantees the accused the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. 
47 The development of international human rights standards in the intervening years did however 
provide general standards of fair trial and due process in a criminal proceeding before an 
international court. Morris &  Scharf (note 20) 175. 
48 The ICTY Statute is available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut.html. The ICTR Statute is 




The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure 
and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, 
the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate 
matters. 
 
The Report of the Secretary-General49 recommended the preparation and 
adoption of the Rules by the judges as a whole. The participation of all the judges 
in the elaboration and adoption of the Rules was meant to ensure consideration of 
the general principles of criminal procedure and evidence recognised in the 
different legal systems represented by the judges. In terms of Article 13 of the 
ICTY Statute the General Assembly has the power to elect eleven judges to reflect 
the diversity of the world's principal legal systems.50 
 
The judges, assisted by the Secretariat and proposals from States and 
organisations,51 adopted the Rules in February 1994.52 At the time there were 
suggestions that the adoption should be delayed until April 1994 to allow for more 
reflection. The Rules were, however, quite hastily adopted because it was believed 
that the procedures should be in force not only before the first trial, but also 
before the first investigation and indictment.53 In designing the Rules, the judges 
took note of patterns of crimes and the forms specific crimes took in the conflict 
in the Balkans. By doing this they endeavoured to devise a ‘purpose-made’ set of 
rules that would facilitate their work in adjudicating justiciable crimes within the 
context of the crimes committed.54 The ICTY has attempted to create a body of 
rules which reflect the international criminal law jurisdiction under which it 
operates - rules customised to the prosecution of international crimes. 
 
In addition, several States and organisations55 submitted comments and draft 
provisions for the Rules. Of these the United States submitted by far the most 
comprehensive set of proposed rules with commentary (numbering approximately 
75 pages) many of which found their way into the Rules adopted by the ICTY. 
The rules that were rejected addressed questions of substantive law that were 
decided to be beyond the scope of the rules of procedure and evidence as decided 
                                                   
49 Secretary General’s Report (note 2). 
50See Chapter 3 on the election of the judges. M C Bassiouni & P Manikas The Law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1996) 209. 
51 Ibid 177. 
52 The Rules entered into force on 14 March 1994 in accordance with Rule 1 of the ICTY RPE. 
53 Morris & Scharf (note 20) 181. 
54 Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991. A/49/342, S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994, paras 75, 76. 
55 Submissions were received from Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Norway, Sweden as well as 
from the United States and the American Bar Association. Morris & Scharf (note 20) 176. 
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on by the judges.56 Examples of such rules include proposals addressing issues 
such as the type of war crimes falling within its jurisdiction, the definition of 
crimes against humanity and the exclusion of the defence of superior orders.57 
 
The Rules and Statute of the ICTY and ICTR can be regarded as the guiding 
norms of the Tribunals. The hierarchy of the norms guiding the ICTY and ICTR 
rests on their respective Statutes. The Rules were adopted pursuant to and remain 
subordinate to the Statutes.58 In turn, many of the administrative directives and 
guidelines are specifically authorised by the Rules. This means that all 
administrative directives must conform to the Rules, which must adhere to the 
Statute. Bassiouni writes that the ICTY Rules, to some extent, fill gaps in the 
Statute which was not tailored to the particular characteristics of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia.59 This is reflected in rules concerning patterns of conduct60 
regarding the protection of victims and witnesses61 and regarding evidence in 
sexual assault cases.62  
 
5. The Rules of the ICTR 
It has been said that the ICTY and ICTR are ‘joined at the hip’.63 The Rules 
provide one more example of this: The ICTY Rules provided a model for the 
ICTR Rules in order to ensure that the two international Tribunals would function 
‘harmoniously’.64 The judges of the Rwanda Tribunal adopted the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the Rwanda Tribunal at its first session held from 26 
to 30 June 1995. Article 14 of the Statute of the ICTR provided that the judges at 
the ICTR should adopt the Rules of the Yugoslavia Tribunal ‘with such changes as 
it might deem necessary’. The judges at the ICTR had the benefit of a detailed set 
of rules which has already been amended several times to reflect the practical 
needs of the ICTY. Amendments made to the Rules of the ICTR often (but not 
always) follow directly amendments made to the Rules of the ICTY.65 As a result 
                                                   
56 V Morris & M Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (1995) 177. A key proposal by the United States that was rejected would have 
authorised the Prosecutor to grant immunity to defendants in exchange for cooperation. Ibid. 
57 United States Proposal for the Yugoslavia Tribunal Rules, Rules 2.2 and 25.14 and the 
commentary thereto, reprinted in Morris & Scharf (note 20) 516, 547. 
58 See Bassiouni & Manikas (note 50) 825. 
59 Ibid.  
60 ICTY Rule 93. 
61 ICTY Rules 34, 69 and 75. 
62 ICTY Rule 96. 
63 W Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2nd ed. 2004) 12.  The statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR are largely similar. In addition the two institutions share a prosecutor and an 
Appeals Chamber. 
64 Statement of France, UN The Normative Impact on International Law of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ in Y Dinstein, M Taborg (eds) War Crimes in International Law 
(1996) 210 SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453rd meeting. at 4, UN Doc S/PV.3453 (1994) reprinted in Morris 
& Scharf (note 20). 
65 The first eight sets of amendments to the Yugoslavia Tribunal Rules were incorporated in the 
initial Rwanda Tribunal Rules adopted in June 1995. Morris & Scharf (note 20) 422, 423. 
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the Rules of the two Tribunals are almost identical. As in the case of the ICTY, 
the ICTR followed a broadly accusatorial approach.66 
 
6. The quasi legislative power of the judges 
Was it appropriate to grant the judges the power to make the rules they apply 
themselves? Judge Cassese acknowledged the unusual nature of the judges' 
rulemaking duty when he said:  
 
Let me also add that the Judges of our Tribunal, besides fulfilling judicial duties, also have 
a unique legislative task, in that they pass and amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, what I would call our ‘Code of Criminal Procedure’.67 
 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court ('Rome Statute') departed from 
the ICTY Procedure in not granting the judges the power to draft the Rules of the 
ICC. Pursuant to Article 51 (1) of the Rome Statute, the ICC Rules must be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of State Parties. 
Only in urgent cases (cases where the ICC Rules do not provide for a specific 
situation) may the judges, by a two-thirds majority draw up provisional rules.   
 
According to Roberts, there is no doubt that denying the judges of the ICC the 
power to make rules was the result of a conscious decision. He writes that the 
antipathy to judge-made rules was in part the result of a perceived difference in 
circumstances between the permanent court and the ad hoc Tribunal.68 Roberts 
repeats the reason often given for the substantial powers and flexibility granted to 
and exercised by the judges of the ICTY - this reason being the unique nature of 
the Tribunal and the unforeseen circumstances the Tribunal could not be fully 
prepared for. He writes that the ICC, having had the benefit of the ICTY 
experience, is less likely to require the same volume of amendments. Article 51 of 
the ICC Statute reflects a desire by the drafters to establish certainty in procedure 
to the benefit of the parties to the proceedings. Legal certainty diminishes when 
rules are constantly being amended. Even though the ICC Judges will not have 
drafted the rules themselves, their input before adoption of the Rules has been 
said to be critical.69 
 
                                                   
66 Unlike the approach at Nuremberg, which combined principles of civil and common law, the 
ICTY judges, in drafting the Rules, decided to follow a largely adversarial, rather than inquisitorial 
approach. UN Doc IT/30 (1994). 
67 Speech by A Cassese at the meeting between Secretary- General Kofi Annan and the Judges of 
the   ICTY, 3 March 1997. 
68 K Roberts ‘Aspects of the ICTY Contribution to the Criminal Procedure of the ICC’ in May, 
Tolbert,  Hocking (eds.) (note 13) 569. 
69 ‘[the ICTY] judges wish to encourage the Preparatory Commission to include a provision that 
would allow judicial participation with the Assembly of State Parties in the adoption of the Rules’, 
Contributions of the Chambers of the ICTY, 13 August 1999, PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP 38, 
para 6.  
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The difference between the powers awarded to the judges of the ICTY and those 
of the ICC has been explained on the ground that  the drafting of the ICTY Rules 
were dictated by the circumstances in which the ICTY Statute was drafted which 
differs significantly from the context in which the ICC is being created. The ICTY 
derives its powers directly from Chapter VII of the UN Charter and is concerned 
with a defined conflict in a single region. It was therefore created in a situation 
that allowed for easier consensus and, some argue, the allocation of greater power 
than would have been appropriate to grant to the ICC.70 It is submitted that the 
power to adopt and amend the Rules, unaccompanied by review mechanisms or 
sufficient safeguards exceeds the power the judges of the ad hoc Tribunals should 
legitimately have been granted.71  
 
7. The amendments 
According to Rule 6 of the ICTY Rules, the Rules may be amended with the 
assent of seven judges at a plenary meeting convened with sufficient notice 
following a written request for amendment by a judge, the Prosecutor or the 
Registrar.72 An amendment may be approved other than at a plenary meeting of 
the International Tribunal with the unanimous approval of the judges. 
Amendments adopted by either procedure enter into force immediately. An 
amendment may however, not prejudice the rights of an accused in a case that is 
already pending before the Tribunal.  
 
The first amendments to the Rules of the ICTY took place at the third session of 
the International Tribunal held from 25 April to 5 May 1994. Since then, the 
ICTY and ICTR Rules have been amended several times. At the ICTR even the 
Rule pertaining to amendments, Rule 6, has been amended three times.73 
 
The Rules are amended by the Rules Committee. This Committee is made up of a 
minimum of three permanent Tribunal judges and considers proposals for 
amendments received from the President or a judge. The Committee then submits 
                                                   
70 Roberts compares the circumstances in which the ICTY was created to that of the ICC and states 
that, because of the larger number of states representing a broader background of legal systems and 
the political concerns involved, the drafters of the Rome Statute were more constrained by the need 
to compromise. Roberts (note 68) 572. 
71 Judge Wald agrees that rulemaking is a legislative task. She finds it problematic that Tribunal 
judges both draft and apply the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Interview with Judge Wald, 
ICTY Chambers, The Hague, August 2001.  
72 Rule 6 (A) reads: 
Amendments of the Rules  
(A)Proposals for amendment of the Rules may be made by a Judge, the Prosecutor or the Registrar 
and shall be adopted if agreed to by not less than seven judges at a plenary meeting of the Tribunal 
convened with notice of the proposal addressed to all judges. 
 
73 Rule 6 was adopted on 29 June 1995 and was amended on 5 July 1996, 8 June 1998 and 1 July 
1999. Whereas the ‘original’ Rule 6, states that Proposals for amendment of the Rules shall be 
adopted if agreed to by not less than seven judges at a Plenary Meeting, the amended text of 1 July 
1999 states that amendments should be agreed to by no less than ten judges. 
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a report setting out the proposals and recommendations to the Plenary or to the 
judges for adoption under Rule 6 (C). Upon agreement by the Plenary of 
amendment to the Rules, the Rules Committee will, as soon as practicable, issue 
an official document setting out the amendments and this document shall be 
submitted for publication in the next issue of the Bulletin of the International 
Tribunal.74 
 
There has been no opportunity for UN bodies, states or NGO's to comment on 
proposed amendments. According to Bassiouni, a brief period of comment and 
review might enhance the substantive quality of the Rules.75 Ideally, he argues the 
Rules should have been formulated as part of the entire legal framework of the 
Tribunal and should have been developed prior to the Tribunal's establishment.  
 
Since rules have important implications for the fairness of proceedings and are 
sometimes substantive in nature, a procedure for the review of proposed and 
amended rules should be established.76 Bassiouni is of the opinion that approval 
by the Security Council should be required before proposed rules and 
amendments are adopted. An important reason for this is that rules could affect 
substantive issues or could bear on the determination of guilt or innocence.77  
 
The need to expedite cases has been offered as a reason or justification for the 
frequent amendment of the Rules.78 One of the greatest obstacles currently facing 
the Tribunal involves constraints in bringing a case to trial within a reasonable 
time after the accused has been detained.79 In the Aleksovski Appeals Decision80 it 
was stated that ‘the purpose of the Rules is to promote a fair and expeditious trial’, 
and Trial Chambers must have the flexibility to achieve this goal. The process of 
amending the Rules in order to achieve the goal of good case management and 
                                                   
74 Judicial Supplement 31 – IT/143/Rev 2, January/February/March 2002. 
75 Bassiouni & Manikas (note 50)  827. 
76 Bassiouni writes of the procedural rules that ‘insure the substantive aspects of procedural 
fairness’. These substantive aspects include the right to life, liberty and other civil rights. MC 
Bassiouni Introduction to International Criminal Law (2003) 641. Interestingly, the ILC’s draft statute for 
the ICC provided that the court’s rules be drafted by the judges and submitted to a conference of 
state parties for approval. The ICJ Statute however, does not provide for review of the ICJ’s rules 
by any other body. Bassiouni & Manikas  ibid.  
77 Ibid 824. 
78 Proceedings during  the pre-trial and trial phases were recently expedited  by amending Rule 65ter 
and Rule 92bis. Boas (note 11) 45. 
79 See in this regard Barayagwiza Reconsideration Decision (note 24). 
80 See Prosecutor v Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-AR73) Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility 
of Evidence, 16 February 1999, para 19. 
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thereby expedite trials, began at the 18th Plenary held on 9-10 July 1998.81 At this 
session six rules were added and 25 others amended.82 
 
In May 2000 a reform programme was put forward by Judge Jorda when he was 
President of the ICTY, on behalf of the judges. The aim of the programme was to 
improve the effective functioning of the ICTY.83 It included measures to expedite 
trials such as improving pre-trial case management and the appointment of ad litem 
judges, and required additional amendments to the Rules. Such amendments 
included simplifying the form of Status Conferences so that they could be held 
outside the courtrooms with the senior legal officer presiding and the parties in 
attendance. Examples of rules that have already been amended in the name of 
expedition will be examined under the heading ‘Amendments to Expedite’. 
 
Next to the justification of expediency, the need for ‘flexibility’ has become a 
favourite justification of the ICTY. Boas writes that a high level of flexibility has 
been pursued by the judges of the ICTY in the process of drafting, amending and 
interpreting the Rules. This flexibility has been justified by the need to expedite 
trials and the need to reconcile concepts borrowed from continental and common 
law systems.84 
 
In spite of the emphasis put on expediency and flexibility the Tribunal has been 
criticised for the frequent amendments as early as 1996. Judge Cassese responded 
to this criticism when he told the General Assembly in November 1996 that it was 
‘essential, in the interests of justice, to amend the Rules in light of new problems 
... or unanticipated situations....’.85. He used the same arguments often used in 
response to criticism directed at the Tribunal's ‘innovative’ approach to lawmaking 
- arguments relating to the new and unique character of the Tribunal:86 
 
We have been attacked for amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence too many 
times. In reply to this criticism, I would say that our whole enterprise has been very much 
a step into the unknown. It has been impossible to foresee all the new problems that have 
arisen, and may well continue to arise during our proceedings. I should also point out that 
an institution that keeps its internal regulation under review, and constantly seeks to 
                                                   
81 These amendments were first reflected in Revision 13 of the Rules, which is available on the 
ICTY website. For the current version of the Rules, see 
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev21con.htm, and selected older versions 
at:http://www.un.org/icty/basicl-e.htm. 
82 The following Rules were amended: 11bis, 15, 45, 47(F), 50, 62bis, 65, 66, 72, 73, 77, 85, 86, 87, 
88, 88 bis, 90, 94, 99, 100, 101,102,103, 108 bis and 111. 
83 See the Jorda Report (note 40). 
84 Boas (note 11) 41, 42. 
85 Morris & Scharf (note 20) 423. 
86 In a similar tone, Justice Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg in concluding his 
report on the Nuremberg Trials acknowledged that ‘many mistakes have been made and many 
inadequacies must be confessed. I am consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this novelty, 
errors and missteps may also be instructive to the future’.  See Report to the President by Mr Justice 
Jackson, 7 October 1946. 
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improve its procedures and the quality of justice it offers to all the parties - accused, 
defence counsel, prosecutors - should be commended for its fairness, not rebuked.87 
 
Morris and Scharf state uncritically that the amendments constitute ‘clarifications 
or elaborations’ of the general principles contained in the original Rules or address 
issues raised by those Rules.88 As will become clear in the discussion of the case 
law of the Tribunals, many amendments are made for reasons other than mere 
clarification. It can also be asked whether clarification should not be sought in the 
emerging body of case law of the Tribunals itself. 
 
Another important question is whether a Trial Chamber, in interpreting the Rules 
can effectively amend the Rules although not expressly authorised to do so by the 
Statute, if the circumstances necessitate such an amendment in order for a 
Chamber to carry out its judicial functions?89 This question is related to the issue 
of whether a Trial Chamber has the competence to strike out a Rule which is ultra 
vires for which there also does not seem to be a mechanism for the Chambers to 
abolish rules that are ultra vires the Statute.90 The judges, when gathered in plenary 
session, have to decide about the abolition of a rule. 
 
According to Nice the regular changes to the Rules place strain on practitioners 
and judges alike. The regularity of the need for change points at the imperfection 
of the system thus far.91    
 
The principle of legality has been examined in Chapter 5. The Tribunals’ practice 
of frequently amending the Rules constitutes a clear infringement of the principle 
of legality. In addition to the substantive legality principle, dicussed in Chapter 5, 
there also exists a procedural legality principle. Acording to this principle 
procedural law should adhere to standards of fairness and justice. Just as 
substantive law should be certain and specific, so procedural law should also be 
certain. The law of the Tribunals has to adhere to both substantive and procedural 
legality. 
 
8. Procedural Lawmaking in Domestic Jurisdictions 
It is instructive to look at the ways in which rules are made in domestic 
jurisdictions. In the United States the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure are 
made by the federal judiciary. The federal judiciary is authorised by Congress to 
prescribe the rules, procedure and evidence for the federal courts, subject to the 
right of Congress to reject or modify any of the rules. The authority for 
                                                   
87 Address of A Cassese, President of the ICTY to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 4 
November 1997. 
88 Morris & Scharf (note 20) 423. 
89 D Mundis ‘The Legal Character and Status of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2001) 4 International Criminal Law Review 12. 
90 Ibid. 
91 G Nice ‘Trials of Imperfection’ (2001) 14 LJIL 392. Nice suggests that the shortcomings are not 
the fault of the judges but results from structural inadequacies. 
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promulgating the rules is set forth in the Rules Enabling Act 28 USC.92 Meetings 
of the rules committees are open to the public and minutes of the committee 
meetings, comments submitted by the public and transcripts of hearings are all 
public. It is generally believed that the pervasive and substantial impact of rules on 
the practice of law demands exacting and meticulous care in drafting rule changes. 
All interested individuals and organisations are provided with an opportunity to 
comment on proposed amendments and to recommend alternative proposals.93 
What is commendable about the procedural lawmaking by American judges is the 
openness and transparency of the process. The process by which these federal 
rules are promulgated has been praised as ‘perhaps the most thoroughly open, 
deliberative, and exacting process in the nation for developing substantively 
neutral rules’.94  
 
In South Africa rulemaking in the courts is regulated by Statute, most importantly 
by the Supreme Court Act95, the Magistrates Court Act96 and the Rules Board for 
Courts of Law Act (‘Rules Board Act’)97. The Rules Board Act authorises the 
Rules Board to make rules for the High Court and the Magistrates Court. Section 
43 of the Supreme Court Act authorises the Judge President of a provincial 
division to exercise discretion and to make rules for regulating the proceedings of 
that division. The Judge President can make rules regulating such matters as (i) the 
time for holding the courts (ii) the placing on the roll of cases for hearing and (iii) 
the extension or reduction of any period in which an act is required to be 
performed. In addition the Rules Board Act authorises the Rules Board to make 
rules for the efficient administration of justice. The Rules Board is composed of 
members of the legal profession such as judges, advocates, attorneys and 
academics.98 The Rules Board Act delegates power to the Rules Board to draft the 
Uniform Rules of Court. Judges cannot amend the Uniform Rules of Court but, 
under certain circumstances, ‘on good cause shown’ they can deviate from the 
Rules of Court. Magistrates are not authorised to make the rules of magistrates 
courts. Everything pertaining to rulemaking in Magistrates Courts is regulated by 
the Magistrates Court Act. The Magistrates Courts are creatures of Statute 
whereas the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own procedure. 
  
9. The Rules and Inherent Powers 
An important question is whether the Chambers possess powers not enumerated 
in the Rules or the Statute to deal with matters that arise during the course of 
proceedings. Assuming that in municipal systems all courts possess the inherent 
                                                   
92 www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm 
93 Ibid. 
94 Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the US, Proposed Long Range Plan 
for the Federal Courts recommendation 30 (1995). 
95 Act 59 of 1959. 
96 Act 32 of 1944. 
97 Act 107 of 1985. 
98 Ibid section 1. 
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powers necessary to perform their judicial functions, are the Chambers competent 
to define and exercise such inherent powers? According to Buteau and 
Oosthuizen Chambers can resort to what is commonly referred to as the ‘inherent 
powers’ or ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of the Tribunal.99 The main reason for the need 
to resort to such powers lies in the relatively rudimentary nature of the Statute, 
Rules and other formal documents.100 It would of course also have been 
impossible for the drafters to foresee and regulate every matter that may arise. 
 
The above question was discussed by the Tadic Appeals Chamber in the context of 
determining the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal. The Chamber 
rejected the Trial Chamber's narrow definition of the concept of jurisdiction.101 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber distinguished between what is stated in international 
law as ‘original’, ‘primary’ or ‘substantive’ jurisdiction and ‘incidental’ or ‘inherent’ 
jurisdiction which derives automatically from the exercise of the judicial 
function.102 The Appeals Chamber also referred to these powers as ‘residual 
powers which may derive from the requirements of the 'judicial function' itself’.103 
 
In the context of the power of a court to establish its own competence104 the 
Chamber stated that this power, known as la competence de la competence is a major 
part of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitrary tribunal. 
The Chamber stated that this power is a necessary component in the exercise of 
the judicial function and does not need to be expressly provided for in the 
constitutive documents of those Tribunals.105  
 
The inherent power of the Tribunal has been referred to in several other cases of 
the ICTR and ICTY. In the Tadic Contempt Judgment,106 Mr Vujin, former defence 
counsel for Tadic stood accused of having committed contempt of the Tribunal 
by knowingly and willfully interfering with the administration of justice: The 
allegations against him were made in accordance with Rule 77(E) which states that 
‘Nothing in this Rule affects the inherent power of the Tribunal to hold in 
contempt those who knowingly and willfully interfere with its administration of 
justice.’ The Chamber stated in this regard: ‘As an international criminal court, the 
                                                   
99 M Buteau & G Oosthuizen ‘When the Statute and Rules are Silent: The Inherent Powers of the 
Tribunal’ in May, Tolbert & Hocking (note 13) 65. 
100 One example of such document would be the Directive on the Assignment of Counsel 
(IT/73/Rev 63) 
101 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 
October 1995 (‘Tadic Appeal Jurisdiction Decision’) paras 9 -12. 
102 Ibid para. 14. 
103 Ibid. 
104 The Chamber quoted and supported, Judge Cordova: ‘the first obligation of the Court - as of any 
other judicial body - is to ascertain its own competence’. See the Advisory Opinion on Judgments 
of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon complaints made by UNESCO, 1956 ICJ Reports, 
77, 163, Advisory Opinion of 23 October 1956, (Judge Cordova  dissenting). 
105 Tadic Appeal Jurisdictional Decision (note 101) paras 15 -17. 
106 Prosecutor v Tadic, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, AC, 
IT-94-1-A-R77, 31 January 2000 (‘Tadic Contempt Judgment’). 
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Tribunal must therefore possess the inherent power to deal with conduct which 
interferes with the administration of justice’.107 The Chamber further rejected the 
Respondent's arguments that the kinds of conduct that would amount to 
contempt had been increased by the amendments made to Rule 77.108 It was 
argued by the Respondent that the nature of the conduct which amounts to 
contempt had been greatly increased to the prejudice of his rights by the 
amendments made to Rule 77 both after the commencement of the relevant 
period in this case and after its conclusion.109 The Respondent argued that his 
rights had therefore been prejudiced. The Chamber stated that ‘the inherent power 
of the Tribunal to deal with contempt has necessarily existed since its creation, 
and the existence of that power does not depend upon a reference being made to 
it in the Rules’. The Chamber added that the amendments made to Rule 77 in 
December 1998 did not increase the kinds of conduct that would amount to 
contempt.110 
 
The Security Council could not have exhaustively spelt out the Tribunal's powers. 
From the Trial Chamber judgments it seems clear that the judges agree that when 
the Statute and the Rules are silent the Tribunal's inherent power may be invoked. 
Oosthuizen and Buteau suggest that, by invoking the inherent power the 
Chambers fill both substantive and procedural lacunae in the Statute.111 In relying 
on inherent powers, there is always potential for arbitrariness. The inherent 
powers of the Tribunal should not be used by the Chambers to depart in any 
direction they wish without sound justification.  
 
10.  Limitations on Scope of the Rules 
In spite of this wide delegation of legislative power the authority given to the 
judges to promulgate procedural and evidentiary rules was subject to limitations. 
Most importantly, being a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, the ICTY 
must perform all its functions in conformity with the relevant provisions in the 
United Nations Charter. This means that the Rules must be consistent with 
principles of justice and international law as the guiding principles of the United 
Nations.112 The Security Council's Report emphasised the importance of the 
ICTY respecting internationally recognised standards of human rights particularly 
those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Furthermore the Rules of Procedure and Evidence must be consistent with the 
                                                   
107 Ibid para 13. 
108 Ibid para 12. 
109 Ibid para 27. 
110 Ibid paras 27-28. 
111 It is not clear what the authors mean when they state that ‘substantive’ lacunae can be filled. See 
Buteau & Oosthuizen (note 99)  80. 
112 See T Meron ‘The Normative Impact on International Law of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’ in Y Dinstein, M Taborg (eds) War Crimes in International Law (1996) 211. See 
also UN Charter, Article 1 (1). 
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Statute - the Statute being the constituent instrument of the ICTY and the 
exclusive basis for its competence and authority. 113  
 
It is clear that the Rules cannot be contrary to the express language or purpose of 
the Statute.114 The extent to which they may address matters not expressly 
provided for in the Statute is however less clear. According to Morris and Scharf, 
some judges favoured a more innovative approach to the drafting of the Rules, 
following the spirit of the Statute and the principle of justice as guiding principles, 
whereas other judges favoured a more cautious approach. The limited competence 
of the International Tribunal, its unprecedented character and its influence on 
subsequent Tribunals and the ICC, were factors which, some believed, called for 
caution. Because the minutes of the Plenary Sessions are confidential UN 
documents, one can only speculate about which judges favoured the more 
cautious approach and which favoured a more innovative approach and what their 
reasons could have been.  
 
Although the procedure by which States are to comply with their obligations 
under the Statute may be addressed in the Rules, the judges are not authorised to 
create new substantive law or impose new obligations on States under the guise of 
procedural rules. 
 
A further limitation on the scope of the rules result from the independence of the 
Office of the Prosecutor as a separate organ of the ICTY with the exclusively 
responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of cases. The Rules were to 
govern the judicial proceedings from the pre-trial phase through to final appeal 
rather than matters relating to the investigation and prosecution of cases. 
However the responsibility of the judges to ensure a fair trial, extends to ensure 
the rights of a suspect or accused during the investigation or before trial.115 
These limitations also apply to the scope of the Rules of the ICTR.116 
 
11. Are the Rules Binding? 
Rule 89 (A) mandates that the evidentiary rules are binding on the Chambers. 
With the exception of the evidentiary rules, it remains unclear whether the Rules 
are mandatory or discretionary. According to the Rules, non compliance with the 
Rules will not automatically invalidate the act concerned.117 Whereas some see the 
flexibility afforded by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as a positive aspect of 
                                                   
113 The Nuremberg Charter contained an express provision to this effect. It was not however 
considered necessary to include a similar provision in the ICTY Statute or the ICTR Statute. 
Nuremberg Charter Article 13. 
114 It goes without saying that the Rules must also not conflict with the peremptory norms of 
international law. In the event that a rule violates a norm of jus cogens the judges in Plenary could 
remedy the deficiency. See Mundis (note 89) 3. 
115 Morris & Scharf (note 20) 420, 421. 
116 Ibid  419, 420. 
117 Rule 5 states that it may provide grounds for an objection by a party who seeks to invalidate the 
act by decision of a Chamber. 
269
 
the practice of the ad hoc Tribunals, this flexibility and the possible discretionary 
nature of the Rules could also reduce legal certainty and adversely affect the rights 
of the accused. This problem could be addressed by inserting a provision in the 
Rules indicating that their application is mandatory. Because of the prescriptive 
nature of rules, one could argue that the very existence of the Rules implies that 
they should be binding.  
 
12. Ultra Vires Rules 
Bohlander has argued that it is questionable whether judges have the authority to 
adopt punitive sanctions for conduct outside of the criminal offences for which 
the Tribunal has subject matter jurisdiction. He is of the opinion that Rule 77 and 
Rule 91 may be ultra vires to the extent that they seem to criminalise conduct that is 
not provided for in the Statute.  
 
With respect to Rule 77 and Rule 91, Bohlander correctly points out that the 
ICTY Rules governing contempt and the giving of false testimony set forth a 
scheme whereby violators can face lengthy incarceration and fines. He writes: 
‘There can be no debate that [Rule 77] which allows a contemnor to be 
incarcerated for up to 7 years creates a criminal offence, and not some kind of 
administrative sanction’. Bohlander argues that Rule 77 is vulnerable to a challenge 
regarding its legality under the Statute. 
Judge Hunt argues that ICTY Rule 47 (B), which is ultra vires the Statute, sets out 
what constitutes a prima facie case for purposes of confirming an indictment118  He 
writes: 
 
It necessarily follows that - if a prima facie case for the purposes of determining whether 
the accused has a case to answer means that the evidence, if accepted, is such that a 
reasonable Trial Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
accused - it must mean the same thing for the purposes of presenting an indictment to a 
Judge of the Trial Chamber in accordance with Article 18 (4),119 of confirming the 
indictment in accordance with Article 19.120 If this be so, it inevitably follows that ICTY 
Rule 47 (B) is ultra vires the Statute.121 
                                                   
118 Rule 47 (B) reads: 
The Prosecutor, if satisfied in the course of a investigation that there is  
sufficient evidence that to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a  
suspect had committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, shall 
 prepare and forward to the Registrar an indictment for confirmation by a Judge, 
together with supporting material. 
119 ICTY Article 18(4), which concerns investigations and the preparation of an indictment, reads: 
 4. Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prosecutor shall prepare an     
indictment  containing a concise statement of the fact and the crime or crimes with which 
the accused is charged under the Statute. The indictment shall be transmitted to a judge of 
the Trial Chamber. 
120 ICTY Article 19, governing Review of the indictment reads: 
1. The judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been transmitted shall 
review it. 
If satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecutor, he shall 




Judge Hunt concludes that since Rule 47(B) provides a less onerous task for the 
Prosecutor than does Article 18(4), it is inconsistent with the Statute to the 
detriment of fundamental rights of the accused.  
 
According to Mundis there are further examples of Rules that are ultra vires the 
Statute. He writes that one can conclude from Article 17 of the Statute, which 
governs the responsibilities of the Registry as well as from Article 11 which 
describes the Registry as a separate organ that the intention of the Statute was to 
create three independent organs.122 The Registry is an independent organ of the 
Tribunal. According to Mundis there are several examples of rules that impinge 
upon the independence of the Registry and which consequently may be ultra vires 
the Statute. Rule 19 (A), for example, provides that the President shall supervise 
the activities of the Registry. In addition, Rule 33 describes the functions of the 
Registrar and includes a provision putting the Registrar under the authority of the 
President.123 Mundis suggests that there is no reason why guidelines pertaining to 
the functioning of the Registry need to be addressed in the Rules. In his opinion 
these provisions could be re-evaluated to ensure compliance with the Statute and 
could be placed in administrative directives or internal regulations.124 
 
Thus far, no rule has been struck down by a Trial Chamber or the Appeals 
Chamber on the ground that it is ultra vires. It remains to be seen whether a Trial 
Chamber or the Appeals Chamber would do so. The Rules relating to the 
contempt provisions and sanctions are the most likely Rules to be challenged on 
the grounds that they may be ultra vires. 
 
Although the ICTY has not yet been faced with significant contemptuous 
behaviour, the possibility of a challenge remains. Since the judges before whom 
the argument was made may have themselves adopted the Rules in question it 
could be argued that it is unlikely that they will find they exceeded their authority 
by doing so. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor 
, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of 
persons, and any other orders as may be requested for the conduct of the trial. 
121 D Hunt  “The Meaning of a "prima facie case" for the purposes of confirmation” in R May (et 
al) (eds.) Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence I Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 146 (emphasis in 
original; footnotes added). 
122 Mundis (note 89) 17. 
123 Mundis speculates that the reason for the difficulty with the Rules relating to the functioning of 
the Registry concerns the issue of whether the Rules should regulate this matter at all. Although 
Article 15 is broad enough to include ‘other appropriate matters’ within the ambit of the Rules it is 
argued that matters pertaining to the administrative or internal functioning of the Tribunal are best 
left to internal directives or other administrative guidelines. Ibid. 
124  Ibid 19. 
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Another interesting case in this regard is the Vujin Appeals Chamber decision.125 In 
this case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held, with Judge Wald dissenting, that it had 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the merits from one Appeals Chamber bench to 
another, notwithstanding the fact that the ICTY Statute does not provide for such 
jurisdiction. Mr Vujin appealed the decision made by the Appeals Chamber, sitting 
as court of first instance, which found him to be in contempt and levied the fine 
of f15, 000 against him. This forced the issue of whether a right of appeal existed 
in the event that the Appeals Chamber had been the original body to render the 
judgment. The Appeals Chamber, relying on general principles of law that all 
judicial decisions be subject to a right of appeal, determined that an appeal was 
possible. Judge Wald dissented on the grounds that she could find no legal basis 
for permitting an appeal from one Appeals Chamber bench to another.126 
 
Short of plenary action, there appears to be no mechanism for the Chambers to 
abolish rules that may be ultra vires. 
 
13. The Barayagwiza Appeals Chamber Decision 
The clearest example of a case in which the judges amended the Rules for political 
reasons is the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. Barayagwiza was accused of six 
counts of violations of international humanitarian law stemming from his acts 
during the Rwandan genocide.127 He was a member of the radical Hutu party 
‘Coalition for the Defence of the Republic’ and one of the founders of 
‘Radiotelevision Libre des Milles Collines’, which incited hatred against the Tutsi 
population. It was Barayagwiza’s prolonged pre-trial detention that caused 
controversy.128  
 
Barayagwiza was arrested in the Cameroon pursuant to international arrest 
warrants issued by Rwanda and Belgium on 15 April 1996. On 16 May 1996, the 
Prosecutor of the ICTR notified Cameroon that the Tribunal was no longer 
interested in Barayagwiza’s transfer. On 17 February 1997, Cameroon’s courts 
denied Rwanda’s extradition request and ordered Barayagwiza’s release. On the 
same day, however, the Prosecutor again asked that Barayagwiza be held pending 
a decision on the transfer request. On 24 February 1997 the Prosecutor decided to 
follow through with her transfer request. However, Barayagwiza was not sent to 
Arusha, the seat of the ICTR, until 19 November 1997. On 23 February 1998 he 
pleaded guilty to all counts against him. On the next day, Barayagwiza filed an 
                                                   
125 Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1, Appeal Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against prior counsel, 
Milan Vujin, 27 February 2001. 
126 Judge Wald found that the majority of the court decided that the judgment of the first Appeals 
Chamber was a ruling in the ‘first instance’ and did not rectify what she called a ‘fatal omission’ in 
the Rules and Statute. See Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1, Separate Opinion of Judge Wald Dissenting 
from the Finding of Jurisdiction 2. 
127 Amended Indictment Prosecutor v Barayagwiza ICTR-97-19, 11 April 2000. 
128 For more on the ‘halting pace of adjudication at the ICTR’ see Eric Husketh ‘Pole Pole: 
Hastening Justice at UNICTR’ (2005) 3 Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights. 
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‘extremely urgent motion’ that sought to throw out his arrest because he claimed, 
inter alia, that he had been illegally detained. The Trial Chamber of the ICTR 
denied the motion129 and an appeal was filed as a preliminary motion pursuant to 
Rule 72. But on 3 November 1999, in the Barayagwiza Appeals Chamber Decision, the 
Appeals Chamber reversed this decision and ordered that Barayagwiza be returned 
to Cameroon because the length of his detention has been far beyond what would 
be allowed by international human rights standards. The Appeals Chamber 
decided that the fundamental rights of the Appellant had repeatedly been violated 
and that the prosecution’s failure to prosecute the Appellant was tantamount to 
negligence. The indictment against Barayagwiza was dismissed and the Appeals 
Chamber ordered his immediate release.  He was however not set free 
immediately since the prosecution submitted a motion for review.130  
 
In the Barayagwiza Appeals Chamber Decision the court stated that Rule 40 and 40 bis 
had to be read together. Rule 40 sets forth in great detail, the provisions for the 
transfer and provisional detention of suspects. The Appeals Chamber proceeded 
to read the two provisions together and concluded that these Rules must be 
interpreted restrictively. The Chamber stated: 
 
Rule 40 permits the Prosecutor to request any state, in the event of urgency, to arrest a 
suspect and place him in custody. The purpose of Rule 40 bis is to restrict the length of 
time a suspect may be detained without being indicted. We cannot accept that the 
Prosecutor, acting alone under Rule 40, has an unlimited power to keep a suspect under 
provisional detention in a State, when Rule 40 bis places time limits on such detention if 
the suspect is detained at the Tribunal's detention unit.131 
 
The Appeals Chamber undertook an analysis of the two Rules and discussed the 
time frame under which the provisional detention of a suspect was permissible. 
With respect to Rule 40, the Appeals Chamber found that the facts of the case 
notes that the time frame set out in Rule 40 bis (C) did not begin to run until the 
day after the suspect had been transferred to the Tribunal's detention unit.132 The 
Appeals Chamber came to the conclusion that the purpose of Rule 40 and Rule 40 
bis is to limit the time that a suspect may be provisionally detained without the 
issuing of a warrant. The Chamber concluded that if the time limits set forth in 
Rule 40 and Rule 40 bis (H) are not complied with, the Rules mandate that the 
suspect must be released.133 
 
                                                   
129 Prosecutor v Barayagwiza Decision on Extremely Urgent Motion by the Defense for Orders  to 
Review and/or Nullify the Arrest and Provisional Detention  of the Suspect , ICTR-97- 19, 17 
November 1998. 
130 For a summary of the facts see JK Cogan ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: 
Difficulties and Prospects’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 134, 135. 
131 Barayagwiza Decision para 46. Footnote 127 in the decision discusses the principle of effective 
interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) which the Appeals Chamber relied upon in deciding to 
read the two Rules together and restrictively. 




The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Appellant was detained at the behest of 
the Prosecutor from 21 February onwards, notwithstanding the fact that he was 
only transferred to the Tribunal's detention unit on 19 November 1997.134 The 
judges concluded that Cameroon was ‘holding the Appellant in constructive 
custody for the Tribunal by virtue of the Tribunal's lawful process or authority’.135 
 
According to Mundis, the interpretation given by the Appeals Chamber to Rule 40 
bis resulted in a de facto amendment to that Rule.136 This was the case 
notwithstanding the language of paragraph 60 of the Barayagwiza Decision which 
purports to limit the decision to the facts of this case. Since the Appeals Chamber 
has no authority to change the Rules, it is unlikely that it would explicitly state that 
it was effecting an amendment. Mundis explains why he regards this 
‘interpretation’ as a de facto amendment: It is almost impossible to imagine a 
scenario where the procedure set out in Rule 40 and Rule 40 bis would not meet 
the constructive custody criteria as set out in the Barayagwiza Decision. In other 
words, whenever a State holds a suspect pursuant to Rule 40 that State will always 
be doing so as an agent of the Tribunal and consequently, the accused will always 
be in the Tribunal's custody.137 There will never be a case where the accused is 
kept in the custody of the Cameroon (or another country) and not also be kept in 
the custody of the Tribunal. The important result of this is that Rule 40 bis (C) 
which provides that the time limits set out in Rule 40 bis do not start to run until 
after the suspect has been transferred to the detention unit has been rendered 
meaningless.  Because the Appeals Chamber does not have the authority to amend 
the Rules, it will seek to limit its decision to the specific case in front of it. Yet, 
when confronted with two ‘irreconcilable’ Rules, as in the Barayagwiza case, the 
interpretation agreed upon by the judges might result in an ‘amendment’ which 
would inevitably affect other similar cases. 
 
 It is submitted that interpreting rules in a way that could have the same effect as 
an amendment is more acceptable than changing a rule in a plenary session and 
less of an infringement on the principle of legality. Judges interpret law every time 
they decide on the meaning of a law. Interpretation is considered less of a 
usurpation of the ‘legislative’ role than explicit acts of lawmaking.138 
 
14. The Barayagwiza Reconsideration Decision 
The first decision of the Appeals Chamber to release Barayagwiza unleashed a 
storm of criticism by the Rwandan Government against the Tribunal and the 
Rwandan Government threatened to withhold all forms of cooperation with the 
                                                   
134 Ibid para 54. 
135 Ibid paras. 55-60. 
136Mundis (note 89) 13. 
137 Ibid  
138 Judge Wald agrees that rulemaking is a legislative task (note 71).  
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ICTR.139 Without the cooperation of the Rwandan Government the ICTR could 
not have continued its work. The ICTR Prosecutor was confronted with the very 
real possibility that the ICTR would disintegrate and assured the Rwandan 
government that she would do everything in her power to convince the Appeals 
Chamber to reverse its decision. 
 
While the Barayagwiza Reconsideration Decision was pending, the ICTR judges met in 
Arusha at the seventh ICTR Plenary meeting and amended Rule 72. The judges 
added Rule 72 (H) to further define what constitutes ‘an objection based on the 
form of the indictment’, thereby limiting appeals under Sub-Rule 72 (B)(i) and 
Sub-Rule 72 (D). Sub-Rule 72 (I) was added which requires a bench of three 
Appeals Chamber judges to review appeals brought under Sub-Rule 72 (D) to 
ensure that the new requirements set out in Sub-Rule 72 (H) were met.140  
 
The effect of this amendment was that whereas under the original Rule, an 
accused could file an interlocutory appeal as of right from a Trial Chamber 
decision regarding the legality of his arrest, the amendments made to Rule 72 
made such an appeal virtually impossible. Rule 72 D states that preliminary 
motions are without interlocutory appeal except under very limited circumstances. 
Fear that other accused could challenge the legality of their arrest which would 
lead to similar problems, might have prompted the judges to amend this Rule in 
such a restrictive and conservative manner. The procedural precedent set by the 
Barayagwiza Decision whereby an accused could challenge the legality of his arrest, 
detention and transfer to the custody of the Tribunal, was reversed by the 
amendment to Rule 72. Any future appeal under Rule 72 concerning issues 
surrounding unlawful arrest, detention or transfer would fail under the new test 
set forth in ICTR Sub-rule 72 (H) and (I). 
 
On 31 March 2000, following a rehearing in light of the Prosecutor's Motion for 
Review,141 the Appeals Chamber reversed the holding of the Barayagwiza Decision. 
On the basis of new information before it, the Appeals Chamber found that the 
                                                   
139 Rwanda refused to grant a visit to the ICTR Prosecutor and Rwanda refused to allow sixteen 
Rwandan witnesses to travel to the court to testify. See ‘Rwanda Bars UN Tribunal Prosecutor; Visa 
Refused After Court Freed Genocide Suspect’ Washington Post  23 November 1999 at A24.  
140 As amended on 21 February 2000, Sub-Rules 72 (H) and (I) read as follows: 
72(H) For the purpose of Rule 72 (B) (i) and (D), an ‘objection based on lack of jurisdiction’ refers 
exclusively to a motion which challenges an indictment on the ground that it does not relate to: 
 
(i)  any of the persons indicated in Articles 1, 5, 6 and 8 of the Statute,                                             
(ii) the territories indicated in Articles 1, 7 and 8 of the Statute; 
(iii) any of the violations indicated in Articles 2,3,4 and 6 of the Statute 
 
(I) An appeal brought under Rule 72 (D) may not be proceeded with if a bench of three judges, 
assigned by the Presiding Judge of the Appeals Chamber, decides that the Appeal is not capable of 
satisfying the requirements of paragraph (H), in which case the Appeal shall be dismissed. 
141 The Review was filed pursuant to Article 25 of the ICTR Statute. 
275
 
Appellant was already aware of the general nature of the charges against him by 3 
May 1996 (an earlier date than the date claimed by the Defence) and that the delay 
in transferring the Appellant to the seat of the Tribunal could not be attributed to 
the Prosecutor but was due to the attitude of the Cameroon.142 
 
This is an example of a case where the judges in Plenary reversed a decision of a 
Trial Chamber by enacting a subsequent amendment to the Rules. It is submitted 
that an amendment to the Rules should only be made in exceptional 
circumstances and not to change the effect of a single judgment. Several other 
detainees have also been arrested and transferred in circumstances similar to those 
forming the basis of the Barayagwiza appeal. In light of the strong reaction of the 
Rwandan government to the Barayagwiza decision it would be safe to assume that 
the amendment made to Rule 72 was made in response to this decision. It is of 
course undesirable to amend rules because of political considerations. However it 
could be argued that this was a case of political necessity and that the law is often 
influenced by policy considerations. 
 
In a dissenting opinion to the Barayagwiza Reconsideration Decision, Judge 
Shahabuddeen stated that the way the Appeals Chamber interpreted Rule 40 and 
Rule 40 bis was ‘directed at changing the substance of the purpose of the text’ and 
amounted to legislation instead of interpretation.143 In his commentary on the 
case, Swart writes that the conclusions reached by the Appeals Chamber are not 
warranted by a literal reading of these Rules.144According to Swart it is obvious 
from the text of Rule 40 that the relevant time periods start to run from the 
moment a suspect is transferred to the Tribunal and no earlier.145 If one interprets 
the Rule in this way no violation of the rights of the accused had occurred. It 
seems that the Appeals Chamber, worried by the implications of a literal 
interpretation, which could mean that an accused could be held in provisional 
detention in a State for an indefinite period, borrowed the ‘constructive custody’ 
concept from the case law of the United States on interstate extradition to solve 
the problem. It could also be argued that amending rules could be undesirable in 
itself (as it threatens legal certainty) regardless of whether the amendment may 
benefit the accused. According to Swart the Tribunal could have found solutions, 
other than amendment, to protect the suspect against unwarranted delays, for 
example by referring to Article 20 of the ICTR Statute which is concerned with 
                                                   
142 The Appeals Chamber also found that the initial appearance of the Appellant was deferred with 
the consent of his counsel. In the opinion of the Appeals Chamber all of these facts diminished ‘the 
role played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as the intensity of the violations of the rights of 
the Appellant’. It was decided that if the Appellant was found not guilty he should receive financial 
compensation for the violation of his rights. On the other hand, if he were to be found guilty, his 
sentence should be reduced to take account of the violation of his rights. See the Commentary by B 
Swart in A Klip, G Sluiter (eds) Annotated Leading cases of International Criminal Tribunals, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1999) 207. 
143 Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 3 November 1999. 




the rights of the accused.146 It could also be argued that amending rules could be 
undesirable in itself (as it threatens legal certainty) regardless of whether the 
amendment may benefit the accused.  
 
15.  Abuse of discretion? The Kupreskic Deposition Decision 
The Appeals Chamber Decision on depositions in Kupreskic and Others147 provides 
a good example of a situation in which the judges disapproved of a decision on 
the grounds of the application of a rule. In this case, the Appeals Chamber was 
faced with an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the Trial Chamber relating 
to depositions taken pursuant to Rule 71. 
 
The facts of the Kupreskic Deposition Decision are as follows: During the trial 
proceedings the Presiding Judge informed the parties that one of the judges was ill 
and was unlikely to attend the hearings for the remainder of the week. Following 
prompting by the Presiding Judge the Prosecution requested that depositions be 
taken pursuant to Rule 71 from the defence witnesses scheduled to be heard 
during this time period. Counsel for the accused opposed this motion on the 
ground that the full trial Chamber should hear such evidence since the witnesses 
were going to give evidence /testify on specific facts relating to the charges against 
the accused. The Presiding Judge made a written ruling the following day 
overruling the defence objection. The grounds were that the circumstances were 
exceptional and that the interests of justice demanded a fair and expeditious 
trial.148 Two defence witnesses proceeded to testify by way of deposition. As a 
third defence witness was about to depose, the defence filed an application for 
leave to appeal under Rule 73 and the deposition proceedings were discontinued. 
 
The Appeals Chamber, with Judge Hunt filing a separate opinion but concurring 
in the result, reversed the Trial Chamber, relying inter alia on the plain and ordinary 
meaning of Rule 71, Article 12 and Rule 15 (E).   
 
Rule 71 provides that a Trial Chamber may order that a deposition be taken, whilst article 
12 of the Statute stipulates that a Trial Chamber shall be composed of three Judges. Given 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the latter provision, a Trial Chamber is only competent 
to act as a Trial Chamber per se if it comprises three Judges. The Appeals Chamber, 
therefore, finds that the ruling was null and void since it was rendered without jurisdiction 
with regard to [the defence witnesses] heard pursuant to the ruling.149 
 
The rules underlying the Kupreskic Deposition Decision were subsequently amended at 
the twenty-first Plenary, held on 15- 17 November 1999 - four months after the 
decision was rendered. Sub-rule 15 (e) and (F) were deleted and a new rule, Rule 
15 bis was adopted covering situations where the judges are absent for a period of 
                                                   
146 Ibid. 
147 Prosecutor v Kupreskic and Others, Decision on Appeal by Dragan Papic Against Ruling to Proceed 
by Deposition, IT-95-16-AR73.3, 15 July 1999 (‘Kupreskic Deposition Decision’). 
148 Mundis (note 89) 11. 
149 Kupreskic Deposition Decision (note 147) para 14. 
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less than three days. Rule 71 was also amended, removing some of the procedural 
hurdles in adopting the deposition procedure.150 
 
The judges abused their discretion by amending Rule 71. Does the illness of a 
judge really constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’? It is submitted that the defence 
was entitled to have the depositions heard by the full Trial Chamber and that the 
judges amended this Rule because it resulted in an unsatisfactory outcome. It must 
be asked whether the judges should always be satisfied by the outcome of a Rule. 
Is it not the function of a judge to apply a Rule even if it is inconvenient or does 
not suit his purposes? 
 
16. Amending to Expedite 
The ICTY has often been criticised for the slow pace at which the trials are 
proceeding. In their current preoccupation with expediting trials the judges are 
faced with the challenge of reconciling the human rights guarantees enshrined in 
the Statute of the ICTY with the competing need to expedite proceedings. The 
ICTY judges have publicly acknowledged the need to expedite trials.151  Apart 
from considerations of procedural fairness, an important reason for expediting 
trials is the rapid growth in the number of accused at the ICTY. According to 
Mundis there has been an evolution of the Rules from a system driven primarily 
by the parties to a system in which judges play a more active role.152 
 
An example of an amendment that had a drastic impact on the expedition of trials 
is the amendment of Rule 89 and the adoption of Rule 92 bis. At the twenty-third 
Plenary session of the ICTY in December 2000, the judges adopted Rule 92 bis 
entitled ‘Proof of Facts other than by Oral Evidence’. The purpose of this Rule is 
to enable a Trial Chamber to admit into evidence written statements containing 
evidence which would otherwise be led in testimonial form.153 Rule 92 bis has 
already had a dramatic impact on the way parties present their cases. Another 
good example is the application made to the Registrar in the Plavsic case, in which 
the prosecution identified 170 witnesses from whom it wished to present written 
statements pursuant to Rule 92 bis (A).154 
 
                                                   
150 One of the consequences of this amendment was to override a decision of the Appeals Chamber 
that a Chamber could not sit in deposition with less than a full bench over an objection by one of 
the parties. 
151 See the seventh Annual Report of the ICTY, A/55/273-S/2000/777, 7 August 2000. The ICTY 
judges bought the issue to the attention of the ICC PrepComm in the hope that the ICC will not be 
troubled by similar difficulties. See the remarks of Judge Richard May at Fourth Session of the ICC 
PrepComm released as ICTY Press Release JL/PIS/479-E available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p491-e. 
152 Mundis (note 45) 369. 
153 Boas (note 11) 73. 
154 Prosecutor v Plavsic and Krajianik IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Application to the Registrar for Presiding 
Officers Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 7 May 2001. 
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Amendments were also made to Rule 89, entitled ‘General Provisions’ which 
amended the preference for live witness testimony. Prior to the amendments, Rule 
90 (A) indicated a preference for live testimonial evidence: ‘Subject to Rule 71 and 
71 bis, witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers’. At the 
Plenary, Rule 90 (A) was deleted and Rule 89 (F) created: ‘A Chamber may receive 
the evidence of a witness orally, or where the interests of justice allow, in written 
form’. It is not yet clear what is meant by the words ‘in the interests of justice’ in 
this context155. 
 
The judges were given the power to control the amount of evidence received 
during a trial. The Trial Chambers have exercised their power to control the 
evidence that will be admitted into proceedings.156 Rule 90(G), a new provision, 
was added157 which specifically provides that a Trial Chamber ‘may refuse to hear 
a witness whose name does not appear on the list of witnesses compiled pursuant 
to Rules 73 bis (C) and 73 ter (C)’. As a result the judges now not only see the 
witness list but, where a party seeks to present a witness not previously agreed to, 
the judges may refuse the evidence. This provision, and other similar provisions, 
give judges substantial power over the conduct of the proceedings. The idea was 
to narrow the facts in issue at the pre-trial stage. 
 
The judges also amended rules regarding pre-trial management. At the twenty first 
Plenary session the judges overhauled the pre-trial case management provisions at 
the Tribunal. Rule 65ter was amended in November 1999 so as to increase the pre-
trial judge's powers in the conduct and preparation of the pre-trial proceedings. 
The amendments in this context broaden the powers and functions of the pre-trial 
judges. It was believed that better pre-trial management will result in speedier 
trials.158 The pre-trial judge may submit a file to the Trial Chamber which will 
form the basis of orders given by the trial chamber to the prosecution or the 
defence to reduce the list of witnesses.159 Judge Jorda’s reform programme 
proposed that some of the powers of the pre-trial judge with regard to judicial 
administration be delegated to the senior legal officers of the Trial Chambers and 
the adoption of ad litem judges.160 To achieve this, Rule 65 was amended on 17 
November 1999. Rule 65 ter (D) (i) states that a pre-trial judge may be assisted in 
the performance of his duties by one of the Senior Legal Officers assigned to 
Chambers. 
  
Amendments were also made to restrict the amount of witnesses parties may call. 
Rule 73 bis and Rule 73 ter were amended to enable the Trial Chamber to set the 
                                                   
155 For an extensive discussion of the history of this amendment, see Boas (note 11) 73-78. 
156 See the discussion of case management in Boas (note 11) 60-72. 
157 At the extraordinary session of the plenary in April 2001. 
158 Encompassing Rule 72, 73bis, 73 ter and 90 
159 The file might include a report by the pre-trial judge, highlighting the issues which truly warrant 
litigation at trial. This is intended to give more teeth to the Trial Chamber’s case management. 
160 Jorda Report (note 40) paras 93 – 95. 
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number of witnesses parties may call as well as the length of time available to the 
parties to conduct their case.161 Rule 65 ter (D) provides that the pre-trial judge 
must establish a work plan setting forth the pre-trial obligations of the parties. The 
pre-trial judge will order the parties to meet and discuss questions relating to the 
preparation of the case.162 
 
Another time-saving device is Rule 87 (C). This rule was added to permit the Trial 
Chamber to render one combined verdict which includes sentence.163 This 
obviated the need for a separate sentencing hearing. This means that the parties 
are permitted to introduce evidence that is relevant for sentencing purposes during 
the trial and prior to conviction.164 
 
One of the measures implemented to improve efficiency at the Tribunals was the 
appointment of ad litem judges. Provision was made for the appointment of a pool 
of 27 ad litem judges to increase the capacity of the Trial Chambers to hear cases. 
Twenty three rules were amended to bring the Rules in line with the statutory 
limitations on the duties of ad litem judges and to limit their role to trial 
functions.165 
 
The Rules of the ICC have been influenced by the ICTY Rules. The ICC Rules 
mirror the ICTY and ICTR Rules in many respects.166 The ICC Statute, for 
example, establishes a pre-trial division of six judges,167 imbues the pre-trial judge 
with many powers, including the power to authorise the Prosecutor to conduct an 
investigation168 and making orders dealing with the investigation, victims and 
witnesses and the preservation of pre-trial evidence.169 The ICC Statute and Rules, 
do not however contain some of the radical provisions under the ICTY Rules 
which gives far-reaching powers to the pre-trial judges.  
 
The judges of the ICC might opt for a more jurisprudential oriented development 
of its Rules. Instead of re-codifying the developments as has happened at the ad 
hoc Tribunals, the ICC, if it wants to amend its Rules, may do so through the 
development of precedent as part of the interpretation and application of its 
                                                   
161 Rule 73bis (E); Rule 73ter (E). Parties may be granted additional time ‘if this is in the interest of 
justice’. Rule 73bis (F); Rule 73ter (F). 
162 Rule 65ter (D) (v). 
163 See Mundis (note 45) 372. 
164 Rule 86 has been clarified to permit the parties to address sentencing matters in their closing 
arguments. 
165 The following rules were amended to indicate the distinction between permanent and ad litem 
judges: 2, 6, 7bis, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 40bis, 45, 55, 59bis, 62, 65bis, 65ter, 9bis and 
124. See  D  Mundis ‘The Election of Ad Litem Judges and Other Recent Developments at the 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2001) 14  LJIL 858. 
166 Boas (note 41) 277. 
167 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 39 (1). 
168 Ibid Article 15 (4). 
169 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Articles 57 and 58. 
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Rules.170 Such an approach would be less likely to infringe upon the principle of 
legality. Since the ICC Rules are more comprehensive than the ICTY and ICTR 
Rules, they may escape the need for significant re-evaluation and amendment. 
 
It should be noted that expedition is not necessarily in favour of the accused if the 
amendments made to expedite trials infringe on the rights of the accused in other 
ways. Hurried justice could also be justice denied. It is important that, when a trial 
has already started, an amendment should only be made if it is ultimately in favour 
of the accused. The accused should benefit from such an amendment both 
procedurally and substantively. Pre-trial management should not lead to pre-
judging. Doubt can be cast on the practice of extending powers traditionally held 
by judges to senior legal officers. Legal officers are not subject to the same 
requirements of independence and impartiality expected of judges. There is no 
doubt that expeditious trials are important but it can be asked whether the ICTY 
is not overzealous in its amendment of the Rules in an attempt to compensate for 
its earlier inefficiency and delays.171 In 1998 Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 
warned against rushed trials: ‘We should not force ourselves into a grand prix race. 
Our goal is not to try cases with lightning speed, but to try cases making efficient 
use of court time.’172   
 
17. Conclusion  
What happens to the rules is important. According to Franck it is the object of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to manifest the fairness of the judicial process in 
dispute resolution.173 Changes to the Rules should be made with sensitivity to 
procedural fairness and the principle of legality. The principle of legality requires 
rules to be fixed, clear and certain. Although it is possible that some amendments 
could fill gaps in the Statute, eliminate shortcomings and illuminate obscurities, 
frequent amendments clearly pose a serious threat to legal certainty. The accused 
should be in a position to prepare a defence without fearing that his trial may be 
upset by the making of amendments. 
 
The Tribunals’ response to objections regarding the frequency and nature of 
amendments has been unsatisfactory, almost dismissive. Their pronouncements 
are often highly rhetorical with continued emphasis being laid on the ‘inevitability’ 
of changing the Rules and ‘the need for flexibility’. In spite of the Tribunals’ 
alleged concern for procedural fairness it is feared that prodigious procedural 
lawmaking may result in inadequate protection of the rights of the accused. 
                                                   
170 Boas (note 41) 276. 
171 Judge Patrick Robinson wrote: ‘The challenge facing the Tribunal is to ensure that it does not 
overreact to concerns of the international community about the slow pace of trials, by devising 
procedures that facilitate expeditiousness, but which infringe the rights of the accused.’ See P 
Robinson ‘Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’ (2000) 11 EJIL 589. 
172 ICTY Press Release, 16 July 1998. 




 In light of the controversial, some say thin, basis for their authority,174 the judges 
should be more circumspect when making and amending rules. Alternative 
solutions could be found to the making of amendments. In a case such as the 
Barayagwiza Decision where the Tribunal was confronted with seemingly conflicting 
rules, the judges may make use of rules or conventions of interpretation to solve 
the conflict. Introducing a procedure for the review of proposed and amended 
rules will help the judges maintain their authority and credibility. The current 
practice of frequently changing rules could strengthen the perception that the 






                                                   
174 See the questions relating to the legality and legitimacy of the establishment of the Tribunals in 
Chapter 1. The ‘political’ nature of judicial appointments, discussed in Chapter 3, could also taint 






May Tribunal judges make law? The Report of the Secretary General is 
unambiguous on this matter. It states that the ICTY can apply only lex lata, 
existing law.1 This is consistent with how the Tribunals have interpreted their 
mandate. It was argued in Tadic that the Security Council could not create criminal 
liability on the part of individuals.2 Since the Tribunals were created by the 
Security Council the ad hoc Tribunals could similarly not create such liability.  
 
If however one interprets ‘law’ broadly, as including both written and unwritten 
law, substantive and procedural law, hard law and soft law, it is difficult to 
maintain that Tribunal judges have not made law. If, moreover, one compares the 
function and position of Tribunal judges to the functions of ICJ judges and if one 
interprets the mandate and role of the Tribunals liberally one has to allow for 
some judicial creativity. The need for judicial lawmaking has long been recognised 
at the ICJ. To repeat the words of Judge Tanaka: ‘We cannot deny the possibility 
of some degree of creative element in their judicial activities. What is not 
permitted to judges, is to establish law independently of an existing legal system, 
institution or norm.’3  Since the ad hoc Tribunals, similar to the ICJ, are legal 
organs of the United Nations what is true for the ICJ must be true a fortiori for the 
ad hoc Tribunals who face the additional obstacle of having to apply the 
underdeveloped system of international criminal law. 
 
What are the arguments in favour of and against judicial lawmaking at the 
Tribunals? What are the arguments in favour of judicial restraint?  It is argued here 
that these questions cannot be considered without considering the peculiarities of 
international criminal law as well as the particular context of the ad hoc Tribunals.  
 
There seems to be many arguments in favour of accepting or permitting judicial 
lawmaking in the sphere of international criminal law and specifically at the 
Tribunals. The most important arguments addressed in this study are the 
following:   
 
(i) International criminal law is a rudimentary form of law.4 It has been argued that 
the unwritten rudimentary nature of international criminal law affects the 
lawmaking of international judges. The unwritten nature of rules of international 
                                                   
1 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) (presented 
3 May 1993) (S/25704) para 34. 
2 Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-T Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 10 August 1995, para 
2.  
3 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966,  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, 
ICJ Reports 1966, 277. 
4 See A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 17. 
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criminal law makes these rules relatively indeterminate.5 It also makes the rules 
more flexible and easy to manipulate. Because there is less law and less precedent 
in international criminal law, making law would be more appropriate than in a 
system of written rules. Instead of being passive law appliers, Tribunal judges must 
be understood as builders of a system. 
 
(ii) The humanisation of humanitarian law is an argument in favour of extending 
the protection of humanitarian law to areas that have previously been unaffected 
by humanitarian law. In this regard Meron writes of the ‘strong pull towards 
normativity’.6  In the spirit of the Martens Clause one would argue that 
international humanitarian law should be interpreted consistently with the 
principles of humanity. This idea is reflected in Shahabuddeen’s Opinion in the 
Nuclear Weapons case in which he stated that ‘in effect the Martens Clause provided 
authority for treating the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience as principles of international law’.7  
 
Tadic provides one of the best examples of the maximum extension of the 
protection of humanitarian law. In the Tadic Appeals Judgment it is stated that 
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is directed at protecting civilians to 
the maximum extent possible.8 It seems as if the Appeals Chamber uses the 
‘maximum protection’ argument as a justification to extend the law at the possible 
risk of violating the principle of legality.   
The protection of humanitarian law has also been extended through the use of 
purposive interpretation. This mode of interpretation advances the purpose of the 
ICTY Statute: to provide a criminal forum for the punishment of those who have 
perpetrated especially serious violations of international humanitarian law.9 In the 
Tadic case the Appeals Chamber decided to abandon the literal definition of 
protected persons and (in the spirit of purposive interpretation) focused more on 
the factor of allegiance than formal nationality in determining the protective 
regime.10 By finding that the Bosnian Serbs acted as de facto agents of another state 
(the FRY), the Appeals Chamber also expanded the scope of protection of 
humanitarian law.11 
 
(iii) The Martens Clause also influences the formation of custom. Cassese writes 
that, because of the influence of the Martens Clause usus and opinio juris, elements 
                                                   
5 Ibid. 
6 T Meron ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and the Dictates of the Public Conscience’ 
(2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 78. 
7 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, ICJ Reports, 1996, 226, 406. 
8Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999 para 168. 
9A M Danner & J S Martinez ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command  
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’ (2005) 93  California Law  
Review 132 
10 Tadic (note 8) para 163 – 169. 
11 Ibid  para 168. 
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of customary law, play a different role in humanitarian law than in international 
law generally.12 According to him it seems ‘logically permissible’ to infer that that 
the requirement of state practice does not need to apply to the formation of a 
principle or rule based on the laws of humanity or dictates of public conscience.13 
This has a dramatic impact on the sources of international criminal law and leads 
to a loosening of the standards applied to determine the existence of custom. This 
‘loosening’ of the criteria for establishing custom facilitates and encourages 
lawmaking.  
 
The Kupreskic case is an example of a case in which the judges resorted to the 
Martens Clause in the absence of sufficient state practice for the determination of 
custom. In considering the question of the legality of reprisals against civilians, the 
Trial Chamber in Kupreskic examined whether states not party to Protocol 1 were 
nevertheless bound by the rules on reprisals. The Trial Chamber conceded that 
state practice did not support the proposition that custom had evolved on this 
subject but nevertheless found that in this area the imperatives of humanity or public 
conscience weighed heavily in its favour and that from those imperatives it was 
possible to deduce opinio necessitatis, which was sufficient to establish customary 
law.14 
 
(iv) Some argue that in the context of international adjudication judges need not 
be as constrained by the principle of legality as would be the case in national 
jurisdictions. With regard to the applicability of nullum crimen sine lege, Bassiouni and 
Manikas point to various factors that need to be taken into account specifically in 
the context of international criminal law.15 These factors include the lack of 
international legislative policies and standards, the ad hoc process of technical 
drafting and the assumption that international criminal law norms will be 
embodied in the national criminal norms of various states.16 Bassiouni writes that 
the principle of legality should be adjusted in international criminal law and should 
take the form of nullum crimen sine iure – no crime without some law.17 What is still 
required is the existence of a legal prohibition arising under conventional or 
customary international law declaring certain conduct to be prohibited or 
punishable. Somewhat similarly, Triffterer argues that it is only the ‘core’ of the 
principle of legality that applies in international law.18 According to Triffterer this 
‘core’ is the principle that, in order to prevent arbitrariness every state 
                                                   
12 A Cassese International Law (2001) 122. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Prosecutor v Kupreskic IT-95-16, 14 January 2000 
15 M C Bassiouni & P Manikas The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(1996) 265. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid  290. 
18 O Triffterer ‘Bestandsaufnahme zum Völkerrecht’, in G Hankel & G Stuby (eds) Strafgerichte gegen 




infringement on the liberty of individuals must be bound to an existing norm.19 
Bassiouni and Triffterer suggest that the principle of legality can be loosened or 
relaxed in the context of international criminal law.20 This shows an acceptance of 
a measure of judicial activism.  
 
(v) An ‘historical’ argument can be made that because lawmaking took place (even 
to the extent of infringing the nullum crimen principle) at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
lawmaking should similarly be acceptable at the ad hoc Tribunals. The inclusion of 
the crime against the peace (the ‘supreme crime’) in the Nuremberg Charter, was 
very controversial and would be one of the best examples of an innovative Charter 
provision which violated the principle of legality.21 It is argued here that because 
of the historical, symbolic and moral authority of the Nuremberg trials lawmaking 
at Nuremberg set a precedent for lawmaking at the ICTY and ICTR.  
 
(vi) Lauterpacht writes that it is the indirect purpose of the ICJ to develop 
international law.22 This view is supported by pronouncements made by other ICJ 
judges. Judge Shahabuddeen disagreed with the idea that the ICJ may only develop 
the law in the limited sense of bringing out the true meaning of existing law in 
relation to particular facts.23 Judge Alvarez finds it difficult to say where 
development ends and where the creation of law begins.24 Judge Tanaka similarly 
stated that the line between declaring the law and making the law is very fine and 
difficult to determine.25 He makes provision for some creative element and for the 
filling of some lacunae in the law. It may be argued that the ICJ, as an organ which 
can be expected to develop international law should take a wide interpretation of 
the scope of its task.26 It is argued that the increasing importance and relevance of 
the jurisprudence of the Tribunals also calls for ‘wider application’ of the scope of 
the task of the Tribunals. It is argued here that development of international 
criminal law can be seen as one of the purposes of the Tribunal. This is an argument 
in favour of bold judicial action at the Tribunals. 
 
Judges avoid the use of terms suggesting that they make law and prefer to use 
terms which indicate that all they are doing is to work out the true meaning of 
existing legal principles – they are just interpreting or developing the law. 
However, when judges interpret law or do what they consider to be ‘developing’ 
                                                   
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 M Boot Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2001)186, 187. 
22 H Lauterpacht The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958) 66. 
23M  Shahabuddeen Precedent in the World Court  (1996) 68. 
24 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 1949, 
Individual Opinion by Judge Alvarez, ICJ Reports, 1949, 190.  
25 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966,  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka 
ICJ Reports 1966, 277 
26 Lauterpacht (note 22) 83. 
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the law they are often making law. In this study the term ‘lawmaking’ has not 
covered every application and interpretation of the law. The term ‘lawmaking’ was 
understood as covering instances where the Tribunals extended the law to new 
areas or filled legal gaps.   
 
(vii) If one accepts Lauterpacht’s view that the finding of a non liquet in 
international law is prohibited, such prohibition could also operate in favour of 
judicial activism. The non liquet doctrine is premised on the idea of international 
law as a complete system and arises when a court refuses to give a decision after it 
has already assumed jurisdiction and when the refusal is based ‘on the absence or 
insufficiency of the applicable substantive law’.27 Some, such as Lauterpacht, 
believe that it follows from the prohibition of a non liquet in international law that a 
judge has a duty never to refuse to give a decision ‘on the ground that the law is 
non-existent, or controversial, or uncertain and lacking in clarity’.28 If one agrees 
that there exists a prohibition on declaring a non liquet in international law it 
follows that judges have no choice but to make law when gaps arise in the law. 
 
(viii) It has been argued that the raison d’etre of general principles as a source of 
international law is to provide for judicial lawmaking. The role of general 
principles is to provide guidelines for the proper interpretation of the law when 
specific rules prove insufficient. According to Starke general principles were 
inserted into the ICJ Statute in order to provide an additional basis for a decision 
if there were no other materials to rely on.29 Lauterpacht claims that Article 38 (1), 
stating that the ICJ is bound to apply ‘the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations’, was drafted in order to prevent the possibility of a non liquet.30  
 
 In Furundzija the ICTY Trial Chamber held that the definition of rape as a crime 
against humanity resulted from the convergence of the principles of the major 
systems of the world.31 The Trial Chamber stated that these principles may be 
derived ‘with all due caution’ from national law.32 
 
(ix) The fact that judges make law in domestic jurisdictions, especially in common 
law jurisdictions is an argument in favour of accepting judicial lawmaking in the 
international sphere. Tribunal judges come from different backgrounds and 
systems and to an extent, continue to do what they did at home. It is only natural 
for common law judges to understand their function as developing and to some 
extent ‘making’ law.33  
                                                   
27 H Lauterpacht ‘Some Observations on the Prohibition of  ‘Non Liquet’ and the Completeness of 
the Law’ in Symbolae Verzijl Vol 2 ( 1958)  199. 
28 Ibid  216. 
29 J G Starke Introduction to International Law (1989) 32. 
30 Lauterpacht (note 22)  205–6.  
31Prosecutor v Furundzija IT-95-17, 10 December 1998 para 174 -181. 
32 Ibid. 




(x) Adventurous lawmaking by the judges has often been justified by the claim that 
the Tribunals, being new and sui generis, need a certain flexibility34 and the 
opportunity to correct errors and shortcomings in the drafting of the Statutes and 
Rules and in the institutional structure and conception of the ICTY and ICTR. 
Cassese has, for example, explained the frequent amendments made to the rules 
by stating that ‘our whole enterprise is a step into the unknown’.35  
 
(xi) An argument in favour of judicial activism can also be made by relying on the 
status of ius cogens norms. The crimes that the accused before the Tribunals are 
charged with are often so severe that they shock the conscience of the 
international community and violate ius cogens. A measure of judicial activism could 
be justified if it results in effectively prosecuting crimes of such magnitude. The 
Eichmann court justified its non-adherence to the principle of legality by 
emphasising that one’s sense of justice should recoil from the non-punishment of 
a person who participated in outrages such as the odious crimes committed by 
Eichmann.36  The moral repulsion expressed by the judges at the Tribunals is 
often used as a justification for not adhering to strict principles of justice. 
Such are the arguments for judicial activism. Compelling arguments for judicial 
restraint at the ICTY and ICTR have also been made in this study. The most 
important are: 
 
(i) First and foremost, international judges should exercise caution because of the 
critical role the principle of legality plays in international criminal law. According 
to Mettraux judicial creativity poses a direct challenge to the principle of legality.37  
 
This principle of legality occupies a central place in the criminal law of civil law 
jurisdictions and in international human rights instruments.  In national law the 
rationale for the principle of legality is that it acts as a safeguard against the 
arbitrary exercise of authority by the state over its subjects. The rationale in 
international criminal law is that individuals should not be punished or deprived of 
their freedom by international courts without prior warning in the form of prior 
written law.38 In international criminal law the applicability of the nullum crimen 
principle may be a matter of debate but it is important that the Tribunal respects 
its original intentions in this regard. The importance of the ICTY's adherence to 
the legality principle is expressed not only in the Secretary General's Report but 
                                                   
34 See G Boas ‘Development in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court’ (2001) 12 Criminal Law 
Forum 1. 
35 Address of Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY, to the UN General Assembly (4 November 
1997). 
36 Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, Israel Supreme Court (1968) 36 ILR 282. 
37 G Mettraux International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (2005) 17. 
38 F Allen The Habits of Legality  (1996) 5.  
288
  
also in Article 25 (1) of the ICTY Statute39 and in the first case before the ICTY, 
Prosecutor v Tadic.40 It was initially understood that the law of the Tribunal must 
come from existing international criminal law or the national law of the situs of the 
conduct alleged to be criminal.41 It is submitted that the founding principles and 
pronouncements of the Tribunals regarding their adherence to the legality 
principle do not correspond to their current practice.42  The various definitions of 
rape formulated in the Furundzija,43 Kunarac44 and Akayesu45 cases provide vivid 
examples of an infringement of the principle of legality. An accused in Rwanda or 
the former Yugoslavia could not have been in a position to know that forced oral 
penetration, for example, constitutes rape and not sexual assault. 
 
The principle of legality requires rules to be fixed, clear and certain. The 
proliferation of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the many amendments 
the judges have made to the Rules form an important example of a violation of 
the principle of legality.  It is of course problematic for judges to not only apply, 
but also make and amend rules. Amendments were even made for political 
reasons.  The most vivid example of such an amendment was the amendments 
made as a result of political pressure by the Rwandan government in the 
Barayagwiza case.46 
 
The rationale for many of the amendments (such as the amendments to Rule 
65ter) was to expedite trials. Some of these amendments dramatically increase the 
powers of the pre-trial judge in the conduct and preparation of the pre-trial 
proceedings. In order to expedite trials Tribunal judges have also indicated a 
preference for written evidence instead of oral evidence.47 It is doubtful whether 
these amendments comply with the requirements of procedural justice. The 
argument that considerations of expedience and flexibility calls for amendments to 
the rules does not outweigh the importance of the procedural justice and the 
principle of legality. 
 
                                                   
39 Although the ICTY and ICTR Statutes do not explicitly refer to the principle of legality, Article 
25 states that in determining the penalties imposed by the Tribunal, the Trial Chambers shall have 
recourse to ‘the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia’. 
The ICTR Statute contains a similar provision. The word ‘Rwanda’ replaces ‘former Yugoslavia’. 
The principle of legality has however been included in the ICC Statute in Article 22. 
40 Tadic (note 2) para. 72-74.  
41 Bassiouni & Manikas (note 15) 266. 
42 It has been argued that the purpose of the statement of the drafters of the ICTY Statute that the 
Tribunal should apply customary international law was to avoid violating this principle. It can be 
asked whether the problems surrounding the application of the principle of legality are adequately 
dealt with in this way. 
43 Furundzija (note 31) para 185. 
44 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al  IT-96-23-T, 22 February 2001 paras 453 - 460. 
45 Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998 para 597. 
46 Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, Decision (Prosecution’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), ICTR-97-AR72, 31 
March 2000 (‘Barayagwiza Reconsideration Decision’). 
47Examples include the amendments to Rule 89 and the adoption of Rule 92bis. 
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(ii) Considerations regarding the accountability of the Tribunals are important 
arguments for judicial restraint. The accountability of the Tribunals is affected by 
questions such as the funding and independence of the Tribunals. Independence 
includes both the independence of mind of the judge (what Franck calls ‘internal 
independence’48) as well as the independence of the judges from the countries that 
nominated them and the institutional independence of the Tribunals from the 
Security Council (‘external independence’). Independence can refer to formal or 
‘structural’ independence or real, substantive independence. Doubts have been 
raised about the independence of certain Tribunal judges.     
 
It is clear that the question of funding has some impact on the independence of the 
Tribunals. The fact that the Tribunals are funded by the United Nations means 
that they are not completely independent from the Security Council.49 According 
to Megret the fact that the ICTY is dependent on the United Nations for its 
funding means that there is a risk that the Tribunal could be controlled by it. 
Although the first ten years of the Tribunals’ practice have proved that the 
Tribunals have not been controlled by the United Nations, the risk remains. It has 
been argued in this thesis that the expense of international criminal tribunals place 
greater responsibility and accountability on the shoulders of the judges.50 As 
bearers of such responsibility the judges should be more cautious in their 
application of the law. It is argued here that the Tribunals will only enjoy 
legitimacy if the judges are seen to be independent.  
 
Some believe that the financing of the ICTY could be an obstacle to achieving  
impartiality and independence.51 Apart from the UN contribution, the United 
States has made the biggest financial contribution to the ICTY. The United States 
has also made significant voluntary contributions towards different projects.52 
Trifunovska writes that some sources indicate that the ICTY has been the 
recipient of corporate patronage and routinely works in tandem with the 
departments overseeing US foreign policy.53 According to Trifunovska, the 
manner of the financing of the Tribunal through private donors and ‘intermeshing 
of NATO governments’ indicates the influence which some countries might 
exercise on ICTY activities and the lack of independent review of the whole 
system.54  
The fact that judges are not ‘permanently’ assigned to either a Trial Chamber or 
the Appeals Chamber is problematic. This makes it possible for judges who sat on 
the bench of a Trial Chamber in a specific case to also sit on the appeal or 
                                                   
48 T Franck Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) 320.  
49 Ibid. 
50 See ‘The Cost of Justice’ in Chapter 1. 
51 S Trifunovska ‘Fair Trial and International Justice: The ICTY as an example with special 
reference to the Milosevic case’ Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis (2003) 1, 11 
52 The United States has also provided significant intelligence information to the ICTY to support 
its investigations. In addition they have provided ‘political support’. 
53 Trifunovska  (note 51) ibid. 
54 Ibid 11. 
290
  
interlocutory appeal in that same case.55 This could clearly influence the 
independence and impartiality of a judge. It is unlikely that a judge would be 
impartial when reviewing his or her own decision. There are other structural 
features which could affect independence at the Tribunals. Two of the most 
important are the absence of a separate, structurally independent Appeals 
Chamber and the fact that the Office of the Prosecutor and Chambers are housed 
in the same building. These structural deficiencies make the ad hoc Tribunals seem 
less independent than they should be. 
 
In addition, it is argued that the political nature of the appointment process and 
work of Tribunal judges could influence independence and could militate against 
an activist approach to lawmaking at the Tribunals.56  
 
(iii)Closely connected to the question of accountability are considerations of 
legality and legitimacy of the Tribunals. The question of the legality of the 
establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals has attracted much debate and is important 
because it affects the authority and credibility of the judges of the Tribunals and of 
the Tribunal as an institution. Many believed that the Tribunals should have been 
established by treaty and not by Security Council Resolution. Academic 
commentators have been critical of the reasoning of the Trial and Appeals 
Chambers in the jurisdictional challenge raised in Tadic.57  Alvarez wrote that the 
Tadic Appeals Chamber Decision was not sufficiently reasoned to legitimise a 
Tribunal with such grand aims as the ICTY.58 Because of the controversial 
method of the establishment of the Tribunals it is argued that judges should err on 
the side of caution.  
 
(iv) A critical argument in favour of judicial restraint is that the ICTY and ICTR 
are criminal tribunals. The Tribunals attempt to merge the ‘profoundly consensual’ 
body of international law with the ‘profoundly coercive’ nature of domestic 
criminal law.59 In criminal proceedings great emphasis should be placed on the 
rights of the accused and fairness of procedure. Whereas lawmaking might be an 
appealing intellectual and academic exercise to some of the judges, lawmaking 
might not be equally appealing to the accused. It has repeatedly been emphasised 
in this thesis that the jurisprudence of the Tribunals be perceived as fair even (or 
particularly) by the accused. In the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision the Appeals Chamber 
stated that the Tribunal was established by law because it has been established in 
accordance with appropriate procedures under the United Nations Charter and 
                                                   
55 Rule 27 makes provision for the rotation of judges between Trial and Appeals Chambers. 
56 See the sections on the Election of Tribunal judges, ICC judges and ICTY judges in Chapter 3. 
57 J E Alvarez ‘Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 European Journal of International Law  
245. 
58 Ibid 245. 
59 L Arbour ‘Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice’  (1997) 21 Fordham 
International Law Journal 531. 
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provides all the necessary safeguards for a fair trial.60 The Appeals Chamber 
referred to the fair trial guarantees contained in international instruments such as 
those set out in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.61 However practices such as the extensive pre-trial detention (as seen in 
Barayagwiza62) at the Tribunals indicate that the Tribunals are not always true to 
their founding provisions and intentions. 
 
(v) The determination of custom at the Tribunals has been criticised.63 A military 
court at Nuremberg once noted: ‘We may wish the law were otherwise but we 
must administer it as we find it.’64 The Tribunals have often found custom even in 
the absence of sufficient state practice. The substitution of state practice by, inter 
alia, considerations of humanity has been questioned. The Tribunals need to 
clearly state and justify their methodology in choosing national case law for the 
purpose of proving the existence of state practice. As a result the determination of 
customary law at the Tribunals has often been arbitrary and not neutral.65   
 
(vi) An institutional or structural reason why judges should exercise restraint is the 
fact that the Tribunals are ‘self-contained systems’66 and function in the absence 
of a supervisory body. There is no legislative arm or body with the power of 
correcting decisions of the International Criminal Tribunals.  
 
(vii) The importance and impact of the jurisprudence of the Tribunals may operate 
as arguments in favour of caution. If the Tribunals are to serve as models for the 
ICC, and if their case law is to serve as precedent for national courts it may be 
prudent of the judges to exercise caution and not depart too strongly from pre-
existing law. Although there is no formal system of precedent at the Tribunals and 
in international law generally, it is in the interest of consistency and legal certainty 
that the ICC follow the precedent set by the Tribunals.67 The Appeals Chamber in 
the ‘Celibici’ case agreed that ‘so far as international law is concerned, the operation 
of the desiderata of consistency, stability, and predictability does not stop at the 
frontiers of the Tribunal. [...] The Appeals Chamber cannot behave as if the 
general state of the law in the international community whose interests it serves is 
                                                   
60 Tadic Jurisdictional Decision  IT-94-1-AR72  2 October 1995 para 47. 
61 Ibid para 45. 
62 See note 45. 
63 See Mettraux (note 37). A Nollkaemper ‘The legitimacy of International law in the case law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugolslavia’ in T A J A Vandamme & J-H 
Reestman, (eds) Ambiguity in the Rule of Law, The Interface between National and International Legal Systems 
(2001).  
64 United States v Von Leeb  US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment of 28 October 
1948, in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, XI (‘High Command’ Case) 563. 
65 See the view of  Mettraux (note 37) 15 
66 In the Tadic Jurisdictional Decision the ICTY Appeals Chamber referred to the centralised structure 
of international law and stated that: ‘every tribunal is a self-contained system’. See Tadic Jurisdictional 
Decision (note 60) para 11. 
67 On the question of precedent at the ICTY, see Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-A, 24 
March 2000, para 89. 
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none of its concern.’68 According to Alvarez, adjudicative lawmaking raises a 
number of problems – the most prominent of which is the prospect of conflicting 
interpretations of public international law. The ICTY and ICJ have for example 
openly differed concerning the requisite test to apply to determine a state’s 
responsibility for the conduct of rebel forces – as can be seen in the Tadic decision 
finding the ICJ’s test as applied in the Nicaragua case to be ‘unpersuasive’.69 The 
ICTY and ICTR have also differed in their respective interpretations of crimes. 
Different Trial Chambers of the ICTY have also come to different conclusions on 
the same point of law. The best example is the different definitions of rape arrived 
at in Akayesu and Furundzija. In addition the symbolic importance of the Tribunals 
and its epic goals of achieving peace and reconciliation it the Balkans might be 
more easily achieved if the judges exercise restraint and are guided by national case 
law and the principle of legality. 
 
(viii) Many have questioned whether lawmaking should happen through 
international tribunals instead of through domestic prosecutions. According to 
Alvarez it may be desirable to leave the development of international crimes to 
Rwandan (or national) judges because such judges can act more readily and more 
legitimately fill in gaps through resort to established domestic criminal law.70 It 
might ultimately lead to greater uniformity of the law, believes Alvarez, if 
progressive development of international humanitarian law is left to domestic 
courts.71  
 
The foregoing arguments in favour of a cautious approach seem more specific to 
the Tribunals and more particular to international criminal law. It is therefore 
argued that the considerations in favour of judicial caution should weigh more 
heavily than those in favour of judicial activism. The aims of the ad hoc Tribunals, 
that of serving peace, deterring future crimes, advancing reconciliation and 
establishing an accurate historical account of the time and events under its 
jurisdiction72 may be furthered both by conviction and acquittal. A public 
perception of fairness could only be created if due process guarantees and the 
principle of legality are respected even if it leads to acquittal.  
 
                                                   
68 Prosecutor v Delalic IT-96-21-A,  20 February 2001, para 24 , quoting Separate Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen in fn 35, appended to Decision, Le Procureur v Laurent Semanza, ICTR-97-20-A, 31 
May 2000, para 25.  
69 See Prosecutor v Tadic IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1997, paras 115-145.  
70 J E Alvarez  ‘Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’  (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law 409.  
71 Ibid 390. 
72 For more on the goals of the Tribunals see P Akhavan ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International 
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’ (2001) 95 AJIL  7. JL Snyder  ‘Trials and Errors: 




The conclusion seems inevitably cautious: international judges and specifically 
Tribunal judges cannot avoid making law. An important reason is that this is a 
system of law in which legislative opportunities for modifying rigid, unjust and 
obsolete rules are nominal.73  According to Lauterpacht the need for judicial 
lawmaking is intensified by the strong inducement to supplement and remedy the 
deficiencies and inconsistencies in an imperfect system of law.74  If one accepts 
that it is part of their mandate to develop international humanitarian law one could 
argue that, to some extent, it is their duty to make law. For all the reasons stated 
above they have to develop the law cautiously showing respect for the accused, 
fair trial guarantees and the principle of legality.  
 
Some degree of lawmaking on the part of international courts and tribunals is 
necessary to bring precision to international law. If such lawmaking increases the 
efficacy of international criminal law and is exercised with due regard to the 
principle of legality it may be acceptable. The credibility and acceptability of 
international norms and standards depend to a large extent on the readiness of 
states and individuals to comply with these norms and standards. States will not 
easily do so in relation to norms that ignore their position on a given issue or 
practice in a certain regard.  Mettraux reminds us that the Tribunals also risk losing 
the trust states have placed in them if they assume too much discretion when 
determining what the law is.75 
 
In 1999 Alvarez wrote that the Trial Chamber judgments in Tadic and Akayesu 
show that international judges do not always choose expansive interpretation of 
existing international humanitarian law.76 He predicted that Tribunal judges might 
avoid expansive holdings because they might want to avoid the accusations of 
judicial legislation and the imposition of ex post facto criminal liability.77 The many 
and varied instances of lawmaking discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 indicate that 
Alvarez’s early assessment was incorrect. Tribunal judges have, on the contrary, 
been criticised for developing and expanding international humanitarian law too 
much. 
 
The most important reason why certain instances of lawmaking can be described 
as illegitimate is the infringement on the principle of legality and the 
corresponding lack of legal certainty. Lawmaking can also be described as 
illegitimate because of the inappropriate use of national case law. The 
inappropriate use of case law has usually taken place in the context of determining 
custom. Tribunal judges have attempted to prove custom in almost every case. It 
can be argued that custom has been the main vehicle of Tribunal lawmaking. This 
                                                   
73 Lauterpacht (note 22) 77. 
74 Ibid  155. 
75 Mettraux (note 37) 16. 




is consistent with the statement in the Report of the Secretary General that the 
ICTY should apply rules of the international humanitarian law which are beyond 
any doubt part of customary law.78 It is however argued that the judges have often 
strained to find customary law when presented with insufficient evidence of state 
practice and opinio juris. It might have been more acceptable if the judges had 
admitted to making law rather than cloaking their actions with the language of 
custom. 
 
But to condemn all lawmaking by the Tribunals is to diminish their work and 
achievements. It is predicted that the instances of legitimate lawmaking by the 
Tribunals will form an important part of their legacy.  The judges and prosecutors 
at Nuremberg had an acute sense of the significance and epoch-making nature of 
that trial.79 It is possible that the judges at the Tribunals may have a similar sense 
of the importance of their work. The introduction of the category of crimes 
against humanity has been described as a ‘great moral and legal achievement’.80 
Instances of lawmaking such as the criminalisation of sexual offences and the 
extension of the protection of humanitarian law can similarly be seen as moral and 
legal achievements. In a similar way to Nuremberg, the Tribunals have extended 
the rule of law through their work. Since not all Tribunal lawmaking can be 
described as legitimate (primarily because of infringements on the principle of 
legality) the legacy of the Tribunals may be described as ambiguous. 
 
Lachs, a former President of the ICJ saw the World Court as ‘a great international 
experiment’ that will require time and experience to mature.81 Although it has 
been said that the tribunals have now ‘come of age’, they still represent a fairly 
novel experiment in international justice.82 Judicial lawmaking at the Tribunals can 
only gain legitimacy and international acceptance if the independence and 
impartiality of the judges are beyond doubt.  
         
  
Sassoli and Olson write that any manipulation of the law has to be avoided, even if 
it is done for a just cause.83 The end, however desirable, cannot justify the means. 
In order to give genuine protection to the victims of war crimes and to foster 
reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region and the Balkans, the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunals has to be perceived as fair, not only procedurally but also substantively. 
This is precisely why the lawmaking power of the judges can not be taken for 
                                                   
78 See note 1. 
79 Luban writes that ‘those who conducted the trial at Nuremberg viewed their own words and 
deeds from the perspective of a distant and more pacific age’. D Luban ‘The Legacies of 
Nuremberg’ (1987) 54 Social Research 779. 
80 Ibid 781. 
81 RY Jennings Oppenheim’s International Law (1992) 56. 
82 See the title of Judge Wald’s article ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia Comes of Age’ (2001) 5 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 87. 
83 M Sassoli & L M Olson ‘The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber on the merits of the Tadic 
case’ (2000) 82 International Review of the Red Cross 769. 
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granted and why, if one acknowledges that Tribunal judges can make law, it is 
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Dit proefschrift betreft de vraag naar rechtsvorming door de rechterlijke macht bij 
het ad hoc Joegoslavië Tribunaal, International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) en Rwanda (ICTR). In de Nederlandse context wordt ook wel 
gesproken over de rechter als ‘wetgever-plaatsvervanger’. 
 
Rechters van Tribunalen hebben zich vaak beroepen op het nieuwe en rudimentaire 
karakter van de Tribunalen om de behoefte te rechtvaardigen tot het maken van 
materiële en procesrechtelijke regels bij de Tribunalen. Het feit dat deze 
Tribunalen kunnen worden omschreven als op zich zelf staande systemen, zonder 
toezichthoudend orgaan met de bevoegdheid om de beslissingen van de 
Tribunalen te herzien, vraagt om strikt en nauwkeurig onderzoek, en zou kunnen 
pleiten tegen wetgevende activiteiten  
 
Sommigen menen dat internationale strafhoven een inherente partijdigheid tegen 
gedaagden hebben. Zij uiten hun bezorgdheid over het feit dat er politieke druk op 
de Tribunalen wordt uitgeoefend om vonnissen uit te spreken waarin de 
gedaagden schuldig worden bevonden en dat bij veel zaken om politieke redenen 
en vanwege de zwaarte van de delicten de uitkomst van tevoren vastligt. De druk 
om te veroordelen zou de wetgevende activiteiten van de rechters verhogen, 
aangezien het bestaan van dergelijke druk het zeer onwaarschijnlijk maakt dat 
rechters het non liquet uitspreken. 
 
Het is niet het doel van dit proefschrift om vast te stellen of wetgevende 
activiteiten door de rechterlijke macht al dan niet zou moeten zijn toegestaan. Het 
doel is eerder om de bijzonderheden van het internationaal strafrecht en de 
specifieke context van de ad hoc Tribunalen te overwegen en de vraag te stellen: 
wat zijn de argumenten voor en tegen wetgevende activiteiten door de Tribunalen? 
 
De idee dat internationaal recht een humanitaire functie zou moeten hebben, zou 
kunnen dienen als een acceptabele rechtvaardiging voor de vergaande wetgevende 
activiteiten van het Joegoslavië Tribunaal. Theodor Meron heeft beargumenteerd 
dat de humanitiare principes, zoals neergelegd in de Martens Clausule, voorzien in 
een machtiging om het internationale humanitaire recht te interpreteren in 
overeenstemming met de humanitaire principes en hetgeen wordt 
“voorgeschreven door het publieke geweten”. Sommigen, zoals Sassoli en Olson, 
hebben beargumenteerd dat de wetgevende activiteit van het Tribunaal 
gerechtvaardigd is vanwege het feit dat de bescherming van het humanitaire recht 
wordt uitgebreid ten aanzien van hen die voordien niet beschermd waren. Het Hof 
van Beroep in Tadic vertrouwde op het doel van artikel 4 van de Vierde Geneefse 
Conventie, gericht op de bescherming van burgers tot het maximaal haalbare, om 




Hoe de voortgaande ontwikkeling van het internationale humanitaire recht 
plaatsvindt is belangrijk. Internationale advocaten wijzen er op dat de groei en 
interpretatie van internationaal-strafrechtelijke normen moeten worden verenigd 
met de eerlijke behandeling van de gedaagden, inclusief respect voor het 
legaliteitsbeginsel en het daarmee samenhangende verbod op de terugwerkende 
kracht van strafbepalingen (ten nadele). Volgens Alvarez is de spanning tussen de 
doelen van enerzijds een verdere ontwikkeling van het internationale humanitaire 
recht en anderzijds de plicht om zich te houden aan het legaliteitsbeginsel 
toegenomen vanwege het feit dat de internationale gemeenschap steeds vaker 
grijpt naar het politiek opportune middel van de instelling van ad hoc Tribunalen. 
De spanning is ook in zoverre vergroot dat men zich verlaat op wetgevende 
activiteiten van de rechters gedurende de looptijd van de strafzaken om het recht 
een duwtje in een nieuwe richting te geven of om leemten op te vullen. 
 
Dit proefschrift houdt zich met name bezig met de vraag naar de rechtmatigheid 
en verantwoordelijkheid van de ICTY en de ICTR. De ICTY moet, terwijl zij haar 
rechterlijke functies uitoefent, bijdragen aan het vastleggen van de grotere 
vraagstukken betreffende de toerekenbaarheid, verzoening en het vaststellen van de 
waarheid met betrekking tot de gebeurtenissen in het voormalige Joegoslavië. Er 
zal worden beargumenteerd dat door de vragen omtrent de rechtmatigheid van de 
oprichting van de Tribunalen, de rechters bijzondere terughoudenheid zouden 
moeten betrachten bij het maken van nieuwe rechtsregels. De onafhankelijkheid 
van de rechters van de Tribunalen is in dit opzicht ook van belang. Rechterlijke 
onafhankelijkheid speelt een grote rol bij het in stand houden van de 
geloofwaardigheid en van de onafhankelijkheid van internationale tribunalen. De 
kosten van het opzetten van internationale tribunalen zorgen voorts voor een 
verhoging van de behoefte aan rechterlijke verantwoordelijkheid.  
 
Nollkaemper heeft zelfs gesuggereerd dat het Tribunaal, in plaats van kunstmatig 
te steunen op internationaal gewoonterecht om de gaten op te vullen, 
eenvoudigweg zou moeten erkennen dat de internationale gemeenschap nog niet 
in staat is om alle noodzakelijke regels aan te nemen om bepaalde gedragingen 
strafbaar te stellen. 
 
Als men accepteert dat rechters van Tribunalen geen andere keuze hebben dan het 
nieuwe rechtsregels te ontwerpen, dan is het belangrijk dat deze wetgevende 
activiteiten worden onderworpen aan beperkingen, waarvan dan het 
legaliteitsbeginsel de belangrijkste beperking is. In het Rapport van de Secretaris 
Generaal over de oprichting van de ICTY is het belang benadrukt dat het 
Tribunaal zich houdt aan de vereisten van het legaliteitsbeginsel. Het Rapport zegt 
dat: “het internationale tribunaal regels moet toepassen van het internationale 
humanitaire recht die zonder enige twijfel onderdeel zijn van het gewoonterecht, 
zodat problemen doordat sommige maar niet alle Staten zich houden aan de 
specifieke conventies niet kunnen ontstaan”. De Secretaris Generaal legt uit dat 
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“bij het opdragen aan het Internationale Tribunaal van de taak om personen te 
vervolgen, die verantwoordelijk zijn voor ernstige schendingen van het 
internationale humanitaire recht, de Veiligheidsraad niet wil dat nieuwe rechtsregels 
worden gevormd of de indruk gewekt wordt dat nieuwe rechsregels worden gevormd. De 
Tribunalen zouden eerder de taak hebben om het bestaande internationale 
humanitaire recht toe te passen.”  Het recht dat wordt toegepast door de 
Tribunalen moet afkomstig zijn van bestaand international strafrecht of het 
nationale recht van de plaats waar de handelingen hebben plaatsgevonden waarvan 
wordt beweerd dat deze strafbaar zijn.  
 
Dit proefschrift houdt zich voorts bezig met zowel het maken van 
materieelrechtelijke als procesrechtelijke rechtsregels door de rechters. Het maken 
van materieelrechtelijke rechtsregels is problematischer en moeilijker te definiëren 
dan procesrechtelijke rechtsregels. Het maken van materieelrechtelijke rechtsregels 
heeft immers betrekking op de ontwikkeling van het recht dat behoort tot de 
jurisdictie van de Tribunalen (strafbare feiten die zijn opgenomen in de Statuten 
van de Tribunalen). Het maken van materieelrechtelijke rechtsregels heeft ook 
betrekking op de interpretatie en definitie van de bestanddelen van de strafbare 
feiten en de interpretatie en de definitie van (wijzen van) aansprakelijkheid voor 
strafbare feiten. Het maken van procesrechtelijke regels daarentegen heeft 
betrekking op het maken en aanpassen van de rechtsregels met betrekking tot 
procedure en bewijsmateriaal. Het verschil tussen materieel recht en procesrecht is 
niet altijd duidelijk. Wijzigingen in het procesrecht kunnen tot gevolg hebben dat 
de materiële rechten van de gedaagde worden aangetast. Dit is eens te meer een 
reden waarom de macht van de rechters om met nieuwe regels te komen zeer 
zorgvuldig moet worden onderzocht. 
 
De Tribunalen zijn ook betrokken bij indirect wetgevende activiteiten. De 
“Dissenting Opinion” van rechter Cassese in de Erdemovic zaak over de plaats die 
de nationale jurisprudentie zou moeten innemen in het internationale strafrecht, is 
daar een goed voorbeeld van. Indirecte wetgevende activiteiten vinden plaats 
wanneer de rechters verklaringen afgeven over zaken die niet de centrale juridische 
vraag die voor hen ligt betreffen. Deze vorm van wetgevende activiteiten vindt 
incidenteel plaats als onderdeel van een “obiter”- verklaring. 
 
Eén van de meest interessante kenmerken van de ad hoc Tribunalen is de 
samenstelling en combinatie van de groep rechters. De rechters van de Tribunalen 
worden beroepen vanuit zowel “common law” als “civil law” systemen en, alhoewel 
het recht en de procedures van de ICTY en ICTR voornamelijk “adversarial” zijn, 
hebben veel invloeden van “civil law” hun weg gevonden naar de jurisprudentie van 
het tribunaal. Het verschil tussen civil en common law lijkt beslissend voor de 
houding van de rechters en de publieke acceptatie van wegevende activiteiten. In 
common law systemen is het geaccepteerd dat hogere rechters, binnen zekere grenzen, 
niet alleen het recht toepassen, maar ook vormen. De implicaties voor het domein 
van het strafrecht in het bijzonder zullen worden onderzocht. De vraag hoe de civil 
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of common law achtergrond van de rechters hun houding ten opzichte van 
wetgevende activiteiten beïnvloedt, zal worden behandeld. 
 
Rechters die niet bang zijn of zich verontschuldigen over hun rechtsvorming 
kunnen worden omschreven als actief. In de context van de Tribunalen kan men 
steun vinden voor zowel rechterlijke terughoudendheid als rechterlijk activisme. 
Het kan beargumenteerd worden dat zowel het fragiele karakter van de 
Tribunalen, hun nieuwe en sui generis karakter, als het rudimentaire karakter van het 
internationale strafrecht in het algemeen vragen om juridische terughoudendheid. 
Maar degenen die voor juridisch activisme zijn, hebben zich ook verlaten op de 
nieuwheid en het fragiele karakter van de Tribunalen, om hun argumenten voor 
activisme te ondersteunen. Gedurfde wetgevende activiteiten worden  
gerechtvaardigd door de wijzen op het sui generis karakter van het rechtssysteem 
van het Tribunaal.84. In verband hiermee zullen de handelingen van de rechters 
van het Internationaal Gerechtshof, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in de 
praktijk en hun visie worden besproken. Ondanks het feit dat er een sterke traditie 
van rechterlijke terughoudendheid is bij de ICJ, zijn er toch een aantal belangrijk 
voorbeelden van rechterlijk activisme. 
 
Naast de bovengenoemde reden voor rechterlijke terughoudendheid is ook de 
instutionele competentie van de internationale tribunalen om rechtsregels te 
maken in twijfel getrokken. Een belangrijke reden waarom internationale rechters 
terughoudend zouden moeten zijn om nieuwe rechtsregels te maken is dat, in 
tegenstelling tot de binnenlandse sfeer, er geen mogelijkheid is om de rechtsregel 
die door de rechters is gevormd te corrigeren door de wetgever, als later de 
rechtsregel onbevredigend blijkt te zijn. Degenen die beargumenteren dat 
internationaal recht geen recht is, hebben zich traditiegetrouw beroepen op de 
afwezigheid van een internationale wetgevende macht en een handhavende macht 
binnen het internationale recht. Dit betekent dat het leerstuk van de scheiding der 
machten niet van toepassing is, in elk geval niet zoals deze in eerste instantie is 
geformuleerd. De afwezigheid van een centrale wetgevende macht of van een 
vergelijkbaar toezichthoudend orgaan in het opkomende systeem van het 
internationaal strafrecht plaatst de rechters in de positie van de ultieme wetgevers 
– een positie die om terughoudendheid vraagt. 
 
Internationaal strafrecht is een rudimentair rechtssysteem. Lauterpacht, een groot 
aanhanger van een volledig internationaal recht en van de ontoelaatbaarheid van 
non liquet, heeft beargumenteerd dat het “gebrekkige” karakter van internationaal 
recht vraagt om rechterlijke terughoudendheid en zelfs de verklaring van een non 
liquet. 
 
                                                   
84 Zie de mening van Cassese over de amendementen op de Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Adress of Antonio Cassese, President van het ICTY aan de Verzamelde Vergadering van de Verenigde 
Naties, 4 november 1997. 
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Bij de tribunalen lijkt het erop dat overwegingen als het politieke karakter van de 
procedure voor benoemingen en de internationale politiek, de benoemingen van 
rechters beïnvloeden. Er is gezegd dat de politiek de nominatie en de procedure 
voor de verkiezingen bij het ICTY heeft beïnvloed en dat de rechters die zijn 
gekozen niet eenvoudigweg zijn gekozen op basis van hun geschiktheid voor de 
baan. 
 
Bij de bespreking van het verschijnsel van de wetgevende activiteiten van de 
Tribunalen kijkt dit proefschrift zowel naar de toekomst als naar het verleden. 
Vergelijkingen worden getrokken met de wetgevende activiteiten en het 
procesrecht van de Tribunalen van Nürnberg en Tokyo, evenals met de 
wetgevende activiteiten van de ontwerpers van het statuut en de regels voor het 
Statuut van Rome van het Internationaal Strafhof.(ICC). The ICTR en de ICTY 
zijn ook beschreven als modellen of als mogelijke blauwdrukken voor the ICC.  
Sommigen hebben gesteld dat de Tribunalen de weg hebben vrijgemaakt voor de 
ICC en dat er bij de ICC minder noodzaak zal zijn voor wetgevende activiteiten. 
 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt de oprichting en organisatie van de ad hoc Tribunalen 
besproken. De geschiedenis van de pogingen om een internationaal strafhof op te 
richten zal worden getraceerd vanaf de eerste voorzichtige wortels tot te 
oprichting van de ICTY, ICTR en ICC. Het is belangrijk dat de Tribunalen 
worden gezien als legitiem opgerichte Tribunalen. De uitdaging om tot legitimiteit 
van de oprichting van Tribunalen te komen zal daarom worden besproken. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden het concept en de theorie van de wetgevende activiteiten 
beschreven, de invloed van het rudimentaire karakter van het internationale 
strafrecht op de wetgevende activiteiten van de rechters van de Tribunalen wordt 
bediscussieerd en het verschil tussen rechterlijke wetgeving en de ontwikkeling van 
internationaal recht wordt belicht. De betekenis van het “gat” of lacuna in het recht 
zal worden onderzocht. De vraag of een vonnis van non liquet kan worden gezien 
als een alternatief voor wetgevende activiteiten zal worden onderzocht. Omdat 
rechters terughoudend zijn in het toegeven dat zij nieuwe rechtsregels schrijven, is 
het moeilijk om te analyseren wat zij doen. Rechter Cassese lijkt de enige rechter te 
zijn die zich niet verontschuldigd heeft en die open is over rechtsvorming bij de 
ICTY. 
 
Omdat de statuten van de ICTY en ICTR geen rechtskeuze bevatten of in 
bronnen voorziet die lijken op artikel 38 van het statuut van ICJ, zal worden 
onderzocht op welke bronnen rechters zich kunnen beroepen als zij nieuw recht 
vormen voor het internationale strafrecht. Bijzondere aandacht zal worden 
gegeven aan het gewoonterecht en algemene rechtsbeginselen als methodes om 
nieuw recht te vormen. De rechters van Tribunalen hebben gekeken naar het 
gewoonterecht om vast te stellen wat de bestanddelen zijn van misdrijven die 
worden vermeld in de Statuten. Cassese stelt dat usus en opinion juris, als 
bestanddelen van het gewoonterecht, een andere rol spelen in het humanitaire 
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recht dan in het internationale recht in het algemeen onder invloed van de Martens 
clausule. De rechters van de Tribunalen hebben ook vaak hun toevlucht genomen 
tot algemene rechtsbeginselen als methode om rechtsregels te maken. Er is gesteld 
dat het steunen op algemene rechtsbeginselen, voor zover dit wordt gebruikt om 
gaten op te vullen in de toepassing van de bestaande rechtsregels, de vraag op kan 
roepen van legitimiteit aangezien de waarschijnlijkheid groot is dat de toepassing 
van “algemene rechtsbeginselen” resulteert in algemeenheid in plaats van in 
specificiteit. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over degenen die de rechtsregels maken: de rechters als een 
groep van individuen. Frank schrijft dat elke rechtbank zijn eigen “culturele 
omgeving” schept. Verschillende aspecten van de culturele omgeving van de ICTY 
en de ICTR krijgen in het boek aandacht. Vragen over onder andere het 
ontwerpen van het proces en het belang van  “dissenting opinions” worden 
besproken. Het argument dat juridische realisten gebruiken is dat, omdat dat 
rechters geen automaten zijn, het onvermijdelijk is dat zij worden beïnvloed door 
hun persoonlijke en professionele achtergronden. 
 
De onafhankelijkheid van de rechters van de Tribunalen is het onderwerp van 
hoofdstuk 4. Dit hoofdstuk behandelt de vraag wat impact heeft op de 
onafhanlijkheid van de rechters van de ICTY en de ICTR, zoals bijvoorbeeld de 
manier waarop de rechters worden gekozen. De vraag of de rechters Odio Benito, 
Florence Mumba en Richard May zich hadden moeten terugtrekken in specifieke 
zaken vanwege beweerde vooroordelen zal eveneens aandacht krijgen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 spitst zich toe op het belang van het legaliteitsbeginsel binnen de 
context van het internationale strafrecht in het algemeen en in het bijzonder 
binnen de context van de Tribunalen. Er wordt gesteld dat binnen de context van 
het internationale strafrecht, het legaliteitsbeginsel zich opwerpt als de 
belangrijkste beperking van de rechterlijke wetgevende activiteiten door de 
rechters. Omdat Duits recht de oudste traditie heeft voor wat betreft het erkennen 
en de toepassing van het legaliteitsbeginsel, zal de wijze waarop dit beginsel is 
toegepast binnen het Duitse recht uitgebreid aandacht krijgen. De status van het 
legaliteitsbeginsel in common law jurisdicties zoals de Verenigde Staten, wordt ook 
besproken. Het schijnt dat er een algemene consensus is dat de context van het 
internationale strafrecht vraagt om een meer toegevende en flexibele aanpak met 
betrekking tot de toepassing van dit legaliteitsbeginsel dan wanneer dit wordt 
toegepast in systemen binnen een staat.  
 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een aantal gevallen van het maken van rechtsregels in de 
jurisprudentie van de ICTY en de ICTR besproken. Het maken van rechtsregels 
moet worden gezien als het ontwikkelen van het recht en het uitbreiden van het 
recht naar nieuwe gebieden. Verschillende methodes van rechtsvorming zullen 
worden beschouwd. De geselecteerde jurisprudentie laat onder andere zien hoe de 
tribunalen definities formuleerden en uitbreidden, telogologisch interpreteren en 
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gaten opvulden in de Statuten. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien hoe de Tribunalen zowel 
het concept van interne tegenover internationale conflicten heeft ontwikkeld als 
het concept van gemeenschappelijke doelen, vergelding en beschermde personen heeft 
uitgebreid en ontwikkeld. Aandacht zal worden gegeven aan het indirecte of obiter 
rechtsvorming  Cassese in Erdemovic. De rechters hebben ook misdrijven zoals 
foltering en verkrachting gedefinieerd en geherdefinieerd. Deze gevallen van 
rechtsvorming hebben aanleiding gegeven tot veel academisch debat. Dit 
hoofdstuk onderzoekt de vraag of dat tot gevolg heeft dat het maken van 
rechtsregels legitiem of niet legitiem is. 
 
De rechters hebben bij verschillende gelegenheden de procedureregels aangepast 
en nieuwe regels gevormd. De rechtsvorming wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 7. 
Het maken van procesrecht door de tribunalen heeft de vorm aangenomen van 
het maken en aanpassen van de regels van het procesrecht en het bewijsrecht. Het 
is de opvatting dat de rechters niet de bevoegdheid hebben om nieuwe materiële 
rechtsregels te ontwerpen of om nieuwe verplichtingen op te leggen op staten 
onder de dekmantel van het procesrecht. Er kan worden gesteld dat de frequente 
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